



Rethinking Fiscal Policy after the Crisis

Before the financial crisis, fiscal policy often played a secondary role to monetary policy, with the manipulation of interest rates to hit inflation targets being the main instrument of macroeconomic management. However, after the financial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis, fiscal policy has been brought back to the fore. In the past, the limited understanding of the effects of fiscal policy, neglect of monetary-fiscal interactions, faulty institutional set-ups or ignorance of market expectations often led to bad policies. This book, written by a team of leading economists, seeks to address the current oversight of fiscal policy and to upgrade our understanding and conduct of fiscal policy, presenting a well-balanced diagnosis and offering several important lessons for future fiscal analysis and policy-making. It is an essential read for academics and graduate students focused on the current debate over fiscal policy, as well as policymakers working on day-to-day policy issues.

ĽUDOVÍT ÓDOR is a member of the Council for Budget Responsibility in Slovakia and Vice Chair of the Network of EU Independent Fiscal Institutions. In the past, he has served as a member of the Bank Board and Executive Director responsible for research at the National Bank of Slovakia, as an advisor to the Prime Minister, and as Chief Economist at the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic. His book with Miroslav Beblavý and David Cobham, *The Euro Area and the Financial Crisis*, was also published by Cambridge University Press.

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