

Introduction

The Vietnamese Revolution in World History

The odds are stacked against revolutionaries in any society. Most have never had a chance to wield state power because even weak governments command sufficient forces to defeat them. Even if revolutions successfully overthrow the *ancien régime*, young revolutionary states from France to Russia have often faced powerful foreign enemies that make their survival even more remarkable. This book focuses on Vietnam as one of those rare exceptions in modern world history when revolution succeeded and endured.

In this study, I trace the worldview of Vietnamese revolutionaries over an eighty-year period, starting from the 1920s when they were a band of outlaws who dreamed of building a communist paradise; through the decades in between, when they struggled to seize power, build a new society, and defeat foreign interventions; and to the late 1980s when they attempted in vain to save socialism at home and abroad. The revolution effectively ended then, but its legacies are surprisingly resilient: the communist regime is under tremendous pressure for change but has stubbornly refused to abandon its widely discredited ideology. Thus, this book places ideology at the center of nearly a century of modern Vietnamese history. I argue that ideology helped Vietnamese communists persevere against great odds, but did not lead them to success and left behind dismal legacies.

In the popular image, Vietnamese revolutionaries appear as pragmatic nationalists who inherited strong patriotic traditions and whose heroism deserves great admiration. By closely examining their vision, this book shows them in a very different (yet not necessarily negative) light – as radicals who dedicated their careers to utopia. The story the reader

encounters here is less sanguine than that told in numerous accounts of this revolution: the deeply held belief of Vietnamese revolutionaries was the source of not only glorious triumphs but also colossal tragedies.

This book serves three goals. First, it aims to be a historical study of communist thought in Vietnam with a special focus on the worldview of revolutionaries. I am interested in how these Vietnamese imagined the world surrounding them and how Marxist-Leninist concepts inspired them. Few previous studies of this kind exist. Scholars of the Vietnam War and the Vietnamese revolution have commonly dismissed Vietnamese communism as ideologically shallow.

Second, this book hopes to offer explanations for the foreign relations of the Vietnamese communist state. Unlike most existing accounts, the explanations I provide here are centered on the Marxist-Leninist ideology of state leaders. My central claim is that ideology was a primary factor shaping Vietnam's external relations. Because Vietnam is a country of growing importance in Southeast Asia, scholars, students, and policy makers must be aware of the robust legacies of ideology in Vietnamese politics today.

Third and finally, this book can serve as a case study about the significance of revolution in world politics. At one point, the Vietnamese revolution had a critical impact on the global order and became a beacon in the eyes of millions around the world. The light from that beacon ultimately led to nowhere, yet that fact reflected the inherent limits of radical politics in solving human problems, not the limits of Vietnamese leaders' revolutionary commitments. This book is the first study that traces those commitments over the entire length of the revolution, showing how they once turned Vietnam into the vanguard of world revolution.

For all that this book attempts to accomplish, I do not claim to offer a comprehensive history of the Vietnamese revolution.¹ Nor is this book

¹ For notable studies of particular periods or events, see Christopher Goscha, *Vietnam: A State Born of War, 1945–1954* (unpublished manuscript); Stein Tønnesson, *The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945* (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1991); Stein Tønnesson, *Vietnam 1946: How the War Began* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); David G. Marr, *Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); David G. Marr, *Vietnam: State, War, and Revolution, 1945–1946* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); David Elliott, *The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta 1930–1975* (New York: Armonk, 2003). For a rare comparative study that stresses the role of the communist ideology in the Vietnamese revolution, see Clive Christie, *Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900–1980: Political Ideas of the Anti-Colonial Era* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001).

Introduction

3

aimed to be a diplomatic history of communist Vietnam.² My primary objects of analysis are not particular events and policies but the evolving thoughts of revolutionaries about Vietnam's relations with the world. Major policies and historical events are discussed only if they were relevant to or reflected significantly in the worldview of revolutionaries. This Introduction will first present the puzzle about the Vietnamese revolution and the comparative scholarship on the role of radical revolutions in world politics. I will then discuss the Marxist-Leninist worldview of Vietnamese communists and its role in their revolution.

THE PUZZLE ABOUT A MISUNDERSTOOD REVOLUTION

During much of the twentieth century, many anti-Western revolutions swept throughout Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.³ Embracing ideologies from communism to Islamism, those revolutions sought to overthrow or roll back Western domination. Revolutionary states, whether large (Russia and China) or small (Cuba and Nicaragua), might have deterred but were never able to defeat the West. Many have collapsed, including the once mighty Soviet Union. Most survivors have in fact made peace with their former Western enemies. Nevertheless, even small revolutionary states had tremendous impact on world politics in their heydays. For example, we now know that the attacks in June 1950 that started the Korean War were launched at the initiative of Kim Il-sung, who persuaded Stalin and Mao to go along.⁴ Kim failed in his goal to conquer South Korea, but the war drew the United States back to mainland East Asia and escalated tensions between Washington and Moscow. The Cold War might have been confined to Europe if Kim had not made the move. China's participation in the Korean War accelerated

² Major studies that have been published in recent years include: Ang Cheng Guan, *Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Lien-Hang Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Pierre Asselin, *Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); and David Elliott, *Changing Worlds: Vietnam's Transition from Cold War to Globalization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

³ Of course, there were other revolutions that were not against the West such as the Chinese revolution of 1911. The term "the West" here can be understood broadly as the countries in the Western European-American bloc that are economically capitalist and culturally secular.

⁴ Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," in Christian Ostermann ed., *Cold War International History Project Working Paper 8* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1993).

its own domestic social revolution, forced the indefinite delay of its plan to invade Taiwan, and deepened its conflict with the West.

In an endeavor even bolder than North Korea's, communist North Vietnam decided to orchestrate an insurgency in South Vietnam in 1959 against the wishes of not only the United States but also the Soviet Union and China, eventually drawing all three into the conflict. Despite committing about half a million troops to the conflict at one point, Washington failed to achieve its goal of defending its South Vietnamese ally. The conflict in Vietnam profoundly divided American elites, seriously damaged American credibility around the world, and lent moral support to many radical movements in Africa and Latin America. Some observers credit the conflict for inspiring "antisystemic movements" in the 1960s and 1970s in North America, Europe, Japan, and Latin America.⁵ One source counts at least fourteen revolutions that ensued in the seven years following US withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam in 1973.⁶

Scholars of international politics have made the case that the great French Revolution introduced the mass conscripted armies and the practice of foreign interference into weaker states.⁷ By contrast, the conflict in Vietnam contributed to the American move to abandon conscription and revert to the paid volunteer military of the eighteenth century (with some modifications). American failure in Vietnam led to its retreat from nation-building missions abroad in the subsequent two decades. This self-restraint was partially lifted only with the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, which, for the first time since 1814, brought war to continental United States.⁸ Al-Qaeda was hosted by the Taliban state in Afghanistan, another revolutionary state that had earlier battled Soviet forces and accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁹ The Taliban state not only waged war on the United States indirectly through its support for Al-Qaeda but also drew Washington and its allies into a costly war that now stands as the longest in American history.

⁵ Giovanni Arrighi, Terence Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Antisystemic Movements* (London: Verso, 1989), 35–36.

⁶ Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 178.

⁷ Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics; International Systems in Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 45–46.

⁸ George Herring, "The War that Never Seems to Go Away," in David Anderson and John Ernst, eds. *The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 346.

⁹ For discussions of the Taliban's ideology as a fundamentalist movement, see William Maley, "Interpreting the Taliban," in William Maley, ed. *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 1–28.

Given their limited military and economic capabilities, the ability and determination of small but radical states like North Vietnam and Afghanistan to inflict such humiliation on the superpowers pose a significant analytical puzzle. Their risky behaviors did not conform to the normal notion of rationality. The death of some states (Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, Afghanistan's Taliban) and the dire poverty of survivors (Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam until recently) suggested the steep price they paid for standing up against powerful external enemies. The puzzle is: What were the thoughts of revolutionary leaders in those states? How could they even think of challenging those much more powerful than they were?

These questions must be asked for all revolutions, but they hold special importance in the Vietnamese case because the nature of this revolution has been widely misunderstood.¹⁰ During the Vietnam War, Vietnamese revolutionaries were commonly portrayed either as pawns in the game of great powers or as nationalists who inherited a tradition of patriotism and were motivated simply by national independence. The image of Vietnamese revolutionaries as minions for Moscow or Beijing was frequently put forward by US leaders as a reason for intervention. In this image, Vietnamese communists neither possessed their own belief nor were they capable of independent action. The then-Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified before a Congressional committee in 1951 that Vietnamese communists were “strongly directed from Moscow and could be counted upon ... to tie Indochina into the world communist program.”¹¹ A decade later, when he sent American troops to Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson pointed to Beijing as the real culprit:

Over this war – and all of Asia – is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.¹²

¹⁰ For a full treatment of all perspectives in the debate over Vietnam in the United States, see David W. Levy, *The Debate over Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 97. For a recent analysis of early American arguments for intervention, see Andrew Rotter, “Chronicle of a War Foretold: The United States and Vietnam, 1945–1954,” in Mark Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall, eds. *The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 282–308.

¹² Lyndon Johnson, “Lyndon B. Johnson Explains Why Americans Fight in Vietnam, 1965,” in Robert McMahon, ed. *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1995), 210–211.

Whether Moscow or Beijing was behind Hanoi, the domino theory justified US intervention, as then-Senator Hubert Humphrey spoke in 1951, “We cannot afford to see southeast [sic] Asia fall prey to the Communist onslaught ... If Indochina were lost, it would be as severe a blow as if we were to lose Korea. The loss of Indochina would mean the loss of Malaya, the loss of Burma and Thailand, and ultimately the conquest of all the south and southeast Asiatic area.”¹³

Not all Americans were persuaded by Rusk, Johnson, and Humphrey. In opposing American intervention, early critics harped on the nationalist myth about traditional animosity between China and Vietnam as if it were truth.¹⁴ Senator William Fulbright claimed that

Ho Chi Minh is not a mere agent of Communist China ... He is a bona fide nationalist revolutionary, the leader of his country's rebellion against French colonialism. He is also ... a dedicated communist but always a Vietnamese communist ... For our purposes, the significance of Ho Chi Minh's nationalism is that it is associated with what Bernard Fall has called “the 2,000-year-old distrust in Vietnam of everything Chinese.” Vietnamese communism is therefore a potential bulwark – perhaps the only potential bulwark – against Chinese domination of Vietnam.¹⁵

Although admitting that “it is not meaningful to speak of the Viet Minh as more nationalist than communist or as more communist than nationalist,” Fulbright believed that their belief in communism would not be sufficient to overcome Ho and his comrades' instinctive fear of China.¹⁶ In his 1989 memoir, Fulbright disclosed that he had believed as early as 1965 that Ho “was a true patriot, like Tito of Yugoslavia.”¹⁷

¹³ William Gibbons, *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships: Part I: 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 96.

¹⁴ Premodern relationship between China and Vietnam was fundamentally peaceful and periods of war were rare. In fact, the Vietnamese have historically fought against other Vietnamese or against other states on China's southern frontier far more often than against Chinese. See Keith Taylor, “The Vietnamese Civil War of 1955–1975 in Historical Perspective,” in Andrew Wiest and Michael Doidge, eds. *Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War* (Hoboken, NJ: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 18–22. Also, Tuong Vu, “State Formation on China's Southern Frontier: Vietnam as a Shadow Empire and Hegemon,” *HumaNetten* (forthcoming).

¹⁵ J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House, 1966), 112, 114.

¹⁶ Fulbright approvingly quoted Bernard Fall who speculated that “Ho is probably equipped with an instinctive Vietnamese fear of Chinese domination ...” *Ibid.*, 112.

¹⁷ J. William Fulbright with Seth Tilman, *The Price of Empire* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 110.

Introduction

7

In an influential book that has been touted as “the bible for opponents to the war in the 1970s,”¹⁸ scholars George Kahin and John Lewis echoed Fulbright and claimed that “American support of France [in the early 1950s] forced Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh into an unwelcome dependence upon China and denied the movement the freedom to act in accordance with the historically conditioned, anti-Chinese proclivity of Vietnamese nationalism.”¹⁹

Some war critics did notice, and in fact admire, certain revolutionary policies that went beyond traditional Vietnamese nationalism. In his famous address in 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr. took issue with the US government for rejecting

a revolutionary [Vietnamese] government seeking self-determination, and a government that had been established not by China (for whom the Vietnamese have no great love) but by clearly indigenous forces that included some communists. For the peasants, this new government meant real land reform, one of the most important needs in their lives.²⁰

Although both sides in the debate had a point, this book suggests that many arguments by the antiwar camp do not stand up to scrutiny. The Vietnamese revolution was, at heart, a communist revolution, and Vietnamese revolutionaries as a group were internationalists no less than their comrades in the Soviet Union or China. Although Dr. King was correct that the government in Hanoi was led by indigenous forces, he underestimated its commitments to world revolution. While giving priority to their revolution, Ho and his comrades did not ignore revolutions elsewhere. As a Comintern representative for Southeast Asia, Ho presided over the formation of the Indochinese, Siamese, and Malay

¹⁸ George Herring, “America and Vietnam: The Debate Continues,” *The American Historical Review* 92: 2 (April 1987), 354.

¹⁹ George Kahin and John Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam*, 2nd ed. (New York: Delta, 1969), 326–327. Kahin and Lewis’s arguments were later repeated by many American diplomatic historians and prominent journalists whose works have profoundly shaped the popular perception of the Vietnamese revolution. For example, see George Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 3–4; Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1990), 2; Frances FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), esp. 8; Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam, a History* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), esp. 110; Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Light: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 159–162.

²⁰ Martin Luther King, Jr., “Declaration of Independence from the War in Vietnam,” April 1967 in Marvin Gettleman, Jane Franklin, Marilyn Young, et al., eds. *Vietnam and America: The Most Comprehensive Documented History of the Vietnam War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 313.

communist parties in the 1930s. In mid-1949, he ordered Vietnamese units into southern China to assist Mao's army in defending its base from attacks by Chiang Kai-shek's forces.²¹ Vietnamese troops helped establish communist regimes in Laos and Cambodia in 1975, and until the 1980s Vietnam directly supported communist parties in other Southeast Asian countries. Postwar Vietnam trained sappers for, and sent surplus weapons to Algeria, Chile, and El Salvador in service of revolutions there.²² Significantly, the internationalist spirit of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is still alive today, a quarter century after the collapse of world communism. As recently as 2012, Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong journeyed across the globe to Cuba, where he preached about the merits of socialism and the evils of capitalism.²³ If not because of internationalist commitments, why would the Vietnamese leader want to thumb his nose at Washington? Why did he risk alienating the US government and American corporations on whose aid and investment poor Vietnam was dependent?

Dr. King's characterization that the Vietnamese had "no great love" for China cannot explain the awe and veneration Vietnamese communists showered on Chinese leaders in the 1950s and the slavish deference the Vietnamese leadership today expresses toward China.²⁴ It is true that North Vietnamese leaders implemented a "real land reform" by redistributing large amounts of land to landless peasants, but they also executed

²¹ Nguyen Thi Mai Hoa, *Cac nuoc Xa hoi chu nghia ung ho Viet Nam khang chien chong My, cau nuoc* [Socialist countries' assistance to Vietnam's resistance against America to save the country] (Hanoi: Chinh tri Quoc gia, 2013), 53–55.

²² Merle Pribbenow, "Vietnam Covertly Supplied Weapons to Revolutionaries in Algeria and Latin America." Cold War History Project e-Dossier No. 25, n.d. Available at www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/e-dossier-no-25-vietnam-covertly-supplied-weapons-to-revolutionaries-algeria-and-latin; Merle Pribbenow, "Vietnam Trained Commando Forces in Southeast Asia and Latin America." Cold War History Project E-Dossier no. 27, January 2012. Available at www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/e-dossier-no-27-vietnam-trained-commando-forces-southeast-asia-and-latin-america. Pribbenow collected the information from the PAVN history blog www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php, where veterans posted comments, personal documents, and sometimes internal official documents.

²³ The text of the speech of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Cuba in November 2012 is available at <http://vov.vn/Home/Bai-noi-chuyen-ve-Chu-nghia-Xa-hoi-cua-Tong-Bi-thu-tai-Cuba/20124/205986.vov>

²⁴ For the popularity and influence of Maoism from the late 1940s through the 1950s, see Kim Ninh, *A World Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary Vietnam, 1945–1965* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), esp. 39–41; for the enormous influence of China on Vietnamese politics today, see Alexander Vuving, "Vietnam: A Tale of Four Players," *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1 (2010), 366–391.

about 15,000 landlords and rich peasants in the process.²⁵ For all that bloodshed and fanfare, barely five years later most peasants had been coerced into giving up their lands and joining Maoist-style cooperatives. By the time Dr. King made his speech, most farmland in North Vietnam had been collectivized for nearly a decade.²⁶ Forced to stay in cooperatives and denied any escape by a strict household registration system in the cities, the free farmer of North Vietnam was reduced to a modern serf. He and his family were chronically hungry and occasionally threatened by famines.

Antiwar activists misunderstood the nature of the Vietnamese revolution, but proponents of intervention fared no better, as Vietnamese communists were no stooges of Moscow or Beijing. At the height of the war, Hanoi leaders scorned both their Soviet and Chinese comrades for not daring to stand up against US imperialism.²⁷ After their victory in 1975, they thought of themselves as the vanguard of world revolution and snubbed not only the United States but also China and the Soviet Union.²⁸ Hanoi attempted to defend the international communist camp even when its big brothers had abandoned it. In 1989, when Eastern European communist regimes were about to fall, the general secretary of the VCP prodded Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to convene a conference of all communist and workers parties to discuss strategies for saving the socialist camp from the coming collapse.²⁹ When Gorbachev turned a deaf ear to the request, Vietnam asked China to create an anti-imperialist alliance (Beijing also said no).³⁰

In the end, Vietnamese communism stopped short of exporting revolution beyond Indochina because its radical character had created enemies

²⁵ Vo Nhan Tri, *Vietnam's Economic Policy Since 1975* (Singapore: ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), 3.

²⁶ See Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Andrew Vickerman, *The Fate of the Peasantry: Premature "Transition to Socialism" in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1986).

²⁷ On their criticism of Khrushchev in 1963–1964, see R. B. Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War*, v. 2 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), chap. 13, esp. 227; for their criticism of China in 1971–1972, see Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 197–202.

²⁸ Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986).

²⁹ Huy Duc, *Ben Thang Cuoc* [The Winners], v. 2 (Los Angeles: Osinbook, 2012), 63–67.

³⁰ Tran Quang Co, *Hoi uc va suy nghi* [Memories and Thoughts] (July 2005). Published online; available at www.diendan.org/tai-lieu/ho-so/hoi-ky-tran-quang-co

everywhere around it, from Vietnamese peasants who resisted collectivization, to Chinese and Cambodian leaders who resented Vietnam's claims to be the vanguard of world revolution. The prointervention camp widely exaggerated the security threat of the Vietnamese revolution to the United States. Yet that threat never materialized, not because Vietnamese communists were not real communists as the antiwar camp claimed, but because their fanaticism was self-destructive and engineered their own demise. With all due respects for their intellect and conscience, both sides in the Vietnam War debate misunderstood the Vietnamese revolution because they failed to grasp its communist nature. As this debate continues today, the same misunderstanding is frequently found in scholarship.³¹

REVOLUTIONS AND WORLD POLITICS

A study of ideology in the Vietnamese revolution is valuable not only for the enduring Vietnam War debate but also for the comparative study of revolutions. The voluminous comparative literature on revolutions has privileged factors such as social classes, state structure, and economic and political crises.³² However, ideology tends to be neglected. Revolutions are generally treated as domestic events: although they may be influenced by international factors, their bearing on international politics lies outside the scope of most works.

A handful of studies that do address the international dimensions of revolutions nonetheless indicate their enormous impacts on world politics.³³ As Robert Jervis recently observes, “Revolutionaries rarely

³¹ For recent reviews of the Vietnam War debate, see Andrew Wiest, ed. *America and the Vietnam War* (London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009); David Anderson and John Ernst, eds. *The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007).

³² For reviews, see Jeff Goodwin, “Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements,” in Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, Alexander Hicks et al., *The Handbook of Political Sociology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), esp. 421; Jack Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions,” in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds. *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. 70.

³³ See Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*; Mark Katz, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves* (London: Macmillan, 1997); Robert S. Snyder, “The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 2 (1999): 265–290; Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Patrick Conge, *From Revolution to War: State Relations in a World of Change* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); J. D. Armstrong,