

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-14144-5 - The Federal Reserve's Role in the Global Economy: A Historical Perspective

Edited by Michael D. Bordo and Mark A. Wynne

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Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-14144-5 - The Federal Reserve's Role in the Global Economy: A Historical Perspective

Edited by Michael D. Bordo and Mark A. Wynne

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