CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This book examines the ways in which demographic anxieties and attempts to govern them are shaping ideas about citizenship. Demographic anxieties are often expressed regarding immigration but also arise in relation to other demographic changes unfolding in the contemporary 'Global North'[1] – most notably, the longstanding trend towards lower birth rates and consequent population ageing. With particular attention to changing gender roles and life courses, the book examines how unfolding demographic transformations, including *but not limited to* immigration, and efforts to manage these changes are interacting and transforming ideas about citizenship.

Citizenship is, of course, a multi-functional and multi-dimensional concept – it is used to describe both a formal legal status as a member of a bounded political community and an ideal of equal membership, with associated rights and duties and political participation. A voluminous body of literature has emerged in the last decades around the ways in which international migration challenges states' right, ability and willingness to control who enters and stays in their territory, as well as the assumed cultural and religious uniformity of the (nation) state. Such analyses, often focusing on the legal regulation of immigration and

[1] The term 'Global North' is often used as a shorthand to distinguish between 'developed' states (that is, states with high human development: industrialised, politically and economically stable, with high levels of human health) and other states (the 'Global South'). This is a rough divide based on socioeconomic and political factors rather than geography – not all of these states are located in the Northern Hemisphere (Australia and New Zealand are the most obvious examples of states located in the Southern Hemisphere which are part of the Global North).

citizenship, capture part of the picture of the ways in which immigration shapes ideas about citizenship. However, they typically leave out or only cursorily refer to the remarkable demographic changes which stimulate and underpin continuing immigration, knowledge of which is driving states to encourage or at least tolerate further immigration, albeit with considerable anxiety and constant efforts to minimise those impacts of international mobility that they consider most detrimental. These changes have to do with the trend towards lower birth rates and consequent population ageing, and they include dramatic shifts in gender and family dynamics, as well as changes in age structures and adaptations of the life course. When immigration is viewed with attention to these demographic transformations, which form the context for continuing immigration, a more nuanced picture of the manifold challenges to citizenship emerges. The topic then raises issues around not just sovereignty, control over borders and national identity but gender roles, reproduction, intergenerational responsibilities and family life and relationships.

This book tries to connect the dots between some of the many debates about and struggles over citizenship and immigration, by drawing attention to the changes in demographic background and attempts to govern or manage these changes based on demographic knowledge. In particular, it emphasises the shifting role of gender relations and a time dimension, both of which are important for understanding the current set of anxieties around citizenship and immigration and for getting a fuller picture of states' attempts at managing demographic change. With special attention to four late-modern societies – Italy, the United Kingdom, Australia and Finland – the book argues that efforts to manage demographic changes that seek to sustain a (nation) state are bound up with contestations regarding gender relations, the family form and intergenerational compacts, as well as transformations in the role of the state in relation to its population. The book discusses both the legal rules on immigration and citizenship and other areas of policy which shape citizenship, such as aspects of economic and social policy and the welfare state, family law and employment regulation. It uses insights from the social sciences (sociology, legal anthropology and, of course, demography) to investigate how demographic trends, and knowledge and fears related to them, are shaping states' approaches to citizenship, as well as to examine what these demographic contestations reveal about the interconnections between national and biological reproduction.

Investigating efforts to manage population changes, or 'demographic governance' (see later) – for instance, through measures aimed at raising the birth rate or at altering immigration patterns – involves venturing into an area that used to be called 'population policy'.[2] As Jacques Vallin has noted, 'the desire to influence the size or composition of the population is an ancient one',[3] and modern states' ongoing interest in their populations is explained by the absolute indispensability of the latter as a condition for their existence.[4] Talking about population policies, however, immediately raises the spectre of the many attempts, often repugnant, to control the lives of populations and subpopulations in the not so remote past. These include, most obviously, Nazi Germany, where racially motivated extermination of subpopulations was undertaken along with eugenic research to improve 'population quality', but also the neo-Malthusian[5] 'global population control' movement which became associated with the promotion of coercive means to reduce childbearing in the Global South.[6] It is of course the rejection of ideas associated with eugenics and coercion that has led to the extension of personal freedoms, and indeed the rise of human rights that largely keeps democratic states in the Global North away from explicit population policies. However, this book argues that just because liberal states' direct and explicit control over population developments is more circumscribed, this does not mean they have lost interest in the current and future resource their populations represent, nor the threats segments of them may pose. The fact that states continue to shape their populations is most evident with regard to immigration, but extends beyond it.

Rather than demonising demographic governance through references to its sinister past, this book examines the attempt to manage demographic trends and anxieties as something that deserves attention

[2] May, *World Population Policies*, 2, defines population policies as 'actions taken explicitly or implicitly by public authorities, in order to prevent, delay, or address imbalances between demographic changes, on the one hand, and social, economic, and political goals, on the other'.

[3] Vallin, 'Population policy', 1. See also McIntosh, *Population Policy*, 28, who characterises the link between population and power as a persistent theme of population policy.

[4] The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States defines a state as an entity that has 'a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with the other states' (Art. 1).

[5] For Malthus's original essay, see Malthus, *Essay on the Principle of Population*.

[6] These include forced sterilisations in India and the infamous one-child policy in China. On the population control movement and its discontents, see e.g. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*; Eager, *Global Population Policy*; Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs*. On the Chinese one-child policy as a form of demographic governance, see Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China's Population*.

because of its implications for scholars interested in the regulation of citizenship and immigration, as well as gender equality. In fact, much of what can be characterised as population policy in the contemporary Global North is mundane and takes place every day, under the agency of a range of actors.[7] Governments plan for the future and use various forms of demographic knowledge, for instance censuses and demographic projections, uncertain as they are,[8] to plan long-term strategies around the labour market and health care systems. This sort of management, though not necessarily innocuous, is typically considered both rational and benign. However, what makes it important are the ways in which the governance of populations is connected to the changing concept of citizenship. This book argues that ideas about citizenship, the rights and duties that membership entails for citizens (men and women) and the conditions under which migrants are allowed to join politico-legal communities are embedded in demographic histories and rationales. Decisions about managing demographic changes in contemporary states involve political and legal choices that carry real consequences for citizens and non-citizens alike. As one demographer admits, 'the question of equity is most often absent from demographic thinking, though central in terms of political action.'[9] What is therefore of interest is precisely the nexus between demographic thinking and political action, as a site of inclusion and exclusion, contestations and resistance.

The rest of this chapter introduces the demographic background that will be explored in the book, outlining the most important demographic trends that are creating (sometimes contradictory) anxieties. It then discusses states' efforts at managing demographic changes ('demographic governance') and outlines some of the many implications of these efforts for citizenship. Finally, it sets out the structure of the book.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATIONS

Current issues related to citizenship and immigration are connected to global, regional and national population trends, as well as increased awareness of and anxiety over them. The broad and increasingly global

[7] Livi-Bacci, 'Population policy', 192.
[8] Demographic projections are not *predictions* – they extrapolate based on past trends and do not take into account changes in policy parameters but assume that the trends will continue to operate in the future.
[9] Toulemon, 'Should governments in Europe', 188. On demographers' lack of sensitivity to gender equality, see Presser, 'Demography, feminism'.

trend, though not unfolding in the same way in every place, involves a slow shift from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates, as countries develop from pre-industrial to industrial and post-industrial societies. This transformation started in Europe and is sometimes described as being part of a complex worldwide process known as the 'demographic transition'.[10] Demographers and social scientists are still debating the origin and theoretical interpretation of this shift,[11] but the idea of a demographic transition is a useful shorthand for describing broad demographic developments that have taken in place in the last couple of centuries. The argument goes as follows: improvements in health, sanitation, nutrition and medical science led/lead to lower mortality and longer lifespans, which in turn led/lead (initially) to population increase. This growth, together with factors like improving contraception and societal and cultural changes (e.g. urbanisation, which reduces the value of children's agricultural work; women's increasing education; attitudinal change), is linked with women adjusting their birth rates downwards, thus leading to 'reproductive efficiency'.[12] This modernisation of demographic behaviour is arguably underway, but progressing at uneven pace around the globe.[13] Once started, this gradual process tends to become an ongoing and long-lasting transformation that takes centuries to complete and brings with it societal, economic and political upheavals, thus playing 'a fundamental role in the creation of the modern world'.[14]

A period of population growth is part of this process of demographic change in most societies. Globally, population has been growing for some centuries, but this growth accelerated in the 1800s, as mortality started to decline but fertility decline had not yet begun in most countries. As is well known, world population growth in recent decades has been remarkable: world population was estimated at one billion in 1800, two billion in 1927, three billion in 1960 and reached six billion by 1999 and seven billion in 2011.[15] As one commentator aptly

[10] See Livi-Bacci, *A Concise History*, ch. 4.
[11] As Kirk, 'Demographic transition theory', 384, points out, 'it has not been resolved whether the demographic transition is a theory, a generalisation, a framework for analysis, or merely an "idea"'.
[12] For a sample of discussions around the theory, see Chesnais, *The Demographic Transition*; Dyson, *Population and Development*; Kirk, 'Demographic transition theory'; Lee, 'The demographic transition'; Reher, 'Towards long-term population decline', 'Economic and social implications'.
[13] For a discussion of alleged exceptions and whether they constitute exceptions, see e.g. Chesnais, *The Demographic Transition*.
[14] Dyson, *Population and Development*, ix.
[15] The 7 billion mark was generally greeted with alarmist headlines – see e.g. the *Guardian*, 'Why current population growth is costing us the Earth', 24 October 2011.

remarked, seven billion is four times the world population existing just a century earlier.[16] The acceleration of population growth is due to still relatively high birth rates at the global level, especially in parts of the Global South; though global fertility is now declining all over the world, the rates vary greatly (and growth remains strong in areas like Sub-Saharan Africa).[17] Despite the overall decline in birth rates, the momentum of large age cohorts of women reaching childbearing age is projected to keep global population growing for some decades. While exact population forecasting is a complex task, the latest United Nations (UN) projections show a continued increase of world population – but a decline in the population growth rate – with the global population projected to reach between 8.4 and 8.6 billion persons in 2030.[18] Regional distribution of population is shifting more towards Asia: it now accounts for over sixty per cent of the world population, and China and India together have about thirty-seven per cent of the world's population.[19]

Global population growth is starting to slow down, though the changes will take decades to filter through, if they do at all (the predictive force of the demographic transition 'theory' is not strong[20]). Concerns over global population increase and, in particular, the sustainability of societies experiencing strong population growth – even slowing growth – in parts of the Global South, along with associated urbanisation, have been connected to climate change and other environmental and resource concerns, as changes in population size, rate of growth and distribution have an impact on both the natural environment and development prospects. Though studies show there is little association between nations with rapid population growth and nations with high emissions,[21] it is at present very common to hear environmentalists express the sentiment that the 'growth in human numbers

16 Pearce, *Peoplequake*, 3.
17 May, *World Population Policies*, ch. 2. On demographic patterns in the Global South, see Livi-Bacci, *A Concise History*, ch. 5.
18 United Nations, 'World population prospects'. On the uncertainties involved in the UN and other demographic projections, see O'Neill et al., 'Global population projections'.
19 In both of these states, the sex ratio is skewed due to modern technology being used to enforce son preference – see Sen's influential article that estimated that 100 million women were 'missing' worldwide: Sen, 'Missing women'; on China, see Hvistendahl, *Unnatural Selection*.
20 This issue with the demographic transition theory highlights a general issue regarding demography, which, as Kirk, 'Demographic Transition Theory', 361, puts it, is 'a science short on theory, but rich in quantification'.
21 Satterthwaite, 'The implications of population growth'.

is frightening'.[22] At the same time, it is clear that it is the populations of the Global North, not the poorer, still growing populations of Africa and Asia, who use the vast majority of the world's limited resources and emit most greenhouse gases.[23] Moreover, the most prosperous states are not likely to see the worst effects of environmental degradation and climate change (food and water scarcity are typically seen in places with limited financial means and inadequate political and managerial resources). How to build a sustainable and globally fair system of dealing with the human impact on the environment, including climate change, is both the big moral question of our time and the urgent practical one in many states. While these matters are largely beyond the scope of this book, they form the broader background against which the global sustainability and sensibility of states' policies ultimately need to be evaluated.

In the meantime, the local populations of most states in the Global North, where the transition started in the 1800s, have largely completed it.[24] Women in these societies have significantly fewer children, and many of the populations of late-modern states ceased to grow some decades ago, owing to longstanding low mortality and birth rates that stay barely at or, in most cases, below those required for the replacement of generations (hence, this is often referred to as 'below-replacement fertility'). The total fertility rate (TFR, as in births per woman) has been below the replacement level (1.05 per woman, or 2.1 per couple) in practically all industrialised states for some time;[25] so-called 'lowest-low' fertility states in Europe and East Asia have persistent TFRs below 1.3.[26] Sustained low birth rates in the 'developed' (and increasingly the 'developing') world are often stressed to be 'new' and considered a historically unprecedented shift.[27] Lesthaeghe, with van de

[22] David Attenborough, on joining the Optimum Population Trust; see BBC, 'Attenborough warns on population', 13 April 2009.
[23] And even in the Global North, argue Angus and Butler, *Too Many People?*, most resources are not consumed by individuals or households, but by mines, factories and power plants run by corporations.
[24] Dyson, *Population and Development*, 64. Note that population ageing, the last stage, is still ongoing: Lee, 'The demographic transition'. Taking the long, long view, Caldwell, 'Demographic theory', 311, argues that the world is still in the early stages of moving from a society based on agriculture to one structured by industrial production.
[25] If there were no mortality in the female population until the end of the childbearing years then the replacement level of TFR would be very close to 2.0. The replacement fertility rate is roughly 2.1 births per woman for most industrialised states.
[26] Kohler et al., 'Emergence of lowest-low fertility'.
[27] Douglass et al., 'Introduction', 5; Kramer, *The Other Population Crisis*, 1.

Kaa, calls the sustained and persistent below-replacement birth rates of many northern states a 'second demographic transition' – a new and unpredictable stage in demographic history, associated with trends towards later marriage, increase in cohabitation, fertility postponement and childlessness.[28] Demographers have struggled to explain this development (which is often linked to societal trends such as secularisation, rising individual autonomy and women's emancipation), let alone predict how birth rates may develop in the future.[29] In practice, however, the significant shifts in birth rates that have already unfolded mean that without continuing and, in some cases, higher levels of immigration, contemporary states face the prospect of population decline, and markedly so if projected trends continue.[30] Many states would be in population decline already but for continuing immigration, and indeed, even with immigration, Japan and some states in Europe are likely to encounter negative population growth soon.

The 'second demographic transition' has many enduring consequences. One of the most notable, apart from the prospect of population decline, is rapid population ageing. Population ageing – a shift in the population towards older age groups – is part of the transition to lower birth rates and higher life expectancy, and it is inevitable that the proportion of the population above a certain age rises as part of that transition.[31] However, sustained low birth rates speed up this process. The shift in the distribution of a population towards older ages, crudely encapsulated by the concept of a changing dependency ratio – the age-dependent ratio of those in the labour force, paying taxes, and of those typically outside it (retired and children) – shapes all facets of late-modern societies. Most notably, ageing affects pay-as-you-go pension systems and the provision of health and social care for the growing older cohorts (especially with the increasing numbers of the frail very elderly), but it also has implications for economic growth, labour

[28] Lesthaeghe, 'The unfolding story'. The idea of a second transition was originally raised in Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 'Twee demografische transities?'. See also Chesnais, 'Below-replacement fertility'. Reher, 'Towards long-term population decline', considers long-term decline a 'virtual certainty' for Europe and a possibility for some of the other regions still at the earlier stages of the transition.

[29] E.g. Chesnais, 'A march toward population recession'; Lutz and Skirbekk, 'Low fertility'. Most demographers predicted that birth rates would stop falling when they reached the replacement rate, but instead they kept falling – very much so, in some countries.

[30] E.g. Coleman, 'Europe's demographic future'; Demeny and McNicoll, 'Political demography'; Frejka and Sobotka, 'Overview chapter 1'; Reher, 'Towards long-term population decline'.

[31] Another arguably inevitable consequence of the demographic transition is urbanisation – see Dyson, *Population and Development*.

markets, taxation, living arrangements and housing.[32] Similarly, a decline in the proportion of the population composed of children and increasing diversity in the younger age cohorts will have significant long-term impacts, testing intergenerational loyalty, commitments to universal entitlements of citizenship and social cohesion. While environmental reasons might persuade states to accept ageing and eventual population decline as inevitable or even welcome, the challenges of low birth rates make ageing 'too quickly' an alarming prospect for many states.[33] Globally, demographic decline will also involve readjustments in political weight, for instance in the international political arena.[34] Hence, the contradictory ways in which the prospect of a declining population is considered both a 'threat'[35] (an economic and social one) and 'very good news indeed'[36] (from the standpoint of natural resources and the environment).

Deeming the demographic threat to be more crucial has led many contemporary states to seek strategies to deal with the challenges of ageing – most notably, immigration. Practically all late-modern states consider (though sometimes reluctantly) immigrants as necessary for filling, at least in part, the perceived demographic gap in their workforce and society.[37] However, many states would have to import what they consider to be 'unsustainable' numbers of immigrants to prevent population ageing altogether.[38] Welcoming more immigrants has thus not been the only answer. Some states have adopted family policies to induce citizens (couples, but in particular women) to produce more future workers and tax payers.[39] The relationship between birth rates and migration, in both ideological and practical policy terms, is one

[32] European Commission, 'The 2012 Ageing Report'; see also Tremmel, *Demographic Change and Intergenerational Justice*.
[33] On alarmist discourse around population ageing, see Katz, 'Alarmist demography'; Messerschmidt, 'Garbled demography'.
[34] See Demeny, 'Population policy dilemmas'. In 1950, six of the ten most populous states were in the 'developed' world, four of them in Europe; by 2020, only the United States will remain in the top ten. Livi-Bacci, *A Concise History*, 219.
[35] Demeny and McNicoll, 'Political demography', 269.
[36] Reher, 'Towards long-term population decline', 200.
[37] As Livi-Bacci, *A Concise History*, 233 puts it, 'migration gives a substantive contribution . . . to the rich countries' renewal'.
[38] See e.g. Coleman, 'Immigration and ethnic change', 'Demographic effects', 'Divergent patterns' on how even current immigration numbers involve, in the long run, substantial alteration of the composition of the European population. Note also, however, the ahistorical tendency to treat immigration and resulting population change as 'new' phenomena, especially in Europe, despite immigration having been an integral part of European history for centuries; see Sassen, *Guests and Aliens*.
[39] See Chapter 2.

that is frequently remarked upon but little analysed from the point of view of its policy consequences (and is one of the topics that will be examines in this book). Increased migration and higher birth rates are often argued to be mutually reinforcing elements in a population policy that seeks to mitigate, if not remove, the impact of the demographic transition: for instance, both are argued to be necessary for European states' responses to population decline.[40] A more ethno-nationalistic view, less frequently stated outright, frames higher birth rates and migration as *alternatives* in the management of demographic challenges:

> Federal Opposition Leader [later Prime Minister] Tony Abbott wants Australians to have more babies and let fewer migrants into the country. Mr Abbott today said the Coalition would cut the annual immigration intake to 170 000 places, compared to a peak of 300 000 two years ago, if elected. The Coalition wanted to make immigration more sustainable because many people thought it was 'out of control', he said.
>
> But Mr Abbott is keen for Australians to have more babies, echoing an instruction from former Liberal treasurer Peter Costello who called on them to have three children – one for mum, one for dad and one for the country. 'I would like to see our birth rate improve because even now, despite the uptick in the birth rate over the last few years, it's still significantly below replacement level,' Mr Abbott said.[41]

Quantitatively speaking, birth rate levels are decisive for future population size and structure – and it is because of women having fewer children that many contemporary states are headed for decline, while some less wealthy ones are still heading in the opposite direction (with many intermediate states too now headed in the direction of lower birth rates).

However, in wealthier states, more attention has focused on the (far smaller) variable of immigration. As a demographic process, immigration is 'volatile'[42] – while in a state-centred world order, immigration is more easily controllable by states than are the family decisions of citizens (at least in liberal states), it is also prone to alter the make-up of the receiving states, especially those with low birth rates, contributing to a host of anxieties about new entrants (whether justified or not).[43] As

[40] European Commission, 'Green Paper'.
[41] The *Australian*, 'Tony Abbott says we should have more babies and let fewer people into the country', 25 July 2010.
[42] Van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 'Europe at the crossroads', 1367.
[43] Winter and Teitelbaum, *Global Spread of Fertility Decline*.