

EXPERT FAILURE

The humble idea that experts are ordinary human beings leads to surprising conclusions about how to get the best possible expert advice. All too often, experts have monopoly power because of licensing restrictions or because they are government bureaucrats protected from both competition and the consequences of their decisions. This book argues that in the market for expert opinion we need real competition in which rival experts may have different opinions and new experts are free to enter. But the idea of breaking up expert monopolies has far-reaching implications for public administration, forensic science, research science, economics, America's military-industrial complex, and all domains of expert knowledge. Roger Koppl develops a theory of experts and expert failure, and uses a wide range of examples — from forensic science to fashion — to explain the applications of his theory, including state regulation of economic activity.

ROGER KOPPL is Professor of Finance in the Whitman School of Management at Syracuse University in New York, and a faculty fellow in the University's Forensic and National Security Sciences Institute. His work has been featured in *The Atlantic*, *Forbes*, and *The Washington Post*.

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To Maria, who brings joy

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>page xi</i>
1 Introduction	1
PART I NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM	21
2 Is There a Literature on Experts?	23
Introduction	23
A Simple Taxonomy	26
Berger and Luckmann	33
Defining “Expert”	37
3 Two Historical Episodes in the Problem of Experts	43
Introduction	43
The Socratic Tradition	44
Expert Witnesses in Law	56
4 Recurrent Themes in the Theory of Experts	68
Power	68
Ethics	73
Reflexivity	76
The Well-Informed Citizen	80
Democratic Control of Experts	84
Discussion	85
Market Structure	88
Information Choice in the Context of the Literature on Experts	89
Closing Remark	92

viii	<i>Table of Contents</i>	
PART II FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF EXPERTS		95
5	Notes on Some Economic Terms and Ideas	97
	Spontaneous Order	97
	Competition	106
6	The Division of Knowledge through Mandeville	116
	Introduction	116
	The Division of Knowledge	118
7	The Division of Knowledge after Mandeville	133
	Vico to Marx	133
	Menger to Hayek	139
	After Hayek	142
PART III INFORMATION CHOICE THEORY		149
8	The Supply and Demand for Expert Opinion	151
	The Economic Point of View on Experts	151
	Identifying the Commodity and Defining “Expert”	152
	Information Choice Theory	153
	Honest Error and Willful Fraud	154
	The Economics of Experts Fills a Niche	155
	The Demand for Expert Opinion	160
	The Supply of Expert Opinion	162
9	Experts and Their Ecology	163
	Motivational Assumptions of Information Choice Theory	163
	The Ecology of Expertise	180
PART IV EXPERT FAILURE		187
10	Expert Failure and Market Structure	189
	Two Dimensions of Expert Failure	189
	Identity, Sympathy, Approbation, and Praiseworthiness	197
	Observer Effects, Bias, and Blinding	197
11	Further Sources of Expert Failure	201
	Normal Accidents of Expertise	201
	Complexity and Feedback	202
	Incentive Alignment	204
	The Ecology of Expertise	204
	Professions	205
	Regulation	211

	<i>Table of Contents</i>	ix
	Monopsony and Big Players	214
	Comments on the Market for Ideas	215
	Epistemic Systems Design	217
12	Expert Failure in the Entangled Deep State	221
	Expert Failure and America’s Entangled Deep State	221
	Closing Remarks	234
	<i>References</i>	239
	<i>Index</i>	267

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