

Introducing Renaissance Killers

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Homicide, the most serious of violent crimes, is simultaneously a fixed and finite act that transcends chronological specificity and an action inseparably linked to the attitudes and mores of the time in which it takes place. It has always excited public attention and been a cause for comment and discussion. Multi-angled studies of single crimes remain rare, despite the huge growth of studies of historical crime in the later twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This is the novelty of this volume. Our main aims are to uncover the many faces of murder, and its many cultural presences, across the Italian peninsula in a specific arc of time. These two aims inform the content in different ways: the faces of homicide range from the ordinary to the sensational, from the professional to the accidental, from the domestic to the public; while its cultural presence is revealed through new studies of sculptures, paintings and popular literature. The volume includes new research on a broad range of themes: different kinds of murders (planned or spontaneous, of family members or acquaintances or strangers, involving weapons and bloody wounds or bloodless violence such as strangulation or poison), different kinds of killers (by gender, occupation or situation), different kinds of victim (by age and status), and different kinds of evidence (legal, literary or pictorial). In planning the volume, we were interested in the various types of killing – judicial and criminal, political and religious – and in their modalities (location, weapons), as well as in the representation of murder in chronicles, news reports, literature and the visual arts. We were also concerned to examine how a Christian society that was supposedly taught to observe the biblical commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ came to terms with repeated failure, and accepted itself as a society in which killing was a part of ‘normal’ life.

Much of the public fascination with murder has always lain in its degree of transgression: taking away a life is the most transgressive personal act known to humans. It is at the same time a crime against those in power, part of whose mandate – if they hold power legitimately – is to guarantee public order and the safety of its citizens. Tracking down

those responsible for murders, and ensuring that they are punished in an appropriate manner, has also always been of interest to the governors and to the governed. Hearing of the particular set of circumstances that led in each case to murder appears to have been a source of avid excitement in a society premised on the rule of Christian morality. Keen interest is reserved for especially bloody or unsavoury cases, and this kind of fascination is harder to explain. Shocking acts can – from a distance – be perceived as thrilling, and the presence of blood, with its myriad taboos and connotations, acts to intensify the thrill. Yet murder is a brutal act, however perpetrated, and it has brutal consequences, so perhaps interest is generated too by a mixture of dread and relief (on the part of the person hearing or reading of it, as they are not involved). When the murder contains a sexual element, news interest is further amplified. In this sense, public reaction and comment on acts of murder can be understood to play an equivalent role to the chorus in Greek tragedies, ensuring that the acts did not pass unnoticed and offering alternative readings to official pronouncements.

Another important feature is that some murders, such as tyrannicides or the execution of popular heroes, take on symbolic significance, amplifying their newsworthiness. Although all human life was supposed to be sacred, lives in the Renaissance were simultaneously believed to vary in worth, and news interest followed the norms of assigned value. Even if murder of slaves could in theory be prosecuted in the courts, it would not usually have been considered newsworthy. An argument retrieved from correspondence in the Datini archive over the paternity of a slave's unborn child in late-fourteenth-century Genoa involved a chaplain or *cappellano* saying that she could be thrown into the sea for all he cared, as he was not the father of her child.¹ This was bravado, of course. But slave-women were at the bottom of the hierarchical heap, so although they had a pecuniary value, they had no social value, and therefore murder of them would have counted for very little in terms of news. The lives of the rich and famous, by contrast, were endlessly worth following, and murder in their ranks always elicited comment. Lorenzo Tornabuoni in Florence wrote to the inveterate news-gatherer Benedetto Dei in Milan in November 1486, telling him, amongst other pieces of news, of a rich Roman family blighted by two episodes of murder. The seven-month pregnant wife of Francesco del Buffalo was killed by two of her stepsons, sometime after two of his sons had killed each other.²

This book is divided into five sections, reflecting the themes and concepts we wish to develop. Some of these sections overlap to provide a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of murder as a social and cultural event. At all times attention is focused on the legal and moral

positions on murder, what the act of murder meant to those who were affected and what they perceived the act to be. There is recurrent interest in literary and artistic depictions of murder, and on the perceived newsworthiness of certain types of murder, and the writing that they engendered. Note is taken of occasions when reference is made to classical precedent or the influence of the classical world. The first section starts, appropriately, with the first murder, that of Abel by Cain (Nethersole). This chapter is particularly interested in the meaning of murder, as is that of Bresc. Bresc and Cohen both consider domestic and familial killings more generally, such as those by husbands and fathers of their wives and daughters, which now can be deconstructed in important, gender-informed ways. The second section will consider the murderers, victims and spaces of ‘ordinary’ murders in a typical city, Bologna (Blanshei, Dean): these were so routine as to be commonplace in Renaissance Italy, and were not thought to require extended explanation. The third section addresses extraordinary or sensational murders (Leydi, Salzberg and Rospocher, Dall’Aglione), such as the alleged case of cannibalism in Renaissance Milan that grabbed the attention of the public but whose narrative outline now indicates the existence of a multitude of other social and religious problems. Prominent here will be the theme of the reporting of murder, showing how murder was constantly in the news, whether in the form of diplomatic reports, or chronicles, or private letters, and was a constant presence in the lives of Renaissance Italians. The newsworthiness of murder is particularly apparent with sensational murders, as some murders were considered more newsworthy than others. Murders could start as high-profile – for instance, if the murdered person was a ruler or a prelate – but could also snowball in terms of public interest, as in the case presented by Leydi, where accusations of additional transgressions were tagged on to the primary charge. Some very specific types of murder and suicide will be analysed in the fourth section (Pastore, Lowe, Esposito), those involving particularly disadvantaged groups: poisoners (often women), slaves, nuns and Jews as well as political dissenters or the desperate. These groups were distinctive and many suffered from increased regulation and surveillance vis-à-vis the rest of the population, marking them out as victims and giving additional reason for their murder or self-murder. Murders dressed up to look like suicides offered killers the possibility of covering their tracks, even if public opinion at the time often alerted contemporaries to the crimes. The last section analyses murder by professional killers – soldiers, executioners and butchers (Bowd, Guerra, Dickerson) – trying to ascertain how it was possible for homicide under certain circumstances to be considered either morally justifiable or culturally acceptable. Inclusion here of

a chapter on representations of murdered animals in the form of dead meat in butchers' shops allows a comparison between murdered humans and dead animals, sharpening lines of distinction not only between the living and the dead, but also between the human and the non-human. Why was it permissible not only to kill but also to eat the dead flesh of one category of previously living creature, but categorically forbidden across every type of written and unwritten law to kill or eat the other category? What does this tell us about the act of murder? And why was this boundary policed with such ferocity, so that killing someone to eat their flesh (cannibalism) – which was known about in the Renaissance but ascribed to non-European pagans – was considered so much worse, say, than killing a family member because of an argument? Attempting to sanctify both life and the dead body at a time when neither was held sacrosanct meant that much energy was expended in policing an essentially untenable situation.

In one sense, this volume constitutes a follow-on from our previous edited volume, *Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy* (1994): though we had an image of homicide – in fact, assassination – on the cover, murder was not a major theme of the thirteen essays in the volume. Since the 1990s, other titles in English have touched on Renaissance homicide, without exploring it fully or in its complexities – a trait that history has shared with criminology.³ Trevor Dean's own *Crime and Justice in Late Medieval Italy* deals only briefly with murder, in a chapter focused more broadly on physical violence, though wife killing is covered at some length. Pieter Spierenburg's *A History of Murder* covers a much broader time period and geographical area, and concentrates on the long-term fall in the murder rate and on the slow decline of medieval practices of feuding and vendetta. His typology of homicide is consequently limited, and the opportunity for nuanced analysis is small.⁴ Older titles that are relevant include Guido Ruggiero's *Violence in Early Renaissance Venice*, which examines fourteenth-century murders, distinguishing between passionate and self-interest killings, and between noble and non-noble modes (noblemen preferred hired killers). The collection of essays edited by Lauro Martines, *Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200–1500*, included a chapter on one resounding political murder (of the duke of Milan, 1476), though focusing more on the diplomatic consequences than on the act itself, which had been closely studied by scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵ Murder was covered in that volume also by the essays of Werner Gundersheimer on the 'Book of the Executed' of the city of Ferrara (seventy executions for homicide 1441–1500, in an apparently rising trend), and of Stanley Chojnacki on trials in Venice in the fourteenth century (where he found

popolani resorting to homicidal violence more than nobles, with domestic and neighbourly quarrels prominent as contexts and disputes over money and casual slights prominent as triggers).⁶ Lauro Martines has also written specifically about one of the most momentous of political killings of the Renaissance, the attempt on the life of Lorenzo de' Medici, which resulted in the death of his brother, Giuliano.⁷ One of the contributors to the present volume, Stefano Dall'Aglio, has recently dissected another crucial assassination, that of Duke Alessandro de' Medici by Lorenzino de' Medici in Florence in 1537, and the subsequent murder of the assassin in Venice in 1548. His book emphasises the interconnectedness of murders, the fact that a murder was often the beginning or middle of a process rather than the end.⁸ The investigation of single murderous episodes, or single murderers, in fact seems very much a part of the Italian historiographical landscape, recent instances including, for example, a study of a murder in a cathedral – Reggio Emilia, at mass on 28 June 1517 – which skilfully explains the significance of the time and place, or an investigation into the nature and purpose – part judicial, part historical, part literary – of sources for the killing by a husband in Rome of his wife's noble lover in the 1530s.⁹ As a genre, such case studies stretch back into the nineteenth century, in instances such as the death in a Neapolitan prison of the *condottiere* Jacopo Piccinino in 1465, or the poisoning of the count of Tenda by his own cook in 1475, or the cruel butchering of Ottaviano Manfredi in a narrow mountain pass in 1499.¹⁰ Such studies can provide deeply contextualised readings of single events. Conversely, in the broader study of homicide, the debate is focused more on long-term trends and macrohistorical explanations (see below the essays by Blanshei and Dean for the references to the work of Eisner, Roth, and Spierenburg). This volume aims to connect these two ends of the historical study of homicide.

One of the most intriguing aspects of Italian Renaissance murder is the extent to which it can be seen to foreshadow contemporary twenty-first-century murder. Or to phrase it in another way, we are interested in whatever is distinctive about murder in the culturally specific time and place of Renaissance Italy, but also in how closely aspects of murder in Renaissance Italy and twenty-first-century Europe and America are aligned. So, while trying to analyse what was new and distinctive about murder then, we also try to see what new twists have evolved – indeed what new types of murder have emerged – in the 500-year gap between the periods, in order to shed light on the paradox with which we opened this introduction: murder is simultaneously time specific and yet has a core that is chronologically free floating. Two aspects assuredly have not changed: public fascination with murder,

and murder's newsworthiness. Whether fascination came first and led to newsworthiness, or whether a constant media focus on murder fanned the flames of public fascination with it, is unclear even in the Renaissance.

Two of the most notorious forms of murder in the early twenty-first century are serial murder and mass murder. The first is often assumed to be a modern development, yet records relating to it exist from the Renaissance. For instance, the Venetian diarist Marin Sanudo in 1529 took note of a report from Brescia describing a woman called Malgarita, who cross-dressed as a man and was part of the company of Roberto da San Severino, the count of Caiazzo. Alleged to have murdered twelve boys ('ragazi') by luring them one by one to her quarters, and burying them under the house, she was arrested, tortured, and confessed before being hanged and burned. According to the report, she died heroically.¹¹ In a trial in Bologna in 1340, a woman confessed to killing three of her own children over a period of six years.¹² Whether these events took place as described, these cases are evidence that the phenomenon of serial murder existed. Mass murder is slightly different. It too undoubtedly existed in the Renaissance, especially murder of groups by other groups, for instance in war situations such as sacks (Bowd) or in religiously fraught situations such as pogroms (cf. Esposito). Yet spree murders such as family annihilations or high school massacres, whether random or focused, are more difficult to find. When one does find them, the perpetrators are often labelled as 'mad'. In 1549, Piera, the wife of Paolo da Falla, killed her seven-year-old daughter and her four-year-old nephew with a hatchet, but was restrained before she could kill a further child.¹³ Advances in weaponry and explosives since the Renaissance have made different sorts of murder, including spree murder, easier and more lethal, just as religious hatreds and an increased focus on the individual have augmented the urge to kill – or at the very least whittled away at the reasons for not killing. Further twenty-first-century types of murder have evolved considerably since the Renaissance, again because of scientific advances, but the kernels of the types were known then. For instance, chemicals and infectious pathogens are now routinely used in some parts of the world as tools of mass or other murders, with a clear line of descent from poison (Pastore).

What can the law on homicide tell us about murder? In the mid-sixteenth century, the jurist Jacobus Novellus penned a treatise for lawyers defending suspects on murder charges.¹⁴ In it, he listed forty defences that could be used at least to excuse the culprit from the death penalty and in some cases to allow him or her to walk away without any penalty at all. The list needs to be discussed with care, as some of the arguments

are of dubious validity and it is doubtful that they would have convinced a judge. However, enough of them are encountered in actual court practice, as extenuating or excusatory circumstances, for the list to be used as some indication of the conditions in which homicide was accepted or punished lightly. Though these justifications of homicide are listed without any apparent order, they clearly fall into three groups. First come the specific conditions of the killer, whether physical (young age), or psychological (insanity), emotional ('lascivia', fear, 'iustus dolor', provocation and anger), cognitive (ignorance, sleep, inebriation and error), or occupational (the 'public official exercising his office', those with a record of creative distinction or service to the prince). This range of characteristics, ranging from age, state of mind and emotional state to ability to comprehend actions at the moment of killing and broader function and utility, could serve as justifications for homicide. Second come the specific conditions of the victim: those involved in criminal action could be killed with impunity (thus traitors and rebels, pirates and nocturnal robbers, rapists and adulterers), as could those with a record of past criminal behaviour (bandits), while killers were not liable to punishment if their victims died from wounds having failed to follow medical advice for their treatment. Third, there are some specific conditions of the crime that reduced culpability, either through absence of intent to kill (accidents and play), presence of a higher ulterior motive or value (defending a friend or partner from aggression, putting down a riot, escaping from prison if the 'innocent prisoner could not escape without killing the guards'), or a hierarchical relation in which violence was justified (a husband or master finding his wife or slave *in flagrante crimine*, a father killing his son who resists a 'correctional' beating). Two conclusions can be made from this sort of forensic rhetoric. The first is that the space for inexcusable or unjustifiable homicide seems to be small: unemotional actors, innocent victims in egalitarian relation to their killers, in insignificant contexts. The second is that homicide was conceived as potentially present in all social relations – in politics, sexual relations, families, prisons, employment, public office and play.

Some of these categories listed by Jacobus Novellus clearly originated in the distinction made, more than two centuries earlier, between malice (*dolus*) and responsibility (*culpa*) by Albertus Gandinus, author of one of the early juristic treatises on criminal-law procedure, who insisted that the death penalty required *dolus*, and that this was absent in killings in accident, drunkenness, insanity, self-defence and so on.¹⁵ Consequently, they were also present in the laws and city statutes that were intended to determine penalties in the courts. Each city had its own extensive set of statutes, usually based on initial thirteenth-century codifications, then

revised at politically significant moments in the fourteenth century, and printed in the fifteenth century. At Savona, for example, the punishment for ‘wounding with death’ was hanging or decapitation for anyone over fourteen, except for actions in self-defence or in defence of kinsmen, and for boys play-fighting.¹⁶ At Bergamo the death penalty did not apply if the victim were a bandit, the killing in self-defence or the killer ‘furious’ or under ten.¹⁷ The statutes of Ascoli Piceno having sternly prescribed dragging at an ass’s tail and burial alive for killings with any metal *pallocta*, removed all penalty for killings by accident, in play, in moderate self-defence, or of a thief at night.¹⁸ Self-defence was a common statutory exception, found, for example, in the statutes of Rome, Mantua, Genoa, Cesena and Alessandria.¹⁹ Bandits and enemies of the city were also an exception (Mantua, Asti), and jurists justified their killing on the grounds of benefit to the ‘common good’.²⁰ Some statutes distinguished between premeditated and involuntary homicide: for killing in a brawl, the penalty at Alessandria was a fine and banishment from the city, whereas the penalty for ‘meditated’ killing was decapitation.²¹ At Bergamo, there was a similar distinction between unplanned homicide (‘non tractatim facto’) and planned (‘tractatim facto’),²² while at Ravenna it was between ‘pure’ and ‘with forethought’ (‘animo pensato’).²³ Cesena’s statutes had three categories: ‘malicious and voluntary’ homicide (‘dolose voluntarieque’), for which the penalty was death and confiscation of assets; homicide with ‘blame but no malice’ (‘non dolo sed culpa’), for which the penalty was a discretionary fine; and accidental killing that could not be foreseen, for which there was no penalty.²⁴

By contrast, statutes also added aggravated penalties for heinous killings: assassination (hired killing) in particular, where dragging and hanging was specified, even for assassinations that failed (Rome),²⁵ or pincering of the flesh with ‘hot irons’ and then hanging (Lucca),²⁶ or dragging and hanging, with the culprit’s sons to be banished (Florence).²⁷ Counterhierarchical homicides also attracted this sort of increment. Penalties for patricide, for example: for a son killing his father at Fabriano, the statutory penalty was dragging at a horse’s tail, beheading, and confiscation of assets.²⁸ At Lucca, for sons or grandsons killing their fathers, mothers or grandparents, it was hanging: ‘and his body is not to be let down from the gallows but is to lack burial forever’.²⁹ Similar torments were appointed for servants who killed masters and their families: in a decree of 1393, the duke of Milan ordered that such murderers should be transported in a cart through the city, pincered, then placed on a wooden wheel and left to die.³⁰

Jacobus Novellus’s treatise reflects the end point of an evolution during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries: first, changing the

penalty, from pecuniary to capital; second, removing the role of the victim's kin from any sort of composition of the crime; and third, drawing on subjectivist ideas of Roman Law to distinguish among killings on the basis of the actor's intention and state of mind.³¹ Learned lawyers, who both taught in the law schools and provided legal opinions to prosecutors and defendants, counselled consistently on the importance of distinguishing between malice (*dolus*) and responsibility or blame (*culpa*), and of taking account of the criminal's state of mind.³² In doing so, they followed the influential teaching of Albertus Gandinus, in the early fourteenth century, that the death penalty required evidence of *dolus*, which was absent from some forms of killing.³³

How do these legal distinctions play out in the evidence of practice and non-legal representation? What did murder mean in terms of event and image? Something of the perceived rightfulness of killing can be seen in accounts of tyrannicide, as presented here by Dall'Aglío, or in discussions and narratives involving professional killing, by executioners (Guerra) and soldiers (Bowd); and the distinction between planned and spontaneous homicide is nowhere more visible than in the contrast between poisoning (Pastore) and a stabbing after a sudden, angry confrontation (Cohen). These distinctions were sometime not matched by differential penalties in the law courts (Blanshei). The perceived legitimacy of killing – although still heavily regulated to remove or contain its stigma – extended to the slaughter of animals for human consumption (Dickerson). *Dolus* or malice was undoubtedly present in murders disguised as suicides (Lowe) – rather an intensified and twisted form of malice as the murderer tried to shift the responsibility for the killing away from himself and onto the victim. But law's focus on the murderous event and the state of mind of the killer ignores other significant dimensions to homicide that other studies in the volume explore and analyse: the differentiation by gender and class (Bresc) or by location (Dean). Meanwhile, images and stories of murder had cultural power that had both positive and negative force: an image of murder could acquire an extended, figurative meaning, related to site specificity (Nethersole on Cain and Abel), tales of domestic murders could resonate with patriarchal anxieties (Salzberg and Rospocher), a real child killing could turn into a cannibalistic fable (Leydi), and Jewish blood libels both reflected and inflamed an undertow of antisemitism in Renaissance society (Esposito).

What can one take from this? Murder was normal in Renaissance Italy. The potential for murder was ever present and ever imminent. It took place everywhere, in every type of situation. Motives could be simple or complex. Anyone could be murdered, from the pope to an unborn baby. And anyone could murder, from a young wife to a hired assassin. The

most strenuous efforts on the part of rulers or governments could only hope to reduce murder, not to eliminate it. Catholic teaching forbade it, but murderers chose to ignore moral rules. Gruesome public punishments were not a sufficient deterrent. Those not directly involved in or affected by the murder were still interested in it because of its transgressive aspects. Murder narratives can be found in all media and material forms. Murder in Renaissance Italy may have appeared to be one act because its outcome for the victim was always the same – death – but as these essays have shown, murder is an infinitely variable act, where nothing apart from a corpse can be taken for granted.

Notes

- 1 I. Origo, 'The domestic enemy: The eastern slaves in Tuscany in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries', *Speculum*, 30: 3 (1955), pp. 321–66 at 332.
- 2 Florence, Archivio di stato, Corporazioni religiose soppresse 78, 317, no. 220.
- 3 S. D'Cruze, S. Walklate and S. Pegg, *Murder* (Cullompton, 2006), p. 1.
- 4 T. Dean, *Crime and Justice in Late Medieval Italy* (Cambridge, 2007); P. Spierenburg, *A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Cambridge, 2008).
- 5 G. Ruggiero, *Violence in Early Renaissance Venice* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1980); V. Iardi, 'The assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza and the reaction of Italian diplomacy', in L. Martines (ed.), *Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200–1500* (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 72–113. Among numerous earlier studies: E. Casanova, 'L'uccisione di Galeazzo Maria Sforza e alcuni documenti fiorentini', *Archivio storico lombardo*, 3rd ser., 12 (1899).
- 6 W. Gundersheimer, 'Crime and punishment in Ferrara, 1440–1500', in Martines, ed., *Violence and Civil Disorder*, pp. 104–28; S. Chojnacki, 'Crime, punishment and the Trecento Venetian state', in Martines, ed., *Violence and Civil Disorder*, pp. 198–9, 212–15.
- 7 L. Martines, *April Blood: Florence and the Plot against the Medici* (London, 2003).
- 8 S. Dall'Aglia, *L'assassino del duca. Esilio e morte di Lorenzino de' Medici* (Florence: 2011), and *ibid.*, *The Duke's Assassin: Exile and Death of Lorenzo de' Medici*, trans. Donald Weinstein (New Haven, CT, and London, 2015).
- 9 C. Baja Guarienti, 'Reggio, 28 giugno 1517: liturgia di un omicidio', *Studi storici*, 4 (2008), pp. 985–99; L. Roscioni, 'L'omicidio funesto del principe Savelli: una fonte cronachistica', in S. Luzzatto (ed.), *Prima lezione di metodo storico* (Rome, 2010), pp. 87–104.
- 10 C. Canetta, 'La morte del conte Jacomo Piccinino', *Archivio storico lombardo*, 9 (1882), pp. 252–88; G. Rossi, 'La morte di Onorato Lascaris, conte di Tenda', *Archivio storico italiano*, 5th ser., 15 (1895), pp. 265–75; A. Virgili, 'L'assassinio di Ottaviano Manfredi (13 aprile 1499)', *Archivio storico italiano*, 5th ser., 27 (1901), pp. 101–12.
- 11 Marin Sanudo, *I diarii*, ed. R. Fulin et al., 58 vols. (Venice, 1879–1903), XLIX, col. 429.

- 12 Bologna, Archivio di Stato, Libri inquisitionum, busta 153, reg. 2, fol. 35.
- 13 E. W. Mellyn, *Mad Tuscans and Their Families: A History of Mental Disorder in Early Modern Italy* (Philadelphia, 2014), p. 58.
- 14 Iacobus Novellus, ‘Tractatus aureus defensionum omnium reorum’ in *Tractatus universi iuris* (Venice, 1584), vol. XI, pt. 1.
- 15 H. U. Kantorowicz, *Albertus Gandinus und das Strafrecht der Scholastik* (2 vols., Berlin, 1907–26), II, pp. 209–10, 278–9.
- 16 *Statuta antiquissima Saone (1345)*, ed. L. Balletto (Genoa, 1971), p. 7.
- 17 *Lo statuto di Bergamo del 1331*, ed. C. Storti Storchi (Milan, 1986), p. 165.
- 18 *Statuti di Ascoli Piceno del’anno MCCCLXXVII*, ed. L. Zdekauer and P. Sella (Rome, 1910), p. 91.
- 19 *Statuti della città di Roma*, ed. C. Re (Rome 1880), p. 90; *Statuti bonacolsiani*, ed. E. Dezza, A. M. Lorenzoni and M. Vaini (Mantua, 2002), p. 141; *Statuta et decreta commmunis Genuae* (Bologna, 1498), fol. 6v; *Statuta floride et alme civitatis Cesene* (Brescia, 1473), cl. 26; *Codex statutorum magnifice communitatis atque diœcaesis Alexandrinae* (Alessandria, 1547), p. 61.
- 20 *Capitula, statuta et ordinamenta [civitatis Ast] (1534)*, fol. 29; *Statuti bonacolsiani*, p. 141; R. Sorice, ‘“Impune occidetur, licite occidetur?” La non punibilità dell’omicidio nella dottrina medievale e moderna’, in M. Schmoeckel, O. Condorelli and F. Roumy (eds.), *Der Einfluss der Kanonistik auf die Europäische Rechtskultur*, III (Köln, 2012), pp. 99–106.
- 21 *Codex statutorum magnifice communitatis atque diœcaesis Alexandrinae*, pp. 60–1.
- 22 *Lo statuto di Bergamo*, pp. 165–6.
- 23 *Statuti del comune di Ravenna*, ed. A. Tarlazzi (Ravenna, 1886), p. 158.
- 24 *Statuta floride et alme civitatis Cesene*, cl. 26.
- 25 *Statuti della città di Roma*, p. 90; *Statuta patavina* (Venice, 1528), p. 108 (1366).
- 26 *Statuta lucensis civitatis* (Lucca, 1490), cl. 57.
- 27 *Statuto del podestà dell’anno 1325*, in G. Pinto, F. Salvestrini and A. Zorzi (eds.), *Statuti della repubblica fiorentina* (Florence, 1999), p. 216.
- 28 *Lo statuto comunale di Fabriano (1415)*, ed. G. Avarucci and U. Paoli (Fabriano, 1999), p. 128.
- 29 *Statuta lucensis civitatis*, cl. 61. This treatment of the corpse was added to previous statutes: *Statutum lucani comunis an. 1308* (1867, reprint Lucca, 1991), p. 165.
- 30 *Antiqua ducum Mediolani decreta* (Milan, 1644), p. 187.
- 31 E. Dezza, ‘Gli statuti di Tortona’, *Studia et documenta historiae et iuris*, 43 (1977), pp. 408–13; A. Pertile, *Storia del diritto italiano* (6 vols., Turin, 1896–1903), V, p. 576.
- 32 M. Lucchesi, *Si quis occidit occidetur: L’omicidio doloso nelle fonti consiliari (secoli XIV–XVI)* (Pavia, 1999), pp. 48–71.
- 33 Kantorowicz, *Albertus Gandinus*, pp. 209–10, 278–9.