Introduction

Language, Mind, Freedom and Time: The Modern Arab Intellectual Tradition in Four Words

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Arab writers have often invoked the elusive legacy of the Nahda at moments of crisis as well as hope, most recently amid the wave of Arab uprisings in 2011. The Arabic revival and reform period of the long nineteenth century which Albert Hourani famously conceived as the liberal age and periodized from 1798–1939, has indeed functioned as the foundational process of Arab modernity as well as a bedrock of cultural self-reflection. Historically, the Nahda – literally "rising up," but usually glossed as "renaissance" or "awakening" – was neither a unified process or stable actor-category nor can it be traced back to a single, incontestable moment of inception.[1] In fact, the Nahda existed before there was a word for it, before that term was invested with various meanings. This introduction will critically assess the history and historiography of the Nahda by taking the four words of Hourani's seminal study of the period, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, as analytical entry points: Language, Mind, Freedom and Time. Before turning to those key concepts, however, we must first sketch the genealogy of early Arabic perceptions of the Nahda along with the political and academic context of 1962, the year in which *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* was first published and the revival of Nahda studies in the two decades that preceded the Arab uprisings of 2011.

Arabic Perceptions and Receptions of the Nahda

Albert Hourani never used the term Nahda, nor did the first generation of Nahdawis identify with such a term.[2] The earliest political and patriotic invocation of the Nahda came from the second generation of Syro-Lebanese writers in Egypt, particularly the young radicals Francis

[1] For a trenchant critique of the purity of origins, see Foucault (1977).
[2] On our decision to regloss "the liberal age" as the Nahda, see our Notes on Translation and Transliteration.

Marrash (1836–73) and Adib Ishaq (1856–84).[3] Their peripatetic, dissident colleague, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (1804–87), issued the first programmatic use of the term when he declared, "There is no Nahda without a women's Nahda."[4] The Cairo newspaper *al-Hilal* started mainstreaming the term from 1892, although initially only in its literary sense.[5] Jurji Zaydan (1861–1914), founding editor of *al-Hilal*, eschewed al-Shidyaq's call and canonized the Nahda instead as a league of great men in his *Biographies of Famous Figures of the East in the 19th Century*, first published in 1902–03 with funding from the Ibadi sultan of Zanzibar.[6] Zaydan's widely-circulated book provided the model for many subsequent historians of the Nahda, particularly the biographies by the Egyptian idealist ʿAbbas Mahmud al-ʿAqqad (1889–1964). The first journals entitled *al-Nahda* came out around the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.[7] The term became firmly established as an organizing principle and consciousness-raising rallying point through the *Arabic Nahda Society* founded by Young Turks from Damascus.[8]

In 1924, the American University of Beirut (AUB) held a student essay competition on "The Reasons for the Arabic Nahda in the 19th century." The 22-year-old winner of the Howard Bliss Prize, Anis Nusuli, was to serialize his eponymous essay in AUB's and Cairo University's in-house journals before publishing it as a widely-circulated textbook in 1926.[9] Nusuli's account of the Nahda was much more sophisticated than Zaydan's biographical sketches and in some ways anticipated Hourani's approach. Travel accounts by the Enlightenment Orientalists Comte de Volney and Jean Louis Burckhardt set the stage of his book. The Napoleonic occupation of Egypt from 1798 to 1801 and the subsequent rise of Mehmed Ali Pasha was narrated through the eyes of the Egyptian chronicler ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Jabarti. The role of foreign missionaries in establishing schools and printing presses was integrated into an analysis that was notable for its division into chapters around new cultural institutions: "journalism and publications," "literary and scientific societies," "libraries," "the Orientalists and the Nahda," "Theatre" and "Emigration."[10]

[3] Brugman (1984: 8–10).
[4] al-ʿAzmeh and Trabulsi (1995: 34).
[5] Zaydan (1892: 123–25). Zaydan (1901: 235–36) extended this literary essay to include science.
[6] Ghazal (2010b: 62–64).
[7] For example, in Cairo in January 1908, Tunis in 1909 and Baghdad in 1913. Tarrazi (1913: vol. 1, 81, 191, 255).
[8] At the same time, an Orthodox Nahda emerged in Palestine. See Tamari (2014).
[9] Nusuli (1985). Nusuli went on to become a noted historian, journalist and teacher in Baghdad and Beirut.
[10] Ibid.

The same year that Nusuli's Nahda textbook came out, Taha Husayn (1889–1973) published his seminal *On pre-Islamic Poetry (Fi al-shiʿir al-jahili)*, which argued that many of the classical Arabic poems attributed to the "age of ignorance" were actually written after the rise of Islam. The book caused an enormous uproar and Husayn was accused of blasphemy because of the scientific doubts it cast on the divine nature of the Quran, which harboured the potential for inciting popular sedition.[11] The vilification and subsequent vindication of Husayn that followed would fragment – arguably once and for all – the harmony and syncretism that had characterized the Nahda even after sporadic rifts burst into the open, as when Farah Antun's *The Philosophy of Averroes* came out in 1903, or ʿAli ʿAbd al-Raziq's *Islam and the Foundations of Rule* in 1924.[12]

In subsequent years, such ideological competitors as the exiled pan-Islamic organiser Shakib Arslan (1869–1946), who lectured on "The Arabic Nahda in the Present Time" on his return to Damascus in 1937, the Lebanese communist historian Raʾif Khuri who penned an antifascist defense of the French Revolution in 1943, and the Baʿthists Zaki al-Arsuzi (1889–1968) and Michel ʿAflaq (1910–89) all deployed the term Nahda to formulate different versions of Arab nationalist resurgence.[13] From the beginning, the focus on the Nahda period as the source of a common, modern Arab consciousness had to contend with discourses of ancient authenticity. The rise of archaeology encouraged essential territorial and ethnic identities that offered justification for the colonial invention of new nation-states.[14] Often these discourses represented Arab nations, especially Egypt, as female bodies whose metaphorical chastity nationalists sought to protect from the violations of colonial rule.[15]

[11] Cachia (1956); Hourani (1962); C. Smith (1983); Brugman (1984); Malti-Douglas (1988); Darraj (2005); Y. Ayalon (2009). Taha Husayn anticipated the fall-out early on in his book but sought comfort in the vanguardism of the cultured elites: "I am confident that even if this research angers some and troubles others, it will satisfify this small group of enlightened people who are in reality the promise of the future, the basis of the modern Nahda, and the storehouse of the new culture." Cited and translated by Sacks (2015: 77).

[12] See Leyla Dakhli, Chapter 13, on the ʿAbduh-Antun debate as well as the controversy around Nazira Zayn al-Din's *Veiling and Unveiling* published in Beirut two years after Taha Husayn's *On Pre-Islamic Poetry* came out. In both controversies, Rashid Rida played a key role.

[13] S. Arslan (2008); R. Khuri (1943); Nordbruch (2009); Bashkin (2006). Arabic synonyms for the Nahda, like "al-inbiʿath," did not stick. See, for example, *Udabaʾ al-ʿArab fi al-Andalus wa ʿasr al-inbiʿath* (Beirut: Dar al-Sadir, 1937) by Butrus al-Bustani – no relations to the eponymous nineteenth century figure, *pace* Brockelmann (1938: Suppl. II, 768).

[14] For Lebanon, see Kaufman (2000), for Egypt, see Colla (2008).

[15] Baron (2005).

In response to such objectification, Arab feminists invoked a women's Nahda, particularly in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, as part of national and regional women's movements that agitated both nationally and internationally for political rights.[16] Some were active in the communist party, student organizations or trade unions, including the Egyptian novelist Latifa Zayyat (1923–96), who challenged not only the economic order of Arab state capitalism but also the chauvinism that undergirded it. Female Islamic intellectuals such as Quran exegete and journalist, ʿAʾisha ʿAbd al-Rahman (1913–1998), and the social activist and orator, Zaynab Ghazali (1917–2005), unsettled the claims of state secularism and, just like their secular counterparts, often ended up in prison.[17]

After Arab states gained independence, elite preoccupations with industrial modernization and national economic development marginalized the Nahda discourse and coopted many women's movements. Nevertheless, Arab liberals continued to champion idealist conceptions of Arab modernity. In Nasser's Egypt, the literary critic, Luwis ʿAwad (1914–90) developed a comprehensive, albeit Egypt-centric, Nahda corpus, which was animated in part by an attempt to historicize the July 1952 revolution and to wrest the monopoly on liberation away from the Egyptian military.[18]

Israel's defeat of neighboring Arab states in 1967 hit Arab intellectuals "like a lightening bolt," and ushered in the end of Nasserism.[19] As the Syrian philosopher, Sadik al-ʿAzm (b. 1934), recalled self-critically: "We fell victim to the erroneous idea that history had already decided all the issues raised by the Nahda in favour of progress, genuine modernization, modern science, secularism, socialism, and national liberation."[20] The *Naksa*, as the defeat came to be glossed, politicised some ivory-tower academics like al-ʿAzm and his nemesis Edward Said (1936–2003). At the same time, the Nahda was either vilified as the root

[16] Badran (1995: 223–50), N. Ali (2000), Bier (2011); Fleishman (2003). For the Cairene journal *al-Nahda al-nisaʾiyya* and the Baghdadi women's club, "Nadi al-nahda al-nisaʾiyya," of the 1920s, see Booth (2001), Baron (2005); N. Ali (2009: 22–24), Bashkin (2009: 140–1).

[17] McLarney (2011), Mahmood (2005: 67–72).

[18] The first tome of this incomplete, five-volume study of "Modern Egyptian Intellectual History: The Historical Background" (1969) opened with the claim that women had a long record of resisting ruling elites predating Napoleon's invasion. See also ʿAwad (1962), where he presents the widely discredited Khedive Ismaʿil ("Egypt is no longer in Africa, it is now in Europe") as a great patron of the Nahda.

[19] al-ʿAzm (1997: 116). On the impact of 1967 on Arab intellectuals, see also Kassab (2010) and Abu Rabiʿ (2003).

[20] Ibid. 114.

of all evil or neglected entirely. Some ahistoricist lines of inquiry emerged in what were highly contested attempts to make sense of the post-Naksa Arab condition: myth and gnosis, theology, scientific Marxism, formal logic, structuralist linguistics and literary criticism as well as psychoanalysis.[21] The Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui (b. 1933) strove to recover the emancipatory tradition of the Nahda in his seminal *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?*, first published in French in 1974.[22] His historicist approach combined Marxism and liberalism. By locating the origins of Nahda consciousness in the mid-nineteenth century, he established a correlation between Arabic cultural production and the expansion of organized capital across the Mediterranean. Laroui argued that critical theory could better confront colonialism with the hard facts of its historical record of economic and discursive brutality than any of the escapist alternatives of his day, especially as nationalist elites, particularly in Morocco, responded to colonial violence by "retraditionalizing" society.[23]

Laroui's intervention was overshadowed by the impact of his compatriot, the Averroist philosopher Muhammad ʿAbid al-Jabiri (1935–2010). Al-Jabiri's four-volume *Critique of Arab Reason*, published between 1980 and 2000, relegated the nineteenth century to a derivative episode of Islamic history. He reasoned that the "modern Nahda" was merely revivalist and lacked the originality necessary to render visible the "colonizing action of Europe" and the Orientalist logic of Arab decline.[24] Therefore, the Nahda did not constitute the epistemic shift of earlier cultural leaps of the ʿAbbasid and Andalusian epochs.[25] By locating the "true" Nahdas before the European Renaissance, but well after the Prophet Muhammad's lifetime, al-Jabiri launched a multi-pronged critique of liberal, Marxist and Islamic fundamentalist readings of Islamic history.[26] His alternative treated what he calls the Arabo-Islamic canon as a dynamic "heritage" ("*al-turath*") that invited rational and critical engagement without succumbing to European frames of analysis.[27] Al-Jabiri's early critique of Arab elites' complicity in neoliberalism made his work popular in Arab leftist circles. But his bias against what he

[21] Laroui (1974: 3–5). [22] Laroui (1976). [23] Laroui (1974: chapter 1).
[24] Sacks (2015: 133). See also Jurj Tarabishi (1996) for a critique of al-Jabiri's project, and Elie Chalala on the controversy, www.aljadid.com/content/elie-chalala-reports-tarabishi-al-jabberi-debate.
[25] Al-Jabiri (2011: 50–1).
[26] Against al-Jabiri's charge that treating the Nahda as an Arab version of the renaissance would render Arab history a belated derivative of European culture, the literary historian J. Brugman argues that the concept of al-Nahda "in itself already implies a difference from the European renaissance" that designated neither an awakening nor a "rebirth," but rather a "rising up." Brugman (1984: 8–10).

perceived as the historical philosophical deficits of the Arab east and his acceptance of Saudi largesse late in life cast doubt over his scholarly integrity.[28] Indeed, al-Jabiri's intervention was dwarfed in turn by intellectual production coming out of the Gulf states that championed *salafi* morality in well-funded media outlets and justified the region's drift toward economic liberalization.[29]

A different version of the Nahda, recalibrated for formal Arab politics, appeared in the Tunisian elections of 1989. The leader of the "Islamic Tendency" (*al-Tayyar al-islami*), Rachid Ghannoushi (b. 1941), had changed the name of his movement to the Ennahda Party (*hizb al-nahda*), in order to signal his disavowal of its more radical origins and his acceptance of liberal democracy.[30]

After the Cold War and the end of the Lebanese civil war (1985–1989), the Nahda reemerged as a theme in wider Arabic public discourse – at once pushed by the state to sanction anti-Islamist repression, and championed by intellectuals critical of state violence.[31] In 1992, liberal Egyptian intellectuals gathered around Gaber ʿAsfour (b. 1944) in order to found "The Enlightenment Association" (*jamʿiyyat al-tanwir*), which reissued many of the classics of "the liberal age," including Farah Antun's *The Philosophy of Averroes*, ʿAli ʿAbd al-Raziq's *Islam and the Foundations of Rule*, Taha Husayn's *The Future of Culture in Egypt*, and Salam Musa's primer on the European Renaissance, "*What is the Nahda?*"[32] Between 1990–93, the quixotic Damascene journal *Qadayat wa-shahadat* sought to at once preserve and reshape the memory of the Nahda in general and the legacy of Taha Husayn in particular.[33]

This rediscovery of the Nahda occurred in the context of three concurrent menaces: radical austerity policies imposed by international financial institutions; the rise of militant Islamist groups; and repression by state security apparatuses, especially in Egypt and Algeria. It was a time when Islamists assassinated dozens of liberal intellectuals such as the Egyptian professor and columnist Farag Foda (1946–92) even as the state exiled many others and banned their

[27] al-Jabiri (1999). In this aspect, al-Jabiri's approach resembles Dipesh Chakrabarti's *Provincializing Europe* (2000). *Turathism* continues to be an infuential method among scholars of Islam.
[28] Aksikas (2009: 89–92). [29] Said (1979/1994: 224–30), and Browers (2009).
[30] After two decades of exile and state repression, Ghannouchi and his Nahda Party won the first Constituent Assembly election after the 2011 revolution on a market economy platform and with substantial financial support from the Gulf.
[31] Abaza (2010). [32] Najjar (2004: 200). See also G. Shukri (1992).
[33] Kassab (forthcoming). As we shall see, the curatorial function of liberal intellectuals was itself a defining feature of the Nahda – Nadia Bou Ali (2012:33) speaks of the Nahda as an "archive for the 'Arab nation'."

works. Most famously, the Egyptian Court of Cassation convicted the theologian, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943–2010), of apostasy for his historicist and hermeutical approach to Quran exegesis before death threats from Islamists forced him into exile.[34]

As the space for critical thought appeared to shrink in this atmosphere of economic, political and religious violence, and many self-declared liberals embraced American interventionism in the region, leftist intellectuals in Beirut and Damascus began to invoke the Nahda as an emblem and a shield. In 1992, the editor of Beirut's Marxist flagship journal *al-Tariq*, Mohammad Dakrub, published a well-received literary history on Nahda luminaries such as Amin al-Rihani, Jibran Khalil Jibran, Maroun ʿAbbud and Raʾif Khuri.[35] Under Dakroub's editorship *al-Tariq* ran a series on the contemporary relevance of the Nahda throughout the late 1990s. This culminated in a long and probing essay by the Lebanese novelist, Elias Khoury (b. 1948), after the American invasion of Afghanistan. In "Towards a Third Nahda," Khoury called for "a return to modern Arab history . . . to search for the truth that might help us escape from the frightful decline into which the Arabs have slid at the turn of the 21st century."[36] The Syrian psychoanalytical thinker Jurj Tarabishi (1939–2016) also rediscovered the history of the Nahda. His *From the Nahda to Apostasy* (2000) opens with the lament: "I belong to the generation that has wagered on Arab nationalism, revolution and socialism and has lost."[37] In *Iterations of a Blocked Nahda*, Palestinian Arab nationalist and former Knesset member, ʿAzmi Bishara (b. 1956) reflected on how to revive the orphaned Palestinian contributions to the Nahda project after the expulsions during the Nakba of 1948 that led to the creation of two generations of diasporic intellectuals.[38]

Syrian dissident Haytham Mannaʿ (b. 1951) echoed these appeals for a new Nahda.[39] Writing eight months before the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, Mannaʿ considered it imperative to shift the Nahda project from "superficial" cultural and political battles to matters of concern to the broader social base struggling for change. It was after Muhammad Bouazizi's self-immolation in December 2010 ignited the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings that the Nahda discourse spilled over onto Arab

[34] Abu Zayd (2004, 2006). Agrama (2012: ch. 1). For an intimate documentary tribute, see Muhammad ʿAli al-Atassi (dir.), *Waiting for Abu Zayd* (2010).
[35] Dakrub (1992). See also M. al-Sharif (2000).
[36] For a translation of this text, see Weiss and Hanssen (forthcoming).
[37] Tarabishi (2000:7).
[38] Bishara (2003: 43). For a historically grounded, epistemological critique of the Nahda discourse, see Daghir (2008).
[39] Haytham Mannaʿ, "Min ajl nahda jadida," *aljazeera.net*, 15 April, 2010.

streets. In particular, the chanting of "The People want the Fall of the Regime" was inspired by Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi's famous existentialist poem of 1933, "The Will to Live." Al-Shabbi (1909–1934) did not write political poetry. His *diwan*, which included poems such as "To the People" and "To the Tyrants of the World" that were originally published in the short-lived, experimental Egyptian journal *Apollo*, was not resistance literature but naturalistic and dreamy poetry.[40] But chanted by thousands of protesters in 2011, the poem energized the people to break all barriers of fear in Cairo and invoked Tunisian-Egyptian solidarity:

> If, one day, the people want to live, then fate will answer their call.
> And their night will then begin to fade, and the chains break and fall.
> For he who is not embraced by life's passion will dissipate into thin air,
> Woe to him whom life loves not, against the void that strikes there,
> At least that is what all creation has told me, and what its hidden
> spirits declare.[41]

1962: The Birth of Arab Tragedy?

The earliest and most famous English-language account to politically mobilize nineteenth-century Arab history was George Antonius's classic study *The Arab Awakening*.[42] A romantic account of the birth and betrayal of the Arab national movement funded by the American businessman Charles R. Crane, the book was written in large measure to convince the British public that Arab nationalist aspirations were legitimate and that Arabs deserved independence.[43] In his reappraisal of Antonius, Albert Hourani wistfully noted: "Already by 1938 a shadow of what was to come had fallen across [his] pages: a new age of mass-politics [emerged], when issues would be determined otherwise than by delicate negotiations between men who understood and trusted one another."[44] The British-born historian Albert Hourani had wanted to write a book quite similar to Antonius's after he completed his undergraduate degree at Oxford in 1936.[45] Instead, he decided to go to the Middle East where he taught at the AUB before the outbreak of World War II swept him up in the policy and intelligence world of what Elie Kedourie memorably branded as the Anglo-Arab labyrinth.[46]

[40] Colla (2012). On the Apollo Group, see Awad (1986).
[41] Translated by Elliott Colla (2012).
[42] Antonius (1938). Like Hourani, Antonius did not use the term Nahda.
[43] Hourani (1981: 193–216). Antonius's book stands at the beginning of a rich Anglophone historiography on Arab nationalism in which Ernest Dawn (1973) and Philip Khoury (1983) were key contributions.
[44] Hourani (1981: 213–4). [45] See Hanssen's Chapter 2 in this volume.

When Hourani eventually set out to write his magisterial account of nineteenth and early twentieth century Arab intellectual history, published as *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* in 1962, he eschewed Antonius's nationalist passions in favor of casting a tragic eye upon a fading liberal age. In his epilogue to *Arabic Thought*, Hourani lamented that "[a]n age passed away in 1939, and with it went a certain style of political thought."[47] And in his Antonius lecture of 1977, he confessed that rereading *The Arab Awakening* had filled him with "a certain feeling of sadness."[48] Indeed, while writing *Arabic Thought*, Hourani witnessed the brief but bloody Lebanese civil war of 1958 in which he was disaffected by both the violent insurgents and the corrupt president whose foreign minister, Charles Malik – Hourani's former mentor – invited U.S. marines to secure and stabilize the country.[49] The way that superpower rivalry turned the Middle East into a theater of the Cold War sharply disagreed with Hourani. But he was also unenthusiastic about the United Arab Republic – which united Syria and Egypt into a single polity between 1958 and 1961 – and Nasser's increasingly authoritarian behavior.

When the United Arab Republic came to its ignominious end, Arab intellectuals gathered in Cairo. Summoned by *al-Ahram* editor-in-chief and Nasser's intellectual confidant, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal (1923–2016), they convened for three months to discuss their relationship with the state and their social responsibility. At this point many Egyptian intellectuals were either in prison – especially communists and Islamic thinkers – or disengaged from the state. But without them, Haykal baited his colleagues, neither renewal nor mobilization was possible.[50] The participants were not easily swayed. Lutfi al-Khuli, a briefly imprisoned and recently enlisted leftist lawyer who famously brought Jean-Paul Sartre to Cairo in 1967, opened the proceedings by identifying three overlapping intellectual crises: stifled creativity, lack of historical depth and a decline in critical method.[51] ʿAbbas Mahmud al-ʿAqqad, the Egyptian antifascist featured in Chapter 11, who by 1961 had become the doyen of Egypt's conservative secular intellectuals complained that modern Arab intellectuals had become too focuses on rights, forgetting their duties to the nation. The younger generation of liberals and leftists would have none of it. Anouar Abdel Malek, Hourani's friends Luwis ʿAwad and Magdi Wahba[52], as well as the Lebanese Arab socialist Clovis

[46] Kedourie (1976). [47] Hourani (1962: 341). [48] See also Hourani (1981: 212).
[49] Albert Hourani, "The Pull of Arab Unity," *The Times*, May 21 and 22, 1958.
[50] Abdel Malek, "La 'Crise des intellectuels'" (1962: 192).
[51] Abdel-Malek, (1962: 190).
[52] Albert Hourani, "Obituary of Magdi Wahba," *The Independent*, October 1991.

Maksoud (1927–2016), who had made a name for himself with his book *The Crisis of the Intellectuals* (*Azmat al-muthaqqafin*) three years earlier, objected to being co-opted into the Egyptian military state project so cheaply. Generations of secular intellectuals, not the military, they argued, had made Arab revolutions possible.[53]

The year in which Hourani published *Arabic Thought* was a watershed in the history and historiography of colonialism and its tortured relationship with liberalism. Jamaica and Algeria, two colonies that were central to the British and French empires, celebrated their independence that year. Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* was published, and C.L.R. James's epic story of the Haitian Revolution - *The Black Jacobins* – was reissued.[54] If both were literary monuments of the ongoing liberation struggles, they also sensed the imminent dangers of atrophying anticolonial discourse. Pierre Bourdieu had just returned from four years of French military service in Algeria to witness his first book, *The Algerians*, come out in English translation.[55] Meanwhile, Michel Foucault launched a different kind of revolution in France when he published his first book, *Madness and Civilization*, a critique of modernity's colonizing effects on humanity.[56] In Germany, Jürgen Habermas published his *Habilitation* on the transformation of the public sphere.[57] Hannah Arendt's *On Revolution* recuperated republican ideals.[58] Historians in England were engaged in questions of empire and agency: Arnold Toynbee had just completed the twelfth and final volume of his magnum opus *A Study of History*; Robinson and Gallagher circulated their ideas of imperial diffusion in *Africa and the Victorians*[59]; and Raymond Williams, Eric Hobsbawm and E.P. Thompson published landmark studies on the age of revolution and the formation of working-class consciousness that energized social history and cultural studies in Britain.[60] Meanwhile, Walt Rostow published his influential anticommunist manifesto *The Stages of Development*.[61]

Even as Albert Hourani looked back to the past with regret, other great contemporary books on the modern Middle East invoked the long nineteenth century more confidently, as an era that had bequeathed progress

[53] Abdel-Malek (1962: 194–5). [54] Fanon (1990); James (1938/1963).
[55] Bourdieu (1961). [56] Foucault (1961). [57] Habermas (1961/1994).
[58] Arendt (1963). [59] Toynbee (1934–1961), Robinson and Gallagher (1961).
[60] R. Williams (1961), Hobsbawm (1962), Thompson (1963). On their influence on the writing of history, see Eley (2005).
[61] Rostow (1962). Many other enduring Anglo-American textbooks on liberalism came out around the same time; all remained oblivious to the political and economic force of anticolonialism. E.g., M. Friedman (1962); C.B. MacPherson (1962); K. Minogue (1963).