

Organized Violence after Civil War

Nearly half of all countries emerging from civil conflict relapse into war within a few years of signing a peace agreement. The postwar trajectories of armed groups vary from organizational cohesion to dissolution, demilitarization to remilitarization. In *Organized Violence after Civil War*, Daly analyzes evidence from thirty-seven militia groups in Colombia, demonstrating that the primary driving force behind these changes is the variation in recruitment patterns within, and between, the warring groups. She documents the transition from war to peace through interviews with militia commanders, combatants, and victims. Using rich ex-combatant survey data and geo-coded information on violence over fifty years of war, Daly explains the dynamics inside armed organizations and the strategic interactions among them. She also shows how the theory may be used beyond Colombia, both within the region of Latin America and across the rest of the world.

Sarah Zukerman Daly joined the University of Notre Dame faculty in 2013 as assistant professor in Political Science after receiving her Ph.D. in the subject from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her doctoral dissertation received the 2011 Lucian Pye Award for the Best Dissertation in Political Science from MIT. Her research interests lie in the fields of civil war, peace processes, international security, and ethnic politics with a regional focus on Latin America. Daly has served as a fellow in the Political Science Department and at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.



Sarah Daly argues that organizational characteristics of armed groups in Colombia strongly affect whether they remilitarize after a peace agreement. Their extensive ties enable members of local groups to remilitarize, but members of non-local groups disperse and lose this capacity. Networks and geography are more important than access to weapons, which is almost universal. Daly's extraordinary fieldwork with extremely violent former group members provides convincing quantitative and qualitative support for this important argument. Organized Violence after Civil War is an extraordinary work of political science.

— Robert O. Keohane, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

This study provides a novel and thoughtful explanation of an important question for societies emerging from warfare – why do some groups silence their guns after agreeing to peace, while others remilitarize and return to violence? The argument highlights the role of the geography of recruitment – whether militant groups recruit and deploy fighters locally or from farther afield. The theory put forth is both parsimonious and subtle, and the empirical evidence adduced for it from the case of paramilitary groups in Colombia is extremely impressive. This book is certainly a must-read for any scholar of Colombia or any scholar of paramilitaries, but it will also find an important audience among scholars interested in the complicated dynamics of civil conflict and the behavior of non-state actors as they navigate the often stormy seas of postconflict transition. – Page Fortna, Columbia University

Organized Violence after Civil War explores why some – but not all – armed groups remilitarize after demobilization. Daly argues that the explanation lies in the geography of recruitment – whether the group recruited members from the locale where it was deployed – and in its strategic interaction with other groups after conflict's end. She shows that her theory accounts for why about half of Colombia's three dozen paramilitary groups remobilized, drawing on a wide range of data, from interviews with imprisoned leaders to surveys of demobilized combatants to unpublished government documents. This is an extraordinary achievement based on remarkable field research over several years.

- Elisabeth Jean Wood, Yale University

Civil wars have a strong tendency to recur, yet we know little about why. Drawing on a stunning array of data from extensive fieldwork in Colombia, Sarah Zukerman Daly shows that the geography of armed group recruitment explains why countries at peace slip back into violence. Groups that recruit locally remain cohesive after wars end whereas groups that recruit outside their own region wither away as their members depart. Regions comprised of locally based groups thus maintain a stable and peaceful balance of power, whereas regions where local groups neighbor non-local groups become unstable and prone to violence. Anyone seeking to understand the recurrence of violence after civil war should read this excellent book.

- Alexander B. Downes, George Washington University



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(continued after index)





Organized Violence after Civil War

The Geography of Recruitment in Latin America

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University of Notre Dame, Indiana





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For my family





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Abbreviations

ACCU Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (Peasant

Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá)

ACR Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (Colombian

Agency for Reintegration), previously called Alta Consejería

para la Reintegración (High Council for Reintegration)

ANAPO Alianza Nacional Popular (National Popular Alliance)
ARENA Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican

Alliance, El Salvador)

ASEDSUR Asociación de Desmovilizados de Urabá (Association of

Demobilized of Urabá)

AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense

Forces of Colombia)

BACRIM Bandas Criminales Emergentes (Emerging Criminal Gangs)

BCN Bloque Cacique Nutibara (Cacique Nutibara Bloc)
CAD Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo (Committees of

Self-Defense and Development)

CDC Comités de Defensa Civil (Civil Defense Committees)

CDF Civil Defense Forces (Sierra Leone)

CEDE El Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Económico (Center

of Economic Development Studies)

CERAC Centro de Recursos Para el Análisis de Conflictos (Conflict

Analysis Resource Center)

CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States)

CINEP/PPP Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular / Programa

por la Paz (Center for Research and Popular Education /

Peace Program)

CNRR Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación

(National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation)

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xx Abbreviations

CODHES Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el

Desplazamiento (Consultancy for Human Rights and

Displacement)

CRS Corriente de Renovación Socialista (Socialist Renewal

Current)

CTI Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación (Technical Investigation

Unit)

DANE Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística

(National Administrative Department of Statistics)

DAS Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative

Department of Security)

DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (United States)
DECAS Defensa Civil Antisubversiva (Anti-subversive Civil

Defense Forces)

DIPOL Dirección de Inteligencia Policial (Directorate of Police

Intelligence)

ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National

Liberation Army)

EPL Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army)

ERG Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (Guevarista

Revolutionary Army)

ERP Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary People's

Army)

ERPAC Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista

Colombiano (Antiterrorist Popular Revolutionary Army of

Colombia)

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

FDN Frente Democrático Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan

Democratic Front)

FIDH Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de

l'Homme (International Federation for Human Rights)

FIP Fundación Ideas para la Paz (Ideas for Peace Foundation)
FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional

(Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, El Salvador)

FPSG Resistance Front against GAM Separatists (Indonesia)
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique

Liberation Front)

FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista

National Liberation Front, Nicaragua)

GAM Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, Indonesia)
ICBF Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (Colombian

Family Welfare Institute)



Abbreviations xxi

ICG International Crisis Group

ICTJ International Center for Transitional Justice

IEPRI Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales

(Institute of Political Studies and International Relations)

IGAC Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (Agustín Codazzi

Geographic Institute)

INPEC Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (National

Penitentiary and Prison Institute)

IOM International Organization for Migration

IRA Irish Republican Army

JAC Juntas de Acción Comunal (Community Action

Committees)

JAL Juntas Administradora Locales (Local Administration

Boards)

LRA Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda)

M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April Movement)

MAPP Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz (Mission to Support the

Peace Process)

MAQL Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (Quintín Lame Armed

Movement)

MAS Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers)

MEVEC Mecanismo de Verificación Conjunto de Bandas Criminales

Emergentes (Joint Verification Mechanism for Emerging

Criminal Gangs)

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MILPAS Milicias Populares Anti-Somocistas (and later on,

Anti-Sandinistas) (Anti-Somoza / Anti-Sandinista Popular

Militias) (Nicaragua)

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines)

MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's

Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

MRTA Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento

Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, Peru)

NBI Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (unsatisfied basic needs)

NGO Nongovernmental organization

NRM National Resistance Movement (Uganda)

OEA/OAS Organización de los Estados Americanos (Organization of

American States)

PAC Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (Civil Self-Defense Patrols,

Guatemala)

PCP-SL Partido Comunista de Perú-Sendero Luminoso (Communist

Party of Peru–Shining Path)

PEPES Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar (People Persecuted by Pablo

Escobar)



xxii Abbreviations

PRT Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Revolutionary

Worker's Party)

RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National

Resistance)

RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

SAME Sistema de Acompañamiento, Monitoreo, y Evaluación

(System of Accompaniment, Monitoring and Evaluation)

SENA Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (National Training

Service)

SIJIN Policía Nacional de Colombia (Colombian National Police)

SIMCI Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos

(Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System)

SLA Sierra Leone Army SSR Security-sector reform

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola

(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UP Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union)

UPA Uganda People's Army

URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca

(Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)

USAID United States Agency for International Development

YATAMA Yapti Tasba Masraka Nanih Aslatakanka ("Sons of Mother

Earth," Nicaragua)