

Rebelocracy

Conventional wisdom portrays war zones as chaotic and anarchic. In reality, however, they are often orderly. This work introduces a new phenomenon in the study of civil war: wartime social order. It investigates theoretically and empirically how new forms of order emerge and function in conflict zones. By theorizing the interaction between combatants and civilians and how they impact wartime institutions, the study delves into rebel behavior, civilian agency, and their impact on the conduct of war. Based on years of fieldwork in Colombia, the theory is tested with qualitative and quantitative evidence on communities, armed groups, and individuals in conflict zones. The study shows how armed groups strive to rule civilians, and how the latter influence the terms of that rule. The theory and empirical results illuminate our understanding of civil war, institutions, local governance, nonviolent resistance, and the emergence of political order.

Ana Arjona is Assistant Professor of political science at Northwestern University. She is the coeditor of *Rebel Governance in Civil War* (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Her work has been funded by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the United States Institute of Peace, Columbia University, Northwestern University, and Yale University in the United States; the International Development Research Centre in Canada; the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden; and the Department for International Development and the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK.

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Rebelocracy

Social Order in the Colombian Civil War

ANA ARJONA
Northwestern University



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To Eudald Lerga

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Acknowledgments

I decided to embark on the study of the dynamics of civil war in the early 2000s. Colombia was still enduring some of the worst years of the armed conflict between the state, insurgents, and paramilitary groups. I was initially determined to investigate how countries can recover from the wounds that war leaves behind. But I quickly realized that I would not be able to understand the challenges that societies endure in a postwar period without an understanding of what happens *during* war. Even though I was concerned about the intense violence that often characterizes civil wars, I realized that much more changes in war and we did not know much about it. In particular, war seemed to entail not only the destruction of a preexisting reality but also the emergence of multiple new local realities. There was a sense of normality during lulls in the fighting in conflict zones – but such normality was quite different from place to place, and it seemed to shape civilians' lives in profound ways. I set out to understand which new forms of order emerge in conflict zones, what roles do civilians and combatants play in that process, and what are the consequences for the conduct of war.

This book comes from my doctoral dissertation. I was fortunate to start a PhD in political science at Yale University in the same year that the Program on Order, Conflict and Violence was born. It was a tremendously stimulating place, with professors and students asking new questions, crafting innovative theories, and conducting dedicated fieldwork across the globe. I benefited from the insights and mentoring of an outstanding dissertation committee. The scholarship and teaching of my advisor, Stathis Kalyvas, influenced my approach to social science research in ways that transcend this book. I thank him for continuously challenging

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As Colombia gets close to a peace agreement between the insurgent group FARC and the government, my hope is that this book contributes to our understanding of how war transformed communities and individuals – and how such transformations should be taken into account as the country transitions into peace.

Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms

ACC	Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Casanare (Colombia)
ACCU	Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (Colombia)
AMV	Self-Defense Forces of Meta and Vichada (Colombia)
AUC	United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
BACRIM	Emerging Criminal Bands (Colombia)
C.	Case number
CAJAR	Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo (Colombia)
CNAI	Fundación Nuevo Arco Iris (Colombia)
CP	Communist Party of Colombia
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinsertion
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
ELN	National Liberation Army (Colombia)
EPL	Popular Liberation Army (Colombia)
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDEs	Individually demobilized combatants
IELN	Individually demobilized former ELN members
IFARC	Individually demobilized former FARC members
Int.	Interview number
IPARAS	Individually demobilized former paramilitary members
JAC	Juntas de Acción Comunal (Communal Action Association)
M19	April 19 Movement (Colombia)
MOE	Misión de Observación Electoral (Electoral Observation Mission)
NPLF	National Patriotic Front of Liberia

xxii	<i>Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms</i>
NRA	The National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NYT	<i>New York Times</i>
PKP	Communist Party of the Philippines
PLA	The People’s Liberation Army (China)
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SPLA	Sudan’s People Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan’s People Liberation Movement
TPLF	The Tigray’s People’s Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
UNITA	The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola