Introduction

“A Doughty and Honourable Opponent”: Historicizing the Afghan–Pakistan Borderlands

On April 20, 1960, The Times of London ran an article on the death of the Faqir of Ipi. The article described this political and religious leader from Pakistan’s frontier tribal area as “a doughty and honourable opponent,” grudgingly admiring how “He defied for years all the efforts of political agents and military columns to induce his surrender or neutralise his activities” against the British Empire.¹ The Faqir had long been influential in frontier politics, and the key events of the mid-twentieth century there had punctuated his career. He had led a major tribal revolt against the colonial state in 1936–7; appealed to the Axis powers during the Second World War for financial and military support in renewing his resistance against the British; and had emerged as an ardent supporter of an autonomous “Pashtunistan” in the wake of decolonization and the emergence of independent India and Pakistan. Thereafter, he had actively sought Afghan aid and interference on both sides of the Durand Line, which separated Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the name of the Pashtun people. Why did The Times, thirteen years after Indian and Pakistani independence, pay homage to a man best known as an intractable opponent of the British Empire and its successor state, Pakistan? Part of the answer lies in the enduring appeal of the Afghan–Pakistan borderlands, where fierce clashes between imperial forces and Pashtun tribes, who themselves were governed by tribal codes based on revenge, honor, and hospitality, sparked the imagination of generations of British, Pakistani, and U.S. military and civil officials. One need only look at the works of

Rudyard Kipling, Winston Churchill, and John Masters, among others, to see the frontier’s inspiration.  

Part of the frontier’s appeal was its (apparent) remoteness. This only became increasingly evident as time passed. The era of decolonization and the Cold War saw the globe’s peripheries emerge into prominence. Independence from empire solidified fuzzy colonial frontiers into firm, internationally recognized borders; empire’s diverse subjects increasingly had to acquiesce to nationhood and its citizenship requirements. But this was not a smooth process. The problem of delineating borders, integrating ethnic and religious minorities, and dealing with a new global order that was frequently dominated by the United States–USSR rivalry complicated postcolonial nation building. Throw in the choice between establishing new political and development precedents or relying on colonial-era administrative processes – and where would non-state actors that historically had only limited interactions with colonial states fit in? – and the many travails facing postcolonial leaders become even more evident.

The Afghan–Pakistan borderlands provide a crucial example of the many conundrums decolonization produced. On a globe, Pakistan’s frontier tribal area seems a tiny strip of land in a historically underdeveloped region. Its importance to British colonial officials made sense in light of their regard for colonial India as the jewel in Britain’s imperial crown, their sensitivity to czarist Russian expansionism in the “Great Game,” and their conviction that the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and neighboring tribal area should serve as a buffer against any foreign encroachment. But why did the area still matter in an era

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when empire was heaving its last breaths? The region’s proximity to the Soviet Union provided one explanation, as U.S. influence overtook the British in Pakistan, still in the name of containing Soviet influence. The U-2 incident – which involved a plane based in Peshawar – and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought Pakistan and its border with Afghanistan into the international limelight, as it became a potential, then active battlefield in the global Cold War.

The region also was of huge – even fundamental – importance to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was crucial to the territorial integrity and Muslim identity of newly independent Pakistan. What had been a colonial periphery under the Raj was actively developed and slowly integrated by Pakistani leaders. Meanwhile for the Afghan royal family, who turned to social, economic, and political modernization in an era of free-flowing international aid and declining British influence, the land across the Durand Line presented the opportunity for expanded influence among the largely Pashtun population who shared ethnic, cultural, and religious roots with much of Afghanistan’s own people. From almost the moment of Pakistan’s formation, Afghanistan’s irredentist claims to the tribal area and neighboring NWFP (and even further beyond, at times, to parts of Balochistan and Sindh) led to violent clashes and political impasses, stretching into the modern day.

The Pashtun population spread across these two countries had its own thoughts on decolonization, postcolonial state building, and development. At times, the state pleaded with and prodded local Pashtuns to allow development initiatives to take place, for hospitals, schools, and local economies to spread in a region whose population had historically been largely mobile and pastoral; at others, Afghan and Pakistani leaders decided that force was necessary, as the region’s inhabitants resisted integration. Particularly those Pashtuns who remained politically and socially organized into tribes on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, rather than settling in the nearby NWFP, had their own motivations for resistance. Even as Pakistani and Afghan leaders increasingly attempted to assert their nations’ sovereignty up to their very borders, the possibility of aggressively autonomous action by non-state actors, like the members of Pashtun tribes, threatened to undermine states’ sovereign claims.

The Afghan–Pakistan borderlands, despite their seemingly peripheral location in the world, exerted remarkable influence on politics in South Asia and beyond. There, ethnic, religious, and political networks intersected, creating a site both molded by events in faraway metropoles and capable of impacting decision making across the globe. Whether in terms
of its strategic location for the West, geographical and ideological significance within South Asia, or its local autonomy movements, the region had value for numerous actors.

This book, then, tells a story with many roots. It is the history of a certain place and a certain population: the frontier tribal area of what became Pakistan and the Pashtun population who dominated this region. It is an analysis of the widespread ramifications of decolonization, not only for those independent nations emerging from the imperial yoke, but also their neighbors, like Afghanistan. The history of the transfer of power in South Asia understandably has focused on those areas and people most immediately affected by partition: divided Punjab and Bengal, refugee communities, women, the view from the capitals, Delhi and Karachi. But the independence of India and Pakistan affected the subcontinent’s peripheries just as much, even if these effects were not immediately apparent in 1947. The ongoing unrest pervading Pakistan’s northwest borderlands and India’s northeast highlights this. Thus, the experience of Pakistan’s frontier tribal area arguably is telling not only in furthering understanding of the experiences of decolonization, but also of the struggles new nation-states undertook to establish their legitimacy and influence. Finally, this book reveals the pervasive influence of a global Cold War that led U.S. policy makers, advisers, and “experts” into regions with which they had little historic interaction. In light of recent U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, this is obviously important, but even more critically, this history of Western interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan is crucial in other ways. U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and particularly its frontier tribal areas, reveals critical continuities in Western thinking.

about geopolitics and strategy. Much like their British predecessors, U.S. officials saw the Afghan–Pakistan borderlands as a crucial buffer zone preventing Soviet influence from leaching into the Middle East. But as in so many “hot” zones of the global Cold War, U.S. inexperience with local histories and local populations prevented officials from enacting effective policies or creating enduring relationships.

This book focuses on the increasing interconnectedness of global politics in the wake of the Second World War – in this case, the often fraught relationships between the United States, Great Britain, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India – while reemphasizing the importance of the local. It reflects a new wave of scholarship that has highlighted the relationships between decolonization and the Cold War. Whether in the guise of development supported by U.S. and Soviet technocrats; covert CIA operations and outright political pressure; foreign military aid; disputes within the United Nations; or postcolonial leaders’ attempts to overcome the ideological and political binary between communism and capitalism by adhering to nonalignment, the Cold War influenced the experience of decolonization across the globe.4 South Asia’s involvement in the Cold War was far more complicated than India’s adherence to nonalignment versus Pakistan’s willingness to accept U.S. aid, something scholars of South Asia increasingly have recognized.5 Pakistani and Indian leaders’


5 See Farooq Naseem Bajwa, Pakistan and the West: The First Decade 1947–1957 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996); Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the
motivations and choices shifted over time depending on local circumstances. Domestic political stability was always prioritized.

This book accordingly reflects several initiatives. The first is to consider why Pakistan’s frontier tribal area, despite its small size and geographical distance from major centers of power, has remained disproportionately prominent in policy making the world over. Even if, in practice, Pakistan’s borderlands were inconsequential to British or U.S. policy choices, they nevertheless haunted many officials as a potential battlefield and thus were accounted for in policies time and again. The second is to reinte-grate South Asia’s peripheries back into the history of colonial India’s transition to independence; this means emphasizing the frontier tribal area’s importance in postcolonial Pakistan, moving beyond the typical narratives focusing on Punjab and Bengal, or even Balochistan and Sindh. It also means reintegrating the history of Afghanistan into the history of South Asia; so often overlooked, politics in Afghanistan were frequently molded by events further south in Pakistan and India – arguably more so than by most other countries – and their populations and economies were interconnected.6

But the following chapters do not merely comprise a history of political wrangling between (and within) postcolonial states, their former imperial masters, and the newer Cold War great powers. They also ask other questions: How do non-state – even anti-state – actors react to a wide-scale threat to their autonomy? Where, in essence, do non-state actors, like “tribes,” belong in a world increasingly governed and restricted by the nation-state? The Defiant Border, therefore, seeks to give space to Pashtun tribes themselves, recognizing their influence on political, economic, and social development in colonial India and later Pakistan. It


cannot speak for the members of these tribes, whose individual voices are so rare in the archives, but it at least can help delineate how tribal reactions to state interference have changed.

The Pashtun Tribes

One of the first questions that must be asked, then, is who are the Pashtuns (or Pathans, Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns, or Pushtuns, as they also have been called)?7 And why do they, and “tribes” more generally, matter in a broader context? Numerous works have been written on the Pashtuns’ origins, their history, and their societal structures.8 As an ethnic group, they historically have dominated southwestern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, though they include a large diaspora community as well, stretching especially into India, but also as far as the Gulf region,

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7 For more on the genealogy of this terminology, see Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation on a Colonial Frontier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011) especially 19–21.
Central Asia, and more recently countries like Great Britain and the United States. Since the British established power in the subcontinent’s northwest in the nineteenth century, Pashtuns have been politically – and to an extent, geographically – divided between those Pashtuns who reside in Afghanistan and those who live across the Durand Line in what is now Pakistan; those in Pakistan then can be divided between those who have remained “tribal” – residing in the semiautonomous frontier tribal area and maintaining tribal organization as the most important formal sociopolitical structure – and those who have “settled” in the provinces, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (what was historically the North-West Frontier Province and which will be referred to as such in this text).

But of course, these formal divisions do not necessarily reflect Pashtuns’ lived experiences. For one, the Durand Line historically has been more imagined than real, and easily traversable. Established in 1893 as a means of separating Afghan and British zones of control, its application did not match lived realities. It divided the region’s Wazir Pashtun population between the two powers, for example, although the Wazirs ignored the line in favor of long-standing familial, political, and social relationships.

Similarly no real barrier existed separating the NWFP from the neighboring tribal zone, and economic, religious, and social relations continued between the “settled” and “tribal” Pashtuns. At another level, however, such formal boundaries between and within states have mattered. The British colonial state encouraged – and actively developed – difference within its sphere of influence. Pashtuns in the NWFP participated in local politics and governing structures and were often key landowners and laborers, thus sharing many of the same economic and social structures as other South Asian communities. The tribal zone, in contrast, was directly “governed” by the central government: while colonial political agents represented the Raj in the area, tribal elders, leaders, and jirgas, or tribal councils, remained effectively autonomous. Pashtun tribes and tribal confederations relied on Pashtunwali, Pashtun tribal law, and its interpretation in jirgas and by mullahs and faqirs, the tribes’ politico-religious leaders. Pashtun lashkars, or war parties, often roamed the mountainous, semiarid terrain, settling intertribal feuds and attacking British settlements and garrisons; meanwhile tribal members eked out a living in humble villages with local farming and livestock,

supplemented by raiding nearby settlements. The most obvious result of the colonial presence in the frontier tribal area was its political isolation from the neighboring province, its division into administrative units, each with its own colonial agent, and the identification of individual tribes (and later subtribes) with their own genealogies. These included, from north to south, Bajaur Agency (also known as Malakand Agency until 1970), home of the Uman Khel and Tarkani Pashtun tribes; Mohmand Agency (from 1951), comprising the Mohmands; Khyber Agency, where the majority of Afridi tribes reside; Orakzai Agency, populated primarily by Orakzais; Kurram Agency, home of Turish and Bangash tribes; and finally North and South Waziristan, mostly populated by the Wazir and Mahsud tribes, but also by the Daurs, Sheranis, and Bhittanis.11

This introduces the issue of the term “tribe.” Historians and anthropologists alike have pointed out the problem of “tribal” identity. The tribe, as understood today, particularly outside of the North American context, is very much a colonial construct. Colonial officials across empires constructed “tribes” to explain local relationships, to create leadership hierarchies, and to establish “stable, enduring, genealogically and culturally coherent units” that were easier to understand and thereby govern.12 As Alessandro Monsutti has shown in the Pashtun context, the “colonial body of literature constructed the romantic representation of an unruly and remote region cut off from the outside world, a trope that remains influential even now.”13 Stereotypes and myths were made reality. He notes, as well, how early anthropologists – their field of work itself largely a product of empire – transposed their studies of African tribes, and their systems of segmentary lineage, onto Pashtuns.14 Since independence, Pakistan’s frontier tribal area has been a key site of anthropological debate concerning tribal organization, with the publication of Fredrik Barth’s influential study on leadership among the Swat Pashtuns and its subsequent critique by other anthropologists like Talal Asad and Michael Meeker.15 The nature of Pashtun tribal political, genealogical,

14 Ibid., 272.
15 Barth, Political Leadership; Asad, “Market Model, Class Structure and Consent”; Michael Meeker, “The Twilight of a South Asian Heroic Age: A Rereading of Barth’s Study of
and social organization remains disputed; this book seeks a middle way much like Sana Haroon’s *Frontier of Faith*, in which she promotes “understanding ‘tribal unanimity’ and the genealogical order as a political construct, yet accepting the currency of the discourse of tribe.”

So while anthropologists have studied Pashtuns extensively in both Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal area, much of their focus has been limited to “tribalism,” particularly issues of segmentary lineages within tribes, familial relations, millenarianism and religious leadership within the tribes, and insurgency. James Caron has written a particularly indicting account of scholars’ blinkered focus on tribal insurgencies and an “administration-centric view” in studying Pashtun society before 1978. He encourages the use of alternative sources and a move away from modernization theory. Monsutti agrees. “The case of Afghanistan points to the need to go beyond the idea of multiple modernities, which unfold in parallel following different historical and cultural patterns […], in favor of the idea of entangled modernities, whereby past and present European political, economic, and intellectual developments can be understood only in a relational perspective as a complex process of interactions with other regions of the world.”

Where does this leave a history of Pakistan’s Pashtuns, particularly those in the frontier tribal area? Despite this clarion call by historical anthropologists to recognize the “entangled modernities” of the Pashtuns, the question remains as to how scholars, particularly historians, should address a dearth of local sources in studying them. Circumstances today complicate extensive research in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Archives that were available even in the early 2000s, such as those in Peshawar, are no longer easily accessible for many academics, particularly those based in the West. Those sources that remain available have their own set of limitations. Archives in Pakistan are notoriously difficult to access, and declassification remains a huge issue: as research trips for this book showed, what documents are available one day may not be the next.

Archives in Britain, the United States, and India provide a wealth of information about events in Pakistan, and particularly about the frontier

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*The Defiant Border*

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