1 *Introduction:* oikonomia *in the use of force*

That each should in his house abide
Therefore was the world so wide
Thou shalt make thy house
The temple of a nation's vows

Ralph Waldo Emerson, 'Life' (fragment)

What does it mean to describe a relationship between people or form of rule as 'domestic'? In 1946, Hans J. Morgenthau claimed that debate regarding 'the application of domestic legal experience to international law is really the main stock and trade of modern international thought' (1946/1974: 113). To date, he argued, most international theories had been based on drawing analogies between the character of political and legal relations among individuals in the domestic sphere within the state and foreign relations among states. Perhaps the most controversial but influential analogy of this type is that international relations is similar to Thomas Hobbes' (1651/1968) state of nature where individuals live in constant fear for their survival. The validity of the domestic analogy hinges on whether and to what extent concepts used to theorise relations internal to a state can be applied to relations between them. However, of the numerous criticisms of the domestic analogy, such as the inherently weak reasoning of analogical thought, none of them centres on the meaning of 'domestic'. In the main stock and trade of international thought there is silence regarding the conceptual and political history of the dominant side of the analogy. If international theory depends on some form of distinction between domestic and foreign, then surely more must be said regarding *domesticity* itself. What is its meaning, its origins, its ontology?

Consider the etymology. The term derives from the Latin *domestic-us*, from *domus*, meaning house. The first recorded English usage from 1521 similarly indicates that domestic is to be of or in a household, an 'inmate of a house'. On the surface of things, perhaps this is obvious.

Etymology suggests that domestic, home and household are conjoined and this is reflected in everyday discourse (Rybczynski, 1986). Leaders talk of protecting the motherland or fatherland, of securing the homeland, of the problem of home-grown terrorism; distinctions are drawn between zones of war and the home front. That there is such a thing as 'domestic space' is fundamental to the enterprise of international studies as the study of relations between domesticated spaces. The distinction between domestic and foreign usually denotes a frontier, a boundary, which limits movement and influence. The earliest, clearest use of domestic in this sense is by Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in 1665.[1] But merely pointing out that home is the dominant metaphor for the nation-state is a rather superficial level of analysis, albeit a politically powerful discourse. Like most if not all 'security' talk, analysis of home largely operates at the descriptive level, reproducing terminology while not penetrating very far into the basis of domesticity itself. As others have argued, 'house and home can be used as metaphors for almost anything one can imagine – a fact that points toward the all-pervading nature of the term and the importance of unravelling its multiple meanings in order to understand the past' (Barile and Brandon, 2004: 1–2). In fact, underlying the very idea of domestic politics is a more fundamental meaning of household space, from *oikos*, which is ancient Greek rather than Latin in origin. The more expansive concept of *oikos* captures what is really at stake for political and international thought in domesticity: its rootedness in household governance. International theory's focus on the 'domestic analogy' has obscured the theoretical and historical significance of this more fundamental form of household rule.

Household forms are historically and geographically variable. In ancient Greece, household governance, *oikonomia*, meant a form of rulership over those who resided within the household and, above all, was related to the fundamental human activity of managing basic life needs (Aristotle, 1962; Xenophon, 1923). Life processes are closely related to the biological and labouring activities of the human body. They are necessary, cyclical, and historically their administration has involved violent subordination in accordance with what has usually been conceived as natural hierarchies based on gender, age and degree

[1] 'That the contentions growing among Priests should be decided by Domestique Judges, and not at Rome' (Grotius, 1665: 859).

of civilisation/servility. Those living in the household were imagined to belong to and be of the household. In turn, the head of the household who managed its affairs was distinct from the household and its objects. The notion of a 'head' of a household is an adaptation of the Latin *paterfamiliās*, who in Roman law possessed absolute legal authority over members of the household. This rule may be more or less openly despotic – despot meaning 'master of the house' – but the *paterfamiliās* nonetheless had obligations towards the diversity of household members: women, slaves, children and animals. In fact, '*in order* to discharge these very duties,' writes Dubber, 'the householder enjoyed widespread authority to enforce submission and fidelity in return' (2005: 19, emphasis in original). This is significant for two reasons. First, even when despotic household rule was absolute in law, it was never so in practice. Resistance to despotism occurred inside and between households. Second, household language frequently indicates the continual need to maintain and administer the life of the household through domestic *oikonomia*, precisely in order to quell resistance to despotic rule. Nonetheless, it has been the most subordinated subjects – women, slaves and animals – that have tended to the needs of the household on the command of the household head. This captures the sense in which one belongs to and lives under the tutelage of the *paterfamiliās* and is subject to management; that is, one is *domesticated* in the space of the household. From this perspective, we might say that 'domestic' government occurs when the inhabitants of household space submit (are forced to submit through violence and other necessities) to the disciplinary authority of a household. After all, 'dominate' is by extension 'one of the derivatives of the Latin word *domus*' (Briganti and Mezei, 2012: 5).

Households are at the root of the language of modern economics and the traditional association of household rule with familial relations is the basis of leading theories of government, of management and control, of domination. We might even say that all traditions of political thought that assume rulership or sovereignty as the essence of government and politics find their origins in practices of household rule. The language of domesticity, rooted in household governance, has had a profound influence on political thought, including writing on the patriarchal and naturalist basis of authority; on the existence of hierarchy, of rulers and ruled; and on the obligations of rulers to attend to the welfare of the household as a whole. Although they have

not received attention in international studies, there are literatures in the history of political and economic thought on households and their changing significance, as well as studies of different household formations in anthropology, archaeology and comparative politics.[2] There is a large body of scholarship in literary studies on domesticity, including its imperial and military forms; liberal empire was frequently and explicitly conceived as an efficiently and well-run household.[3] Unsurprisingly, there is a very large literature in gender studies on ideologies of domesticity and ongoing debate of whether home should be reclaimed by feminists as a site of empowerment or rejected as an ideal. Feminists have also written extensively on 'domestic' labour in private homes, or labour made domestic in spaces made private (Martin and Mohanty, 1986; Young, 1997; Elias, 2013). Given the breadth and sophistication of these literatures on households and domesticity, which in turn are based on the historical reality and rich theoretical traditions of household rule, why has analysis of household governance and terminology, as distinct from the use of terms such as 'homeland' and 'home front', been largely absent in modern international thought?[4]

[2] In political thought see Booth (1993); Shammas (2002); Nagle (2006); Faroqhi (2010); Mitropoulos (2012); in comparative politics see Hunter (1984); Mundy (1995); in archaeology see Allison (1999); D'Altroy and Hastorf (2002); Barile and Brandon (2004); in anthropology and ethnography see Bourdieu (1979); Netting et al. (1984); Trigg (2005). In the tradition of social anthropology, 'domestication' refers to the 'move from oral to literate culture; from collective life to individualism and private families; from myth to history; and from concrete to abstract thinking' (Bowlby, 1995: 75; see also Goody, 1977; Levi-Strauss, 1966). For a brief recent discussion of the metaphor of 'home' in international theory see Marks (2011: 45–47). There is a small literature developing the concept of 'domopolitics' to describe the state as being governed like a home (Walters, 2004; Hynek, 2012). There is also a very brief discussion of households at the beginning of Daly (2006).

[3] Pecora (1997); Smith (2003); on imperial domesticity see Hunt (1990); Comaroff and Comaroff (1992: 265–295); Hansen (1992); George, (1993/1994); McClintock (1995); Rafael (1995); Kaplan (1998); Wexler (2000); Raibmon (2003); Myers (2009); Wesling (2011); on military domesticity see Haytock (2003); Colomina (2007); Rachamimov (2012); Kramer (2006); on home and postcolonialism see Bhabha (1992); George (1996).

[4] This is not to imply an absence of discussion of the so-called 'domestic sources' of foreign policy or the significance of the 'home front' in studies of war. The best work on this undoes much in the distinction between the 'war front' and the 'home front' (Hagemann and Schüler-Springorum, 2002; Armstrong, 1983). For Quincy Wright, the classical international law terminology of 'domestic jurisdiction' is defined 'geographically as matters taking place within the territory of a state, personally as matters concerning individuals within

There are at least two explanations for this puzzling oversight, and both are associated with what is taken to be distinctive about liberalism. The first is the dominance of theories of contract, which are *explicitly* based on a rejection of patriarchal models of rule that, in turn, originate in household governance. For early modern theorists of natural law, writes Bobbio (1993: 2): 'The principle of legitimation of political society is consent; this is not true of any other type of natural society. In particular, it is not true of domestic society, that is, of the family/household.' On this account, liberal states are governed through contract; an arrangement defined as the antithesis of governance in non-contractual, patriarchal households. To be sure, liberal thinkers have recognised that familial modes of governance, such as between father and children, husband and wife, metropole and colony, may coexist alongside contractual arrangements between autonomous men. It is well known that forms of liberal despotism have been justified as a temporary means to the end of creating subjects able to enter freely into contracts (Mill, 1999: 14; cf. Pateman, 1998 and Elshtain, 1981). However, liberal individuals are only autonomous to the extent that they freely consent to be governed and engage in privately contracted commercial exchange. Despite its many variants, all liberal theories purport to account for the contractual relations between autonomous citizens able to manage their own conduct, and all are united in their rejection of classical patriarchal forms of rule over autonomous subjects. Although only liberal international theory is premised on the existence of contract societies, much of realist international theory's broader acceptance of liberal premises in the 'domestic' realm has hindered international theory's proper engagement with the history and ontology of domesticity and, in turn, the historical and contemporary significance of household forms of rule.

The second explanation for the absence of investigation into domesticity and households in international thought is that from the eighteenth century, household governance itself was transformed into a new structural form and understood through an entirely new language. Explicit investigation into the meaning of household governance

the jurisdiction of a state, functionally as matters which could be dealt with conveniently and efficiently by states individually, or politically as matters which could be dealt with by states individually without affecting the interests of others' (quoted in Vincent, 1974: 6).

declined with the historical rise of the *social realm* and distinctly social forms of governance and discourse: social regulation, social theory and sociology (Weber, 1978: 375–380). Consider when and why it became possible to conceive of specifically *social* relations requiring sociological explanations. It is surprisingly difficult to find an answer to this question in political and international theory. In fact, this form of social discourse is less than 200 years old. What changed? Relations of dependency previously rooted in – and understood to be rooted in – ancient and feudal households became a matter of public state regulation and administration in the core of the major European empires. With the rise and expansion of capitalist markets and imperial state bureaucracies through the eighteenth century, *oikonomia*, the activity of managing life processes, acquired its own public domain, the modern social realm (Arendt, 1958; Habermas, 1962/1991). This new social realm, initially conceived in the eighteenth century as bourgeois civil society, functioned as an intermediary between the newly distinguished activities of capitalist 'economics' and state/imperial government. By the nineteenth century, bourgeois civil society underwent a major structural transformation, with state and non-state 'social policy' interventions specifically targeted at populations in revolt, especially women, workers and colonial natives. However, this rise and transformation of liberal 'contract societies' did not destroy household governance; it only transformed it. Instead of the antithesis of the household, the nation-state is a distinctively modern and bureaucratic *social* form of household rule. Domestic terminology and iconography lingers. Yet, despite its fundamental significance to the history of modern political and international thought, the origins and real significance of household governance was concealed with the rise of social theory, sociology and social policy intervention. This is deeply ironic. As this book shall argue, the ontology of the social realm and distinctly social regulation are best understood in terms of household governance in which the life processes of populations are managed and domesticated.

There is a far deeper material and ideological significance of domesticity for international thought than is captured in debates about the domestic analogy (Suganami, 1989; Bottici, 2009). There is a *homology*, a correspondence in type and structure, not merely an analogy, between forms of distinctly social regulation at the national, imperial and international levels that is captured through historical and

theoretical analysis of household governance. Homology is from the Latin *homologia* for sameness and Greek for agreement. The term is most commonly used to refer to organs that correspond to a fundamental type in another animal or plant, or to different organs in the same species. More broadly, we can say that there is a homology when there is a correspondence of type or structure – although not necessarily of function – between things. To make a claim of homology is obviously a much stronger argument than analogy, to claim a resemblance, a likeness in form or function, as in the domestic analogy. If to homologise is to claim a correspondence of type or structure, then what is the fundamental type of which social regulation at the national, imperial and international levels is an expression? The answer is that social regulation and government is the distinctly modern and capitalist form of household rule. The modern social realm is a distinctive form of household, one of the historically variable units of rule in which the life processes of members are reproduced and the collective unit of the household is maintained.

International and many political theorists are not used to thinking of households in this way. During the nineteenth century, and under the influence of liberalism, the meaning of the term was transformed to refer to the domestic space of the bourgeois family, making household synonymous with home, and obscuring the broader and earlier sense of a unit of rule in which a household head seeks to maximise the welfare of the whole through the art of household management (Spencer-Wood, 1999: 162–189). Even many feminists, who have insisted on the non-contractual nature of modern society, have not explicitly theorised the modern social realm as a form of household governance, instead primarily analysing the intimate domestic space of the small-scale family house as a 'patriarchal unit within a patriarchal whole' (Millett, 1969/1977: 33). Household rule is always gendered. And yet the history of households is not completely identical with the history of gendered and sexual relations (Hartman, 2004).[5] Moreover, households, houses and homes should not be treated as synonymous. Households can encompass more than one house in the sense of a shelter for specific persons, who may or may not be biologically related.

[5] But see Angela Mitropoulos' recent use of the term *oikos* 'to theorize the confluences of race, sex, class, sexuality, citizenship and gender … as oikonomic arrangements' (2012: 140).

Indeed, the notion of family as exclusively blood relations is relatively recent and parochial; in medieval households,'family' referred to those who lived in the household, whether or not they were kin. The most important thing about households, what is defining of household governance, is the nature of the relationships between people. They are not synonymous with the classical *oikos*, one very particular understanding of households in a relatively brief historical context. Household forms are historically variable. Yet what is common across all households is that they are organised around the administration of life necessities with activities arranged hierarchically according to the assumed biological and other status attributes of different members. As such, household rule is generally despotic, but again there is much variation. This despotism can be direct and centralised (as in a feudal manor or concentration camp) or indirect and decentralised (as in imperial strategies of 'indirect rule', of using local leaders to maintain order). This is important, especially in the history of international and imperial relations: *decentralised* household rule occurs through proxies, the financing and arming of local despots to govern, to domesticate, local resistance. Moreover, the hierarchical running of household affairs need not be a personalised despotism as in the model of the *oikos despot*, the Roman *paterfamiliās*, the village elder, the King's *mund* or royal household. The personalised despotism of the *paterfamiliās* is not a universal, ever-present and static form of domination separate from the system of organising life processes. Modern state administration is bureaucratic, anonymous and largely de-personalised household rule. Moreover, while households are always located in space this is not always fixed or strictly bounded space. The boundaries of households are fluid and porous. Households are mobile; techniques of household rule are highly portable and they play a surprisingly central role in the organisation of international and imperial relations. The absence of analysis of domesticity and forms of household rule in political and international theory is a serious omission.[6]

[6] The closest exception is Marxist-inspired world systems theorists who conceive the household as a basic unit of the capitalist world system that reproduces commodified labour. This literature is an important advance, drawing attention to household configurations that are not reducible to house/home or kinship. However, the household is theorised in the very modern sense of an 'income pooling unit', rather than in the much broader historical sense of a unit of rule whose functions include, but also go beyond, the pooling of income (Smith et al., 1984, 1992; Wallerstein, 1991b). In this view, there is related literature on global householding and transnational households (Peterson, 2010;

This book makes three claims. First, in contrast to most political and international theory, it is argued that the meanings of social and society can only be understood in the context of a specific historical constellation, which developed after – not automatically with – the rise of territorial states. There is an important story to be told of where, when and why social and society emerged as domains with specific patterns, norms and logics, through which human life could be intervened in and transformed. But this story needs to be told in terms of transformations in – and crises of – household forms of rule. Second, contra liberalism, there is strong historical and theoretical evidence to suggest that the modern social realm is a scaled-up and modified form of household governance. This is perhaps surprising, even for many non-liberals; all the major social theories of modern society – liberalism, political realism, Marxism and several critical theories – have explicitly claimed or implicitly accepted that the rise of modern capitalist states destroyed large-scale forms of household rule. More specifically, the household ontology of the social realm has been obscured, especially since the nineteenth century, by the dominance of distinctly social theories and political economy; that is, when *oikonomia* and political thought were demoted in favour of a new series of oppositions and distinctions that emerged with capitalist imperial states. In fact, the rise and transformation of the commercial and then capitalist empires reconstituted – rather than eliminated – the household governance of feudal and early modern forms of rule. Rather than the antithesis of household government, the nation-state itself is a distinctively modern and bureaucratic social form of household, governing populations both at 'home' and overseas through distinctly – but historically specific – social means.

Third, to illustrate the significance of attention to the rise and transformation of social forms of household rule, the book examines the history and theory of a military practice that has played a formative role in the dissemination of social governance, the overseas counterinsurgency wars conducted by liberal empires/states.[7] Since

Douglass, 2010). On the metaphorical uses of *oikonomia* beyond household administration see Leshem (2013).

[7] The language of 'counterinsurgency' emerged relatively late in the history of overseas wars of pacification, during the earliest stages of the US war in Vietnam. For clarity of argument, the Introduction and Conclusion to this book uses the terminology of overseas liberal counterinsurgency to refer to a number of specific military campaigns pursued by Britain, France and the United States

French army officer David Galula (1964: 62) claimed that in counter-insurgencies a soldier had to 'become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout', it has become cliché to talk of 'armed social work'. More recently, US military advisor David Kilcullen argued that armed social work encompasses 'community organizing, welfare, mediation, domestic assistance, economic support – under conditions of extreme threat requiring armed support' (2010: 43; see also Bacevich, 2009; Hodge, 2011: 152; Sitaraman, 2012: 37). There is now a body of literature debating the validity and meaning of armed social work, including analysis of earlier colonial pacification campaigns and so-called small wars (Porch, 1986; Finch, 2013; Callwell, 1896). However, historians and theorists of war are less prone to situate armed social work in the context of a proper history and theory of the social itself, its services and administration (from the Latin *ministrātiōn*, the act of ministering, tending or serving; rendering aid or care). While there is a large historical literature on relations between warfare and welfare, of how mobilisation for world wars contributed to the creation of social welfare states, few have used armed social work as a mirror to reflect on distinctly social forms of pacification in general, or theorise counterinsurgency rule as a distinctive type of government.[8] This omission is surprising. The history and theory of counterinsurgency is an excellent subject for exploring the rise of the social realm and therefore, more fundamentally, changing forms of household rule. The historical context for the development of distinctly social thought and intervention was precisely the problem of populations in revolt. Social theories, sociology and social policy all developed during the nineteenth century

from the mid-to late nineteenth century to the contemporary period. However, the detailed analysis of specific pacification campaigns avoids anachronism and adheres to the language used to describe and justify these wars in the specific context.

[8] In IR, explicit discussion of social work, a term first used in 1847, is not very common. It has been used as a derogatory term to criticise the Clinton administration's foreign policy of seeking (but failing) 'to put an end to suffering in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti' (Mandelbaum, 1996: 18). However, there is also a thriving field of international social work that applies social work methods to what is usually discussed in terms of human security and development in IR (Cox and Pawar, 2012). On the specific national contexts and international conditions for the rise of welfare states see Lindert (2004); Marwick (1974); McClymer, (1980); Skocpol (1992).