What is the relationship between states’ economic power and their formal political power in multilateral economic institutions? Why do we see variation in states’ formal political power across economic institutions of the same era? In this book Ayse Kaya examines these crucial under-explored questions, drawing on multiple theoretical traditions within International Relations to advance a new approach of “adjusted power.” She explains how the economic shifts of our time, marked by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and other emerging economies, have affected and will impact key multilateral economic institutions. Through detailed contemporary and historical analyses of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G20, and the International Trade Organization, Kaya shows that the institutional setting mediates the significance of the underlying distribution of economic power across states. The book presents both case studies and key statistics.

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Power and Global Economic Institutions

Ayse Kaya
Swarthmore College
To Andrew

With love and gratitude, always
Contents

List of figures and tables ix
Acknowledgments xi

1 Introduction 1
   The methods and sources 13
   Plan of the rest of the book 16

2 Conceptualizing political asymmetries in multilateral economic institutions 21
   The adjusted power approach 26
   Conjunctural factors 40
   Alternative factors? 44
   Conclusions and roadmap for the empirical analysis 47

3 The origins of states’ formal equality in the global financial institutions 51
   The origins of weighted voting in the IMF and the World Bank 54
   IMF quotas and their adjustment over time 60
   Conclusions 79

4 The origins of states’ voting equality in the post-war multilateral trading system 86
   Inter-state negotiations on states’ voting equality 90
   Explanations 92
   Conclusions 109

5 Shifts in political power in the IMF in 2008–2010 112
   Prologue: contemporary cases 112
   Introduction to changes in the IMF, 2008–2010 118
   Background to the 2008–2010 shifts 122
   Shifts in members’ formal political power: descriptive analysis 123
   Identifying the outcome: the relatively higher level of accommodation 128
   Explaining the relatively higher level of accommodation 132
   Alternative explanations 141
   Conclusion: reforms and discontent 151
Contents

6 Shifts in political power in the World Bank in 2008–2010 158
   Overview of the 2008–2010 shifts 162
   Key outcome of the 2008–2010 shifts: limited accommodation 166
   Explaining the outcome of limited accommodation 174
   Alternative explanations 183
   Conclusions 189

7 The G20: a delegatory institution 193
   The G20’s institutional design 196
   Explanations: G20 as an informal, delegatory institution 203
   Alternative explanations 213
   Conclusions 214

8 Conclusions 217
   Broad implications 218
   Further explorations and future research 224
   Implications of the book for global economic governance 227
   Concluding thoughts 249

References 250
Index 271
List of figures and tables

Figures

3.1 Initial quotas in 1945, top ten shareholders (in current millions USD) 61
5.1 Share of world exports (%), G20 emerging and advanced economies 113
5.2 Exports from BRICs and the United States (as a share of world exports) 114
5.3 Changes in low-income countries’ share of quotas (%) 150
6.1 IBRD loans to G20 emerging economies 168
6.2 IBRD and IDA disbursements (in million USD) 184
7.1 G20’s institutional structure 198

Tables

2.1 The adjusted power approach in a comparative lens 48
3.1 Increases to IMF’s quotas 63
3.2 IMF quota formulae 65
3.3 Distribution of IMF quota increases 67
3.4 Effects of political-economic proximity to the United States 72
3.5 Sub-sample analysis 73
3.6 Pre-2010 quota shifts 75
3.7 Robustness using real values 76
3.8 Additional variables 77
3.A Summary statistics and variable descriptions 83
5.1 Real GDP growth (%) in key economies 115
5.2 Changes in states’ voting power (%) after the 2008 reforms 126
5.3 States’ voting power (%) before and after the reforms 128
5.4 GDP of G20 emerging economies 129
5.5 Executive director positions 147
5.6 GDP-voting power ratios 153
List of figures and tables

5.7 Members’ calculated versus actual quota shares 154
6.1 Capital increases to the bank 164
6.2 States’ voting power (%) before and after the reforms 165
6.3 Country GDPs – different calculations 167
6.4 States’ post-reform voting power (%) in the World Bank and the IMF 173
7.1 G20’s delegation to other institutions 207
8.1 The Seoul Consensus on development 240
Acknowledgments

During my long relationship with this book, I have had the privilege of receiving help from others.

My first expression of gratitude goes to John Haslam at Cambridge University Press and the anonymous reviewers. Haslam’s interest in the project was critical. And, the two outstanding reviewers helped invaluably in getting the manuscript to its current form.

I am immensely grateful to the following Swarthmore colleagues for all their substantive input to this project as well as their words of wisdom and encouragement: Rachel Buurma, Philip Jefferson, Keith Reeves, Jim Kurth, Dominic Tierney, Rick Valelly, Stephen Golub, Ellen Magenheim, Mike Reay, and Lynne Schofield.

I benefitted greatly from the kindness of others to whom I remain thankful. Clint Pinehardt and the rest of the University of Texas at Dallas Political Science Department gave useful comments on Chapter 3 during my presentation there. Clint also provided feedback for Chapter 4, as did Irfan Nooruddin. Christopher Kilby also generously commented on a version of Chapter 3. I also thank Orfeo Fioretos and Anne Holthoefer for comments on drafts of Chapter 4. Columbia University’s Committee on Global Thought (CGT) provided stimulating feedback on the book project as a whole during my presentation there. I thank Katharina Pistor especially; co-teaching as a postdoc at CGT with her and Michael Doyle remains an important experience. I benefitted from numerous presentations at ISA, APSA, and MPSA conferences.

I had great research assistants, who have all graduated from Swarthmore: Caleb Jones, James Mao, Paul Shortell, and Spencer Topf. All the students especially in my International Political Economy seminars facilitated critical conversations that showed intellectual maturity beyond their years. My friend Robin F. Matthews helped get the references and the format in shape.

I made a number of trips to Washington, DC, to talk to World Bank and IMF officials as well as insiders from other relevant organizations.
While I promised to keep them anonymous, I thank them all for the generosity of their time and input.

Two great scholars from my alma mater deserve special mention: Joel Krieger was a wise counsel throughout the project, and Craig Murphy, despite never having had me as a student, provided extensive comments on Chapters 1 and 2 more than once – his comments were integral to the growth of the project.

I felt the two following friends were always on my team and provided great help on this book (more than a few times!): Geoffrey Herrera, whose knowledge of I(i)nternational R(r)elations has always impressed me, and Asli Leblebicioglu, who is a wonderful economist and a patient one at answering all my statistical questions.

I feel bad not dedicating this book to my parents, who – a lifetime ago – let their eighteen-year-old leave Istanbul for college in the United States and have since then made many trips to help me. I promise them the next book. I could not have completed this project without Andrew Orloff.