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978-1-107-11953-6 - Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of Investment  
Treaties in Developing Countries

Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen

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Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-11953-6 - Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of Investment  
Treaties in Developing Countries

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