

## **Taking Rites Seriously**

Taking Rites Seriously is about how religious beliefs and religious believers are assessed by judges and legal scholars and are sometimes mischaracterized and misunderstood by those who are critical of the influence of religion in politics or in the formation of law. Covering three general topics - reason and motive, dignity and personhood, nature and sex - philosopher and legal theorist Francis J. Beckwith carefully addresses several contentious legal and cultural questions over which religious and nonreligious citizens often disagree: the rationality of religious belief, religiously motivated legislation, human dignity in bioethics, abortion and embryonic stem cell research, reproductive rights and religious liberty, evolutionary theory, and the nature of marriage. In the process, he responds to some well-known critics of public faith - including Brian Leiter, Steven Pinker, Suzanna Sherry, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, and Richard Dawkins - as well as to some religiously conservative critics of secularism such as the advocates for intelligent design.

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Law, Politics, and the Reasonableness of Faith

FRANCIS J. BECKWITH

Baylor University





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#### To Robert P. George

A man in whom many of us have found, what St. Thomas More's contemporaries found in him: "friendship and courage, cheerfulness and charity, diligence in duties, counsel in adversity, patience in pain – their good servant, but God's first." (from "A Lawyer's Prayer to St. Thomas More")





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This book is the first I have published since the death of my father, Harold Joseph Beckwith (1930–2015). It is because of his support and love, in tandem with the same from my mother, Elizabeth, that I chose to pursue the life of a college professor. *Risposa in pace, mio padre*.