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978-1-107-11212-4 - Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies: Holding the Least Accountable Branch to Account

David Kosař

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PERILS OF JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES

Judicial councils and other judicial self-government bodies have become a worldwide phenomenon. Democracies are increasingly turning to them to insulate the judiciary from the daily politics, to enhance independence and ensure judicial accountability. This book investigates the different forms of accountability and the taxonomy of mechanisms of control to determine a best practice methodology. The author expertly provides a meticulous analysis, using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts from 1993 to 2010 and creates a systematic framework that can be applied to future cases.

David Kosař is currently Head of the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science at Masaryk University Faculty of Law. He clerked for a Justice and then the Vice-President of the Supreme Administrative Court, and for a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic.

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DAVID KOSAŘ



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CAVEATS

The empirical part of this book (Chapters 4–7) studies the years between 1993 and 2010. The subsequent developments in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are mentioned only if they illuminate the main findings of this book. The remaining parts of this book reflect the state of the art as of June 30, 2014. The subsequent developments are discussed only selectively.

Usual caveats apply. All opinions expressed in this book are personal to the author and should not be attributed to any institution he was or has been working with during the writing of this book. Any mistake, of course, remains author's own.