INDEX

agenda-setting, 177–180
allocation of jurisdiction to tax, 44–50
antitrust agency, for states, 242–244
arbitrage (tax), 128, 198–199, 216–217, 234–242
authority allocation, 44–50
Avi-Yonah, R., 36, 46–47, 121–122, 130, 147–148
avoidance (tax), 127–128
Baistrocchi, E., 167–168
benefit taxation, 39
BEPS initiative, 157–165, 234–235
bilateral cooperation. See also tax treaties
distributive ramifications of, 49–50
effect on foreign direct investment, 108–109
game theory application to, 4 in double taxation prevention, 73–74
instruments of, 152–155
interests served by, 7
Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), 152–154
tax treaties history, 146–149
Blake, M., 190
Brauner, Y., 181
BRICS countries, 181
Caney, S., 190
capital export neutrality (CEN), 54–55, 58–59
capital import neutrality (CIN), 55–58
capital ownership neutrality (CON), 56–57
cartelization of states policies, 143, 173–174, 242–244
coercive power of state and legitimacy, 199–202
as rationale in cooperation, 144
in distributive justice, 191–195, 201, 206–211
Cohen, J., 191–195
collection, from foreign residents, 106, 113
Commodification Critique of the Market, 216
costs, benefits of, 121–128
distributive justice effects of, 35–37, 121–125, 227–228
efficiency effects of, 31–35, 125–128
for residents, 33–34
fragmentation, 26–30, 33–34
INDEX 247

location-specific rents, 36–37
personal, collective identities, 38–41
political participation and, 40, 48–49
public services provision, 125–127
state as recruiter of investors and businesses, 24–26, 31, 33, 122–124, 197–198
state-citizen relationship and, 12–14, 23, 124–125
state power inequality in, 228–229
tax avoidance and, 127–128
tax incentives, 39
vs. cooperation as solution, 4–5, 10, 120–121
wealth/mobility connection, 36, 38–40
wealth redistribution and, 122–124, 227–228
competitive neutrality, 56–57
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 155–156
cooperation. See also bilateral cooperation; multilateral cooperation
inequality, distributive disparity among states/individuals, 206–211
vs. competition as solution, 4–5, 10, 120–121
credits. See also double taxation prevention
deductions. See also double taxation prevention
developing countries. See also BEPS initiative; multilateral cooperation; tax treaties
asymmetrical tax treaties, 111–113
barriers to competition, removal of, 224–225, 229–230
benefit-maximizing strategies, 113–118
biases against labor in, 143
cartelization against, 143, 173–174, 242–244
desirability of tax treaties, 100
distributive consequences of tax treaties to, 102–104, 119
distributive justice as duty to, 192, 204–205, 207
foreign direct investment in, 115–116, 134, 210
information sharing, transparency, 152, 165, 230–234
lock-in effect and, 174–176
multilateral coordination disadvantages to, 137, 183–184
relative bargaining power of, 132–137, 168–170, 181–183
revenue disparity in tax treaties, 7, 73
strategies regarding tax treaties, 113–114
tax revenue allocation, 44–50, 135
tax treaties, cooperation, motivations for involvement in, 8–9, 102, 110, 113, 144, 167–168
tax treaties, effects on, 77–78, 100–104
tax treaties rejection by, 116–118
UN model, 101, 114–115, 148
distributive justice
competition, effects on, 35–37
cooperation as solution, 203–206
critique, 221–222
inequality, distributive disparity states within, 206–211
multilateral cooperation in, 130, 132–137, 140–141, 188–189
political justice, 191
redistribution as duty, 185–187, 191, 211
state legitimacy, sovereignty and, 10, 187–188, 196–199, 206–211
state's roles, coercive powers in, 193–196, 225–227
taxation goals, 17–19
distributive justice critique, 221–222
double taxation. See international taxation
double taxation prevention. See also tax treaties
bilateral cooperation in, 73–74
deductions, 53–54, 65–66, 86–91
deferral, 66
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>double taxation prevention (cont.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic allegiance, 45–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign tax credit limitation, 66–67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as taxation goal, 15–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition, effects on, 31–35, 125–128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multilateral cooperation costs to, 137–140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emerging countries. See BRICS countries; developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equal distribution, 18–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equal sacrifice, 18–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exemptions. See double taxation prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATCA, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bilateral cooperation and, 108–109 in developing countries, 115–116, 134, 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labor and, 62–65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multilateral cooperation and, 135–136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tax treaties and, 82–83, 106–110, 115–116, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taxation of, 31–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formulary apportionment, 176, 235–236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and tax planning, 27–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition/tax competition, 33 of sovereignty, 198–199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of taxing and spending regimes, 26–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free riding, 219, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>game theory, 4, 7, 60–62, 80–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis of tax treaties, 82–98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Forum, 152–154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coercion, 191–195, 201, 206–211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coercion and legitimacy, 199–202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cosmopolitan, conception of, 190, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>left institutionalism, 191–193, 195–196, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political justice, conceptions of, 188–189, 191, 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statist conception of, 9–10, 185–189, 191–196, 199–211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>global-normative approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>applicability, 6–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirschman, A., 228–229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community as tax policy consideration, 20–23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal, collective identities, 38–41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF, 78–79, 116–118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incorporation, taxation and, 24–26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual relocation, taxation and, 24–26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asymmetry, 218–219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>automatic exchange of, 156–159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharing, transparency, 152, 165, 230–234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, 170–171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allocation of jurisdiction to tax, 44–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anticompetitive collusion in, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as decentralized competitive market, 1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation as strategy, 68–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current regime, 4, 6–7, 159–165, 168–170, 236–237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deferral, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic tax policy and, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign investment, 62–65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free riding in, 219, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information asymmetry in, 218–219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market failures in, 216–217, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national interests as focus of, 44, 65–68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>national preferences in, 62–65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX 249

strategic taxation, 60–62
taxation authority allocation, 44–50
undermining political sphere critique, 222–223
Kingson, C., 67–68
Knoll, M., 56–57
League of Nations report, 44–50
lock-in effect, 174–176
market failures critique of international taxation, 216–220
marketization and tax planning, 27–30
capital markets as leverage, 31–33
and competition for residents, 33
international taxation and, 24–26
market valuation in coercive legitimacy, 196–199
Mason, R., 56–57
Moellendorf, D., 191–193
multilateral cooperation. See also competition/tax competition achievement, sustainability of, 130–132, 215–216
agenda-setting, 177–180
asymmetric capabilities, 168–170
cartelization, 143, 173–174, 242–244
challenges in, 214–215
collective good as rationale, 144–145
competition, attempts to curtail, 149–152
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 155–156
costs, outcomes of generally, 7–8
defections, 131–132, 152
distributive justice in, 130, 132–137, 140, 203–206
efficiency costs, benefits of, 137–140
FATCA and, 155
foreign investment effects, 135–136
Global Forum, 152–154
governmental waste, incentives to reduce, 138–139
harmonization of rates, policies, 128–130
inequality, distributive disparity among states/individuals, 206–211
information, automatic exchange of, 156–159
information sharing, transparency, 152, 165, 230–234
lock-in effect, 174–176
network effects, 170–173, 176, 235–239
OECD’s role in power structure remodeling, 180–183
participation, rationales for, 142–143, 166
participation, strategic rationales for, 166–168
revenue allocation, 135
revenue vs. financial market orientations in, 132–133
special interests, effects on, 139
state sovereignty as rationale, 144
strategic consideration, 7–8, 58–59, 70–71, 146–149, 166–168
tax evasion, 150–151
Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), 152–154
vs. competition as solution, 4–5, 10, 120–121
multilateral instrument, 159–165, 170–171, 224–225
Nagel, T., 191–196, 199–202, 208
network effects, 170–173, 176, 235–239
lock-in effect, 174–176
INDEX

neutrality
- capital export neutrality (CEN), 54–55, 58–59
- capital import neutrality (CIN), 55–58
- capital ownership neutrality (CON), 56–57
- competitive neutrality, 56–57
- efficiency and, 15–17
- flaws of, 57–60, 68–69
- in promotion of welfare, 50–53
- national neutrality, 56
- partial, 53–57, 69

OECD’s role in regime design, 180–183
optimal taxation, 16–17
partial neutrality, 53–57, 69
personal, collective identities, 38–41
planning (tax), 26–30, 198–199
political participation, political sphere, 40, 48–49, 191, 222–223
Race to the Bottom, 7–8, 35–36, 120–121, 123–124, 128–130, 143, 224–225
redistribution as duty, 185–187, 191, 211
Report on Harmful Tax Competition (OECD), 149–154
residency
- competition/tax competition for, 33–34
- state as recruiter, 24–26, 31, 33, 122–124, 197–198
- state-citizen relationship and, 12–14, 23, 124–125
Richman-Musgrave, P., 50–51
Roin, J., 137–138
Ronzoni, M., 203–204
Sabel, C., 191–195
Sangiovanni, A., 191–193
Shaviro, D., 59, 70

Smith, P., 190
source (basis of taxation)
- transaction classification, 27–30
- source rules, 105–106, 198–199
- withholding taxes, 175–176
state as recruiter of investors and businesses, 24–26, 31, 33, 122–124, 197–198
strategic taxation, 60–62
tax arbitrage, 128, 198–199, 216–217, 234–242
taxation
- allocation of jurisdiction to tax, 44–50
- collection, from foreign residents, 106, 113
- distributive justice goals of, 17–19
- efficiency goals of, 15–17
- fragmentation, 26–30
- identity, community and, 20–23
- labor, foreign investment and, 62–65
- marketization and, 24–26
- ring fenced activities, 31–32
tax avoidance, 127–128. See also tax planning
Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), 152–154
tax planning, 26–30, 198–199
tax rules, streamlining, 234–242
tax treaties. See also double taxation prevention
- advantages, benefits of, 105–107
- agenda-setting, 177–180
- as regressive redistribution mechanism, 7, 77–78, 102–104
- asymmetrical, 111–113
- credits, 91–93, 98–99, 105–106

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## INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deductions</th>
<th>86–91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing/emerging countries, benefit maximizing strategies</td>
<td>113–118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing/emerging countries, effects on</td>
<td>77–78, 100–104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double</td>
<td>27–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double taxation alleviation by exemptions</td>
<td>96–98, 105–106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment and</td>
<td>82–83, 106–110, 115–116, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game theory analysis of</td>
<td>82–98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host country national interests</td>
<td>82–84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host country policy preferences</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction, revenue allocation</td>
<td>99–100, 102–104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock-in effect</td>
<td>174–176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network effects</td>
<td>170–173, 176, 235–239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation, strategic rationales for</td>
<td>166–168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief granted by</td>
<td>76–77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence country national interests</td>
<td>84–86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence-host country interactions</td>
<td>74–76, 80–82, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue allocation disparity</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single tax ideal</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>82–84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax-sparing arrangements</td>
<td>115–116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN model</td>
<td>101, 114–115, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiebout, C. M.</td>
<td>122–123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction costs</td>
<td>216–217, 239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>