# 1 Maritime Commerce, Old Rivalries, and the Birth of Three Cities

Modern histories of Southeast Asian nations are often narrated separately, through the lens of the nation. When taught to schoolchildren, Thai history centres largely on the emergence of the *Tai* people, Burmese history on the *Bhama*, and Malaysia on the *Melayu*, the 'sons of the soil'. Nationalist histories often begin by tracking the footsteps of original inhabitants and recounting the splendour of pre-modern polities. The true inheritors of the nation, according to the logic of ethnic nationalism, are those who share a common linguistic and cultural identity constituting the majority of the population, and are born within, not outside, its borders. The 'newness' of Southeast Asian nations in the second half of the twentieth century warranted a sense of national unity and identity. Nationalist history required beginnings rooted in geographies of place and language, lineages of blood and belonging, and mythologies of eras of past greatness. The rise of the great, classical empires of Sriwijaya, Angkor, Bagan, Sukhothai, and Majapahit dominate the early history of the region and form their foundation myths.[1] 'Minority' indigenous groups, such as the Mon, have sought to revive their own nationalist histories, defining themselves in opposition to the majority and putting forth new claims that cross-cut or splinter the territorial maps of nations.[2] We are left with linear narratives of nations, boxed in by post-colonial borders, but few stories of the webs of exchanges between peoples, goods, and ideas that shaped a shared regional and global history.

Cities, like nations, have their origin myths, and their stories are also not often told together. States seek to make cities subservient to the

[1] See for example David Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2003); G.E. Harvey, *History of Burma* (New York: Octagon Books, 1967). On use of 'Melayu' by nationalists and in historical perspective see Anthony Milner, 'Who Created Malaysia's Plural Society?' *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (2003): 1–24.

[2] For a recent overview of Mon nationalism see Ashley South, *Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake* 76:2 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

nation, and their histories are often subsumed within nationalist narratives. Bangkok is the Thai capital and the centre of royal power, while Rangoon is an 'alien city' created by British rule. George Town is the heart of Penang, an island geographically separate from the mainland, and one that continually challenges the racial balance of the nation through political opposition and a celebration of its multi-ethnic past. These were cities born of visions and built on journeys. The mythology of Rangoon begins a thousand years ago, with the voyage of two rice merchants to India seeking the blessing of the Buddha Gautama. Bangkok began as a settlement of Teochew merchants, who aided the Sino-Thai General Taksin on his flight from the ashes of Ayutthaya, which had been devastated by Burmese armies. Penang's tranquil harbour appealed to Francis Light, a seafaring entrepreneur seeking favour with the East India Company by finding a new port on the eastern edge of the Bay of Bengal, one that would draw Asian merchants away from Malacca and the Dutch East Indies. The origins of these three cities were entangled in a regional battle for power between Burma and Siam in the late eighteenth century, amidst the ascendency of British and French commercial interests in Asia.

These cities emerged together out of the winds of commerce, following a lineage of cosmopolitan urban life in Southeast Asia that dates back hundreds of years. Anthony Reid has dated the most dynamic period of commercial interaction in the region to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, describing a vibrant maritime trading world linked through port-cities. In Reid's account, we see Indians, Chinese, Arabs, Bugis, and Mons trading and mingling in ports; we see women warriors and female entrepreneurs. We also see slaves bonded to feudal lords, and festivals and amusements meant to enhance the glories of kings who harnessed new ideas and innovations from the outside world. Reid's narrative of vibrant and adaptable trading cultures stops in the late seventeenth century. He argues:

> The most important shift in the long term, however, was not any absolute decline in trade but the reduced importance of commerce, merchants, urbanism, and cosmopolitanism in Southeast Asian life. The age of commerce had been marked by constant innovation, by repeated adaptation and incorporation of new ideas. The multi-ethnic market cities had set the pace of that change and had kept Southeast Asians for better or worse involved with the world of commerce. The seventeenth century marked not only a retreat from reliance on the international market but also a greater distrust of external ideas.[3]

For Reid, the loss of indigenous states' control over trade in the colonial era resulted in the demise of a long history of cosmopolitanism in

[3] Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce Vol. 1*, p. 328.

Southeast Asia's port-cities.[4] Yet practices of cosmopolitanism and commerce did continue despite this loss. Although *states* had lost their capacity to dictate the terms of maritime commerce, those who lived, moved, and traded within the port-city still showed a capacity to innovate, adapt, trade, and co-exist throughout the colonial era. While many indigenous inhabitants moved of the colonial city,[5] encouraged by the colonial state to focus on agricultural production, some stayed or were drawn to cities, interacting and in some cases intermarrying with the newly arrived migrant communities who put down new roots. A rising multi-ethnic Asian commercial class found ways of adapting to the colonial environment, one that brought new sets of interactions between cultures and communities.

Embedded in regional and global networks of trade and migration, cities provide us with a different kind of history than the territorial boundaries of kingdoms and nations. The porousness of the port-city continually posed challenges to the centrifugal, homogenising tendencies of the dynastic, colonial, and nation-state. The vibrancy of its commerce fuelled the state and was built on interactions with the outside world. The visibility of racial and class hierarchies created the conditions for conflict, particularly in times of economic distress. Yet new experiences of urbanism also brought together people of diverse economic and linguistic backgrounds within a common framework of experience. Rather than the 'imagined communities' of nations put forth by Anderson,[6] the city provided a shared home for local peoples, indigenous traders, migrants, and hybrid communities, who often met face to face as strangers, interacting on an everyday basis. Though these banal and unrecorded interactions left little trace, by examining the growth of cities and their spaces we can begin to trace a lineage of cosmopolitan social practices and regional connections that complicate, enrich, and exist alongside histories of the nation.

## Entwined Origins

Yangon is the oldest of the three sites examined in this study, but it is also the most problematic to study within the framework of the nation-state. It has often been seen as an artificial city born out of British imperial rule, populated largely by Indian immigrants and supplanting the centre of Burmese courtly life at Mandalay. Yet the Shwedagon and Sule pagodas

[4] See also Reid, 'Southeast Asian History and the Colonial Impact', in Ts'ui-jung Liu et al. (eds.), *Asian Population History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 55–59.
[5] Ibid., p. 55. [6] See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

were the two axes around which colonial Rangoon was built, and they had long, ancient histories.[7] Historically, they provided a continuous point of popular cultural and religious affiliation for Buddhists, particularly the Mon- and Burmese-speaking inhabitants of Lower Burma, while royal, walled cities in the interior north shifted and changed sites. The religious appeal of the town of Dagon, as Yangon was then known, was linked to trade. B.R. Pearn, one of the few colonial scholars of Southeast Asia to study cities, argued that Hindu traders originally constructed the shrine.[8] Beginning in the fourteenth century, Dagon grew as a centre of religious life for the inhabitants of the multi-ethnic world of Lower Burma, including nearby Pegu, one of the largest, richest trading empires in pre-colonial Southeast Asia and the only one of Burma's dynastic cities to be located near the sea. In the late sixteenth century, an Italian traveller compared Dagon to his home city of Venice, describing gilded, wooden houses and delicate gardens, and the Shwedagon as a 'Varella' featuring a street 'greater than Saint Markes [*sic*]', where people came to hear Buddhist monks preach.[9] Pearn argues that Dagon's seasonal fairs and major religious festivals played a transformative role in the economy of Burma as they generated a great market for overseas trade, enabling the city to seasonally rival Pegu.[10] Dagon was connected to the region through Pegu's ties to Portuguese Malacca, the centre of the Asian spice trade, supporting the city with rice, foodstuffs, locally built ships, and luxury goods. Tomé Pires pointed to trading customs shared between Dagon and Malacca and also the attraction of Pegu traders to Malay women.[11] The geographical positioning of Dagon, situated near a major seaport, gave it an early history of multi-ethnic interaction that enhanced its spiritual significance.

Bangkok's immediate precursor as a royal city was Ayutthaya, known to European traders as the 'Venice of the East', and the main rival of Pegu and Malacca as a regional commercial power. Dynastic chronicles suggest that Ayutthaya was founded by a Chinese sea merchant, whose travels took him down the coast to the Malay Peninsula.[12] The city prospered due largely to the presence of Chinese, Indian, and Arab mercantile communities living just outside the city walls and the influence of the Chinese Hokkien community at court.[13] Like the Burmese capitals of

[7] See B.R. Pearn, *A History of Rangoon* (Rangoon: American Baptist Missionary Press, 1939), pp. 12–20.
[8] Pearn, *History of Rangoon*, p. 11. [9] Pearn, *History of Rangoon*, p. 30.
[10] Ibid., pp. 29–30.
[11] Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, p. 103.
[12] Charnvit Kasetsiri, *The Rise of Ayutthaya: A History of Siam in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 63.
[13] Wyatt, *Thailand*, pp. 54–55.

Sagaing, Ava, Toungoo, and Pegu, the city was encased in walls based on a square plan.[14] Yet unlike these capitals, which rose, fell, and revolved around the region for strategic as well as cosmological purposes, Ayutthaya was firmly rooted in one place, its rulers looking continually towards the sea.[15] The eighteenth-century 'coastal map' featured in Thongchai Winichakul's *Siam Mapped* belies the cosmological mindset of Siamese rulers: Ayutthaya is a large square space at the centre of the map, while coastal ports from Canton to Pegu and Malacca are portrayed in a series of small bulges jutting into the ocean.[16] Unlike the Burmese capitals with fortress walls, Ayutthaya was a marvel of 'amphibious' urban planning in mainland Southeast Asia.[17] The city restructured itself constantly, with new canals dug to replace older ones in reaction to the changing flows of the Lopburi River, a pattern replicated in Bangkok's waterways. But it was this amphibian nature of the city that made it vulnerable; its walls twice failed to keep Burmese invaders at bay, once in 1569 and again in 1767.

The end of a century of political turmoil in the region, including wars between Burma and Siam, coincided with the expansion of British and French trade in the late eighteenth century. Britain's 'imperial meridian' began to swing eastwards after the loss of the American colonies.[18] The salons and drawing rooms of the Enlightenment age were sustained in part by tea sourced from China. Bengal opium and Indian cotton were exchanged for the increasingly popular commodity, prompting a geographic shift in European maritime commerce to Asia from the mid eighteenth century. The Bay of Bengal was poised on the edge of a 'commercial revolution', in which networks of Asian traders competed with Dutch, Portuguese, French, and English private traders.[19] Seeking

[14] For more on Burma's square, walled cities and Buddhist cosmology see: Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce Vol. 2*, pp. 77–82; U Kan Hla, 'Traditional Town Planning in Burma', *The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 37:2 (1978), 92–104. On Ayutthaya's cosmological significance from an architectural point of view see Sumet Jumsai, *Naga: Cultural Origins in Siam and the West Pacific* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[15] For an excellent analysis of Ayutthaya's origins as a maritime commercial power, see Chris Baker, 'Ayutthaya Rising: From Land or Sea?' *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34:1 (2003): 41–62.

[16] Thongchai, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of the Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994, p. 29 (figure 4).

[17] See Jumsai, *Naga*, p. 77 ff.

[18] Christopher A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (London: Longman, 1989).

[19] Om Prakash, 'From Hostility to Collaboration: European Corporate Enterprise and Private Trade in the Bay of Bengal, 1500-1800', in *Commerce and Culture in the Bay of Bengal*, ed. Om Prakash and Denys Lombard (Manohar: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1999), 135–61.

to establish trading posts throughout the east, Europeans curried the favour of local rulers with exotic commodities in the Burmese delta, Southern Siam, and Kedah, their foreign weapons fuelling the ambitions and failures of kings.

The territorial expansion of the East India Company was not simply a one-way process, but occurred in tandem with the desires of local rulers to harness new forms of military technology and organisation.[20] The emergence of Yangon as the chief port of the Irrawaddy delta in 1755 began with a conflict between rulers in Lower and Upper Burma, with both sides seeking to capitalise on newly available French and British military technology. In response to a Mon revolt that made use of modern French cannon, an ambitious township headman appealed for more arms from the British at the port-settlement of Negrais. After devastating both Pegu and Syriam, then the chief port at the mouth of the Irrawaddy, the headman styled himself King Alaungpaya and made Dagon the new southern seaport, renaming the city 'Yangon', 'the end of strife'.[21] I use the Burmese term 'Yangon' when referring to the city under Burmese rule from 1755 until its conquest in 1852 by the British, from which point I refer to the city using the British term 'Rangoon'.

Unlike Siam's rulers, who seized the commercial opportunities of their seaport-capital, Alaungpaya largely ignored Yangon. Retreating to Ava in the interior, he entrusted governance of the town to Portuguese and Armenian tax collectors while centralising the Konbaung state's rule from Ava. Maritime trade provided the revenues for state expansion, yet it was never the focus of Konbaung interests, which were to consolidate a fragmentary, heterogenous state under strong, centralised rule.[22] Modern Bangkok emerged as a result of Alaungpaya's deathbed wish to re-conquer Ayutthaya, a task carried out by a merciless Burmese army in 1767. The city was desolated in a maelstrom of rape, pillage, and plunder.[23] Ten thousand Siamese captives, many of them from the country's intellectual class, were brought back to Burma, eventually inspiring a cultural renaissance of Burmese court culture.[24]

[20] D. A. Washbrook, 'Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History *c.* 1720–1860', *Modern Asian Studies* 22:1 (1988): 57–96, 13.
[21] For a detailed account of this see Victor B. Lieberman, *Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, 1580–1760* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 237–277. See also Pearn, *History of Rangoon*, p. 47.
[22] See Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830 Vol. 1 Integration on the Mainland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 67–180.
[23] Wyatt, *Thailand*, p. 118.
[24] Aung Htin, *A History of Burma* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Thant Myint-U, *The Making of Modern Burma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 93.

Out of the vacuum of power in Siam, a charismatic Chinese-Thai general, Taksin, founded a new base at Thonburi opposite a Teochew settlement at Bangkok. Trade generated by the Teochew community helped Taksin raise an army of Chinese traders, adventurers, and minor nobility to defeat the only surviving Burmese army in the region.[25] As the Burmese threat subsided, the old nobility resurfaced and two of Taksin's generals, brothers excluded from holding official positions, struck back at Taksin, resenting his Teochew origins as well as his new supporters.[26] The rebels mounted a coup and executed Taksin on charges of treason, as one brother, Thongduang, ascended to the throne to restore a lineage of kings.[27] With the founding of a new capital at Bangkok, Teochews were uprooted from their homes and forced to move south of the walls of the new palace. Other ethnic groups, including the Hokkien (the Teochew's main rivals), Portuguese, Lao, Cham, and Indian communities, were not required to relocate.[28]

The expansion of the Konbaung state and the destruction of Ayutthaya unwittingly provided the impetus for the Siamese monarchy to re-invent itself in the late eighteenth century by establishing a new, modern capital that lay claim to a glorious past. At the expense of Taksin and the Teochew community, the continuity of Ayutthaya was represented in the new dynasty; the cosmological heart of Siam was again epitomised in a divinely ordained ruler. The settlement, '*bang kok*' – literally, the 'waterfront settlement of hog plums' – was given a more suitable name: '*krung thep*', the royal city protected by angels.[29] The walled, royal heart of the city, Rattanokosin, modelled on the former capital, was built with the symbolic rubble of Ayutthaya using the sweat of corvée labourers, who dug new canals and waterways while craftsman constructed temples and a new palace. The monarchy seized the opportunity to renew itself through modern notions of accountability, reaching out to the public by propagating a new set of laws, decrees, and proclamations.[30]

The founding of Bangkok, in turn, fostered a new set of urban connections. Wars with the Burmese have been an important part of Thailand's national narrative as a victim of an aggressor, although less has been said of the history of Siam's own exploitative relationship with its southern

[25] See Edward Van Roy, 'Sampheng: From Ethnic Isolation to National Integration', *SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 23:1 (2008), 5; Wyatt, *History of Thailand*, p. 123–125.
[26] Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, *A History of Thailand* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 27.
[27] Ibid. [28] Van Roy, p. 6.
[29] Takashi Tomosugi, *Reminiscences of Old Bangkok: Memory and the Identification of a Changing Society* (Tokyo: The Institute of Oriental Culture, 1993).
[30] Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, p. 131.

neighbours in the Malay states.[31] These tensions were responsible at least partly for the founding of Penang as the first British colonial outpost in the region. The sacking of Ayutthaya created a window of opportunity for the Malay kingdom of Kedah to end its vassal state status on the southern fringe of the Siamese kingdom. The Sultan of Kedah sought to assert his kingdom's autonomy and sever its tributary relationship to Siam. When approached by an English country trader, he bargained on the promise of British military might. Francis Light proved an ideal interlocutor, speaking fluent Siamese and Malay, and aided by his Portuguese-Malay mistress, Maria Rozelles, from Junk Ceylon (now Phuket).[32] Acting without any affiliation to the colonial government in Madras, Light promised the Sultan that in exchange for the island of Penang, the British would cancel Kedah's debts to the King of Siam with a lease of 6,000 pounds and provide protection to end the 'slavery' of his people.[33] The promises proved false, and ten years later Kedah fell under Siamese rule.

Though their histories have often been seen separately, the geopolitical conflicts between the kingdoms of Upper and Lower Burma, Siam, and Kedah resulted in the emergence of Yangon, Bangkok, and Penang as new Asian port-cities in the late eighteenth century. By telling their stories together, we gain a sense of the ways their emergence was entwined, embedded in struggles of both Asian and Western power, rather than a narrative of straightforward European expansion into Southeast Asian states. Writing to the East India Company on his own initiative, Light sensationalised regional conflicts to make the case for Penang and its tranquil harbour as a new Asian port, describing a pirate-ridden Aceh, constant skirmishes between the Burmese and Peguers (which ruled out the port of Negrais), and the 'fluctuating', 'despotic' government of Siam (which ruled out Junk Ceylon).[34] With a peaceful port at Penang, the English could undermine Dutch domination of the region by drawing Asian trade away from Malacca. Light wrote that 'Malay, Buggises [*sic*] and Chines [*sic*] will come to reside here, it will become the Exchange of the East if not loaded with impositions and restriction'.[35] The choice of Penang as the first outpost of British imperialism in Southeast Asia was

[31] See Richard Windstedt, 'History of Kedah', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 14 (1936): 156–176.
[32] On Rozells see Nordin Hussin, *Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 298. See also 'Wife of Penang's Founder', *Straits Echo*, 5 May 1938, p. 13.
[33] Light described this relationship as 'slavery' in his letters to the East India Company. See Bengal Proceedings relating to Penang, 1786–1787, India Office Records G/34/2, 27.
[34] Light, 23 February 1767. Bengal Proceedings, India Office Records G/34/2.
[35] Light, 5 February 1767. Bengal Proceedings, India Office Records G/34/2.

a direct result of Light's perception of regional instability, informed by his local contacts, and made for a convincing case to company officials.

Penang fell under the administrative control of Bengal until 1805, when its status was raised to a presidency like Madras, Bombay, and Bengal. Penang also enjoyed the same status as Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta as a free port. Its initial Malay population was 158. Light needed labour to establish Penang as a viable port, and relied particularly on a thriving Chinese community on the mainland province of Kedah.[36] Within a decade, ten thousand Malay, Chinese, and Indian merchants from Malacca, Batavia, South China, and the Coromandel Coast arrived on Penang's shores. Many of them sought to escape Dutch and Siamese royal monopolies, lured by the promise of trade without duties or licences and protection by the British flag. Penang inherited the hybrid cultures of old Malacca, Kedah, and Southern Siam, including communities of Portuguese Eurasians, Straits-Chinese, and Jawi-Peranakan, as well as a minority of Burmese and Siamese Christians.[37] Sir George Leith, Penang's new governor, said of the settlement in 1801, 'There is not, probably, any part of the world where, in so small a space, so many different people are assembled together or so great a variety of languages spoken.'[38] Out of the regional conflicts of the late eighteenth century rose the first British colonial port-city in Southeast Asia, providing a new model of an Asian port-city founded on the ideals of free trade.

## Maritime Asia Transformed

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the British Empire was not a cohesive entity but an informal commercial empire, backed by London-based financiers with an enormous amount of capital to invest in shipping, communications, and trade.[39] The primary task of Britain's East India Company was to follow the pattern of the Dutch and secure port-cities as gateways into the Asian trade. From the mid-nineteenth century into the twentieth, as Europe's industrial revolution took off and

[36] C.M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements* (London: Athlone, 1972), p. 9.
[37] For an analysis of Penang's early ethnic make-up see Hussin, *Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka*, pp. 294–319.
[38] Sir George Leith, *A Short Account of the Settlement, Produce, and Commerce of Prince of Wales Island in the Straits of Malacca* (London: Barfield, 1804), p. 25.
[39] For debates on the nature of Britain's 'informal empire' see John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review* 6.1 (1953): 1–15; Peter Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I. The Old Colonial System, 1688-1850', *The Economic History Review* 39.4 (1986): 501–525; and John Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', *English Historical Review* (1997): 614–42.

commerce intensified to meet a limitless demand for Asian raw materials, the modern Asian port-city began serving not only as a trading emporium but as an imperial bridgehead, extending the tentacles of empire into the hinterland. Penang, Rangoon, and Bangkok emerged within a network of port-cities, from Bombay to Shanghai, serving to expand the imperial reach of Europe's Asian empires.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, as European commercial interests nibbled away at the edges of Asian territories, Burmese, Siamese, and Malay rulers did not choose to promote sea-borne commerce among their own subjects as they once did two to three hundred years earlier.[40] While Burmese kings and Malay sultans consolidated their authority inland, Siamese rulers encouraged foreign merchants in Bangkok to capitalise on the Europe–China trade, resulting in a large influx of Chinese immigration and intermarriage between Thais and Chinese. British commercial interests began lobbying their government to establish British legal institutions and property rights to ensure social stability and safeguard their commercial contracts and financial investments. In some cases, these succeeded in generating new loyalties from Asian trading communities drawn to the opportunities of the port-city, enabling them to accumulate private capital. David Washbrook observes of South Asia that both 'progress and problems' emerged out of the entrenchment of European ideologies, state and legal institutions, ranging from an increased ability to invest in infrastructure and agriculture to the subordination of labour and production practices.[41] In Southeast Asia, both progress and problems were compounded by the fact that those most willing to subscribe to such ideologies and institutions were Chinese and Indian immigrants.

Lauren Benton has argued that the imposition of domains of legal and territorial sovereignty by European empires was marked by shifting uneven geographies of control and legal anomalies.[42] While Penang was a testing ground for new ideologies and institutions in Southeast Asia, these were not grafted onto the island wholesale but incorporated, in patchwork fashion, into an immigrant society that followed many of the

[40] See Milner, 'Who Created Malaysia's Plural Society?'. Milner compares the Malay case to analyses of Burma and Siam in Michael Adas, *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852–1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974) and Constance M. Wilson, 'Revenue Farming, Economic Development and Government Policy during the Early Bangkok Period', in *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming*, eds. J. and H. Dick Butcher (New York: St. Martins, 1993), 142–65.

[41] See Washbrook, 'Progress and Problems'.

[42] Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).