

## CHAPTER I

*Paradoxes of Monarchy***I. Aristotle's Defense of Kingship**

In *Politics* 3, after discussing the nature of citizenship and the appropriate criteria for the distribution of political office, Aristotle turns to consider whether those criteria tell in favor of kingship:

For we say that this is one of the correct constitutions. But we ought to inquire into whether it is beneficial for a city and a region, if it is going to be managed well, to be ruled by a king, or if, on the contrary, some other sort of constitution is more beneficial, or if kingship is beneficial for some but not beneficial for others. (*Pol.* 3.14.1284b26–40)

The initial question of chapter 14 is, then, under what conditions, if any, kingship would benefit a city. This question does not at all mark an abrupt shift from what precedes. Aristotle has just finished arguing that “the multitude” (τὸ πλῆθος) of citizens should be “the authoritative element” (τὸ κύριον) in a city unless there is some smaller group or even a single individual so excellent as to be able to manage the city’s affairs better than the others could.<sup>1</sup> If there were such a person, he would be “like a god among human beings.” It would be unjust to exclude him from the city, and likewise ridiculous to suppose that he should take turns ruling and being ruled along with all the others. The only reasonable course of action would be to obey him willingly (3.13.1284a3–17, b27–34, cf. 17.1288a28–29). Such preeminently virtuous people are, to say the least,

<sup>1</sup> I translate κύριον and its forms with the English “authoritative” and related terms. Like “sovereignty,” “authority” is a potentially misleading translation insofar as both terms bear important, if at times imprecise, technical meanings in contemporary political philosophy (cf. Ober 1996c, Rosler 2005). Simpson 1997 prefers “controlling,” which avoids confusion with technical meanings of “authoritative” and “sovereign” but introduces ambiguities of its own. I will use “authority” and related terms throughout with the caveat that I do not intend it in its narrow technical sense, but in the looser sense in which we say that someone has authority over X when he is “in charge of” X. I discuss the relationship of Aristotle’s κύριον and ἀρχή to the technical sense of “authority” in Chapter 3.2.

exceedingly rare. Aristotle's invocation of them therefore strengthens the case for the rule of the multitude by showing what it takes to defeat it. Yet the argument explicitly maintains that, in the appropriate circumstances, the standards of distributive justice require the concentration of power in a single individual. In shifting his attention to kingship, Aristotle is considering whether that implication of the account he has offered so far is ultimately defensible.

Until putting it in question in chapter 14, Aristotle has assumed throughout book 3 that monarchy can come in good forms as well as bad. He has therefore given kingship a place in his classification of constitutions as one of the "correct" constitutions. A constitution (πολιτεία) is an arrangement of those who inhabit the city (3.1.1274b38), or, more strictly, an arrangement of the city's political offices, and especially of the office or institutional body that is authoritative over everything (3.6.1278b8–10). Constitutions may be divided into two broad kinds: Those that are organized with a view to the common good of the rulers and the ruled are "correct" (ὀρθαί), while those that aim only at the good of the rulers are corrupt "deviations" (παρεκβάσεις) from the correct varieties (3.6.1279a17–21). Deviant constitutions, because they subordinate the good of the ruled to the interests of the rulers, subvert the natural and appropriate norms of rule over people who are naturally free. Unlike supposedly natural slaves, naturally free people possess robust capacities for rational deliberation and agency, and it is a fundamental principle of justice that such people should not be subjected to forms of rule that render them the mere instruments of others. Natural slaves, by contrast, lack the capacity for full deliberative agency, and so can, on Aristotle's view, justly be treated as mere instruments of their masters.<sup>2</sup> The form of rule appropriate to natural slaves is "despotic rule" (δεσποτεία, δεσποτική); "political rule" (πολιτική), by contrast, is the form of rule appropriate to naturally free people (3.6.1278b30–1279a13, cf. 1.5–7). Deviant constitutions are deviant precisely because they are despotic where they should be political, and hence deviate from the correct, properly political, forms. The correct constitutions and their corresponding deviations can be distinguished, at least initially, by the number of people who hold the most

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle's theory of slavery is the subject of a vast secondary literature and is a frequent source of embarrassment to his admirers; I discuss it in more detail in Chapter 3. Kraut 2002: 277–305 provides a general overview of the issues, concluding, I think rightly, that in part because "Aristotle's framework for thinking about this subject was internally consistent and even contained a limited amount of explanatory power" (278), its failure remains philosophically instructive.

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authoritative positions: Democracy is the deviation of polity (πολιτεία), both of which are characterized by the inclusion of a majority of citizens; oligarchy represents the deviant rule of the few whose correct form is aristocracy; and tyranny is the despotic and deviant form of monarchy, while the correct form is kingship (3.7.1279a22–b10).<sup>3</sup>

This distinction between political and despotic rule and its application to constitutions as correspondingly correct or deviant provides the conceptual framework for the question that opens 3.14. Aristotle has already concluded that justice properly speaking requires the distribution of political office to be proportionate to the merit of the people to whom the offices are distributed (3.9.1280a11–13, cf. *EN* 5.3.1131a10–b24).<sup>4</sup> Merit in this context is to be assessed by reference to the parties' abilities to contribute to the city (*Pol.* 3.9.1281a4–8), and “justice and political virtue” make an incommensurably greater contribution than either freedom or wealth (3.12.1282b15–1283a22).<sup>5</sup> This view opposes two prominent alternative conceptions of distributive justice. The democratic conception insists on strictly equal distribution among all free, adult, male members of the community: Since they are all equally free, they should all share power equally. The oligarchic conception maintains, to the contrary, that inequalities in wealth justify proportionately unequal distributions of power (3.9.1280a7–9, 22–5, cf. *EN* 5.3.1131a25–9). Aristotle's point against both parties is that the relevant standard of merit should be neither wealth nor freedom per se, but contribution to the good of the city (*Pol.* 3.9.1281a4–10). Freedom and wealth enable such contribution, and so are not wholly irrelevant. It is virtue, however, that makes people willing and able to contribute in the most important ways. Aristotle's merit-based conception of justice therefore privileges political virtue. Because it maintains that political office should be in the hands of those best able to exercise it, we might also call it the aristocratic conception (cf. *EN* 5.3.1131a29).

On its face, this conception of justice might seem to lead directly to a narrow concentration of power in the hands of the few most outstanding individuals in the community. The matter becomes more complex,

<sup>3</sup> From another perspective, Aristotle is willing to classify even correct constitutions as deviant relative to the form of constitution that is best without qualification. For more thorough treatments of Aristotle's theory of constitutions, cf. Fortenbaugh 1991, Keyt 1991b, Mulgan 1991, and Miller 1995. I return to these issues in Chapter 5.

<sup>4</sup> A fuller account of Aristotle's argument in *Pol.* 3.9–13 and of his theory of distributive justice requires detailed reference to *EN* 5 (= *EE* 4), which Aristotle himself cites at 1280a18. I draw here on Keyt 1991b and Miller 1995: ch. 3. For a more introductory treatment, cf. Roberts 2000.

<sup>5</sup> With Ross and against Dreizehnter, I read πολιτικῆς at 1283a20 rather than πολεμικῆς.

however, when Aristotle expands the scope of justice to include the merit-based claims that can be made on behalf of groups as well as individuals. In what is sometimes called “the summation argument,” he defends the political participation of ordinary people of no extraordinary virtue:

For it is possible for the many, none of whom is an excellent [σπουδαῖος] man, nevertheless to be better, when they have come together, than those [few best men], not as individuals but all taken together, just as feasts that are brought together are better than those that have been furnished at a single person’s expense. And although they are many, it is possible for each to have a portion of excellence and of practical wisdom, and just as the multitude can, when they have come together, become like a single human being with many feet and hands and senses, so too [they can become like a single human being] with regard to traits of character and their thought. That is why the many are better judges of the works of culture [μουσική] and of poets; for different people judge different parts, but all of them [collectively] judge all of them. (*Pol.* 3.11.1281a42–b10)

The traditional label for this argument is misleading because the idea of “summation” suggests that what is at issue are merely quantitative considerations.<sup>6</sup> Yet just as a communal feast is likely to be enriched by the contribution not only of more but of a greater variety of foods, so too the work of politics is likely to be improved by the inclusion of a variety of perspectives on matters of collective concern. The common good is, like a tragic drama, complex, and though a few individuals may succeed in cultivating a refined sensitivity to the whole and all of its parts, those of us with less comprehensive critical insight may nonetheless form better judgments collectively than anyone could on his own (3.11.1281b7–10).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> On the summation argument, I am indebted to especially to Keyt 1991b; see too Waldron 1995 and Ober 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Cammack 2013a and Lane 2013 challenge the now-standard view that Aristotle’s summation argument depends on an appeal to diverse qualitative considerations, arguing instead that the argument is strictly quantitative and aggregative. Though their interpretations differ in detail, both emphasize (i) that Aristotle’s analogy of a collective feast does not explicitly cite the superior quality or qualitative variety of the feast, and (ii) that the logic of Aristotle’s argument is aggregative, applying as much to claims to rule on the basis of wealth as to claims based on virtue. Neither of these points makes a persuasive case against the standard interpretation. First, it scarcely follows from (i) that Aristotle does not have the qualitative superiority of the feast and the diversity of individual contributions in mind when describing the collective feast as better, or, more pressingly, when applying the analogy to collective rule. More fundamentally, neither Cammack nor Lane shows that (ii) is inconsistent with basing judgments of the relative superiority in virtue on the qualitative superiority afforded by the diversity of individual contributions. The logic of Aristotle’s argument does indeed depend, as Lane insists, on claims that X possesses “more” of some relevant feature than Y, so that the argument succeeds even when the relevant feature can be compared in purely quantitative terms (as with wealth). But when the relevant feature is virtue, such comparisons must be at least partially

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The summation argument shows that the aristocratic conception of justice must take account of the merit-based claims that can be made on behalf of groups as well as individuals. An individual's ability to contribute to the common good cannot be evaluated by reference to his personal virtues alone. Rather, the relevant excellences of any group to which he might contribute must be set against the individual abilities of the city's most outstanding citizens. In most circumstances, the citizen body's collective virtue will surpass that of any individual or small group of individuals. The principle behind the summation argument therefore provides a powerful basis for endorsing the rule of the multitude.

Aristotle qualifies his endorsement of rule by the multitude in at least two ways. First, he admits the possibility that some groups might be composed of people so corrupt that they could not effectively come together to govern the city well. Some people, he says with some exaggeration, are practically indistinguishable from wild animals or slaves (3.11.1281b18–20, 1282a15–17). It is unclear precisely how corrupt and slavish the people need to be in order to fail the test provided by the summation argument. Aristotle leaves little doubt, however, that the claims of the multitude might in fact be defeated. If a community includes a group or even a single individual whose excellence surpasses that of all the others combined, it will be just for that group or individual to rule. Anyone who possessed such superiority over the rest of the city would be treated unjustly if he were compelled to share power equally with the others (3.13.1284a3–11).

qualitative, and the most plausible way in which individuals who are not outstanding for their virtue can collectively exceed outstanding individuals is by the diversity of their individual contributions, as Aristotle's claim that "each can have some part of virtue and practical wisdom" (3.11.1281b4) and his analogy to collective judgment in poetic competitions, where "one judges one part, another another, and all of them the whole" (3.11.1281b7–10), suggest. Lane 2013: 259–60 acknowledges that these passages are problematic for her interpretation and attempts to read them in strictly quantitative terms, but does not persuasively explain away their appeals to qualitatively diverse contributions. Cammack shows convincingly that we should not follow Waldron 1995 in reading the argument in narrowly epistemic terms, as though the only significant individual contributions come in the form of knowledge rather than other forms of virtue, but this salutary point does not show that the relevant virtues are not inextricably tied up with what makes for excellent deliberation and judgment, as her account acknowledges when she writes of "the aggregation *not* of knowledge but of moral *and intellectual* capacities such as courage, justice, moderation, and *good sense*" (Cammack 2013a: 185, emphasis added). Nor does her insightful discussion of the ways in which the superior virtue of the multitude *does* derive from the quantity of people involved entail that their collective superiority does not depend crucially on the qualitative diversity of their individual contributions (as her reading of the analogy to collective poetic judgments appears to acknowledge, as when she suggests that "what distinguishes a good single man from a mass of people is that the good man comprises *in himself* all the parts of *aretē* that, in the mass, *are found scattered about*"; Cammack 2013a: 191). I discuss the summation argument and the complex dialectical trajectory of 3.11–13 more fully in Chapters 5 and 6.

Second, the presence of such outstanding individuals in the city yields a distinct condition in which the summation argument would fail to justify the rule of the multitude: In this case, the claim of the many ordinary citizens is not defeated by their corruption or depravity, but by the vastly superior excellence of one or a few citizens. The multitude envisioned in this second case does not consist of individuals comparable to slaves or wild animals. Rather, they are fully capable of managing the city's affairs collectively in the absence of any sufficiently outstanding individuals, but they cannot do it nearly so well as the outstandingly virtuous minority. That minority's ability to rule the city better than the collective multitude is the central criterion of the degree of superiority necessary to justify the rule of that minority.<sup>8</sup>

It is important to see that these two conditions in which the summation argument fails are genuinely distinct. It might seem otherwise, since both conditions depend on the comparative ability of one or a few people to govern the city more excellently than the multitude. Moreover, both cases require that the multitude be deficient in virtue. If the citizens on the whole were extremely virtuous, then surely no subset of them could emerge sufficiently superior to merit special consideration. Despite these similarities, distinguishing the two cases brings out an important feature of Aristotle's view: The failure of the summation argument to tell in favor of the multitude in any given circumstance does not depend exclusively on the outstanding vices of a majority or on the achievement of moral perfection by a minority. The case for rule by the multitude rests instead on a comparative claim that their ability to manage the city collectively is not surpassed by the ability of one or a few citizens. Thus the summation principle posits a single criterion for inclusion or exclusion, but that criterion can be met in two distinct sorts of conditions. In the first, only those who are not at all capable of managing the city's affairs well are justly excluded; the second apparently licenses the exclusion even of people who are well suited for political participation.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> As Keyt 1991b notes, the argument seems to require that the minority be able to manage the city's affairs more excellently than any other group, *even a group that includes them*. The summation argument thus sets the bar quite high. I discuss this question in Chapter 6.4.

<sup>9</sup> Though the possibility that some groups might fail to meet the criteria of the summation argument is sometimes dismissed as an expression of aristocratic ideology (e.g., Ober 1998: 321), Kraut 2002: 405 seems right to conclude that "we should not take Aristotle to be saying that *whenever* defective individuals come together as a group, they make good collective decisions. He is making a far more cautious claim: When certain kinds of person come together – namely those whose deficiencies are not great – they can make decisions that promote their common good." Mayhew 2009: 537 rightly emphasizes that Aristotle does not suppose that the summation argument excludes only people who are simply incapable of ruling themselves politically.

The considerations invoked by the summation argument guide us in assessing which of the three correct constitutional types would be just in any given circumstance: Where the many meet the criterion set by the principle of summation, we get polity; where it fails because of the relative superiority of a few, we get aristocracy; and where a single individual's excellence surpasses that of the rest of the city combined, then the distributively just constitutional arrangement will be kingship. Aristotle's openness to aristocracy and kingship shows that he regards the collective merit-based claims of the multitude as in principle defeasible. Though the principle of summation dulls the edge of what might otherwise be the sharply exclusionary implications of the aristocratic conception of justice, this same principle would, in the appropriate circumstances, tell in favor of the claims of a minority and thereby justify rule by the few or the one best man. Doubts about this implication of the argument might apply to aristocracy no less than to kingship, but the latter raises special problems of its own and presents the common difficulties in their starkest form. A defense of kingship in the face of these worries is, a fortiori, a defense of aristocracy as well.

As Aristotle frames it, the primary question is whether kingship would benefit a city. This question is, however, another way of asking whether kingship is a correct constitution. Correct constitutions are those that aim at the common good (3.6.1279a16–20), a phrase that might equally well be translated as “the common benefit” or “the common advantage” (τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον). The connection between the common good and justice is so tight that Aristotle is willing to say that justice *is* the common good (3.12.1282b17–18). If kingship were never beneficial, or if some other constitutional arrangement were always and everywhere more beneficial, then it could not be a correct constitution.<sup>10</sup> When Aristotle asks whether kingship “is beneficial to some but not beneficial to others” (3.13.1284b40), the “some” and the “others” he is asking about are distinct cities, not distinct groups of citizens within a single city.<sup>11</sup> All constitutional types benefit at least some groups in some respects, and so it would hardly be worth asking whether kingship benefits some citizens but not others. Deviant constitutions are deviant primarily because they are directed to the benefit

<sup>10</sup> I take it that the correctness of a constitution is primarily a feature of a kind or type: Thus it is consistent to hold that being conducive to the common good is a necessary condition of being a correct constitution *and* that monarchy is not, in some (perhaps many or even most) circumstances, conducive to the common good.

<sup>11</sup> This much should be clear from 1284b38–9, where the antecedents of the indefinite τισί μὲν...τισί δὲ are πόλεις καὶ χώρας.



of some members of the community at the expense of others. So Aristotle proceeds to consider a series of objections to the claim that kingship promotes the common good. He supposes that answering these objections will establish that kingship is a correct constitution.

Understanding the question in this way helps to make the trajectory of the arguments that follow more intelligible. Aristotle first distinguishes five kinds of kingship. The first is the sort found in Sparta, where the king has authority only over military and religious affairs. This form of kingship, however, differs from a generalship only in the term of its office and in the addition of a religious role. It may also be hereditary or elected, while generalships are typically elected. Thus Aristotle calls it “generalship for life” (3.14.1285a3–16, 26–8). The second form, “barbarian kingship,” grants more power to the king and differs from tyranny in only a few ways. Though it is despotic because the king holds unrivaled power and does not rule for the common good, it is only partially tyrannical because the king rules according to law (κατὰ νόμον) over willing subjects.<sup>12</sup> Such kingships are also typically hereditary (3.14.1285a16–29). Barbarian kingship closely resembles the third form, found instead among Greeks, the αἰσυμνητεία, sometimes translated as “dictatorship.”<sup>13</sup> The αἰσυμνητεία is distinguished from barbarian kingship only by being elected rather than hereditary, and may in fact be for a limited term rather than for life. The αἰσυμνητεία and barbarian kingship are both forms of despotic rule according to law, combining features of tyranny with characteristics of kingship (3.14.1285a29–b1). Aristotle therefore calls them “despotic” (δεσποτική), “tyrannical” (τυραννική), and “kingly” or “royal” (βασιλική), carefully distinguishing them from pure cases of tyranny or kingship (3.14.1285b2–3).<sup>14</sup> In this respect, they differ from the fourth kind

<sup>12</sup> One of the points at issue in the chapters on kingship is just what is and is not entailed by the rule of law. Roughly, however, an official rules κατὰ νόμον when there is a set of rules and institutional procedures that limit and constrain that official’s exercise of authority; the alternative is for an official to be free to rule according to his own will, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν (3.16.1287a1). Aristotle’s argument complicates the relationship between these alternatives. I discuss the issue more fully in Chapter 6.3. “Law” and “laws” here – Aristotle uses the two expressions interchangeably – are to be taken in the broad sense that encompasses what we might prefer to call customs or conventions as well as formal written laws (Aristotle distinguishes these at 3.16.1287b5–8); on the use of νόμος generally, Ostwald 1969 remains instructive.

<sup>13</sup> For this translation, see Simpson 1997.

<sup>14</sup> It is not always appreciated that these forms of monarchy are not pure tyrannies or pure kingships; thus Robinson 1962: 52, though prepared to describe these as “at once kingships and tyrannies,” is troubled by their reappearance in 4.10.1295a11–14 “as forms of tyranny.” Robinson wrongly claims that “nothing is said about the question whether the ruler rules for his own or for the public advantage”; in fact, part of what Aristotle means to tell us in describing these forms of monarchy as “tyrannical” is that they do not aim at the common good. I discuss this point in greater detail in Chapter 6.1 and 6.3.



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of kingship, this one associated with the kings of heroic times. As a form of hereditary rule according to law over willing subjects, heroic kingship initially seems to differ little from the Spartan kingship. Heroic kings, however, surpassed the Spartan kings in the extent of their authority. In addition to military affairs and sacrifices, such kings served as judges and generally “ruled continuously over the affairs of the city, the country, and beyond the borders” (3.14.1285b13–14). Heroic kingship, then, was more than generalship for life. The two forms of kingship are alike, however, in lacking the elements of tyranny found in barbarian kingship and αἰσυμνητεία.

All four kinds of kingship discussed so far share two crucial features: First, they are all forms of rule over willing subjects, and hence not pure tyrannies; second, they are all forms of rule according to law. The fifth, and ultimately most important, form of kingship resembles the others in the first respect but diverges from them in the second. Aristotle initially distinguishes it from the others by the range of the king’s authority: It is the form of kingship that exists “when a single person has authority (κύριος ὄν) over all the common affairs” (3.14.1285b29–30). He labels it, accordingly, “total kingship” (παμβασιλεία, 3.15.1285b36).<sup>15</sup> We might suppose, then, that total kingship simply takes heroic kingship one step further by giving more power to the king. In one sense, this supposition is correct. It is important to see, however, that the extension of authority in total kingship is such that the king is no longer subject to the law. Though this point is initially not made fully explicit, it is implicit in the idea of having authority over “all the common affairs,” and it quickly becomes explicit: The first problem with total kingship that Aristotle considers is “whether it is more beneficial to be ruled by the best man than by the best laws” (3.16.1286a7–9), and he later explains that total kingship is the form in which “the king rules everything in accordance with his own will,” in contrast to ruling according to law (3.16.1287a1–10).

At this point, we can more fully appreciate the importance of understanding the question raised at the beginning of 3.14 as a question about whether kingship is a correct constitution. After distinguishing the five kinds of kingship, Aristotle claims that his inquiry into kingship reduces to questions about the Spartan kingship and total kingship. But these two

<sup>15</sup> I follow Simpson 1997 in translating παμβασιλεία as “total kingship.” This seems preferable to “absolute kingship” (as in Lord 2013), which might unnecessarily suggest that the term itself implies the exclusion of everyone but the king from participation in “rule” or that the king’s authority is entirely unconditional. “Total kingship,” by contrast, has vagueness on its side: Since it is unclear what the term does and does not imply, it is less likely to bias the reader’s judgment on one of the central questions I hope to address.

questions are quite distinct. The Spartan form and total kingship occupy the two extreme poles of kingship as measured by the extent of the king's authority; the total king has the most authority, the Spartan king the least. More fundamentally, however, the Spartan kingship is not a kind of constitution, but merely an unusual form of office. Any kind of constitution, even a democratic one, could conceivably institute the office of generalship for life. It is worth asking whether or not cities would benefit from such an office, whether it is hereditary or filled on some other basis. That question, however, has more to do with laws than with constitutions, and it is kingship as constitutional form that interests Aristotle here (3.15.1285b33–1286a9, cf. 16.1287a3–6).

Though the other kinds of kingship do appear to be something like constitutions, there is good reason to focus the inquiry on total kingship.<sup>16</sup> The tyrannical features of barbarian kingship and αἰσυμνητεία pose obvious problems. Heroic kingship, on the other hand, is not tyrannical, but it remains a mitigated form of total kingship because of the constraints placed on the king's authority. To the extent that any king's authority is limited, the arrangement becomes less a distinct constitutional form and more like one particular office within a constitution.<sup>17</sup> An inquiry into correct and mistaken constitutional varieties would therefore do well to focus more on total kingship than the less complete forms. This focus will bring into view the most distinctive features of kingship as a constitution and will have implications for understanding the less complete forms of kingship to the extent that they approach the status of constitutions rather than mere offices.

The distinction between kinds of kingship therefore serves to clarify the subject of the inquiry. Aristotle then proceeds, as he puts it, “to run over the inherent difficulties” (3.15.1286a7). He begins with a dispute, echoing Plato's *Statesman*, about whether it is best for a city to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. The case for rule by the best man depends on the shortcomings of law. Legal prescriptions are necessarily

<sup>16</sup> The status of barbarian kingship and αἰσυμνητεία as constitutions is unclear, but Aristotle seems to imply that they are not distinct constitutional forms when he describes them as “in accordance with law” (3.14.1285a18–19, 32–3), since he later explicitly denies that a kingship in accordance with law is a form of constitution (3.16.1287a3–4). Since he readily admits the existence of “mixed” constitutional varieties, presumably Aristotle need not be troubled if these categories are not mutually exclusive and admit of degrees of approximation to the paradigm case of total kingship.

<sup>17</sup> cf. 1287a6–8, where Epidamnus and Opus are said to have an office (ἀρχή) in which a single person has authority over the management of affairs (τῆς διοικήσεως). Presumably this office holds something like sole executive authority, though not sole authority over policy making; this would explain why Aristotle considers it more powerful than the Spartan kingship but, like it, insufficient to qualify either city as kingships. I owe this observation to Dhananjay Jagannathan.