

#### Coalitions of the Well-being

Why do some developing countries perform better on health outcomes? This book argues that the design of electoral rules and a country's social structure shapes politicians' strategies in allocating government resources. Where this combination leads to the rise of broad, national, and multiethnic parties, universal health care becomes a central tool to reward voters. Parties transform, creating mechanisms to independently formulate detailed, highly differentiable national health policies, which feature heavily in campaigning. Which electoral rules encourage such parties differs across social structures: in low ethnic-salience countries, proportional representation improves health outcomes; where ethnicity is salient and ethnic groups are geographically intermixed, majoritarian rules are better; and where ethnic groups are isolated, neither rule is superior. The rich set of cases includes Thailand, Mauritius, Malaysia, Botswana, Burma, and Indonesia. The book has important implications for electoral rule design and helps establish a middle ground between the Consociational and Centripetal schools of thought.

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# Coalitions of the Well-being

How Electoral Rules and Ethnic Politics Shape Health Policy in Developing Countries

JOEL SAWAT SELWAY

Brigham Young University





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To Som, for her continual love, patience, and support



The general proposition that I wish to put to you is that the solution to many of today's medical problems will not be found in the research laboratories of our hospitals, but in our Parliaments. For the prospective patient, the answer may not be cure by incision at the operating table, but prevention by decision at the Cabinet table.

Sir George Young, British Minister of Health



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