

## Index

---

- “as if” interpretation, 155
- Abela, Paul, 34, 83
- Adickes, Erich, 170
- Allison, Henry, 21, 34, 98–9, 102, 108, 112, 119–21, 133, 157, 183, 187, 195, 201, 211, 228–30, 235–6
- Ameriks, Karl, 37, 56, 104, 122
- amoralism, 43
- anomalous monism, 134
- anthropology, 17, 20, 35, 38, 57–8, 76, 96, 212
- architectonic, 51–2, 56, 58
- atheism, 149
- autonomy, 233–5
  - and concept of God, 176
  - and structure of reason, 125
  - and value, 210–17
    - not arbitrary, 221–2
  - definition of, 210
- Auxter, Thomas, 226
  
- Bagnoli, Carla, 25–6
- Baumgarten, Alexander, 73
- Beck, Jacob Sigismund, 189–90
- Beck, Lewis White, 87, 98–9, 108, 149
- Bell, David, 64
- biology, 35
- Bird, Graham, 28, 30–1, 33, 64
- Bittner, Rüdiger, 25
- Bojanowski, Jochen, 12, 16
- Boyd, Richard, 14
- Byrne, Peter, 151
  
- categorical imperative, 44–5, *See also* moral law
  - and empirical reason, 119
  - and evolution, 143–4
  - and knowledge of value, 220
  - and particular duties, 37
  - and postulate of freedom, 206
  - and priority of action, 88–91
  - and rational agency, 26
  - different from moral law, 98–100
  - possibility of related to reason, 135–9
- categories, 9, 20, 34, 59–64, 130–2, 141, 144, 155, 239, 247
- causality, 31, 36, 64, *See also* choice, freedom of; determinism; reason, causality of
  - different from cause, 120
  - timeless, 122–30
  - transcendentally free, 120–3
- character
  - definition of, 115, 122
  - empirical, 113, 115–18, 184, 186–7, 189, 191–8, 200–3
  - intelligible, 113, 116, 119, 122–3, 187, 191, 195–6, 201–3, 237
- chemistry, 24, 29, 35, 58, 65–6
- Chignell, Andrew, 158
- choice, 36, *See also* Wille/Willkür distinction
  - animal, 110, 184–5
  - definition of, 182–3
  - empirical faculty of, 110–11, 129, 184–6, 194
  - freedom of, 46–8, 112–14, 132
    - and domain of practical philosophy, 70–1, 73–6
    - and fact of reason, 104–6
    - and moral responsibility, 193–8, 203
    - and ought implies can, 91, 187–93, 202
    - determined by reason, 113–17, 184–6
    - first person, 75–6, 88–91, 205
    - in nature, 67, 184–6
    - of a being in herself, 92, 198–203
    - postulate, 203–6
    - transcendent faculty of, 110–11, 196–8
- Collins, Arthur, 34
- Common Sense theory, 31
- consequentialism, 19
  - and realism, 13
  - and value of humanity, 213
- constructivism, 11, 23–7, 72, 240
  - and metaethics, 26
  - and term “idealism”, 27

- and value, 41
- as decision procedure, 24–5, 39
- as nature of agency, 26–7
- compatible with moral realism, 13, 23
- in mathematics, 23, 51
- in political philosophy, 42
- in theoretical philosophy, 23
- origin of term, 10–11
- seen as only alternative to realism, 11, 37
- critique. *See also* method
  - as division in philosophy, 56, 59–68
  - as project of theoretical reason, 91–4
- Cummiskey, David, 213
- Dall'Agnol, Darlei, 14, 32, 37, 98, 210
- Davidovich, Adina, 163
- Davidson, Donald, 134
- de Almeida, Guido, 98, 235
- De Caro, Mario, 29
- Dean, Richard, 210
- deduction
  - empirical, 60–3
  - metaphysical, 132
  - of moral law, 247
  - of the moral law, 21, 65, 96, 130–2, 143, 145, 227–31, 234–5, 238
  - transcendental, 20, 45, 60–3, 132
- Denis, Lara, 149
- determinism, 35–6, 114–20, 187–93
  - and practical freedom, 111
- dignity, 223
- divine command theory, 16, 177
- domain
  - of ethics as free acts, 73–6, 205
  - of philosophy as ultimate end of human reason, 53–5, 72
  - required for a system, 52
  - separate for theoretical and practical, 70–1
- duty
  - no direct duties to God, 172
  - no duty to believe in God, 87
  - particular duties, 37–9
  - pure and empirical, 58
- Dworkin, Ronald, 10
- Dye, James Wayne, 31
- empirical idealism
  - moral, 20–2, 240, 246–8
  - and contingent ends, 37, 245
  - and duties, 37–9
  - and fact of reason, 103–4
  - and God, 177–9, 245
  - and moral law, 45
  - and necessary ends, 39–42, 246
  - and practical reason, 247–8
  - and reason, 45–7, 145–6, 247
  - and value, 224
  - theoretical, 19–20
- empirical realism. *See also* metaphysical naturalism, nature
  - moral, 20–2, 246–8
  - and duties, 37–9
  - and free choice, 201
  - and method in ethics, 64–8
  - and moral law, 45
  - and necessary ends, 39–42
  - and reason, 45–7, 71, 143–5
  - and value, 217–22, 227, 246
  - theoretical, 19–20, 30, 33, 64
  - and category of causality, 64
- ends
  - end in itself ultimately inexplicable, 236–7
  - objective or necessary, 39–42, 209, *See also* humanity, value of; value, absolute
  - of human reason as domain of philosophy, 53–5
  - order of. *See* reason, order of
  - subjective or contingent, 37, 209, 222
  - that are also duties, 39–40
- error theory, 12–16, 27, 248
- Esteves, Julio, 132
- ethics
  - as discipline in philosophy, 50
  - transcendental method in, 64–8, 130–2
  - whether systematizable, 52–3
- evolution
  - and moral law, 143–4
  - and non humanlike altruism, 62
  - and transcendental method, 62–3
  - of categorical imperative, 247
- experience
  - and fact of reason, 101–2
  - moral, 20–2, 64–8, 85, 92, 96, 98–100, 130–2, 170, 206, *See also* practical point of view
- expressivism, 13–15, 26–7
- fact of reason, 32, 44–5, 96–106, 206
  - and awareness of value, 219
  - and freedom, 104–6
  - and metaphysical naturalism, 104
  - and moral agent, 103–4
  - and realism and idealism, 103–4
  - as act or deed, 100–1
  - as consciousness of moral law, 66–7
  - definition of, 100
  - limits empirical realism, 144
- Falkenburg, Brigitte, 34
- Formosa, Paul, 12, 14, 25, 37, 240
- Förster, Eckart, 59, 175–6

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-08880-1 - Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics

Frederick Rauscher

Index

[More information](#)

## 260 Index

- freedom. *See also* reason, freedom of; choice, freedom of; will  
 acting under idea of, 133–6  
 and boundary between theoretical and practical, 231  
 and fact of reason, 106  
 and primacy, 86  
 as idea of reason, 231  
 as postulate, 47, 83, 104–6, 203–6  
 assumed in action, 88–91  
 cannot be proved, 130–2  
 multiple meanings of term, 108  
 practical, 110–11, 121–2, 183–6, 197, 220, 243  
 transcendental, 122–30, 134, 184
- Friedman, Michael, 29
- Frierson, Patrick, 186
- Fugate, Courtney, 196
- geometry, 20, 24
- God, 41, 70, 121, 142  
 and metaphysical naturalism, 149–50  
 and moral law, 172, 175, 177  
 and moral realism, 179  
 and realism, 13  
 as postulate, 42–4, 83, 149–50, 152–3, 203  
 belief in  
   compared to opinion and knowledge, 156–60  
   function for action, 159–60, 163–5, 167–70  
   not a duty, 87, 163  
   subjective not objective, 158–9, 163–5, 173  
 concept of, 152–3  
   and nature, 152, 169  
   and religious practice, 170–2  
   constructed by practical reason, 166–7, 173, 176–7  
   equated with pure practical reason, 175  
   immanent not transcendent, 167–70  
   scope of term, 149  
   stems from practical reason, 165–6
- Guyer, Paul, 31, 153, 163, 210, 213, 229, 237
- Hare, John, 177
- Henrich, Dieter, 98, 133, 136, 229, 234
- Herman, Barbara, 21
- highest good, 42–3, 71, 87, 94, 149, 156, 167–9, 173, 175, 245  
 as systematic relation, 73  
 not a motive to action, 87–8  
 possibility of natural ground, 163–5
- Hill, Thomas, 11, 24–5, 38
- history, 35
- Höffe, Otfried, 34
- Hudson, Hud, 187
- humanity. *See also* value, absolute  
 as end in itself, 39–42  
 value of, 40–2, 209–17  
   and arbitrariness, 221–2  
   assigned by reason, 223  
   based on natural property, 220–2  
   not an intrinsic property, 217–18, 220–2
- Hume, David, 31
- Hussain, Nadeem J. Z., 26
- Hutter, Axel, 55, 58
- hypothesis, transcendental, 149, 158, 171  
 compared to belief, 159–60  
 compared to idea, 153–6  
 compared to postulate, 162  
 not endorsed in use, 155–6
- idea, 42, 119, 230  
 and boundary between practical and theoretical, 231  
 and domain of philosophy, 53–5  
 and transcendental realism, 142  
 as heuristic device, 154, 219, 238  
 compared to hypothesis, 153–6  
 of God. *See* God, concept  
 of hell not coherent, 171  
 required for architectonic unity, 51–2
- idealism  
 empirical. *See* empirical idealism  
 moral. *See* moral idealism  
 transcendental. *See* transcendental idealism
- immortality, 42–3, 70, 83, 149, 203
- independence  
 as metaphysical separation, 15, 125  
 as unchangeable by another, 126–7, *See also* reason, structure of
- intelligible world, 136–8, 167, 224–7, 229, 233–5  
 as moral ideal, 224–5  
 realized in nature, 225–7
- intuition, 23, 34–5, 117, 218  
 forms of. *See also* space, time
- Johnson, Robert, 211–13, 217
- judgments, 119–20, 133–6, *See also* reason, freedom of
- Kain, Patrick, 25, 37, 39, 43, 102, 139–41, 170, 177, 240
- Kant, Immanuel  
 as reflective rather than active person, 94  
 religious beliefs of, 149
- Kielkopf, Charles, 101
- kingdom of ends, 26, 38, 73, 245

- Kinnaman, Ted, 56  
 Kitcher, Philip, 12  
 Kleingeld, Pauline, 55, 97–8, 100–1  
 Korsgaard, Christine, 11, 21, 23–4, 26, 41, 143, 210, 237  
 Krasnoff, Larry, 10  
 Kuehn, Manfred, 149
- Larmore, Charles, 38  
 logic  
   as division in philosophy, 56, 58  
 Loparic, Zeljko, 29  
 Loudon, Robert, 38, 169
- Macarthur, David, 29  
 Manchester, Paula, 52  
 mathematics, 23, 31, 35, 51, 58, 66, 128, 161, 223  
 Meerbote, Ralph, 134, 187  
 metaphysical naturalism, 27, 29–33, 36, 64, 241–4  
   and duties, 39, 243  
   and empirical power of choice, 185–6  
   and empirical reason as cause, 114–20  
   and fact of reason, 104, 243  
   and free choice, 243  
   and freedom of choice, 45–7, 201, 203  
   and God, 149–50, 177, 243  
   and moral law, 243  
   and necessary ends, 40–2  
   and obligation, 43, 243  
   and priority of action, 96  
   and reason, 242–3  
   and structure of reason, 143–4  
   and transcendental freedom, 125  
   and transcendental method, 60–3  
   and transcendental method in ethics, 64–8  
   and value, 222–4, 244  
   definition of, 29  
   in theoretical philosophy, 33, 241  
   limited to ethics, 32–3  
 metaphysics  
   as division of philosophy, 56  
 method  
   and logic, 56  
   and systematic organization of cognition, 52–3  
   in ethics  
   compared to chemistry, 24, 65–6  
   transcendental, 9, 21, 32, 59–68, 76  
   transcendental, 29, 107, 174  
 Mieth, Corinna, 128, 132–3  
 mind, 27  
   and evolution, 62–3  
   nature of, 17
- moral agent  
   and belief contrasted with opinion and knowledge, 156–60  
   and belief in postulates, 85  
   and causality of reason, 120–3  
   and fact of reason, 101–3  
   and first-person freedom, 75–6  
   and God, 177–9  
   and objectivity, 19, 64–8  
   and priority of action over belief, 88–91, 93–6  
   and reason, 45–7, 75–6  
   and truth, 13  
   as being in itself, 28, 33, 67, 136, 198–203  
   as subject rather than object, 15–16, 47  
   empirical, 16–18, 20–2, 39, 64–8, 96–8, 103–4, 114–20, 129–32, 156–60, 179, 184–6, 189, 201, 222, 239  
   in constructivism, 24–7  
   in definition of moral realism, 14  
   obligation tied to, 43–4  
   possibility of non humanlike, 18, 145  
   praise and blame, 193–8  
   purely rational, 98–100, 129  
   transcendental, 16–18, 20–2, 64–8, 96–8, 103–4, 130–2, 179, 211, 222–4, 245  
 moral anti-realism, 11, 211  
   problems with term, 11–12  
 moral idealism, 68, 145–6, 244–8, *See also* empirical idealism, transcendental idealism  
   and freedom of choice, 47  
   and obligation, 43  
   and postulates, 42–3  
   and priority of action, 94  
   definition of, 14, 244  
   separates reason and reality, 240  
   use of term, 12, 27  
 moral law, 44–5, *See also* categorical imperative  
   consciousness of, 66–7  
   different from categorical imperative, 98–100  
   possibility of deduction of, 130–2  
   relation to concept of God, 157–70  
   reveals freedom, 92, 112–13, 135–9, 188, 194, 205  
   stems from structure of reason, 125  
   ultimately inexplicable, 235–6  
   why a priori, 95  
 moral nonrealism, 11, 13, 16, 27, 38  
   definition of, 14  
 moral principle, property, or object  
   contrasted with one required for morality, 15

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-08880-1 - Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics

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Index

[More information](#)

## 262 Index

- moral realism, 9, 16, 68, 244–8. *See also*  
 empirical realism, transcendental  
 realism  
 and contingent ends, 37  
 and freedom of choice, 47  
 and obligation, 43  
 and postulates, 42–3  
 and priority of action, 94  
 and structure of reason, 139–46  
 at empirical and transcendental levels, 21–2  
 contemporary, 9  
 Cornell, 14  
 definition in relation to moral agent, 14–18,  
 244  
 definition in relation to truth, 11–14  
 need to assess in parts, 22, 37  
 procedural, 23  
 relation to naturalism, 9  
 requires reason to reveal reality, 240  
 moral world. *See* intelligible world  
 morality, 71  
 common moral practice, 93  
 relevance of transcendental/empirical  
 distinction for, 20  
 ultimate inexplicability of, 234–8
- naturalism, 27–36  
 and moral law, 44  
 and postulates, 42–3  
 contemporary, 29–30  
 epistemological, 29  
 Kant's use of term, 27  
 metaphysical. *See* metaphysical naturalism  
 definition of, 241  
 methodological, 28–31, 95–6  
 definition of, 29, 241  
 relation to realism, 9  
 semantic, 29  
 nature, 30, 33–6, 71, 84, 168  
 empirically real, 61–3, 114–20  
 order of, 118–19, 152, 189–93, 233–4  
 reason in, 116–18, 120–3
- O'Neill, Onora, 11, 24–5, 46  
 objectivity, 19, 144–5, 224, 227, 240  
 obligation, 43–4, 98–100, 135, 145, 211  
 ontology, 32–3, 36, 76, 142–3  
 and transcendental method in ethics, 65  
 and value, 218–20  
 no ontological claims in practical  
 philosophy, 94–6  
 ought implies can, 91, 187–93, 202
- philosophy  
 definition of, 51, 53–4, 72–3
- empirical, 54, 57  
 practical, 44, 56–8, *See also* reason, practical  
 and action, 72, 94–6  
 as distinct set objects, 70–1  
 as pragmatic use of knowledge, 74  
 contrasted with theoretical, 68–73  
 domain as free acts, 68–76  
 domain not empirical, 75  
 inner boundary of, 229–34  
 outermost boundary of, 228–9, 234–8  
 structure of, 55–8, 91  
 theoretical, 44, 56–8, 228, *See also* reason,  
 theoretical  
 and knowledge, 72  
 as distinct set of objects, 70–1  
 contrasted with practical, 68–73  
 transcendental, 59–60, 174  
 physics, 30, 34–5, 61, 75, 167  
 Pierce, Drew, 169  
 Pihlström, Sami, 60  
 Plato, 29, 201, 224  
 Pollok, Konstantin, 31, 34  
 postulate, 83. *See also* freedom, God,  
 immortality  
 and idealism, 177–9, 245  
 and primacy of practical reason as belief,  
 84–8, 93  
 as positing existence to theoretical concepts,  
 162–3  
 constructed by practical reason, 166–7  
 definition of, 152, 161–2  
 immanent not transcendent, 157–70, 204  
 theoretical use of term, 152–3, 162  
 practical point of view, 25, 28, 75–6, 88–91,  
 94–6, 101–3, 133–6, 145–6, 239,  
 247–8  
 primacy of practical reason, 81–94, 162  
 and integration model, 83  
 defined as priority of action, 82  
 defined as priority of belief, 81  
 priority of action, 82, 88–97, 102, 105,  
 205–6. *See also* reason, practical  
 priority of belief, 81–90, 97, 103, 105,  
 149, 206, 248. *See also* reason,  
 practical  
 Proops, Ian, 98  
 psychology  
 empirical, 31, 33, 35–7, 44, 62, 74, 95–6,  
 104, 116–18, 184–6, 242  
 moral, 26, 111  
 rational, 122  
 questions of reason, 57–8, 157
- Railton, Peter, 11  
 Rawls, John, 10, 21, 24, 98

- realism  
   moral. *See* moral realism
- reason, 36, 82  
   active nature of, 71–2, 100, 137  
   and system of cognitions, 51–2  
   as transcending nature, 122  
   blamed for wrong action, 194–7  
   causality of, 67, 109–30, 138, 194–8, 224, 237, 243  
   and judgments, 133–6  
   in nature, 109–10, 119–20  
   transcendentally free, 109–10, 120–30  
   ultimately inexplicable, 237
- critical use of distinct from practical or theoretical, 91
- definition of, 109, 120–3
- empirical, 36, 107, 114–20, 184–6
- freedom of, 47, 114–23, 130–6, 183, 203
- human, 53–5, 92, 151, 164, 228, 237, 240
- intelligible character of, 113, 116, 122–3, 191, 195–6, 237
- interest of, 81–94, 232
- one faculty with different uses, 69
- order of, 42, 118–19, 152, 222–7
- practical, 43, 45–7, 157, *See also*  
   philosophy, practical  
   and action, 94–6  
   and concept of God, 166–7, 170–1, 175–7  
   and empirical idealism, 145–6  
   and is/ought distinction, 69–70, 145–6, 232–4  
   and value, 218  
   creates its own objects, 71–2  
   meaning of *Wille*, 183–4  
   primacy of. *See* primacy of practical reason
- pure, 28, 57, 116, 122–30
- regulative use of, 34, 36, 153–4, 157, 168, 174, *See also* ideas, postulates
- requires an unconditioned, 235–8
- speculative. *See* reason, theoretical
- structure of, 108, 122–30, 139–46, 194, 196, 239, 242
- theoretical, 94–6, *See also* philosophy, theoretical  
   and boundary of practical, 231–3  
   and concept of God, 165–6  
   and critical works, 91–4  
   and is/ought distinction, 69–70, 145–6, 232–4  
   and value, 218  
   higher priority of regarding belief, 84–8  
   must conform to practical belief, 81–4  
   objects given to, 71–2  
   same as speculative, 68
- Reath, Andrews, 25, 38–9, 42, 211
- Reinhold, Karl Leonard, 196
- relativism, 43, 146
- Ritchie, Jack, 29
- Rohden, Valerio, 24
- Rosenthal, Jacob, 128, 132–3
- Rotenstreich, Nathan, 85
- Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, 12–14, 255
- Schmidt, Claudia, 36
- Schneewind, J. B., 38, 211
- Schönecker, Dieter, 228–9
- science, 28, 30–2, 57, 61, *See also* biology, chemistry, physics  
   social, 35, *See also* anthropology, history, psychology
- Sensen, Oliver, 211, 213, 218–19, 223
- Shah, Nishi, 26
- Skorupski, John, 30
- Smith, Joel, 29
- space, 9, 17, 19–20, 33, 35, 238
- Stäudlin, Carl Friedrich, 57
- Stern, Robert, 21, 37, 43, 143, 188, 210, 218
- Stevenson, Leslie, 158
- Strawson, P.F., 63
- Street, Sharon, 12–13, 16, 24
- Stroud, Barry, 60, 63–4
- Sullivan, Peter, 29
- Sussman, David, 101
- system  
   nature of systematic organization, 52–3, 124  
   structure of ethics, 52–3, 129–30
- teleology, 35, 54, 57, 167, 169
- theology, 28, 114, 177
- time, 9, 17, 19–20, 33, 36, 113, 203
- timelessness, 122–30, 146, 181, 186–7, 191, 198–203
- Timmermann, Jens, 132, 232
- transcendental argument. *See* deduction, transcendental
- transcendental idealism  
   moral, 20–2, 45–7, 246–8  
   and deduction, 247  
   and duties, 37–9  
   and fact of reason, 103–4  
   and God, 177–9  
   and method in ethics, 64–8  
   and necessary ends, 39–42, 246  
   and reason, 143–5  
   and value, 211–17

264 Index

- transcendental idealism (cont.)
  - theoretical, 19–20, 30, 70, 155, 174
  - and category of causality, 64
  - relation to naturalism, 30–1
- transcendental realism
  - moral, 20–2, 45–7, 107
  - and God, 177–9
  - and practical reason, 142–3
  - and reason, 246
  - and value, 41, 211–17
  - theoretical, 19–20
  - and rationalist ontology, 142–3
- Vaihinger, Hans, 170
- value, 33
  - absolute
    - and autonomy, 210–14
    - and idealism, 224
    - as nonnatural property, 217–22
    - ultimately inexplicable, 236–7
  - as ordering of ends by reason, 222–4
  - of humanity. *See* humanity, value of
  - of persons, 47
  - of subjective or contingent ends, 37, 209
- Ward, Keith, 112
- Watkins, Eric, 113, 193
- will, 36, 84, *See also* reason, practical
  - finite rational, 43
  - freedom of. *See* choice, reason
  - identified as reason, 109, 183–4
  - Wille/Willkür* distinction, 47, 107, 109, 182–3
- Willaschek, Marcus, 84, 100, 132, 161, 163, 169
- Willkür*. *See* choice, will
- Wolff, Robert Paul, 25
- Wood, Allen, 14, 26, 32–3, 38, 87, 139, 145, 149, 166, 187, 189, 210, 212, 214–16, 228, 240
- Zammito, John, 28, 30–1