

Institutional and Organizational Analysis

What explains the great variability in economic growth and political development across countries? Institutional and Organizational Analysis has developed since the 1970s into a powerful toolkit, which argues that institutions and norms rather than geography, culture, or technology are the primary causes of sustainable development. Institutions are rules that recognized authorities create and enforce. Norms are rules created by long-standing patterns of behavior, shared by people in a society or organization. They combine to play a role in all organizations, including governments, firms, churches, universities, gangs, and even families. This introduction to the concepts and applications of Institutional and Organizational Analysis uses economic history, economics, law, and political science to inform its theoretical framework. Institutional and Organizational Analysis provides a framework for understanding why the economic and political performance of countries worldwide has not converged and reveals lessons for business, law, and public policy.

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Institutional and Organizational Analysis

Concepts and Applications

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To Sarah, Mary, Suely, Shannan, and our parents





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Abbreviations

ADA Americans for Democratic Action

AFSCME American Federation of State, County and Municipal

Employees

CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CRP Center for Responsive Politics

DPA Drug Policy Alliance

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FC fixed costs

FTC Federal Trade Commission
GDP gross domestic product
IMF International Monetary Fund

INCRA National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian

Reform

IOA Institutional and Organizational Analysis

IRS Internal Revenue Service
MPB marginal private benefit
MPC marginal private cost
MPP Marijuana Policy Project
MSB marginal social benefit
MSC marginal social cost

MST Landless Peasant Movement (Movimento Sem-Terra)

NCIA National Cannabis Industry Association

NFL National Football League

NORML National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana

Laws

NUMMI New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.

OB office bloc
PC party column
PMR pure majority rule
PT Workers' Party

SENPLADES National Planning and Development Secretariat

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

VC variable costs

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