1 Defining Pragmatics

The What, *the* How, *and Areas of Disagreement*

> Mind the gap.
>
> *Ubiquitous warning on the London Tube*[1]

Imagine walking along a beach and coming across a genuine message in a bottle, one that was dropped in the ocean decades earlier. It reads:

> Mary, you really are a great person. I hope we can keep in correspondence. I said I would write.
>
> Your friend always, Jonathon, Nova Scotia 1985

A note with these very words was indeed found in a bottle on a beach in Croatia in 2013 (McKeon, 2014).[2] How should its sentences be understood? At first blush, the note seems straightforward because it provides enough critical information to allow for the interpretation of not only each of its sentences but also of a speaker's deeper intended message. With little effort I have come up with three possible explanations for this message. Let's consider what these might be.

One is that the message is an uncomplicated expression of Jonathon's desire to stay in touch with Mary after they have known each other for hours, weeks, months, or years as friends. It is similar to the kind of note one would find in a high-school yearbook or in a scrapbook commemorating summer camp. The sentences suggest that they have met and talked and that Jonathon was left impressed. The second possibility, which is more intense, is that the note is part of an awkward post-breakup "let's stay friends" scenario. The key sentence for this hypothesis is "I said I would write." Given that the dropped-in-the-ocean note was a ham-fisted way for Jonathon to keep his word, he arguably did not want to face her. He could not have expected her to ever get the note, or at least he knew the probability was extremely remote. The third reading is a bit darker and sadder for it is entirely possible that Mary does not even know Jonathon. Perhaps Jonathon observed her from a distance, admired her, and convinced himself that he would write; in this case, the message in the bottle was his shy, and useless, way of keeping a promise, to *himself*. These are the three *hypotheses* that I came up with. I am sure there are others that I have not considered.

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Notice that the note's details are rather sparse and that none of these intended readings can be assumed with confidence. So, on second thought, what the message leaves out also leaves doubt about any of the interpretations I tried to draw. Let me underline five features that make the note *gappy*. First, it is difficult to know what "great" means. Is Mary a great person because she is a good friend, because she is wise, or because she is a leader of a club or civic organization? Is she great compared to others who are not? Perhaps she is just above average (as my online dictionary for "great" indicates). Second, Jonathon goes on to write about his "hope" that the two of them will correspond, before adding "I said I would write." This is the part that leaves much to the imagination. One can invent quite a few scenarios (as I did above) to make sense of this sentence. Third, one can get more detailed still and ask what does "can" refer to? Does it refer to the physical ability to write or the know-how to do so? (Consider the frequent request heard over meals, "Can you pass the salt?" A jokester could answer "yes" and continue eating.) We can see that it is hard to draw firm conclusions from the letter writer's words alone. Fourth, even the handwriting (a photo of the note is available on the Internet, see Figure 1.1) does not help us narrow the possibilities from the many scenarios I described; as best as I can tell, the letter writer is at least a teenager. Note that my inference about the letter writer's age goes beyond the words and sentences written. Finally, and most importantly, the letter writer hardly guaranteed that his message would be comprehended by his receiver. Normally, a listener can signal that a message has been received; that is obviously not the speaker's intention here.

These gaps exemplify the sort of issues that *pragmatics* aims to address, which is to determine what the speaker intended to mean through the provided words. One way to view pragmatics then is as a subfield of linguistics concerned with determining the intended meaning of an utterance. While a syntactician might analyze what makes a sentence such as "Mary, you really are a great person" grammatical (e.g., what links "you" with "are" and, ultimately, with "person"), and while a semanticist would be concerned with the logical entailments one can draw (how "you really are a great person" entails "you are a person"), a pragmatist would be concerned with working out the speaker's meaning when that sentence is *communicated* to a listener and in the specific context in which it is presented. As the above analyses indicate, questions pragmatists ask are: What did Jonathon *mean* by using the word "great"? Is he speaking sincerely (or perhaps cynically)? One could go further and ask: Why did he use the rather vague word "person" rather than "woman," "lover," "athlete," or "stand-up comedian"? When one draws out more refined readings from a given word or, more broadly, from a sentence, and when one detects attitudes through the words uttered in context, this enriched understanding is not coming from the sentence itself, that is, it is not part of the sentence's *linguistically encoded* meaning.

Figure 1.1. Photo of a real message in a bottle found in Croatia (shared here by the finder and photographer of the message, Matea Medak Rezić)

For many scholars, resolving these pragmatic aspects of a sentence is a reducible part of a linguistic system that can be determined by, say, features of the context. According to this approach, to get a clear sense of "great" all one needs is more context (which is absent in the message-in-a-bottle example). Other researchers would go further and argue that pragmatics is not so easily reducible. Linguistic pragmatics, for many theoretical pragmatists, concerns the way a sentence is incorporated as part of a *communication* between inter-locutors. Thus, pragmatics for these researchers is not a matter of figuring out a few missing details but is concerned with representing the speaker's intention, which contributes to figuring out the propositional content of an utterance. In the process of doing this, one can enjoin the linguistically encoded meaning carried by the words in the sentence. Note that the aim is similar for both sorts

of scholars – to draw out a richer interpretation from a sentence's linguistically encoded reading. This takes us beyond linguistics and, given our concerns about features such as intentions, into the cognitive sciences more generally. Nevertheless, this tension between the two approaches provides the backdrop for much of the research covered in this book. But it does not change what are considered to be the phenomena, for there is general agreement about where the gaps are. Let us turn to these in greater detail.

Sources of Gappiness: A Nonexhaustive List

To elucidate the gap which separates the words in a sentence from the interpretation(s) they are intended to generate, let us consider in greater detail six cases that are discussed by those who are interested in pragmatics. One of my aims is to present some well-thought-out, well-constructed examples that are typically described when talking of gaps. Another one is to show the extent to which these pragmatic phenomena have been investigated so far, and by whom, in the cognitive sciences.

Indexicals

Utterances have lexical features that refer to people, objects, moments in time, and places. While words, such as "I," "you," "now," and "here," remain constant and clear, to whom or what they refer to will change as a function of speaker, time, or location. These are indexicals. If I were to say, "It is raining here now," it is only true if I am referring to the specific time when, and place where, the sentence was uttered (Lyon, on March 8, 2016). While my interlocutor, who could be in another country, would understand that I am referring to my area and my current time, it might no longer be true if the same sentence were said at another time or in another place. We can see, then, how readily a speaker's meaning changes as a function of context. The identical sentence spoken in rainy Seattle could be true when uttered by one speaker, and false when uttered by another speaker in sunny Miami Beach.

It is probably due to the relative ease with which an addressee can attribute indexicals to their intended targets that there have not been many experimental investigations on the way, say, indexical processing changes as the context does. Debates about indexicals have largely remained the province of philosophers of language who ask to what extent indexicals are automatic or *discretionary* (see Dokic, 2012). For example, whereas "I" does not require much intention reading ("I" = the speaker) and is considered pure, "he" requires a bit more work to understand since it only goes as far as picking out a male; on the other hand, "That paper is impressive" calls for more effort than "I" and "he" because it is not clear what paper the speaker is referring to (e.g., is it an article,

a newspaper, or wallpaper?). Context is arguably more important in resolving the reference for "that paper" than the reference for "I."

Background Knowledge

It is often not clear what the background of an utterance is, which is why an out-of-the-blue sentence can often lead to bizarre interpretations, as is often evident in newspaper headlines. Jay Leno, a now-retired late-night talk show host in the United States, used to have a segment of his program devoted to unintentionally funny headlines or advertisements. While many were funny due to malapropisms or typos (where "cul-de-sac" was written as "cold-a-sack" or "trailblazer" became "trailbalzer"), others were due to unintended meanings. The headline (in 1.1a) undoubtedly described a get-together for owners and trainers of guide dogs and not a culinary retreat featuring those dogs on a grill. The headline in (1.1b), which I found on the web, can leave the impression that one should fill one's own stomach with gas. Background knowledge (e.g., that associations have annual social gatherings and that gas stations often have attached convenience stores) helps us to make proper sense of these sentences and to reject the unintended, bizarre readings. Often, head-lines assume familiarity with a topic that, in turn, license phrases that make no sense or are unintentionally funny to those who are not in the know. Without that specific knowledge, the headline in (1.1c), about a baseball player who plays for a team called the Angels, can seem funny:

(1.1) a. 10th Annual Southeastern Guide Dog BBQ
       b. Empty stomach? Try filling up at a gas station.
       c. Royals to get a taste of Angels' Colon

Experimental psychologists have long investigated issues of background knowledge and arguably consider it key to completing a sentence's meaning. For example, a classic study from Bransford and Johnson (1972) showed how participants recall a long, generic-sounding paragraph (that described how "items" need to be "arranged" and procedures "completed") better when pro-vided with an appropriate title ("Washing Clothes") as opposed to no title. Pragmatists, as far as I can tell, have not considered long-term memory or background knowledge to nearly the same extent as experimental psycholo-gists who study text comprehension (e.g., see Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978).

Unarticulated Constituents

Utterances are often incomplete while saying something that is, otherwise, trivially true (as in 1.2a) or obviously false (as in 1.2b). In (1.2a), the speaker must have eaten at one point in her life, but she is probably indicating that she

has eaten recently. In (1.2b), an example that comes from Kent Bach (1994), the speaker is not falsely asserting that the listener is immortal, but that perhaps a bruise is not fatal.

(1.2) a. I already ate.
       b. You are not going to die.

In other words, speakers are intending to say something more specific (such as 1.3a and 1.3b):

(1.3) a. I already ate (*today*, *this morning*, or *lunch*).
       b. You are not going to die (*from that bruise*).

These particular phenomena are very common in everyday language, but while discussed by philosophers of language, they have not been investigated directly as such by experimentalists.

   If we loosen this category somewhat (from unarticulated constituents) to the many cases in which a speaker makes a reference to some feature of an object or of an act that is left unarticulated, one begins to see experimental pragmatics emerge. For example, *metonymy* involves making reference to an object or concept by referring to something that is associated with it. In the best-known example (from Nunberg, 1978), "The ham sandwich left without paying," the "ham sandwich" is referring to a customer who ordered a sandwich; likewise, when Mary says that she "drank the bottle," she is referring to the liquid contents and not the solid respectacle (Schumacher, 2014). Likewise, when I say, "I began the book," a deeper meaning can be drawn out (Pylkkänen, 2008). For example, it could mean I began *reading* the book, *writing* it, *editing* it, or many other things one does with books. These topics are also fair game (see Chapter 13).

Multiple Meanings

Words can have several meanings or different shades of meaning. For example, the word "bank" could refer to a financial institution or the side of a river, while the word "bat" could refer to the flying mammal or the club used in baseball to hit a ball. These are homonyms and the intended meaning will usually be clarified by context. Other cases of multiple meanings arise from a word that prompts a range of overlapping – polysemous – meanings. As Searle (1980) pointed out, meanings related to the word "cut" intersect with one another, but one meaning cannot easily replace the other:

(1.4) a. The surgeon cut open the patient.
       b. The gardener cut the grass.
       c. The mother cut the cake.
       d. Macy's cut their prices in half.

As Searle (1980: 222–3) wrote:

> If someone tells me to cut the grass and I rush out and stab it with a knife, or if I am ordered to cut the cake and I run over it with a lawnmower, in each case I will have failed to obey the order. That is not what the speaker meant by his literal and serious utterance of the sentence.

Polysemous meanings have been investigated experimentally (e.g., Klein & Murphy, 2001) but not specifically to test linguistic-pragmatic concerns.

When one loosens this category further, one can add metaphors ("John is a dolphin") which call for *ad hoc* changes in meaning (so that the listener is obliged to figure out which feature of dolphins is intended to describe the presumably human John). One can also include approximations ("France is hexagonal"). Metaphors have long been investigated experimentally from a pragmatic point of view and will be addressed in Chapters 2 and 7.

Underspecificity

Utterances can be seen to be underinformative and in need of enrichment and adjustment:

(1.5) a. I got to the party and everybody was there.
      b. Some of their identity documents are forgeries.

In (1.5a), there are two features that call for enrichments. One concerns the conjunction "and." Its meaning simply conveys that two events (getting to the party and observing who was there) occurred. Yet, the utterance appears to convey that either there is an order to the two events (getting to the party and *then* making the observation) or that the two events occurred conjointly, in that the speaker got to the party and *at that point* realized who was there. Second, the "everybody" (who was there) obviously does not refer to everybody in the universe, but to the persons that the speaker and listener considered to be relevant.

In (1.5b), borrowed from Levinson (2000), the quantifier "some," which is the single most investigated term in experimental pragmatics, has a minimal reading that could refer to, say, two identity documents. Left unsaid is whether all of the documents are forgeries. Semantically speaking, the utterance remains true if the speaker goes on to discover that all of the documents are forgeries. On the other hand, the use of the existential quantifier, "some," can be a source of an enrichment, one that allows a reading of the kind "Not all of their identity documents are forgeries." While often considered intuitive and automatic, this enriched reading is not in evidence as much as one might think. As will be seen, this question has taken a very large place in the experimental pragmatic literature (see Chapters 6 and 7).

Attitudes

There are also gaps with respect to attitude. How could one gather the attitude behind an ironic "That was a great meeting" if one were left with only the words? Attitudes are usually understood by listeners (even if it takes a bit of effort when compared to the same utterance spoken sincerely). Note, though, that if one were to consider only the words (i.e., the semantics), one would only get so far and not get the intended meaning of the speaker. Prosody is a way to help signal the intended attitude, and this merits discussion too (see Chapter 13). But even prosodic cues do not guarantee that a speaker's attitude will be processed.

As this partial list makes clear, pragmatic phenomena have been investigated by a variety of cognitive fields. It is also fair to point out that some of this volume's topics are covered in neighboring literatures that would not employ our moniker. The topics that have become emblematic of experimental pragmatics – underinformative expressions (such as the one in 1.5b), reference, metaphor, and irony, to name a few – represent only a handful of phenomena that point to the gap between what is minimally said (in a sentence) and what is ultimately understood (as intended by the speaker). While each of these topics has received an experimental pragmatic treatment, the moment when experiments were first employed on these topics varies. The investigation of utterances with relatively weak scalar terms, such as "some," has been a hot topic in the experimental pragmatic literature for nearly twenty years, whereas metaphor has fascinated experimental researchers for a much longer time.

Labeling the gaps between an utterance and the speaker's intended meaning can leave the impression that specific features are numerable and perhaps relatively rare. This is not the case. Each of these sources of *gappiness* is an example that scratches the surface of pragmatic processing (note the idiom, another pragmatic phenomenon that has been studied experimentally). Resolving gaps becomes important to understanding the speaker's intended meaning. For the sake of putting my cards on the table, I will assume – like many radical pragmatists – that there is *always* a gap between the words in a sentence and what they are intended to mean when used in an utterance in a given situation. In this I am using a key concept from the professional pragmatist's toolbox, which is the *underdeterminacy* hypothesis (Carston, 2002). This says that the sentences in ALL utterances fall short of being explicit enough for determining the speaker's intention.

The gappiness I keep alluding to is ubiquitous and screams out for investigation. Identifying these gaps is a critical step, but we also want a satisfying approach for dealing with them generally. So, before addressing this issue

further, it is important to better understand how theorists have moved the gap-question forward so that it would eventually be ripe for an experimental turn. As we will see, the way and the extent to which one considers gaps surmountable is revealing of one's approach to the study of pragmatics.

How to Conceive of Gaps and the Ways to Bridge Them

Before we get to actual proposals about the way gaps can be addressed, let me present a little background as to how philosophers initially approached the sentence/meaning gap. One issue is what sort of meaning are we aiming to attain? For one school, it concerns what the words properly mean when put together in a sentence. Going back about a century, one can see the development of this school of thought whose approach still remains influential. It was not necessarily interested in communication or linguistics, the way pragmatics is today. Rather the *Ideal Language* approach was concerned about what a sentence meant if it was transformed into a logical formula. This was important for the agenda at the time because sentences were viewed as tools, as a means to present facts, premises, parts of arguments, and deductions that scientifically describe the world. Proponents of this school, such as Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege, noticed that the way a sentence is presented often obscures the proposition, the *ideal*, that it was intended to represent. When a sentence is obscure, it is difficult to properly assign a truth value to the full-fledged proposition. One can see how this school keeps the idea that sentences come up short in fully expressing a speaker's meaning, but note too that it is more concerned with coming up with a way to transform a sentence into a logical form that can then be determined true or false. Moreover, this school deals with sentences that *can* express truth-evaluable propositions. This leaves out questions, commands, wishes, and a whole host of other types of speech acts.

Proponents of this school largely assumed that a sentence has within it the means to be transformed into a clearer, full-fledged proposition. All one needs to do is decompose a sentence (even an obscure one) so that it can expose the logical representation that it was meant to represent. In taking this step, one can remove ambiguities and other obscurities. Natural language descriptions need to be saved from themselves, so to speak, and the best way to do that is to build up a sentence from its elements so that it can be turned into a proper logical proposition. From this perspective, the semantics of the sentence should be very largely determinative in resolving the speaker's meaning.

To give a flavor of this approach, consider Bertrand Russell's well-known example in (1.6), which seems, at face value, to be paradoxical and perplexing. With careful decomposition, he argued, one can determine its truth value, thus eliminating any ambiguity.

(1.6)   The present King of France is bald.

The first reaction could very well be that this sentence cannot be judged true or false because it presupposes that there is currently a person who is the King of France and we know that there are presently no official kings of France, so it is impossible to conceive of such a person being bald. In order to come up with a truth value, one can, according to Russell, reduce it to its parts as a series of conjunctions (1.7).

(1.7)   There is one, and only one, object X such that X is the present King of France (and) X is bald.

Given that one of the conjuncts in (1.7), *there is an X that is at present the King of France*, is false, so too is the sentence. Since Russell, there have been other suggestions for understanding this sentence (see Carston, 2002 for a summary) that can turn it into a logical proposition that (a) captures all the relevant features and (b) determines whether or not it is true. But that is not our concern here. The goal for now is to see how the Ideal Language approach operates, which goes as follows:

One needs to take a sentence – even if it is ambiguous, obscure, under-informative, or complicated – and determine what it represents logically so that one can then determine whether it is true or false. When this can be done, one has an important method for determining the speaker's meaning of a sentence. In the case of the message in a bottle, the listener (or, rather, the correspondent) can determine whether the message is true. Let us assume that Mary got the note. She can then determine whether she is indeed great in some way in order to determine that this statement is minimally true, and she could confirm whether or not Jonathon had promised to write.

That said, the above approach – worrying only about the truth conditions of the sentence – is unsatisfying because it hardly makes a dent into the list that I compiled earlier. For example, the unarticulated constituents that I mentioned in (1.3) are features that go beyond what is actually in the sentence. In the message in a bottle, the question is not so much about whether or not it is true that Mary is great (that would be difficult for anyone outside their conversation to ascertain, partly because it is vague), but to know what he *meant* precisely when he said that (in what way is Mary great or how great is she?). It would not even be relevant to turn any of the sentences in the message into a proper logical proposition. These sorts of facts lead to a second school of thought, which developed in reaction to the first.

The *Ordinary Language school* refers to philosophers – such as Austin, Grice, and Searle – who "emphasized the pragmatic nature of natural language as opposed to say, the language of *Principia Mathematica*" (Recanati, 2004,

p. 1). Ordinary Language philosophy is keen on describing the link between a spoken sentence and its *uses.*[3] One tack that these philosophers took to argue against the Ideal position was to point to utterances that have a straightforward logical interpretation but that remain interpretatively unsatisfying. Consider the cases in the left part of (1.8a–c). While their logical interpretations (as expressed on the right for each case) appear crystal-clear, these do not necessarily capture what the speaker has in mind:

(1.8) a. I am not unhappy ≠ I am happy.
       b. You can have soup or salad ≠ You can have soup or salad or both.
       c. Monica had a baby and got married ≠ Monica had a baby, got married, or vice versa.

While *not not A* is equivalent to *A* in standard logic, the speaker's use of the double negation in (1.8a) can be taken to deny unhappiness (without asserting happiness). Whereas disjunctions are inclusive in standard logic, the disjunction in (1.8b), at least in certain contexts, can be taken to be exclusive. Whereas the conjunction *A & B* is equivalent to *B & A* in standard logic (that is, order does not matter when one conjoins two propositions), the presentation of the conjuncts in (1.8c) can be understood implicitly as expressing order. Turning sentences into logical formalisms clearly has its limits.

Meaning for Ordinary Language philosophy is concerned with what the speaker meant when she said it. While determining what an idealized form of a sentence conveys and discerning whether that sentence is true is going to be relevant, it is still not going to provide the listener with everything he needs in order to understand the speaker's intended meaning when she said it. The underdeterminacy hypothesis mentioned earlier emerges from a basic tenet of the Ordinary Language school, which is that sentences do *not* provide enough explicit information for a listener to fully gather all the communicated information and to understand the speaker's intention. Gaps always remain and these need to be filled, not by idealizing away components of the sentence that are problematic, but through some form of reasoning. As Korta and Perry (2015) write:

Pragmatics involves perception augmented by some species of "ampliative" inference – induction, inference to the best explanation, Bayesian reasoning, or perhaps some special application of general principles special to communication…a sort of reasoning that goes beyond the application of rules, and makes inferences beyond what is established by the basic facts about what expressions are used and their meanings.

The speaker's words, according to the Ordinary Language school, are just part of the communication picture. In fact, as will be underlined later, there are all kinds of communication that can take place, even without words. The

words in the sentence cannot be idealized away in order to simply determine whether its meaning is true or false. According to the Ordinary Language school, the words are a starting point to understand the speaker's intended meaning.

Where Do We Go from Here?

This brief introduction depicts pragmatics as a discipline that is concerned with the interpretation of everyday utterances. While it could be, and is often, considered a subdiscipline of linguistics, it is unlike its fellow subdisciplines in that it is necessarily interdisciplinary in at least three ways. First, its emergence as a field is owed, at least in part, to a *philosophical* cleavage that initiated discussions between those who aimed to account for meaning through a logical analysis of the speaker's words (the Ideal Language school) and those who say that a speaker's words are only part of a listener's effort to get at the speaker's intended meaning (the Ordinary Language school). According to the latter, the gap can only be bridged through nonlinguistic abilities (through some form of inference); the words uttered are but evidence that can help the listener come up with a hypothesis about the speaker's intention. As becomes clear in the following chapters, pragmatics is largely focused on determining the *speaker's* intended meaning, much like the Ordinary Language school proposed. However, logical analyses of spoken sentences still have a role to play (by fully appreciating the extent to which semantics matters), so insights from the Ideal Language school continue to have an impact. Second, accounting for pragmatic enrichments inevitably leads to theories that include psychological processes. After all, one of the central terms used in pragmatics – *intention* – concerns mental states, making pragmatics a concern for psychologists as much as linguists. Third, and this is what made experimental pragmatics unique, starting fifteen to twenty years ago, many pragmatic theories compete for our attention and none of them can be substantiated through linguistic introspection alone. Experimentation, in its most classic form, is especially called for in pragmatics because it can help (a) discover empirical facts that lie beyond linguistic intuition and (b) test between contemporary accounts of pragmatics in order to determine which can best account for generated data. An experimental mindset is critical in order to rigorously test theories and partly to put limits on armchair explorations.

All of the above considerations put us in a position to treat experimental pragmatics as a more general, cognitive science. This is how the book will consider experimental pragmatics. This is not a novel notion. John Austin (1956b, 1979) from early on endeavored to transform ordinary language, viewed as a philosophical object, into a (cognitive) science of language:

> In the history of human inquiry, philosophy has the place of the initial central sun, seminal and tumultuous; from time to time it throws off some portion of itself to take station as a science, a planet, cool and well regulated, progressing steadily towards a distant final state … Is it not possible that the next century may see the birth, through the joint efforts of philosophers, grammarians, and numerous other students of language, of a true and comprehensive science of language? Then we shall have rid ourselves of one more part of philosophy (there will still be plenty left) in the only way we ever can get rid of philosophy, by kicking it upstairs.
>
> Austin (1956b/1979, p. 232)

This quote, written at the dawn of the cognitive revolution, prophesied that it will take a combination of efforts – from a wide range of investigators – to create an inclusive science of language, one that addresses concerns that are central to *utterance understanding*. The work in this book can be viewed as a way to make that vision real, for it provides a prominent place for armchair theorists (philosophers and theoretical linguists), while also emphasizing the importance of data collected from all kinds of language researchers, including linguists (most obviously), experimental psychologists (including psycholinguists of course), neuroscientists, anthropologists, and anyone else interested in communication.

Central to this effort is the quest to better understand the sentence/utterance meaning gap. Through philosophical approaches, on the one hand, and the reliability of experimental data on the other, one can (to adopt a slightly different metaphor) begin to climb the intellectual chimney so that we – collectively – can see the structure below us as we rise. At its start, one cannot know what this structure will look like. We can only advance by considering theories and by carrying out experiments to test them. In the next chapter we consider Paul Grice's seminal account, which is generally recognized for having moved pragmatics forward in one giant step.

Notes

1. Also see Horn (2006), who ended his article with "Mind the GAPP [Golden Age of Pure Pragmatics]."
2. The original story can be found here: www.digitaljournal.com/article/348150. A picture of the note can also be found here: http://imgur.com/riZMikH.
3. This is why Austin's (1975) book is entitled *How to Do Things with Words*, in which he proposed a classification that made distinctions among utterances, not along the lines of truth-functionality but, in terms of what a speech act does. While this approach makes for useful distinctions among classes of utterances, it does not necessarily help us describe a given utterance, which continually provides all sorts of gaps, such as the six types of cases above. For example, *illocutionary* acts are speech acts that are for specific instances, such as promising (*I promise to x*), christening (*I hereby name this ship the y*), and ordering (*Go get the forks*), and cannot be reduced to truth conditions. Instead of considering truth conditions, he described "speech acts in terms of felicity conditions, interpreted as conditions for appropriate usage" (Levinson, 1980).