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Introduction

Activating Democracy

With the collapse of communism at the end of the twentieth century, democracy supplanted authoritarianism as the most common political regime around the globe. Since the 1970s, more than sixty countries (almost one-third of the countries in the world) have made transitions to democracy (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008). At the turn of the twenty-first century, 60 percent of the world's countries were democratic (Diamond, 2008, p. 36). Democratic gains have occurred across all continents, and more people live in free societies today than ever before.

Yet, as examples from Russia to Nigeria to Thailand demonstrate, the collapse of authoritarian governments and the introduction of competitive elections do not ensure that stable, democratic regimes will persist. When Samuel Huntington described the global expansion of open politics in the last quarter of the twentieth century as the "third wave" of democratization, he noted that democratic breakdowns had followed each previous wave (1991). According to Freedom House's annual *Freedom in the World* survey, as of 2014, global freedom had declined for nine consecutive years – the longest continuous period of setbacks since the yearly surveys began in 1972 (Puddington, 2015). Some of the most dramatic declines have occurred in strategically important countries, such as Egypt, Russia, and Iraq. But in countries ranging from Mexico to Benin to Indonesia, democracy has endured. Fair and free elections persist and are accompanied by expansive protections for civil liberties.

What explains these trends? Why do some democracies survive beyond initial elections while others revert to more authoritarian regimes? What can the new range of cases where democracy failed tell us about the factors that facilitate or hinder open political regimes?

This study offers some answers to these questions through a comparative analysis of two deviant "third wave" cases of regime change: post-Soviet Russia and post-Suharto Indonesia. In both countries, democratizing systems replaced authoritarian regimes in the 1990s. Their subsequent regime trajectories, however, have diverged in surprising ways that depart from global trends. After almost a decade of reform, Russia turned back to authoritarianism. Indonesia, meanwhile, continues as a democracy more than a decade after its antiauthoritarian breakthrough. Yet most theories of democracy would predict the *opposite* outcomes: Russia's significantly higher level of socioeconomic development and long history of independent statehood should foster democracy, whereas Indonesia's low level of socioeconomic development and short postcolonial history should hinder democratization. Rather than examining these two countries in comparison with their regional neighbors, as often happens in political science, this project seeks to analyze these crucial cases from a broader, cross-regional perspective.

I argue that patterns of political participation in Russia and Indonesia explain their deviations from global democratization trends. By comparing two cases at opposite ends of theoretical expectations, this study demonstrates that patterns of political participation play a decisive role *after* a democratic transition occurs. While Russians retreated from political participation and remain wary of the institutions that characterize democracy, Indonesians quickly grew accustomed to pressuring elites and learned to use new democratic institutions to manage conflict and channel popular preferences for governance. Mass behavior made all the difference in the trajectories of regime change in these countries.

I find that patterns in mass political participation constitute the crucial link between a country's socioeconomic and historical factors and democracy's survival. When a society adopts *elite-constraining* forms of participation, it impedes leaders from abusing democratic norms and procedures between elections. Civil society engagement, political efficacy, and political trust drive these patterns of participation. Individuals who are civically engaged, who believe in their ability to influence political outcomes, and who trust political institutions are more likely to become involved in elite-constraining forms of participation, such as campaigning, building political parties, and protesting. When *elite-enabling* participation (such as contacting public officials and supporting incumbent party machines) predominates, democratic institutions become more vulnerable to elite manipulation and democracy's survival is at risk. Elite-enabling activities give power holders more latitude to manipulate elections, constrict rights and freedoms, and repress real and imagined opponents.

Democratization in Russia and Indonesia

The record of countries that have experienced political regime change since the mid-1970s suggests several factors that may be conducive to democracy, including higher levels of socioeconomic development, stronger parliaments, weaker presidents, and a longer history of independent statehood (Bunce, 2000; Fish, 2005; Fish & Wittenberg, 2009). Contravening factors include economic reliance on hydrocarbons, contested national borders, and low levels of socioeconomic development (Fish, 2005; Ross, 2001; Rustow, 1970). These factors, however, cannot account for the political experiences of Russia and Indonesia – two of the world's largest countries.

In the 1990s, both Russia and Indonesia completed democratic transitions during which governments came to power by fair and free elections. Russia's political liberalization followed seventy years of Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union, which dissolved in 1991. After several years of democratic reform, Russia gradually moved back toward authoritarianism in the second half of the 1990s.

Like Russia, Indonesia's political history was largely authoritarian. After a protracted struggle following the country's 1945 war for independence, Indonesia had a brief spell of open politics in the 1950s. But in 1957, President Sukarno introduced "guided democracy," which curtailed democratic institutions. After a failed coup attempt in 1965, General Suharto came to power and introduced the "New Order" regime, which imposed severe restrictions on civil liberties and conducted a bloody purge of suspected communists and sympathizers, killing at least half a million Indonesians by the end of 1966. This brutally repressive regime lasted for more than thirty years, until popular protests forced Suharto's resignation in 1998, leading to immediate political liberalization and free and fair elections in 1999.

Over the next decade, Indonesia undertook a wide range of democratic reforms. It held direct elections for the presidency in 2004, bolstered regional autonomy and decentralized administrative authority, and eliminated the military's role in the legislature. Indonesia's successful democratization is as puzzling as Russia's backsliding. After all, Indonesia is a lower middle-income country that remains largely rural and only weakly industrialized.[1] It also has a short history of independent statehood and a

[1] GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 2007 was $3,712 for Indonesia and $14,690 for Russia (UN Development Program, 2009); the percentage of the student-age population enrolled in tertiary education in 2009 was 22 percent in Indonesia and 76 percent in Russia (World Bank); and the percentage of the population employed in agriculture in 2009 was 40 percent in Indonesia and 10 percent in Russia (World Bank).

TABLE 1.1. *Values for Hypothesized Causes of Democracy in Russia and Indonesia*

Factors[a]	Russia	Indonesia
Modernization variables		
Socioeconomic development (+)	High	Medium
Urbanization (+)	High	Low
Educational attainment (+)	High	Low
Economic reliance on hydrocarbons (–)	High	Medium
Corruption (–)	High	High
Statehood variables		
History of independent statehood (+)	Long	Short
Former colony (–)	No	Yes
Contested national borders (–)	Yes	Yes
Sociocultural variables		
Ethnic heterogeneity (–)	Medium	High
Muslim majority population (–)	No	Yes

[a] (+)positive for democracy; (–) negative for democracy.

long shadow of colonial rule – structural conditions deemed unfavorable for democracy's survival (Fish & Wittenberg, 2009).

If the level of socioeconomic development and a history of independent statehood fully predicted the outcome of regime change, Russia, rather than Indonesia, would be a democracy today. Table 1.1 compares Russia and Indonesia along several factors believed to influence prospects for democracy. I have grouped these factors into three general categories: modernization, statehood, and sociocultural variables. If we look at the modernization variables, Russia has a clear advantage over Indonesia, demonstrating higher levels of socioeconomic development, urbanization, and educational attainment. Russia's only negative variables in this category are its high levels of corruption and economic dependence on hydrocarbons. As of 2010, fuel exports constituted 64 percent of Russian merchandise exports. Hydrocarbons and corruption play a considerable role in the Indonesian economy as well, with fuel exports constituting 30 percent of Indonesia's merchandise exports for the year 2010 (World Bank).

While Russia's natural resource endowment may have hindered its democratic development, this factor alone cannot explain the variation between Russia and Indonesia, which also has an economy that depends heavily on natural resources.[2] Moreover, if we consider the steps that link

[2] Much has been written about Indonesia's extensive natural resources that extend beyond oil and gas to include minerals and timber. According to an analysis by Budy P. Resosudarmo,

natural resources to democratic failure in Russia, the natural resource explanation is complemented by my argument. As M. Steven Fish asserts, natural resource wealth did not stymie modernization in Russia, but rather facilitated opportunities for repression and corruption (2005, pp. 118–138). In both Russia and Indonesia, natural resource endowments provided elites with resources to push back against democratization. Yet, while the Russian population did not resist elites' moves to hinder democratization, Indonesians fought back against elites' encroachments on democratic gains.

Another possible impediment to democratization is corruption. Corruption enhances political elites' interests in preserving the benefits of their rents and keeping the polity closed, thereby providing an obstacle to democratization. As Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (www.transparency.org/research/cpi/) demonstrates, both Russia and Indonesia have long-standing problems with corruption. The first CPI, issued in 1995, placed Indonesia last among the forty-one countries included. From 1998 until 2007, Indonesia fared worse than Russia on the CPI yet still managed to achieve greater democratization success.

When we consider the statehood variables, Russia again has better odds than Indonesia. While both countries confront secessionist struggles, Russia has a long history of independent statehood and has never been colonized. Indonesia, on the other hand, declared independence only in 1945, and parts of the country had been under colonial rule since the seventeenth century.

In terms of sociocultural variables, Russia also has a slight advantage. Both countries have large, ethnically diverse populations, a quality that scholars often cite as an impediment to democracy. Indeed, Indonesia has greater ethnolinguistic heterogeneity than Russia. Democratization scholars have also suggested that religious traditions emphasizing obedience to authority, such as Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Confucianism, and Islam, may foster belief systems antithetical to democracy (Bollen, 1979; Huntington, 1991, 1993; Lipset, 1960; Pye, 1968). Yet, as the third wave of democratization has shown, numerous countries with populations adhering to these religious beliefs have built open political regimes. At present, the democratic deficit among predominantly Muslim countries has focused particular attention on a possible relationship between Islam and authoritarianism (Donno & Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002, 2011;

in the 1990s, oil and gas constituted about 30 percent of Indonesia's total exports, minerals and related products accounted for 19 percent, and forest products accounted for 10 percent (2005, "Introduction," pp. 1–9, p. 3).

Midlarsky, 1998), suggesting that Indonesia's status as a Muslim-majority country might create an obstacle to democratization there.

In short, if we compare Russia and Indonesia on the factors generally believed to foster democracy, Russia has greater advantages for democratic survival. Yet scholars might cite Russia's communist heritage as a particular disadvantage. Does a communist history present a greater impediment to building democracy than a history of noncommunist authoritarianism? The all-encompassing ideology of communism promoted a thorough transformation of public and private life that is not generally seen in noncommunist authoritarian regimes (Linz, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996). In his well-known articulation of the perils of the "Leninist legacy," Ken Jowitt highlights the "fragmented, mutually suspicious, societies with little religio-cultural support for tolerant and individually self-reliant behavior" (1992, p. 304). Scholars have also bemoaned Russia's "authoritarian collectivism" (Meyer, 2003), "culture of impersonal measured action" (Jowitt, 1992, p. 291), and numerous other ills associated with the structures, institutions, and norms that took shape during the Communist period, all of which contribute to "an authoritarian, not a liberal democratic capitalist, way of life" (Jowitt, 1992, p. 293).

Yet this explanation for Russia's failure at democracy is overly simplistic. First, it fails to account for the substantial variation in the organization of communist regimes across Eurasia. Communism differed dramatically across regimes and within the Soviet Union's republics. Many formerly communist countries in the Balkans, such as Bulgaria and Romania, have built sustainable democracies after their repressive communist regimes, suggesting that the relationship between a communist history and a postcommunist regime type is more complex than a simple legacy explanation permits. Second, the argument that Russia's communist heritage cast a weightier burden than Indonesia's New Order regime ignores the significant levels of repression that existed under Suharto.

Several Soviet regime features that are considered impediments to democracy in Russia have parallels in Indonesia's New Order. As Chapter 2 discusses, both regimes had ideological underpinnings, thoroughly penetrated society, relied on mobilized participation to ensure regime compliance, and built large, coercive apparatuses to control the population. Both the Soviet and New Order regimes were transformative and exhibited low levels of tolerance for views outside of official regime doctrine.

Nevertheless, they did exhibit one important difference. While both regimes engaged in political repression, the Soviet regime was more

pervasive in its grip over social life, including prohibitions regarding religion and political party formation. As Chapter 5 details, the Soviet monopolization of civic life meant Russians endured an experience of social repression that differs from that of Indonesians, who enjoyed limited social pluralism under Suharto. This variation in levels of social control is perhaps the most profound difference between the Communist (Soviet) and the noncommunist authoritarian (New Order) regimes in this paired comparison. Yet Communist social control alone did not predetermine democracy's failure in Russia. While Russia was disadvantaged at the beginning of political liberalization, patterns of political participation that obtained *after* initial elections – not during the Soviet period – fostered authoritarian reversal.

If none of the factors just described is sufficient for explaining Russia's and Indonesia's outlier status, why did democracy survive in Indonesia and not in Russia?

Democratization and Democracy's Survival

To answer this question, I must clarify some concepts. I define democracy as the procedures that ensure competition for leadership positions through free, fair, and frequent elections, and the assurance of open debate about candidates and policies through freedoms of speech, media, and association. This definition encompasses all of the characteristics that Robert Dahl defines as the "procedural minimum" for polyarchy.[3] Dahl's characteristics can be roughly collapsed into two dimensions: (1) institutions that guarantee free elections determine access to political power and (2) civil liberties that ensure equal access to these institutions. This is a proceduralist definition of democracy that does not presume additional conditions, such as level of socioeconomic equality, which is frequently cited in definitions of democracy rooted in socialist and Marxist traditions (Barber, 1984; Marshall, 2000; Roemer, 1999). Yet, by including the dimension of civil liberties, this definition protects against the fallacy of equating the presence of elections with democracy (see Karl, 1986; Lindberg, 2006; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Schmitter & Karl, 1991).

[3] Dahl's characteristics are: 1) elected officials have control over key government policy decisions; 2) elected officials are chosen in free, fair, and frequent elections; 3) practically all adults have the right to vote; 4) practically all adults have the right to run for office; 5) there is a protected right to free expression; 6) there is a protected right to seek out alternative sources of information; and 7) there is a protected right to form parties, associations, and interest groups (1989, p. 233).

Most social scientists concur that democracy is a continuous variable that can be measured by degrees of political openness. A fully consolidated democracy constitutes one extreme, while a fully consolidated "monocracy," or rule by a single individual or unified collective actor, marks the other (Fish, 2005, pp. 19–20). Between these two extremes stand political systems that are either more or less democratic. This continuum includes meaningful thresholds that categorize countries along an ordered scale. Some countries meet Dahl's procedural minimum for a democracy; other countries meet some conditions; and others fail to meet any. This ordering leaves us with three groupings of countries: democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.

What happens when a country democratizes? Huntington's (1991) articulation of the "third wave" described three stages of democratization: extrication from the authoritarian regime, transition to democratically elected government, and consolidation of democratic institutions. In this framework, a "transition" is complete after an initial round of fair and free elections. In most countries, however, initial democratic elections are not the endpoint that determines democracy's subsequent survival. Instead, they represent a new benchmark of political competition that must be repeated regularly for democracy to endure. To that end, institutions that ensure political competition and safeguard civil liberties – the two dimensions of democracy Dahl outlined – usually require further deepening and institutionalization after the first election.

If democracy exists along a continuum with clearly defined thresholds, then a country can make progress in strengthening and extending the institutions and practices of democracy to move further along this continuum. Ensuring democracy's survival involves institutionalizing democratic rules of political competition and access to political power and sanctioning those who violate these rules. When democratic rules and practices are institutionalized and become "the only game in town" (Linz & Stepan, 1996), democracy's chances of survival increase. Without the institutionalization and strengthening of democratic rules and practices, political elites can more easily roll back democratic gains, threatening democracy's survival. In short, a country that has introduced political liberalization might deepen or restrict democracy. Some scholars would call this process "democratic consolidation." I believe it is more accurate to call it "democratic survival."

How should we measure democratic survival? Numerous indices measure democracy, but only Freedom House provides annual rankings for political openness among the world's 193 countries. Freedom House



FIGURE 1.1. Democracy's dimensions: Political rights and civil liberties, 2012.

determines its yearly scores by averaging two separate ratings for political rights and civil liberties. The scores range from a high score of "1" for complete political openness to a low score of "7" for a completely closed system, and these scores are further divided into groups labeled as "free" (1–2.5), "partly free" (3–5), and "not free" (5.5–7).[4] Some regimes in the middle have democratic political institutions, but fail to protect civil liberties. Others do a better job at protecting civil rights, but lack competitive political institutions. The level of political openness can rise and fall on either or both dimensions, thereby affecting a regime's overall level of democracy. Additionally, along this continuum, clear and meaningful thresholds appear that constitute the empirical minimum for calling a regime a democracy, as well as the empirical minimum for calling a regime a hybrid – that is, more politically open than a monocracy, but not open enough to be a democracy.

Figure 1.1 depicts the two dimensions of political rights and civil liberties. For illustrative purposes, I have plotted all countries with a population of more than 100 million that have undergone some form of political liberalization since the 1970s. The values on the graph correspond to Freedom House's annual political rights and civil liberties scores in its *Freedom in the World* rankings for 2013. As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, countries in the upper right-hand quadrant meet the minimum qualifications of political rights *and* civil liberties to be considered democracies. Among the eight countries plotted in Figure 1.1, three earn this distinction: Brazil, India, and Indonesia, all of which Freedom House

[4] For more details on how Freedom House develops these scores, see the "Methodology" section of Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, available at www.freedomhouse.org.



FIGURE 1.2. Freedom House scores in Russia and Indonesia, 1989–2012.

considers "free." Countries located in the lower left-hand quadrant do not meet standards of even partial freedom in political rights and civil liberties and are best thought of as authoritarian regimes. The only case that fits this category is Russia, which Freedom House ranks as "not free." Countries clustered around the intersection of the two axes are ones that Freedom House deems "partly free." Figure 1.1 displays four cases in this category: Bangladesh, Mexico, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

I consider a country as having engaged in substantial democratization if it achieved a combined score of "4" or better (the midway point for "partly free" countries) for at least five consecutive years after climbing from a score of "5" or below. I measure democracy's survival as having achieved a score of "2.5" or better for five consecutive years. A country can be said to have deviated from the path toward democratization if it dropped a full two points on the Freedom House scale and stayed in this position for at least five consecutive years.

As Figure 1.1 shows, Russia and Indonesia demonstrate opposite outcomes of democratic survival. Figure 1.2 plots each of their combined annual Freedom House scores from 1989 to 2012. Since beginning political liberalization in 1998, Indonesia has continued on the path of democratization. It entered Freedom House's "free" category in 2005, and its democracy has survived over four national election cycles. Russia's level of democracy, by contrast, peaked at the initial point of political liberalization in 1991. It stagnated and then gradually eroded over the next decade. Russia's nascent democracy did not survive, and Freedom House has designated it as "not free" since 2004.

As scholars have noted, the factors that facilitate a democratic transition are not necessarily the same as those that foster democracy's