CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This is a book about how English Renaissance writers imitated, and how they remembered. It is about how their imitative works can be read as acts of memory, but most of all it is about how such works are about memory. In the course of imitating other writers, Wyatt, Shakespeare, Jonson, and Milton offer a series of searching questions and insights into how things are recalled and forgotten, what triggers these processes, what they say about who we are and how we work. This group spans a familiar 'Wyatt-to-Milton' scope but does not imply either a new homogeneity in the outlooks of these writers, nor a definitive narrative of change over time. They all discover different things about memory in the course of imitation; these differences are derived from individual artistic styles and from the contexts in which they work. They do, however, all, harness imitation together with the possibility of saying things in a new way, in one's own voice, in one's own time. In this respect, calling them Renaissance writers, exemplary of certain trends in Renaissance literature, is purposeful.

The title of the book refers to 'intertextuality' rather than imitation, and this term will feature more prominently and consistently as the argument develops. In Chapter 2 its specific use in opposition to 'allusion', and the theoretical context in which that opposition developed will be considered. Most of the time, however, it will be used in its more general current sense, referring to the interconnection of works with one another. Since the spontaneity of connections between Shakespeare and Ovid, or Milton and the pastoral tradition, will be in conversation with the devisedness of Wyatt's rewriting of Petrarch, or Jonson's marshalling of Seneca and Pliny, the broad term is helpful. However, its stretch to accommodate a wide variety of things that texts might seem to do will not always be a comfortable one.

It is well established that memory and intertextuality are central concerns of Renaissance writers, and the connection between them is not new. However, the terms on which it is elaborated in this book are. The approach is inspired by developments in cognitive literary theory, that is, approaches to

the subject that are informed by findings in cognitive science. A science of the mind might hope to illuminate what is involved in some of the most complex and subtle products of the mind, and the work of a growing number of critics demonstrates this potential. Nevertheless, the case for a cognitive approach in this context and in general is not entirely straightforward. In order to make that case, the first task is to offer an account of the state of thinking about Renaissance imitation, and about memory, in order to see why cognitive theory might offer a way forward. However, even before doing that, it is important to say for the first time something that will emerge as a kind of refrain in the book. The science of memory has great explanatory power in certain contexts and on certain terms, but it does not have a monopoly on that power. The writers, critics, and readers discussed and evoked in this book all know things about the mind that are different from the things known by scientists, but not less substantial. Theories of memory can tell us things about literary intertextuality; but literary intertextuality can tell us things about theories of memory.

In his survey of criticism addressing Renaissance imitation, Jeffrey Todd Knight identified two key phases preceding his own attempt to advance the field.[1] The first phase, exemplified by Terence Cave, George W. Pigman III, and Thomas Greene, identified imitation as, against modern expectation, 'a force for creative discovery' (p. 91).[2] Tensions between writer and source, modern and ancient, Christian and classical, were sources of energy. Knight sees two problems with these influential models: one is their reliance on an idea of writing as 'individualistic self-assertion', whereas 'the applicability of such Romantic models of authorship across historical periods has been called into question' (p. 92). Knight argues for a less unified and unitary idea of the imitating writer. His second problem, illuminated by the second phase of imitation criticism, originates from an idea that the imitated writer should also be less unified and unitary. In the work of Mary Thomas Crane and Ann Moss on the Renaissance tendency to extract and reuse parts of works, in opportunistic and fragmentary encounters, a new way of understanding imitation emerged.[3] Knight

[1] Jeffrey Todd Knight, *Bound to Read: Compilations, Collections, and the Making of Renaissance Literature* (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 90–4.

[2] The key works are Terence Cave, *The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), George W. Pigman III, 'Versions of Imitation in the Renaissance', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 33 (1980), 1–32, and Thomas Greene, *The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).

[3] See Mary Thomas Crane, *Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England* (Princeton University Press, 1993), and Ann Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

himself aims to build on this by stressing compilation as a key creative technique and quality of Renaissance literature.

This material turn in criticism, especially of the Renaissance, is evident in many places. So is a cognitive turn, as will be elaborated later in this Introduction. Mary Thomas Crane moved from the former to the latter, as did Evelyn Tribble (also to be discussed later); this suggests a possible affinity between these two turns. They have a commitment to materiality – the book and the brain – in common at least. Ann Moss's subtitle, 'The Structuring of Renaissance Thought', further proposes an interaction between materiality and cognition. Clearly for her thought is something that is not only an inward thing; it is carried out also on the page; and many in cognitive science, as will be seen, think similarly.

If there is an interesting affinity between the material turn and the cognitive turn, there is also an affinity between the two strategies contrasted by Knight. The possibility of agency and self-definition seen by Cave, Pigman, and Greene, and the evidence of fragmentary, opportunistic encounters attested by Crane and Moss, and by Knight himself, both come through compellingly in the readings of literary imitation that will follow. One of Knight's key examples is Thomas Watson's *Hekatompathia*.[4] Knight convincingly represents its lyrics, and its headnotes describing how they have been translated, adapted, and 'inverted' from named originals, as examples of the tendency for imitation to be an art of compilation. However, the *Hekatompathia* might also be presented as explicit evidence of what is mostly implicit, if thought about at all, in the imitative writing of the period: an awareness, shared between writer and reader, that a poem can be a direct, addressable encounter between text and text.

Imitative writing of this period involves things that read like acts of interactive self-assertion, and things that read like compilations. One can be discovered amid the other; the dynamic between them gives many of the works in this book some of their energy. Cognitive science works across a similar dialogue: between the vivid experience of consciousness, attention, and intention, and the thought that these things are actually compiled, the products of countless processes that have evolved from, and remain quite close to, the workings of animal brains. The specific topics in memory studies explored in Chapters 2 and 5 elaborate this in some detail, and in general memory can be thought of in this way. It is a combination of something directed, personal, active, and of things that are surprising, unintentional, contextually driven: it too is a collage.

[4] Thomas Watson, *The Hekatompathia or Passionate Century of Love* (London: Gabriel Cawood, 1582).

Andrew Hiscock has shown that memory as a concept and a practice had a central part to play in authorship, identity, religion, and cultural renewal in the Renaissance.[5] One strand of the scholarship focuses on the memory arts. These offered esoteric possibilities as well as practical ingenuity. Early modern thinkers embraced arcane possibilities with enthusiasm, and saw their discipline opening up preternatural potential. Frances Yates's *The Art of Memory* argues that medieval memory arts aimed to assuage the effects of human frailty, whereas Renaissance exponents sought to harness the power of the human mind, and to equip it to apprehend the whole world.[6] These grandiose thoughts arise from the writings of Giordano Bruno and Robert Fludd in particular, and her book ends up with a conviction that there is yet more mysterious coherence to be found in these aspirations. Despite her wishes, future scholarship has not really established a fundamental key to explain the extreme hopes of the memory arts – some sort of underlying religious or philosophical innovation, for example. Nonetheless, interest in memory has not dimmed, and its possibilities have been explored across the European Renaissance.[7] The work of Mary Carruthers sets out the development and deployment of memorial metaphors and techniques from antiquity (with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, attributed to Cicero at the time, the most influential early exposition of the techniques) to the Middle Ages.[8] These arts of memory very often use 'loci' or places in which to situate material to be remembered.

It is easy enough, then, to make the claim that artificial memory – the construction of systems that improve retention – is vital to intellectual life in the period, and that intellectual programmes took it into account as they mapped out knowledge. It is less straightforward to take this as a starting point in a literary-critical enquiry. The concept of a poem

[5] Andrew Hiscock, *Reading Memory in Early Modern Literature* (Cambridge University Press, 2011). This book will be discussed further in Chapter 8.

[6] Frances Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), which traces techniques and ideas of memory from antiquity. Douwe Draaisma, *Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas about the Mind*, trans. Paul Vincent (Cambridge University Press, 2000), takes a broader view.

[7] See also Lina Bolzoni, *La stanza della memoria: Modelli letterari e iconografici nell'età della stampa* (Turin: Einaudi, 1995), Paolo Rossi, *Logic and the Art of Memory: The Quest for a Universal Language*, trans. Stephen Clucas (University of Chicago Press; London: Athlone Press, 2000), and Jörg Jochen Berns and Wolfgang Neuber, ed., *Ars memorativa: Zur kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der Gedächtniskunst 1400–1750* (Tübingen: Max Neimeyer Verlag, 1993).

[8] Mary J. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge University Press, 1990). This work is extended in *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), in which the use of mnemonic techniques to create communal memories is explored.

remembering another poem arises readily; the thought that this is an activity involving 'loci' or places might work less easily. William Engel's work on 'mnemology' has sought to make this transition: to interpret Renaissance literary works in terms of memorial structures. He makes the case that Renaissance literature is often structured according to the memory arts and should therefore be read in the same way.[9] This is pursued in his book *Death and Drama in Renaissance England*, which takes its cue from Frances Yates as it interprets Ralegh's *History of the World*, as well as plays, in the light of underlying memorial qualities.[10] Engel seeks to understand works of literature as things designed to be memorable in themselves, or as structures in which something preceding or arising from the work (its message, or point, or content) might itself be made more memorable. My focus is on things that might be deemed outside this range: things that are remembered (and sometimes forgotten) in the process of the literary work, and how reflections of, and on, memory in literary works achieve a kind of knowledge about the mind.

In this respect I am in line with Garrett Sullivan's book on memory and forgetting in Renaissance drama, which emphasizes early on that studies of the subject have focused on artificial memory, whereas the plays and their characters do not seem particularly interested in it.[11] Rather memory and forgetting are components of selfhood, in that integrity is a question of remembering yourself, whereas dramatic action is often precipitated by characters forgetting themselves. Sullivan assumes 'that memory and forgetting are inevitably social; that they are less purely cerebral processes than modes of behaviour and kinds of bodily deportment; that each manifests a relationship not only with the past but with the present and the future' (p. 21). This (as will be seen below) brings out the affinity between his account and the idea of the 'extended mind' (which posits that human thinking is not all done within the head, but in collaboration with the outside world). Sullivan also distinguishes straightforward forgetting (when things are not available in the memory) and forgetfulness, which is

[9] See his two survey articles 'Mnemonic Criticism and Renaissance Literature: A Manifesto', *Connotations*, 1 (1991), 12–33, and 'What's New in Mnemology', *Connotations*, 11 (2000/2001), 241–61. Mary Carruthers, 'Inventional Mnemonics and the Ornaments of Style: The Case of Etymology', *Connotations*, 2 (1992), 103–14, is a complementary response to the former. Its key contribution is to assert that memory is an inventive capacity, relating to the use of images. The memory arts do not just aid recall; they also structure use.

[10] William E. Engel, *Death and Drama in Renaissance England* (Oxford University Press, 2002). See also *Mapping Mortality: The Persistence of Memory and Melancholy in Early Modern England* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995).

[11] Garrett A. Sullivan, *Memory and Forgetting in English Renaissance Drama: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Webster* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 5.

stronger, a 'mode of being or a pattern of behaviour', associated with bodily phenomena (pp. 12–15).

Rhodri Lewis pursues a related dichotomy in his work on memory. He notes that the distinction between memory and recollection (the former a practical art, the latter a thing that happens to people) dates back to Aristotle and is widespread in the Renaissance.[12] He argues that in *Hamlet* the prevailing metaphors for memory blur this distinction, adding to the hero's struggle to take command of his own remembrance, and to focus the things he needs to recall and retain into a present need for action. In his work on Francis Bacon Lewis finds a similar distinction, though Bacon thinks the memory is essentially a limited tool that can give access to useful material, but does not really drive intellectual discovery.[13] The important thing is that memory in the Renaissance had one indubitable flourishing in the form of memory arts, but it had another acknowledged life too, in the more spontaneous work of recollection: that will be the domain explored in later chapters.

The distinction being made here is not only a feature of Renaissance thinking. It parallels one made by Paul Ricoeur. He proposes a distinction between memorization and remembering: the former is the goal of the artificial schemes, which are devoted to making something last in spite of the human tendency to let things slip. Remembering, conversely, covers the vital frailties of the process as it is experienced by trained and untrained alike. The memory arts, as Carruthers and others have shown, find room for the mind's capacity to remember things unintentionally, and acknowledge its tendency to forget, but in general they aim to assuage the problems of remembering (*reminiscentia*) with deliberate practice (*memoria*).[14]

Imitation and memory both combine the purposeful and the serendipitous, the structural and the incidental, the personal and the circumstantial. Throughout the book the potential of memory as a metaphor through which to understand literary imitation will be elaborated by means, not of Renaissance theories of the mind, but of modern ones. The interdisciplinary challenge involved in bringing together literary interpretation with cognitive science has been broached by a number of scholars whose work is sometimes grouped under the title 'cognitive literary theory'. This field is united by its interest in the discoveries of experimental psychology as

[12] See Rhodri Lewis, 'Hamlet, Metaphor, and Memory', *Studies in Philology*, 109 (2012), 609–41, which quotes Pierre de la Primaudaye, *The Second Parte of the French Academie*, trans. Thomas Bowes (London, 1594), pp. 163–4, making the same distinction.

[13] Rhodri Lewis, 'A Kind of Sagacity: Francis Bacon, the *Ars Memoriae* and the Pursuit of Natural Knowledge', *Intellectual History Review*, 19 (2009), 155–75.

[14] Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 58–68.

a means of understanding the workings of literature, but there is a significant difference between those studies that focus on its effects on the reader's mind, and those that aim to explain the writer's creative process.[15]

For some critics a cognitive approach validates reader-response criticism: both envisage a text signifying in the recipient's mind.[16] The vivid presence of a theatrical audience – as minds and bodies – means that some of the most energetic work has considered drama.[17] Some of the founding work that might be considered part of the discipline has explored the workings of metaphor. This is treated as a part of ordinary thought and everyday language, and of the very structure of mental function, and as something which finds special but not exclusive expression in literature.[18]

[15] The *Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary Studies*, ed. Lisa Zunshine (Oxford University Press, 2015), represents the field, especially advances in narratology and links with other literary theory. Patrick Colm Hogan, *Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts: A Guide for Humanists* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), is an introduction to the basic tools of a nuanced literary response. There are a number of shorter studies that offer an introduction to the field, often while defending it, e.g., Alan Richardson, 'Studies of Literature and Cognition: A Field Map', in *The Work of Fiction: Cognition, Culture, and Complexity*, ed. Alan Richardson and Ellen Spolsky (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 1–29. See also Lisa Zunshine, ed., *Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). Earlier surveys of the field are instructive, as they demonstrate ebbs and flows of fortune and confidence. Mary Thomas Crane and Alan Richardson, 'Literary Studies and Cognitive Science: Towards a New Interdisciplinarity', *Mosaic*, 32.2 (1999), 123–40, is balanced and has a good bibliography up to 1999. See also F. Elizabeth Hart, 'The Epistemology of Cognitive Literary Studies', *Philosophy and Literature*, 25 (2001), 314–34. A special issue of *Poetics Today*, 23 (2001), no. 1, eds Alan Richardson and Francis F. Steen, includes a range of cognitive critical practices. An important response from Hans Adler and Sabine Gross, 'Adjusting the Frame: Comments on Cognitivism and Literature', *Poetics Today*, 23 (2002), 195–220, argues that an attempt at a scientific method might spuriously and destructively undermine nuance and argument in literary criticism. Similar anxiety is explored in Tony Jackson, '"Literary Interpretation" and Cognitive Literary Studies', *Poetics Today*, 24 (2003), 191–205.

[16] See Norman N. Holland, 'Where Is a Text? A Neurological View', *New Literary History*, 33 (2002), 21–32, and Craig A. Hamilton and Ralf Schneider, 'From Iser to Turner and Beyond: Reception Theory Meets Cognitive Criticism', *Style*, 36 (2002), 640–58. Guillemette Bolens, *Le style des gestes: corporéité et kinésie dans le récit littéraire* (Lausanne: Éditions BHMS, 2008; English translation as *The Style of Gestures*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) focuses on bodily 'kinesic' responses to literature.

[17] See Bruce McConachie, *Engaging Audiences: A Cognitive Approach to Spectating in the Theatre* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), and Amy Cook, *Shakespearean Neuroplay: Reinvigorating the Study of Dramatic Texts and Performance through Cognitive Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). See also McConachie, 'Falsifiable Theories for Theatre and Performance Studies', and Cook, 'Interplay: The Method and Potential of a Cognitive Scientific Approach to Theatre', both in *Theatre Journal*, 59 (2007), and the essay collection *Performance and Cognition: Theatre Studies and the Cognitive Turn*, ed. Bruce A. McConachie and F. Elizabeth Hart (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[18] See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (University of Chicago Press, 1980) and *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (University of Chicago Press, 1989). Also vital in this are Mark Turner's books *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science* (Princeton University Press, 1991), *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), and *The Literary Mind* (New York

Thus one figure of rhetoric is given a role in fundamental thought process: studies in cognitive poetics explore more widely the possibilities of a cognitive rhetoric, where key tropes are not just figures of speech, but describe the structures of thought.[19] Another main strand of cognitively oriented work focuses on psycholinguistics, literary form, and the sound of literature, as means of exploring a sensory poetics.[20] Literary critics have made most use of cognitive theory relating to memory itself when considering the oral tradition.[21] In Homer, for example, the patterns of storytelling overlap with mental capacities because the works were stored in memory as well as founded there.[22]

In Mary Thomas Crane's *Shakespeare's Brain*, cognitive science and the cultural environment are in constant dialogue: Crane sees them in collaboration, creating and altering meaning.[23] Shakespeare's uses of certain powerful and repeating images are explored in the light of this, and the texture of his language is read in relation to key determinants acting on it, namely the presence of these images in early modern English culture, and the brain's systems for managing concepts. This combination enables Crane to recognize a telling affinity between cognitive science and literary criticism, namely, their mutual efforts to understand the autonomy of the creative agent, in relation to the shaping effects of culture:

and London: Oxford University Press, 1996), which make a good deal of the role of schemata in thought (as will Part II). F. Elizabeth Hart, 'Cognitive Linguistics: The Experiential Dynamic of Metaphor', *Mosaic*, 28.1 (1995), 1–23, is a very successful study of Shakespeare in the light of Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner. William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, *Cognitive Linguistics* (Cambridge University Press, 2004) introduces the broader field and Zoltan Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2010) takes on metaphor in particular. My own *Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) applies these approaches to a set of literary-critical questions.

[19] Raymond W. Gibbs, *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language and Understanding* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Margaret A. Boden, *The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2004).

[20] As in Reuven Tsur's *Toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1992) and *Poetic Rhythm, Structure, and Performance: An Empirical Study in Cognitive Poetics*, 2nd edn (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

[21] See especially David C. Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and Counting-out Rhymes* (Oxford University Press, 1995) for its conclusions about cognitive science (esp. pp. 302–7) as well as about literature.

[22] See Elizabeth Minchin, *Homer and the Resources of Memory: Some Applications of Cognitive Theory to the Iliad and Odyssey* (Oxford University Press, 2001). Jocelyn Harris, *Jane Austen's Art of Memory* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), is less invested in the science, but also asks how we might understand a (very different) creative process.

[23] Mary Thomas Crane, *Shakespeare's Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory* (Princeton University Press, 2003). See also Arthur F. Kinney's *Shakespeare's Webs: Networks of Meaning in Renaissance Drama* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004) and *Aristotle's Legacy and Shakespeare's Drama* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), both of which pursue a cognitive approach inspired in part by Crane.

> The current theories of cognitive psychology seem to some extent to corroborate our view of the author as fragmented, unable consciously to control language, unable to evade the mandates of his culture. But they also open a space for a more informed speculation about the role of the author within culture and the role of culture within the author's brain. (p. 16)

Crane's work manages to be both historical and textual in its application of cognitive theory, and it suggests a unification of the opposed positions described by Jeffrey Todd Knight, which were discussed at the opening of this Introduction. She clarifies that there is no need to be wary of a deterministic or positivistic tendency in cognitive science. The discipline is also open to the discontinuous, the fuzzy, the metaphorical.

In her book *Gaps in Nature*, Ellen Spolsky explores the importance of epistemological gaps in the workings of the brain, derived from ideas of the modular brain (from Jerry Fodor) and 'gappy consciousness' (Daniel Dennett).[24] Her approach is animated by the ways in which thoughts fill in these gaps by means of necessary leaps. These recompositions are creative acts and are therefore analogous to the creation of new ideas in literature or, as Spolsky explores in detail, to the development of new approaches in criticism. This connects interestingly with other critics' identifications of cognitive analogies for creativity and originality.[25] Spolsky expands on *Gaps in Nature* in *Satisfying Skepticism*, where the consequences of these gaps in meaning are measured on a philosophical scale. Scepticism is found to replicate a property of mental life, in that it posits the non-existence of absolute knowledge (something Spolsky finds in cognitive science): explorations of scepticism in literature engage with and satisfy the mind.[26] Another key work for my study in the field of cognitive literary criticism is Nicolae Babuts's *The Dynamics of the Metaphorical Field*.[27] Babuts explores reading and writing literature, and the production

[24] Ellen Spolsky, *Gaps in Nature: Literary Interpretation and the Modular Mind* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).

[25] Margaret A. Boden's *The Creative Mind* has an intriguing exploration of 'creative connectionism' – how the structure of cognitive activity enables new originality. See also Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier, 'A Mechanism of Creativity', *Poetics Today*, 20 (1999), 397–418, which defines 'conceptual blending' as a deep cognitive activity that 'makes new meanings out of old' (p. 397) – i.e., the brain brings things together and thus produces unpredictable new combinations, and this is an analogy for, but also perhaps the neural activity behind, literary creativity.

[26] Ellen Spolsky, *Satisfying Skepticism: Embodied Knowledge in the Early Modern World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). Spolsky's *Word vs Image: Cognitive Hunger in Shakespeare's England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) pursues the connections between culture and cognition already recognized in the work of Crane and Kinney above.

[27] Nicolae Babuts, *The Dynamics of the Metaphorical Field: A Cognitive View of Literature* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, and London: Associated University Presses, 1992).

of meaning in general, in relation to memory. The emphasis is not on sources, and there is a less basic commitment to explication than the one to be found below, but cognitive science, philosophy, and literary criticism are brought together.

Evelyn Tribble's book *Cognition in the Globe* takes its inspiration from some key emerging psychological concepts: the 'extended mind' and 'distributed cognition'. Pioneered by Andy Clark and others, this way of thinking about the mind posits that its functions are extended and 'distributed' beyond the biological brain itself. Interactions with the body, the environment, other minds, objects, and the surrounding culture help the human being achieve more, and more efficiently, in their cognition.[28] Tribble argues that early modern actors faced great challenges of memorization. They solved these not by rote-learning anchored in a static, rhetorical staging, but rather by a dynamic process in which the actors' memories were supplemented by one another, the shape of the theatre (entrances and exits), parts and cues, verse, gestures, props, and so on. Thus the company worked together, and with its setting, to achieve performances of multiple plays in quick succession.[29] Tribble and John Sutton have posited an idea of a 'cognitive ecology', an extended, distributed environment in which human minds work.[30]

Although other work in this field has not been so explicitly inspired by the cognitive scientists working to integrate brain, body, and culture, it is clear that the interface between memory and material culture is of wide interest. Richard Yeo has considered note-taking and how it supports the

[28] See Andy Clark and David Chalmers, 'The Extended Mind', *Analysis*, 58 (1998), 7–19, and later expansions such as Andy Clark's *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension* (Oxford University Press, 2008), and (because it takes the memory on specifically) 'Intrinsic Content, Active Memory, and the Extended Mind', *Analysis*, 65 (2005), 1–11. For 'distributed cognition' see Edwin Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).

[29] Evelyn Tribble, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare's Theatre* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). See also Evelyn Tribble and Nicholas Keene, *Cognitive Ecologies and the History of Remembering: Religion, Education and Memory in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), which (especially in a very helpful introduction, pp. 1–18) connects the extended mind to material culture and social history. On memory and the Shakespearean theatre, see Lois Potter, '"Nobody's Perfect": Actors' Memories and Shakespeare's Plays of the 1590s', *Shakespeare Survey*, 42 (1990), 85–97. See also Peter Holland, 'On the Gravy Train: Shakespeare, Memory and Forgetting', in *Shakespeare, Memory and Performance*, ed. Peter Holland (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 207–34, and Laurie E. Maguire, *Shakespearean Suspect Texts: The 'Bad' Quartos and Their Contexts* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), which bases its categorization of good and bad texts on signs of memorial reconstruction, and thus contains many insights into the ways in which a play might be remembered or misremembered.

[30] See Evelyn Tribble and John Sutton, 'Minds in and out of Time: Memory, Embodied Skill, Anachronism, and Performance', *Textual Practice*, 26 (2012), 587–607, and 'Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies', *Shakespeare Studies*, 39 (2011), 94–103.