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On April 18, 1961, as U.S.-trained forces attacked Cuba in the Bay of Pigs invasion, Lázaro Cárdenas rushed to Mexico City’s airport and boarded a private jet to Havana to fight alongside Fidel Castro. The flight never left the runway; Mexico’s president, Adolfo López Mateos, had ordered the military to ground the plane and remove Cárdenas from the premises.¹

But Cárdenas would not be stopped from defending Cuba. He made his way from the airport to the Zócalo – Mexico City’s main plaza – where from the improvised podium of the roof of a car he denounced the invasion. Cuba needed the moral support of Mexico, Cárdenas said, and if all the people of Latin America united to help the island, there would be nothing the United States could do.² The presence of the ex-president was captivating; a crush of eighty thousand protesters sat silently on the ground in the plaza, overwhelming the police force tasked with keeping the area clear.³

Cárdenas’s condemnation of the Bay of Pigs invasion also reached beyond the Zócalo. He sent a scathing message to a wide range of

¹ Luís Suárez, Cárdenas: Retrato inédito, testimonios de Amalia Solorzano de Cárdenas y nuevos documentos (Mexico City: Editorial Grijalbo, 1987), 214–16. See also Alfonso Corona del Rosal, Mis Memorias Políticas (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1995), 131.
international institutions and leaders, including the United Nations, the presidents of numerous countries, and prominent U.S. journalist Walter Lippmann, in which he called the invasion “a great crime whereby a small country is wounded by the powerful resources of imperialism.” He also made inflammatory statements to Cuban reporters, swearing, “[If the government continues to deny me permission to go to Cuba], I will go instead to the Mexican interior to organize support for the Cuban Revolution.”

President López Mateos was well aware of Cárdenas’s actions. Intelligence agents collected copies of Cárdenas’s declarations and newspaper clippings about the protest in the Zócalo. They maintained a round-the-clock watch outside Cárdenas’s house and submitted extensive reports about his activities. The president also knew of students’ desires to follow Cárdenas’s example: according to intelligence agents, an organization called the Student Front in Defense of the Cuban Revolution had recruited more than a thousand members to form a brigade to send to the island. López Mateos continued to deny permission to all those who wanted to go to Cuba, citing Mexico’s traditional policy of non-intervention and threatening to revoke the citizenship of anyone who “lent his or her services” to a foreign government without permission from Congress.

Displeased with Cárdenas’s very public response to the Bay of Pigs invasion, López Mateos summoned the ex-president to a private meeting. There, he confronted Cárdenas about his attempt to fly to Cuba. “Mexico is passing through a difficult situation right now; the revenue from tourism has dropped. The campaign abroad is very intense and it appears to me that we are borrowing other people’s troubles,” López Mateos explained. When Cárdenas refused to agree about the importance of cultivating good relations with the United States, López Mateos took a more threatening tack. “They say that the communists are enclosing you in a dangerous web,” he warned Cárdenas.

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4 Lázaro Cárdenas, “[Cárdenas’s telegram to the United Nations about the Bay of Pigs Invasion],” April 17, 1961, DFS, VPLC, Leg. 2, Hoja 165, AGN.
6 Ruben Fernández Millán, “[Vigilance outside of Cárdenas’s house during Bay of Pigs],” April 17, 1961, DFS, VPLC, Leg. 2, Hoja 166, AGN.
7 Manuel Rangel Escamilla, “[Student protests against Bay of Pigs invasion],” April 19, 1961, DFS, VPLC, Leg. 2, Hoja 172, AGN.
8 “Ningún mexicano podrá ir a pelear,” Excélsior, April 19, 1961.
Yet, despite all these concerns about communists, the United States, and borrowing other people’s troubles, President López Mateos spent much of his time in office defending the Cuban Revolution. During a tour of South America in January 1960, he informed Venezuelan journalists that his country had been the first to recognize the new Cuban regime and compared Castro’s agrarian reforms to those undertaken by the Mexican government after the Revolution of 1910. He told Brazilian reporters that Mexicans’ revolutionary experience gave them a unique understanding of the events in Cuba. “Mexico,” López Mateos explained, “has formulated an entire theory about agrarian reform and land distribution founded on the principles of justice, [and] cannot but look favorably upon a country with similar problems [that] resolves them in agreement with the needs of its own people.” López Mateos again demonstrated solidarity with the Cuban Revolution five months later when he welcomed Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado in an official state visit. López Mateos greeted Dorticós at the airport in front of a crowd of thousands who cheered and waved celebratory banners. In a speech that contained numerous comparisons between the Mexican Revolution and the more recent Cuban one, López Mateos said, “We, who have travelled similar paths, understand and value the transformative effort that Cuba is undertaking.” By connecting the two countries’ experiences, he validated Castro’s actions and reasserted his own government’s revolutionary credentials.

Mexico’s defense of Cuba changed but did not cease as Castro increasingly allied his government with the communist bloc in 1960 and 1961. No longer praising the Cuban Revolution and comparing it to Mexico’s own experience, President López Mateos and his representatives in the Organization of American States (OAS) instead began focusing on Cuba’s juridical rights to self-determination and nonintervention. In

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10 Mexico was actually among a group of countries that all recognized Castro’s new government on January 5, 1959. The other countries were Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Honduras. “Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia y Honduras reconocen a Urrutia,” Excélsior, January 6, 1959.
11 Presencia internacional de Adolfo López Mateos, Vol. 1 (Mexico City, 1963). López Mateos neglected to mention that Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Honduras recognized Castro’s government on the same day as Mexico.
13 On Mexican foreign policy and the doctrines of self-determination and nonintervention, see Olga Pellicer de Brody and Esteban L. Mancilla, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana 1952–1960: El entendimiento con los Estados Unidos y la gestación del desarrollo estabilizador, Vol. 23 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978); Guillermo Garcés
January 1962, the Mexican foreign minister cited those principles when he abstained from voting on OAS resolutions that expelled Cuba from the organization. In July 1964, when the OAS resolved that all member nations that still maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba should sever them, Mexico alone refused to comply. For the rest of the decade, it was the only Latin American country to maintain diplomatic relations and air contact with Cuba. In serving as a bridge between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere, the Mexican government aided Castro and risked reprisals from the United States.

López Mateos’s decision to support Cuba came at a high price. The country served as a central hub of the Cold War in Latin America, a thoroughfare for people, money, weapons, and information traveling between Cuba and the rest of the Americas. Yet, Mexico’s leaders steadfastly maintained their relations with Cuba, because, despite what López Mateos told Cárdenas in their private conversation, Mexico was not borrowing someone else’s problems. It was confronting its own. Castro and his fellow Cuban revolutionaries had unwittingly exposed a contradiction.
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-coded deep in the DNA of Mexican politics: the tension between the country’s revolutionary past and its conservative present.

This is a book about the Cold War in Mexico, and Mexico in the Cold War. It argues that a dynamic, shifting combination of domestic and international pressures initiated Mexico’s Cold War and shaped its evolution and outcomes. The participants in Mexico’s Cold War did not live and act in separate fields of foreign and domestic politics, but in both at the same time. Domestic problems took on international dimensions, and foreign events influenced the ways that Mexicans across the social spectrum interpreted domestic problems. Just like the wider global confrontation, Mexico’s Cold War was a multisided geopolitical and local contest. It was an undeclared state of war over questions of ideology, economics, culture, citizenship, and security. Mexico may have appeared to be an island of stability in the turbulent sea of Latin American politics, a mere observer of the Cold War, but a closer look reveals that the peaceful haven was actually an active battleground where multiple groups debated, spied, schemed, and struggled for influence. At stake was the shape of Mexico’s future, and that of the inter-American community.

In Mexico, the Cold War began when the Cuban Revolution intensified the preexisting struggle over the legacy of the Mexican Revolution. Fidel Castro’s triumph over the dictatorial Fulgencio Batista and his bold


challenge to U.S. imperialism resonated among the Mexican population, serving as an inspiration to some and a warning to others. *Fidelismo* was an especially destabilizing force in Mexico because Castro’s dedication to many of the same nationalist and populist causes that the Mexican revolutionaries had originally pursued called attention to the fact that the government had since abandoned those promises. Workers, *campesinos*, journalists, students, and even former presidents like Lázaro Cárdenas seized upon the Cuban example and demanded that their own government return to its revolutionary roots.¹⁹

Members of the Mexican public were thus central actors in Mexico’s Cold War. Through their actions and organizations, Mexicans across the social and political spectrum put forward their own interpretations of domestic and international events. They held conferences, built alliances, marched in the streets, and even took up weapons. Information about the grassroots dynamics of Mexico’s Cold War comes from the newspapers, magazines, cartoons, posters, and pamphlets that they created. These sources provide nonstate perspectives and vivid detail about the events on the ground in cities and towns across Mexico. They show how the battle over the legacy of the Mexican Revolution shaped not only Mexico’s domestic politics, but also its relations with Cuba and the United States.

This internal struggle over the legacy of the Mexican Revolution determined Mexico’s role in the hemispheric Cold War. López Mateos’s fear of a domestic backlash and desperation to maintain his government’s revolutionary legitimacy compelled him to defend Castro. His decision established a precedent that would endure throughout Mexico’s Cold War: contradictory overt and covert foreign policies. Publicly, López Mateos declared that the United States was Mexico’s “greatest problem” and predicted that the Cuban Revolution would be “one step more toward the greatness of America.”²⁰ At the same time, he quietly decreased trade with the island, instituted travel restrictions, and facilitated U.S. efforts to spy on the Cubans. Mexico’s secret cooperation with anti-Castro efforts suggests that sentiments of revolutionary or Third World solidarity did


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not play as great of a role in Mexican foreign policy as some historians have suggested. U.S. and Mexican intelligence agents perceived Castro as a threat, and their records demonstrate that they cooperated extensively in their efforts to monitor and obstruct Cuban activities.

In fact, perception played a crucial role in all aspects of Mexico’s Cold War. Mexicans’ perceptions of their own revolutionary legacy shaped their responses to the Cuban Revolution. While some saw the Cuban Revolution as a reminder of the promises that the Mexican Revolution had yet to fulfill, many others perceived it as a warning of what a new revolution in Mexico could become. At the same time, the Mexican government’s perception of threats influenced the way it responded to domestic and international events. Mexican officials focused on the communist role in the Cuban Revolution, and would increasingly perceive activism among Mexican workers, campesinos, and students as evidence of an international communist conspiracy.

These perceptions, as well as the ideas, fears, and ambitions that drove Mexico’s Cold War, are now visible in the recently opened records of Mexico’s intelligence organizations. In 2002, the government declassified hundreds of thousands of pages of reports written by the agents of the Department of Federal Security and the Department of Political and Social Investigations. These organizations served as the eyes and ears of presidents Adolfo López Mateos (1958–64), Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70), and Luis Echeverría (1970–6). Some of their information was accurate; much of it was not. Yet even though the intelligence reports were often biased, exaggerated, and false, they were still the best information that Mexico’s presidents had available. As historical sources, therefore, the records of the intelligence organizations can sometimes tell us what was actually happening, but more often – and more importantly – they tell us what Mexico’s leaders thought was happening. When read carefully, they reveal how intelligence agents shaped both Mexican presidents’ perceptions of threat and the strategies that they used to defend themselves.

22 On the significance of the intelligence archive for historians, see the special dossier edited by Tanalís Padilla and Louise E. Walker in “Spy Reports: Content, Methodology, and Historiography in Mexico’s Secret Police Archive,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 19, no. 1 (July 2013): 1–111. Recently, in 2015, Mexico’s National Archive began recategorizing most of the files of the Department of Federal Security. The current status of access to researchers remains unclear and in flux.
23 Scholars have long argued that internal factors played a crucial role in shaping Mexico’s policy toward Cuba, but they lacked the sources to prove it. See Olga Pellicer de Brody, México y la Revolución Cubana (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1972); Mario Ojeda, Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México (Mexico City: El Colegio
The declassified intelligence records also prove that conservative groups and government officials were responsible for instigating and perpetrating the vast majority of the violence that occurred during Mexico’s Cold War. Mexico’s revolutionary legacy and the Cuban Revolution did inspire people across the political spectrum to take action, but government security forces and civilians on the right wing of the spectrum were the first groups to resort to violent tactics and the ones who embraced the use of force most consistently and effectively. In Mexico, as in the rest of Latin America, the Cold War was not an equal fight.\textsuperscript{24}

While internal struggles were fundamental to Mexico’s Cold War, foreign actors also played important roles. Not surprisingly, the countries that participated the most in Mexico’s Cold War and felt the greatest effects were the ones that represented the two opposing ideological poles of the hemispheric Cold War: Cuba and the United States. These countries’ physical proximity to Mexico, as well as their long histories of interactions with Mexico, also influenced the trilateral relationship. Mexico presented unique challenges and opportunities for both of its neighbors, and the governments of all three countries persistently pushed and tested each other in their efforts to maximize the benefits of Mexico’s exceptional position.

Fidel Castro followed Adolfo López Mateos’s lead, and crafted contradictory overt and covert foreign policies toward Mexico. Publicly, he praised the Mexican government’s “democratic and constitutional tradition” and pledged to maintain “inviolable norms of respect” for Mexico’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{25} In secret internal communications, however, Castro and other Cuban officials expressed much lower opinions of Mexico’s
\textsuperscript{24} For opposing views in the debate over apportioning blame for Cold War violence in Latin America, see Brands, \textit{Latin America’s Cold War}, and Rabe, \textit{The Killing Zone}. For an application of the “Two Devils Thesis” to the Mexican context, see Jorge Castañeda, \textit{Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War} (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
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government. Thanks to the recent declassification in 2013 of some of Cuba’s diplomatic records, we can now gain new insight into Cuban perceptions of Mexico and its leaders. These records reveal that Cuban officials did not really admire Mexico’s government; rather, they frequently criticized it and saw the Mexican example as one to avoid. What was more, the Cuban government used its embassy and consulates in Mexico to spread propaganda and possibly even to support revolutionary activities in Mexico and elsewhere. In examining Cuba’s foreign policy toward Mexico, this book contributes a new perspective to a body of literature that has almost exclusively focused on Cuba’s relations with its allies or its enemies. Just as Mexico was both friend and foe to Cuba, Cuban foreign policy toward Mexico was ambivalent, variable, and contradictory.

The United States, meanwhile, adjusted its hemispheric Cold War strategy to meet Mexican needs. U.S. leaders initially wanted to isolate Cuba completely and tried to compel Mexico to join the campaign against Castro, but they relented when their Mexican counterparts convinced them that the symbolism of ties with Cuba played a crucial stabilizing role. Eventually, the United States not only accepted but also even embraced Mexico’s decision to maintain relations with Cuba. U.S. leaders realized that even though Mexico’s independent foreign policy aided Castro, it also benefited Mexico and the United States.

The U.S. role in Mexico’s Cold War was thus more accommodating than decisive. Though histories of the Cold War in Latin America have criticized U.S. interventionism and anticommunism for good reason, in focusing so much on the United States they have tended to overlook the ways that Latin Americans sometimes took the lead in the Cold War and shaped U.S. policy. Just as the literature on inter-American relations has tended to exaggerate U.S. power, it has also overstated the centrality of the United States to Latin American foreign policy formulation. While it would be

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17 On the tendency to overlook Latin American agency, see Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (November 2003): 621–36; Brands, Latin America’s Cold War.

18 On U.S. centrism in histories of inter-American relations, see Jürgen Buchenau, In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central America Policy, 1876–1930 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996), x. Prominent exceptions include...
This book combines a wide variety of sources and perspectives from Mexico, Cuba, and the United States to analyze the intersecting domestic and international struggles that constituted Mexico’s Cold War. It examines multiple facets of national politics and international relations, including social mobilization, diplomacy, espionage, and cultural