

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-07728-7 - Evolution of the Social Contract: Second Edition

Brian Skyrms

Index

[More information](#)

INDEX

- alarm call, 44, 86–7, 95–104, 117
- Alexander, J. M., xi, 113
- altruism, xii, xiv, 20, 55–8, 62, 104, 107, 118
- anomaly, 4, 29, 98
- approximate justice, 21
- Arbuthnot, J., 1–3, 8
- Argiento, R., 123
- Aristotle, 77, 121
- Aumann, R. J., 70, 107, 121–3
- Axelrod, R., 37, 62, 116, 118–19
- babbling equilibria, xv, 84
- Bala, V., 126
- bargaining, 4–22, 23–42, 94, 106–9, 111, 114, 125, 126
- basin of attraction, 14–20, 79
- Bergstrom, T., 119
- Bicchieri, C., 121
- Binmore, K., 28, 30, 33–4, 39, 113–16, 126
- Bolton, G., 115
- Bomze, I., 117
- Bonachich, P., 126
- bourgeois strategy, 78–9
- Boyd, R., 119
- Braithwaite, R. B., 125
- Burgess, J. W., 122
- categorical imperative, xiv, 62, 107, 109
- Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., 113, 118, 119
- Charnov, E., 113
- Cheney, D. L., 86, 102–3, 123–4
- chicken, 66–74, 72–4, 78
- Colinvaux, P., 121
- commitment, 23–42, 66, 106
- common knowledge, 26, 85–7, 95, 103–4
- cooperation, 20, 40–62
- correlated equilibrium, 70–80, 107, 122
- correlation, xi–xii, xiv, 18–21, 41, 46, 48–63, 72–80, 98–104, 107, 109
- Crawford, V., 122
- cultural evolution, xiv, 11, 35, 40, 62, 87, 95, 110
- curse of symmetry, xv, 64, 75, 80
- Danielson, P., 36, 116
- Dante, 25, 34, 64
- Darwin, C., 3, 7–11, 21, 43–5, 49, 62, 86, 107, 109–10
- Davies, N. B., 117, 122
- Dawkins, R., xiii, 122
- deception, 58, 101–4, 124
- doomsday machine, 24–6, 35, 114
- dove, 66–79, 106, 120
- easy rider, 31–7
- Eells, E., 117
- efficiency, 13, 62
- Eshel, I., 113, 118, 119
- evolutionarily stable state, 102, 118
- evolutionarily stable strategy, 11, 21, 50–3, 60, 79, 89–90, 98, 106, 123

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-07728-7 - Evolution of the Social Contract: Second Edition

Brian Skyrms

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

- Fagen, R. M., 118
 fairman, 31–9
 fairness, 23–42
 Farrell, J., 122
 Feldman, M., 118, 119
 Fisher, R. A., 3, 7–9, 12, 17, 112
 focal equilibrium, 85, 95, 103
 Foster, D., 113, 116, 126

 Gale, J., 30, 33–4, 39, 115, 116
 gamesman, 31–9
 Ghazali, 65–8, 74, 119–20
 Gianni Schicchi, 25–7, 39, 46
 Gibbard, A., 117
 Glass, L., 121
 Golubitsky, M., 121
 Goyal, S., 126
 granularity, 16
 Grice, H. P., 124
 Gross, T., 126
 Güth, W., 27, 115

 Hamilton, W. D., xii, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 113
 Harms, W., 39, 116
 Harper, W., 25, 114, 117
 Harsanyi, J., xiii, 6, 21, 67, 111, 112, 120, 126
 hawk, 66–79, 106, 120
 Henrich, J. 40, 116
 Hofbauer, J., 116, 117, 123
 Holland, J., 36, 116
 Hu, Y., 123
 Hume, D., xiii, xv
 Huttegger, S., 123
 Huxley, T. H., 43, 116

 Jeffrey, R., 45–62, 117
 Jonker, L., 50, 112, 117–18,
 justice, 1–22, 106–10

 Kahn, H., 24–5, 114
 Kahneman, D., 77, 114–15
 Kalai, E., 108, 125–6
 Kandori, M., 113, 121, 126
 Kavanaugh, M., 124
 Kavka, G., xvi
 kin selection, 56, 61

 Kirchner, W., 122
 Kitcher, P., 118
 Knetsch, J., 77, 114–15
 Koza, J., 36, 116
 Krebs, J. R., 117, 122
 Kreps, D., 114, 116
 Kropotkin, P., 43–4, 49, 63, 119
 Kummer, H., 122

 learning, 11, 28, 33, 72–9, 103, 107,
 109–10, 121
 Lewis, D., 70, 76, 82–101, 117,
 121–3
 Liggett, T., 126
 Luce, R. D., 125
 Lumsden, C., 119

 Mackey, M., 121
 mad dog, 31–9
 Mailath, G., 113
 Marx, K., xiii, 43, 110
 Max, 47–9
 Maynard Smith, J., xii, 11, 50, 52, 55,
 56, 60, 61, 66, 78, 89, 112, 115,
 116, 119, 122
 meaning, xii, xv, 76, 81–105, 106,
 124
 Michod, R., 118
 Milgrom, P., 119
 Millikan, R., 124
 Moritz, 47–9
 Muller, H., 116
 mutation, xiv, 16, 35–9, 56, 71, 79,
 107
 mutual aid, xiv, 43–63, 119
 Myerson, R. B., 116

 Nachbar, J., 117
 Nagel, T., 81, 122
 Nash, J., 5, 6, 20, 27, 46, 47, 51, 61,
 70, 73, 103, 106, 108, 111
 Nash bargaining solution, 108, 125,
 126
 Nash equilibrium, 5, 20, 27, 46, 47,
 51, 61, 70, 106, 111
 norms, xii, 21, 29, 40–2, 62, 76, 102,
 108
 North, D., 119

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-07728-7 - Evolution of the Social Contract: Second Edition

Brian Skyrms

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

- Nowicki, S., 122, 124
 Nozick, R., 117
 Nydegger, R. V., 4, 111

 Okuno-Fujiwara, M. 28, 114
 Owen, G., 4, 111
 ownership, xv, 77–8, 86, 106, 121

 Pacheco, J., 119
 Packer, C., 122
 paradoxical strategy, 79, 122
 Parker, G. R., 50, 52, 53, 78, 122
 Pemantle, R., 123, 126
 Pollock, G. B., 119
 polymorphic traps, 11–21, 93, 94
 Poundstone, W., 117, 120
 Prasnikar, V., 28, 114
 Price, G. R., 11, 53, 66, 112, 115
 prisoner's dilemma, 37, 46–63, 98–9,
 102, 106
 property, 77–80, 121
 Pusey, A. E., 122

 Quine, W. V. O., 81–2, 85, 105,
 122

 Raiffa, H., 125
 randomness, 18, 76, 107
 ratifiability, 48–53
 Rawls, J., xiii, 6–7, 21, 111, 112
 reciprocal altruism, xii, 58–9, 62
 recombination, xiv, 35–8, 107, 116
 replicator dynamics, xiii, 11, 14,
 30, 32–3, 35, 37, 38, 49, 50,
 52–3, 57, 61, 92, 94, 106–7,
 115, 117
 Rescher, N., 120, 121
 Richards, R., 122
 Richerson, P., 119
 Rob, R., 126
 Robson, A., 119
 Roth, A., 28, 114
 Rousseau, J.-J., xiii, 1, 77, 121
 Russell, B., 66, 120

 salience, 85, 104
 Samuelson, L., 30, 33–4, 39, 113,
 115, 116, 119, 126

 Sanderson, M., 118
 Santos, F., 119
 Sauer, A., 113
 Savage, L. J., 45–53, 117
 Sayama, H., 126
 Schelling, T., 85
 Schmittberger, R., 27
 Schuster, P., 117
 Schwartz, B., 27
 Searcy, W. A., 122, 124
 Searle, J., 81, 122
 Selten, R., 26, 34, 39, 67, 111, 114,
 116, 120, 123, 126
 sex ratio, xi, xiv, 2–3, 7–9, 11, 16–18,
 113
 Seyfarth, R., 86, 102–3, 123, 124
 Shaked, A., 28, 114, 119
 Shaw, R., 113
 Sherman, P. W., 117
 Sigmund, K., 116, 117
 signaling system, xii, 86–104, 123
 Smordinski, M., 108, 125, 126
 Sobel, J., 122
 Sober, E., 118
 Socrates, 64
 Stalnaker, R., 117
 Stewart, I., 121
 Stigler, S., 111
 Strangelove, 24–5
 strongly dominated strategy, xiv,
 62
 subgame perfect equilibrium, 26–33,
 114
 Sutton, J., 28, 114
 symmetry, xv, 67–80, 92, 95, 104,
 107, 120, 121
 symmetry breaking, xii, 67–80, 107,
 120, 121

 Tarrès, P., 123
 Taylor, P., 50, 112, 113, 117, 118
 Thaler, R., 29, 77, 114, 115
 Thomas, E., 118
 Tosca, 46
 Towne, W., 122
 trembling hand, 35, 37, 39, 106, 114,
 116
 Trivers, R., 62, 119

Index

- ultimatum game, xi, 23–46, 106, 107, 111
- utilitarian bargaining solution, 108, 109, 124, 125, 133
- van Damme, E., 115, 116, 118, 119
- Vanderschraaf, P., 70, 121, 126
- veil of ignorance, xiv, 6, 10, 21
- Verner, J., 17, 113
- viscosity, 98, 104, 119
- Volkov, S., 123
- von Frisch, K., 86
- Waage, J. K., 122
- Wagner, E., 123
- Wärneryd, K., 123
- Watts, A., 126
- weakly dominated strategy, xiv, 33–4, 38, 115
- Weingast, B., 119
- Williams, G. C., 113
- Wilson, D. S., 118, 121
- Wilson, E. O., 119
- Wittgenstein, L., 81, 122
- Wright, S., 113, 118, 119
- Young, H. P., 113, 116, 126
- Zamir, S., 28, 114
- Zeeman, E. C., 117
- Zollman, K. xii, 116
- Zuberbühler, K., 122