Index

Aarts, Kees, 5
ACT Party (NZ), 165
Alivizatos, Nikos, 62
Alliance Party (NZ), 163
alternative vote electoral system, 44, 80
Anderson, Christopher, 4
Andres, Gerd, 138–139
Argentina, 48
Austen-Smith, David, 19
Australia, 44, 46
Austria, 93
Bächtiger, André, 8
backbenchers
closed-list proportional systems, 48
debate participation, United Kingdom vs. Germany, 100–101, 104–114, 129–132, 135–137, 140–141
disagreement with leaders, 70–72
dissent by, 25–27, 125, 129–132, 135–137, 140–141
ideological disagreement within parties, 115–123
majoritarian systems, 44–46
MMM systems, 51
MMP systems, 50
New Zealand, 169–173
overview, 11–12
utility function of, 36–37
ballot structures, 24, 44, 48, 80–81
Beck, Volker, 33
Blair, Tony, 129
Brazil, 48
budget debate participation (NZ), 166–173
Bundestag, see Germany
cabinet, 17, 103, see also Westminster system
Cameron, David, 30
Canada, 44, 62, 83–84
candidate selection (European Parliament)
dissent and, 152–162
empirical implications, 51–52
overview, 12–13, 148–149, 161
rules of parliamentary debate and, 149–151
capital relocation debate (Germany), 17
Carey, John, 47
Carruba, Clifford J., 157
case studies
cultural effects, 61
electoral systems, 61–62
European Parliament, 66–69
Germany, 63–64
institutional effects, 61
New Zealand, 69–70
rules of parliamentary debate, 62–63
United Kingdom, 64–65
Chile, 48
Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) (Germany)
allocation of speaking time, 63–64
capital relocation debate, 17
euro crisis debate, 31–34, 55
fiscal stimulus debate, 127, 137, 139–140, 144–145
ideological disagreement within, 120
closed-list proportional electoral systems, 11, 25, 37, 48–49
coalition governments
dissent in, 143–147
Germany, 31, 117, 120, 127–128, 143–147
impact on intra-party dynamics, 175
New Zealand, 69, 164
coalition governments (cont.)
parliamentary debate in, 6, 97–99
United Kingdom, 30
cohesion within parties, 25–27, 56, 86–99, see also dissent; party leaders
ideological congruence, 4, 91–93, 176–178
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), 5
competition among political parties, 174–175
Congress, US, see United States
congruence, ideological, 4, 176–178, see also cohesion within parties; dissent
consensus systems, see proportional systems
Conservative Party (Canada), 83
Conservative Party (UK), 104, 118, 126
country-level variables, 44–49
Cox, Gary, 5–6, 27
Cronbach, Lee, 90
cross-national comparison, 61
cultural effects, case studies and, 61–63
Darling, Alistair, 126
data, parliamentary speech as, 23–24, 178–179
debate agenda, access to, 27
defections, see dissent
deliberative democracy, 8
discipline, party, 7, 46, see also cohesion within parties; party leaders
discourse quality index, 8
dissent
backbenchers, 25–27, 125, 129–132, 135–137, 140–141
euro crisis debate, 31–34
European Parliament, 152–162
discipline, party, 7, 46, see also cohesion within parties; party leaders
discourse quality index, 8
dissent
backbenchers, 25–27, 125, 129–132, 135–137, 140–141
euro crisis debate, 31–34
European Parliament, 152–162
euro crisis debate, 31–34
fiscal stimulus debate, 129–147
Germany, 11–12, 31–34, 136–147
euro crisis debate, 31–34
incentives, 124
latent disagreement and observed dissent, 26–27
media and parliaments in United Kingdom, 129–132
New Zealand, 166–173
party leaders’ monitoring of, 86–89, 136
probit models for levels of, 135–136, 141, 142, 146
roll-call votes, 25–27
sanctions for, 87–88
United Kingdom, 11–12, 28–30, 129–136
websites, 179

Darling, Alistair, 126
data, parliamentary speech as, 23–24, 178–179
debate agenda, access to, 27
defections, see dissent
deliberative democracy, 8
discipline, party, 7, 46, see also cohesion within parties; party leaders
discourse quality index, 8
dissent
backbenchers, 25–27, 125, 129–132, 135–137, 140–141
euro crisis debate, 31–34
European Parliament, 152–162
euro crisis debate, 31–34
fiscal stimulus debate, 129–147
Germany, 11–12, 31–34, 136–147
euro crisis debate, 31–34
incentives, 124
latent disagreement and observed dissent, 26–27
media and parliaments in United Kingdom, 129–132
New Zealand, 166–173
party leaders’ monitoring of, 86–89, 136
probit models for levels of, 135–136, 141, 142, 146
roll-call votes, 25–27
sanctions for, 87–88
United Kingdom, 11–12, 28–30, 129–136
websites, 179

Ecuador, 48
electoral systems, see also mixed-member electoral systems;
proportional systems
alternative vote system, 44, 80
closed-list systems, 11, 25, 37, 48–51
first-past-the-post system, 28–30, 143, 163
majoritarian systems, 4, 44–46, 61–62, 163–166, 176–178
open-list system, 46–48
single nontransferable vote systems, 47
single transferable vote systems, 47
Index

euro crisis debate (Germany), 31–34, 55
Eurobarometer survey, 4
European Financial Stability Facility, 31, 32, 33
European Parliament
allocation of speaking time in, 149–151
candidate selection, 12–13, 148–162
case study, 66–69
dissent in, 152–162
division of parliamentary debate in, 68–69
elections in, 66–68
empirical strategy, 58
incentives in, 151, 152, 155, 162
latent concepts, measurement of, 71–72
participation in parliamentary debate, 152–162
political groups in, 148
research design, 10, 72
rules of parliamentary debate in, 149–151
theoretical implications in, 10, 52
FDP (Free Democratic Party)
(Germany), 31–34, 55, 63–64
Field, Frank, 130–132
filibusters, 6, 79
financial crisis of 2008, 147, see also fiscal stimulus debate
first-past-the-post electoral system, 28–30, 143, 163
fiscal crisis of 2008, 125–129
fiscal stimulus debate (Germany and United Kingdom)
CDU/CSU, 127, 137, 139–140, 144–145
coalition governments, 143–147
dissent in, 129–136, 140–143, 145–147
Labour Party, 125, 129–132, 133–134
legislative behavior, 134, 140, 145
media’s role in United Kingdom, 129–132
overview, 125–129
SPD, 127, 137–139, 141, 144–145
floor time, allocation of, 62–70, 78–79, 81, 84–85, 149–151
France, 44, 46
Free Democratic Party (FDP)
(Germany), 31–34, 55, 63–64
game-theoretic model of floor speeches, 10, 35–41, 175–176
Germany, see also Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU);
fiscal stimulus debate; Social Democratic Party
backbencher debate participation, 100–101, 104, 114, 137, 141
Berlin Stunde, 63
budget speeches, probit model of, 122–123
Candidate Survey, 116
capital relocation debate, 17
case study, 63–64
coalition governments, 31, 117, 120, 127–128, 143–147
delegetion model of parliamentary debate, 31–34, 41, 50
dissent in, 11–12, 31–34, 136–147
division of parliamentary debate in, 63–64
empirical strategy, 56–58
euro crisis debate, 31–34, 55
FDP, 31–34, 55, 63–64
Green Party, 31, 33, 63–64
ideological disagreement, intra-party, 115–123
latent concepts, measurement of, 71–72
Left Party, 33, 63
MMP system in, 63, 93, 107–109, 113–114, 123, 141–143
models of parliamentary speech in, 111–114
New Zealand compared to, 69
parliamentary activities and debate investment, 21
parliamentary speeches overview, 101–103
party leaders’ debate participation, 107, 109, 111–114, 118–120
research design, 11, 72
SMD elections in, 101
speaking time allocation in, 63–64
Greece, 62
Green Party (Germany), 31, 33, 63–64
Green Party (NZ), 165
Gregor Gysi, 33
Guillory, Christine, 4
Habermas, Jürgen, 18
Harris, Douglas, 45
Heathrow expansion debate (UK), 28–30, 54–55
Hix, Simon, 154–155
Hoey, Kate, 29–30
Hoon, Geoffrey, 29
House of Commons, see United Kingdom
House of Representatives (NZ), see New Zealand
House of Representatives (US), see United States
Hungary, 51
hybrid electoral systems, see mixed-member electoral systems
ideological congruence, 91–93, see also cohesion within parties; dissent, 176–178
ideological disagreement within parties, 115–123
incentives
allocation of speaking time, 81
debate delegation, 34–35, 36–39
dissent, 124
European Parliament, 151, 152, 155, 162
majoritarian systems, 44–46
MMM systems, 51
MMP systems, 50, 177
participation in parliamentary debate, effect on, 27, 100–101, 123
personal vote seeking, for, 79–83
proportional systems, 46–49
rules of parliamentary debate, 79–83, 91–97, 99
Ireland, 47, 62
Italy, 51
Japan, empirical implications of delegation model in, 47, 51
Kam, Christopher, 25
Kauder, Volker, 33
Labour Party (NZ), 163, 165, 167
Labour Party (UK)
fiscal stimulus debate, 125, 129–132
Heathrow expansion debate, 28–30
ideological disagreement within, 117–118
participation in parliamentary debate, 104
Lammert, Norbert, 32–34, 55
latent concepts, measurement of, 70–72
leaders, party, see party leaders
Left Party (Germany), 33, 63
Lijphart, Arend, 4
Lithuania, 51
majoritarian electoral systems
backbenchers in, 44–46
case studies, 61–62
delegation theory, 44–46
ideological congruence, 176–178
incentives, 44–46
MMM system, 49–51, 176
New Zealand’s shift from, 163–166
party leaders, 44–46
satisfaction with democracy, 4–5
Maltzman, Forrest, 44–45
Maori Party (NZ), 165
Martin, Lanny, 6, 98
McDonnell, John, 28–30, 54–55
McFall, John, 132–133
Meacher, Michael, 129–130
media
amplification of dissent role, 129–132
fiscal stimulus debate, 137
monitoring of speech by party leaders in, 88–89
reporting on dissent in Germany, 22, 138–140
websites, dissent on, 179
members/MPs, see backbenchers; party leaders; specific country
MEPs, see European Parliament
Merkel, Angela, 31, 128
Meyer, Laurenz, 139–140
Mißfelder Philipp, 144
Index

Mill, John Stuart, 8
mixed-member electoral systems, see also European Parliament;
mixed-member proportional electoral systems; mixed-member majoritarian systems
democratic satisfaction level, 5
electoral tiers in, 49–51
impact on parliamentary speech, 43
incentives for vote seeking, 81
MMM system, 176
preferences for, 176–177
mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems, 49–51, 176
mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems
backbenchers in, 50–51
electoral tiers in, 49–51
Germany, 63, 93, 113–114, 123, 141–143
ideological congruence, 176
incentives, 50–51, 177
New Zealand, 13, 69, 93, 163
participation in parliamentary debate, 54, 107–109
personal vote seeking, 93
MMM systems, see mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems
MMP systems, see mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems
monitoring of speech by party leaders
analysis of, 91–99
control variables, 93–94
dissent and, 86–89, 136
extraparliamentary activities, 88–89
hypotheses regarding, 91
intraparty cohesion, 91–93, 96–97
linear regression models, 94–97
media’s role, 88–89
party leadership monitoring scale, 85, 89–91
personal vote seeking, 93, 96–97
National Party (NZ), 163, 165, 167
national rebel defection score, 158, 160–161
national rebel voting decision, 155–157
Netherlands, 93
New Zealand
ACT Party, 165
Alliance Party, 163
backbencher debate participation, 169–173
budget debate, 166–173
Business Committee, 70, 165
Candidate Survey, 166
case study, 69–70
dissent in, 166–173
empirical implications of delegation model in, 50
temporal strategy, 58
Germany compared to, 69
Green Party, 165
Hansard, 167
importance of representational activities in, 166
Labour Party, 163, 165, 167
latent concepts, measurement of, 71–72
Maori Party, 165
MMP system in, 69, 93, 163
National Party, 163, 165, 167
New Zealand First Party, 163
overview, 13, 163
party leader debate participation, 172–173
Progressive Party, 165
research design, 11, 72–73
roll-call votes, 167–168
rules of parliamentary debate, 164–166
SMD elections, 69, 168
Standing Order 102, 164
United Kingdom compared with, 13, 69–70
United Future Party, 165
New Zealand First Party (NZ), 163
normative political theory, 18
Norris, Pippa, 4–5
Norway, 93
Noury, Abdul, 154
open-list proportional electoral system, 46–48
opposition, debate role of parties in coalition governments, 97
critical policy influence role, 6
opposition, debate role (cont.)
delegation theory testing, 102, 103–104, 107, 111, 112, 118
importance of speech-making for, 62, 63
incentives for unity vs. dissent, 46
party leaders’ monitoring, 94–96
satisfaction with democracy, 4
parliamentary debate, 20–24, see also
delation model of parliamentary debate; rules of parliamentary debate
participation in parliamentary debate, see also dissent
European Parliament, 152–162
ideological disagreement, 115–123
incentives, effects of, 52–55, 100–101, 123
member-level analysis, 109–114
MMP systems, 54, 107–109
overview, 11–13, 100, 123
party leaders, 100–114, 172–173
party-level analysis, 103–109
party leaders, see also monitoring of speech by party leaders
closed-list systems, 48–49
dissent, effect of status on, 136
exogenous nature of, 78n
majoritarian systems, 44–46
MMP systems, 51
MMP systems, 50–51
participation in parliamentary debate, 100–114, 172–173
proportional systems, 177–178
rules of parliamentary debate, 79–81
utility function of, 37–39
party whips, 26, 35, 67, 164, 165
personal vote seeking
incentives for, 79–83
low-level, 48–49
MMP systems, 93
moderate-level, 46–48
monitoring of speech by party leaders, 93, 96–97
strong-level, 44–46
Peru, 48
plenary time, 5–6, 27
Poß, Joachim, 144
policy, parliamentary debate’s role in, 6–7, 20–21
position-taking, 7–9, 17–18, 20–21, 176
positivism, parliamentary debate and, 18–19
presidential systems, 44–45, 47–48
proportional electoral systems
case studies, 61–62
delation model, 46–49
European Parliament, 148–149
ideological congruence, 176–178
incentives in, 25
party leaders in, 177–178
political parties in, 25
satisfaction with democracy, 4–5
proportional systems, see mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems; New Zealand
Quinn, Kevin, 45
rapporteurs, 160
Raunio, Tapio, 155
rebellions, see dissent
research design
case studies, 61–70
cross-national comparison, 58–61
empirical strategy, 56–58
latent concepts, measurement of, 70–72
overview, 10–11, 56, 72–73
party survey, 59–61
rules of parliamentary debate, see also monitoring of speech by party leaders
access to floor, 78–79
allocation of speaking time, 78–79
candidate selection, 149–151
case studies, 62–63
coalition governments, 97–99
coming to floor, 78–79
demand for speaking time, 84–85
Index

European Parliament, 149–151
filibusters, 79
incentives, 79–83, 91–97, 99
New Zealand, 164–166
overview, 11, 77, 99
party leaders, 79–81
political party rules, 83–99
speaker lists, 78–79, 85–88
Russia, 51
sanctions for dissent, 87–88
satisfaction with democracy, 2–5
Schäffer, Frank, 32–33, 55
Schäuble, Wolfgang, 17
Schneider, Carsten, 138
Senate, see United States
Sigelman, Lee, 44–45
single-member district (SMD) elections
Germany, 101, 107–109
implications of delegation model in,
44, 47, 49–51, 54
New Zealand, 168
SMD elections, see single-member
district (SMD) elections
Smith, Steven, 20
Social Democratic Party (SPD)
(Germany)
allocation of speaking time, 63–64
euro crisis debate, 31
fiscal stimulus debate, 127, 137–139,
141, 144–145
ideological disagreement within, 120
sovereign debt crisis, EU, 31–34, 55
Spörndli, Markus, 8
speaker lists vs. Speaker recognition,
32, 34, 62, 65, 78–79, 85–88
speaking time, allocation and access,
62–70, 78–79, 81, 84–85,
149–151
speech delegation model, see delegation
model of parliamentary debate
speech, parliamentary, see
parliamentary debate
Steenbergen, Marco, 8
Steiner, Jörg, 8
Stewart, John, 30
supermajority requirements, 5–6
Sweden, 93
Thomassen, Jacques, 5
unitary actors, political parties as,
174–175
United Future Party (NZ), 165
United Kingdom, see also Labour Party
(UK)
backbencher debate participation,
129–132, 135–136
British Representation Study, 21, 116
budget speeches, probit model of,
122–123
case study, 64–65
Conservative Party, 104, 118, 126
delegation model of parliamentary
debate, 41, 44, 46
dissent in, 11–12, 28–30, 129–136
division of parliamentary debate in,
64–65
empirical strategy, 56–58
fiscal stimulus debate, 129–136
Heathrow expansion debate, 28–30,
54–55
ideological disagreement, intra-
party, 115–123
latent concepts, measurement of,
71–72
models of parliamentary speech in,
109–111
New Zealand compared to, 13,
69–70
parliamentary activities and debate
investment, 21
parliamentary speeches overview,
101–103
party leaders’ debate participation,
104–107, 109–111, 117–118
research design, 11, 72
Standing Order 23, 65
United States
delegation model empirical
implications, 44–45, 48
Democratic Party, 45
filibusters in, 6, 79
financial crisis of 2008, 125
utility functions of backbenchers and
party leaders, 36–39
Vanberg, Georg, 6, 98
votes, see electoral systems; personal
vote seeking; roll-call votes
voting agenda, access to, 27
Westminster system
Canada, 83–84
floor time access, 62–63, 78–79
New Zealand, 13, 58, 164
parliamentary activity break-down, 21

presidential systems comparison to,
UK, 56, 62–63, 64–65
whips, party, 26, 35, 67, 164, 165
Willsch, Klaus-Peter, 32–33, 55
World Values Survey, 4