Introduction: Cicero and the Translation of Philosophy from Greece to Rome

The Romans did not understand their own religion. They were the heirs to immemorial practices in honor of their gods. But when they paid the gods cult, they did not know the meaning of what they did, nor the nature of the gods they worshipped. The result was that they moved like strangers through their own city, looking for a way to feel at home.

Or that is how Cicero paints it (p. 73 below). The problem was one for intellectuals, perhaps a small class, who wanted not only to practice their religion, but also to understand it in a rigorous way. One remedy was the antiquarianism of Varro, who aimed by historical study to recover the intentions of the religion's founders. But Cicero's suggestion was to apply a new resource to the problem: Greek philosophy.

In the event, Cicero carried through this project in two dialogues, *On the nature of the gods* and *On divination* (*De natura deorum*, thus *DND*, and *De divinatione*, thus *Div.*).[1] In this book, I aim to interpret the whole and some parts of *these texts themselves*, not the Hellenistic philosophy for which they are excellent sources, nor what Cicero's own sources might have been. Now I do not argue that in these dialogues Cicero wrote, or aimed to write, as an "original philosopher." But I *do* think that he shaped the drama, the characters, their speeches, and his own authorial comments, as parts of literary and philosophical wholes. I think that he thus suggested a unique and interesting answer to the dialogues' questions.[2]

[1] A third dialogue, *On fate* was planned to complete this sequence. Cicero indeed wrote an *On fate*, but not as he had planned it. I argue below (p. 47–49) that we may read *DND* and *Div.*, without *On fate*, as a completed project.

[2] Was Cicero an "original" philosopher? If the question is whether he brought forth ideas or arguments that he did not get from anybody else, then it seems probable that he did so in his writings on political philosophy, especially in the *Republic*, *Laws*, and *On friendship*. But it is rare to find evidence that he does so in what I call the Late Sequence dialogues. Nor was it his objective to do so. But why must the philosopher who always produces original ideas be valued higher than somebody who presented or used the ideas and arguments of others in an original way? Both promote wisdom, which is why universities employ historians of philosophy today.

My goals are first, to interpret that answer, and second, to show by example that Cicero's philosophical dialogues may fruitfully be read in this way.

A century ago, when philological science held Cicero's philosophical writing in low esteem, it would have looked silly to write this book. The best scholars, and what seemed the best evidence, suggested that Cicero's philosophical dialogues would not reward a reader who looked for unity of literary form and a fertile intellectual project. It was even said that Cicero was unable or unwilling fully to understand the philosophy he wrote about. My book is one attempt to make good on a slow rise in scholarly opinion of Cicero since then. In this introduction I shall collect some reasons to allow the assumption that Cicero's dialogues might sustain my sort of treatment.

Cicero's philosophical dialogues fall into two kinds. One kind includes dialogues in which Cicero's skepticism, and the Hellenistic philosophers whom he treats, are rarely drawn to the reader's attention (*Republic*, *Laws*, *On old age*, *On friendship*). The second kind includes dialogues in which Cicero points to his skeptical agenda and to his Hellenistic material. These are the sequence of dialogues marked out by Cicero at *Div.* 2.4: *Hortensius*, *Academica*, *On ends*, *Tusculans*, *DND*, *Div.*, and *On fate*. I shall call the latter set of dialogues the "Late Sequence" because these works were written in sequence towards the end of Cicero's life. I shall draw on evidence from and about the other dialogues when I explore Cicero's approach to the dialogue form in general. But the arguments of this introduction are intended to apply principally to the Late Sequence.

I note one further convention here. Cicero puts "himself" into his dialogues as a character, but I think we should not simply assume that these characters reflect accurately the historical Marcus Tullius Cicero. Rather than labor these distinctions, I shall from now on call Cicero the historical person, or his authorial voice, "Cicero," but his avatar in each respective dialogue "Marcus." His brother's avatar, who appears in *Div.*, is "Quintus."

0.1 An Older View of the Late Sequence

> [*Cicero*] *sive diffitetur sive confitetur, omni tempore secutus Ennianum illud*
> philosophari est mihi necesse, at paucis, nam omnino haut placet
> *et degustandum non ingurgitandum sibi ratus, cum senex civibus philosophia explicanda utilis esse statuisset, tanta facilitate et celeritate libros scripsit ediditque, ut Graecorum exemplis vix legendis vacaret. miranti vel Attico respondit*

> apographa sunt, minore labore fiunt: verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo. *bene profecto actum nobiscum esset, si optimorum librorum vel Panaetii ac Posidonii apographa nobis reliquisset. at nego Ciceronem eum fuisse qui philosophum Graecum veritatem spinosa arte exputantem et in viscera penetrantem sequi aut vellet aut posset. foro natum erat hoc ingenium, non scholae.*
>
> [Cicero], whether he admits or denies it, followed Ennius' line every time,
>
> *I must philosophise, but only a little, for to philosophise entirely displeases*,
>
> and reckoned that he should taste, but not gorge himself.[3] When, as an old man, he had decided to make himself useful to his fellow citizens by explaining philosophy, he wrote and published books so quickly and glibly that there was scarcely time left to read his Greek models. He replied to Atticus, who was perhaps wondering about this, "they are copies, they come out with relatively little work. I add only the words, with which I overflow."[4] Certainly he would have done well by us, had he left us 'copies' of the best books of, say, Panaetius and Posidonius. But I deny that Cicero was a man who was either able, or wished, to follow a Greek philosopher thinking out the truth with his thorny art, and penetrating to the guts of it. Cicero's genius was born for the forum, not for the lecture hall.

If these words were only a little less kind, you might guess they came from Theodor Mommsen, Cicero's chief deprecator (see p. 4 below). In fact Hermann Usener wrote them, in the preface to his *Epicurea* (p. lxv).

The attitude to Cicero that Usener reports is important to the story of Cicero's philosophical writings, because it represents well the attitude that prevailed during a crucial period in the history of classical scholarship, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. *Epicurea* was, and still is, a landmark collection of texts for the study of Epicurus.[5] Usener influenced Hermann Diels, author and editor of *Doxographi graeci* and *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, and Hans von Arnim, editor of *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* (*SVF*).[6] *Doxographi graeci* was a foundational contribution on our sources for philosophy of the centuries before and after Plato and Aristotle.[7] *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* is still the standard collection of texts for the Presocratics, *SVF* for the older Stoics. In his preface to *SVF*, von Arnim signs on to the picture of Cicero "whose authority in

[3] Usener here flatly denies Cicero's own claim at *Tusculans* 2.1. Usener supplements Cicero's version of Ennius' line from Gellius *NA* 5.15.9.
[4] Usener quotes *Letters to Atticus* 12.52.3 = 294 SB. See below pp. 20–23.
[5] For example, while David Konstan's *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* bibliography (Konstan 2016) lists Arighetti's as the "best edition," Usener is the "most complete collection of fragments."
[6] For Usener's influence on Diels, and on the project of *Doxographi Graeci* in particular, see Mansfeld and Runia (1997) vol.1 pp. 6–21. For his influence on von Arnim, see *SVF* p. iii.
[7] On Diels and *Doxographi Graeci* see Mansfeld and Runia (1996–2010) vol.1 Chapter 2.

philosophical matters Usener has weighed in *Epicurea*."[8] Diels, meanwhile, seems to compliment Cicero when he quotes him for the epigraph to *Doxographi Graeci*: "it is one of slow wit who follows little streams and does not see their sources."[9] But the compliment delivers an insult, since for Diels Cicero is a little stream whom, at best, we can follow to his sources.[10] "Excessive ignorance of ancient philosophy" hindered Cicero and he followed the Greek "tentative and anxious like a blind man."[11] When we confront a philosophical speech in Cicero with what Diels thought was its Greek source, we expose "either Cicero's mendacity or his stupidity."[12] For those of us who rate Cicero's philosophical writing higher than this, it is confounding to see first-rate scholars attack him in such terms. It helps to recall how different from our own was the intellectual climate of nineteenth-century Germany in which they trained.

Mommsen had a theory that civilizations rise and fall and that the ancient Mediterranean had a long story with just such an arc, of which in the *History of Rome* he wrote the *last* chapter. The final pages are a sort of cabinet of freaks in which Mommsen collects proofs that by the end of the Roman Republic, ancient civilization was decadent. Here we encounter Cicero's Late Sequence, written "with equal peevishness and precipitation." Mommsen thought the dialogues were in "rude imitation of the popular writings of Aristotle," "stitched together" by Cicero from whichever writings of Hellenistic philosophers "came or were given into his hand, into a so-called dialogue." Cicero exhibited

> . . . that sort of bungling, which a man of letters, who has not attained to philosophic thinking or even to philosophic knowledge and who works rapidly and boldly, shows in the reproduction of dialectic trains of thought. In this way no doubt a multitude of thick tomes might very quickly come into existence—"They are copies," wrote the author himself to a friend who wondered at his fertility; "they give me little trouble, for I supply only the words and these I have in abundance." Against this nothing further could be said; but any one who seeks classical productions in works so written can only be advised to study in literary matters a becoming silence.[13]

[8] *cuius in philosophicis auctoritatem in* Epicureis *examinavit Usener*, p. xix.
[9] *tardi ingeni est rivulos consectari, fontes rerum non videre*, from Cicero, *On the orator*, 2.117.
[10] Diels probably meant to call to mind *Academica* 1.8, where Varro's character tells Marcus that he did not write philosophy in Latin because he instead tells friends who are interested to go directly to the Greeks, and "to drink from the sources rather than follow little streams," *ut. . . a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur*.
[11] *nimia vetustae philosophiae ignorantia*; *vacillans et anxius ut caecus*. Diels (1879) 120, describing Marcus' summary of Greek opinions at *Academica* 2.118.
[12] *vel fraudem vel socordiam*, Diels (1879) 125.
[13] Dickson's translation, sanctioned by Mommsen, vol. 4 pt. 2 (1866) p. 613.

Although *Epicurea* and *SVF* appeared half a century after Mommsen's *History*, the sort of views about history that Mommsen represented are visible in Usener and von Arnim's attitudes, as they were from Diels when he published *Doxographi graeci* in 1879. Now, these were brilliant, and most responsible, scholars. As we shall see, there was what seemed to be good *evidence* for their view of the Late Sequence. Thus, although I shall reject their view as others have now done, we should remember one good reason for these scholars' extravagance against Cicero was that it was in keeping with some big ideas, and the exemplary scholarship, of their times.[14]

0.2 A More Positive View of Cicero's Dialogues

Since the last quarter of the twentieth century there has been a revival in the understanding of Hellenistic philosophy. This revival owes a large debt to the philologists I have mentioned, and to others like them, who flourished a century earlier. For it has shared one part of their approach, the thought that, to quote Long and Sedley (LS p. 9), "Hellenistic philosophy is a jigsaw." So it is, if we define Hellenistic philosophy more strictly as the philosophy of the Greek schools after the death of Aristotle and before Cicero began to write. For, with the exception of some texts from Epicurus, no complete piece of Greek philosophical writing from that time survives. Yet the thought that was contained in the lost texts is recoverable. If we cut up Cicero, and many other sources, into jigsaw pieces, we can rearrange them by school, thinker, and topic, so as to make pictures of the Hellenistic period. "So far as I could," wrote von Arnim, "I projected in [*SVF*] a full and accurate image of Chrysippus' philosophy."[15] When we open volumes II and III of *SVF*, we see that this "image" is made of small jigsaw pieces cut from many texts. Painstaking collection by scholars like von Arnim ultimately bore fruit in today's Hellenistic revival, because it turned out to be true that the "images" they made could yield coherent and fertile reconstructions of Hellenistic thought. We should keep cutting up Cicero for such purposes. I hope that work like mine can make the pieces more useful still.

[14] It is not my intention here to trace in detail the history of influence among these scholars. For introductions to this history see the relevant articles in Briggs and Calder (1990).

[15] *Chrysippeae philosophiae accuratam atque plenam imaginem, quatenus potui, hoc opere adumbravi*, *SVF* p. iii.

But we have seen that the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars matched their care for the philosophy to which Cicero is a witness with a *negative* view of Cicero's own philosophical acumen. By and large, historians of philosophy do not share that negative view today. When scholars have built reconstructions of Hellenistic philosophy in large part on Cicero's reports, those reconstructions have seemed to be well founded.[16] It would be implausible now to think that Cicero was stupid or mendacious in writing about philosophy. That has suggested to many that Cicero's texts might be worth a look not only as sources, but also as objects of study in themselves. We may see Hellenistic philosophy, defined more loosely as the whole life of the Hellenistic schools in antiquity, not in fragments, but available to us in rich and continuous texts. Sure enough, for decades there have been rallying-cries to the study of Cicero's dialogues on their own merits.[17] A number of scholars have taken up the challenge, explicitly or implicitly.[18] The jigsaw approach to Cicero has remained dominant, but in interpreting *DND* and *Div.* as I do I am not doing anything unheralded or unprecedented – despite Mommsen's warning.[19]

One positive view of the Late Sequence I shall call the *encyclopedia* view. The encyclopedia view takes its cue from Cicero's success as a philosophical source. It supposes Cicero's dominant goal in the Late Sequence to be the opening up of philosophy to a new Roman audience by the composition of a philosophical "encyclopedia." On this reading, the topics covered in the dialogues form a curriculum that covers a representative selection of Hellenistic philosophical topics. A given speech represents Cicero's version of *the* Stoic view on the dialogue's topic, or *the* Epicurean view, or *the* skeptic's reply, while a given speaker is cast to represent some particular, or an ideal, member of a school.[20]

[16] Some examples of studies where Cicero has been vital in reconstructing even relatively technical aspects of Hellenistic thought: Bobzien (1998) who draws extensively on *On fate* and *Div.*, Brittain (2001) who draws on *Academica*, Graver (2007) who draws on *Tusculans*, and many of the essays in Sedley (2012).

[17] Some rallying-cries: Boyancé (1936) and preface to Boyancé (1970), Douglas (1962) and (1965), Striker (1995), Powell's introduction to his (1995a), Smith (1995), Schofield (2008). In one way or another these works also make a start on reading the dialogues as they recommend we should.

[18] Schultz's (2014) commentary on *Div.* 1 similarly takes *Div.* seriously as a unified whole (see pp. 12–13). Coverage of all the philosophical dialogues is in Süss (1965), although he regards the quality of the dialogues as uneven, and Woolf (2015). Woolf reads many of the dialogues carefully as Cicero's own projects. Atkins (2013) is not on Late Sequence dialogues, but reads the *Republic* and *Laws* in a similar spirit, as does Zarecki (2014).

[19] In addition to readings more focused on the philosophical purposes of the dialogues, there is recent work exploring Cicero's artful use of the dialogues as part of his rhetorical and philosophical life. See Steel (2005) Chapter 3, Gildenhard (2007), Baraz (2012).

[20] A sophisticated defense of the Late Sequence using the encyclopedia view appears in Striker (1995).

There are good reasons to think that to make his dialogues useful as an encyclopedia was *one* goal to which Cicero gave thought. For one sort of audience whom the dialogues seem to envisage is unlearned Romans who could not get their philosophy from the Greeks. These Romans, before Cicero, could read only works of Epicurean authors in Latin whom Cicero thought incompetent. (See pp. 15–16 below.)[21] Of Cicero's Late Sequence writings, the work most obviously intended to address this need was the *Hortensius*, for it was meant to turn new readers to philosophy.

To further strengthen the conclusion that *one* purpose of the Late Sequence was as an encylopedia, we find that the Sequence appears to have a curricular order and completeness. Cicero lists the Sequence at *Div.* 2.1–3. When we read this list, we see that it begins with the call to philosophy in *Hortensius*, before turning to Cicero's favored school (*Academica*) and the ethical foundation that philosophy offers (*On ends*).[22] Next, the *Tusculans* offer doses of philosophical medicine to soothe common sources of distress – the fear of death, for example – in a way that should appeal to the beginner at philosophy at least as much as to the savant. Further, the Sequence overall is probably meant to cover some of each of the three conventional parts of Hellenistic thought: logic (*Academica*), ethics (*Tusculans*, *On ends*), and physics (*DND*, *Div.*, *On fate*).[23] Indeed, it was Cicero's declared hope in *Div.* 2.4 that he would have time to treat every topic of philosophy in Latin. In sum, the Late

[21] For evidence of attention to unlearned readers, see: Marcus' reply to Varro at *Academica* 1.10; *Tusculans* 1.1–6 which paints the Romans as generally unversed in philosophy; *Div.* 2.1, which envisages *transmission* of philosophy to Cicero's fellow citizens. *Tusculans* 1.6 speaks of "opening up" the sources of philosophy and *Div.* 2.2 describes *Tusculans* as "opening up" matters necessary for living well. *Tusculans* 2.6–9 imagines readers with a liberal education, whose refined literary taste means that they might read Plato and other Socratics, but who would never read ugly texts by Epicurus or the Latin Epicurean authors.

[22] Arguably, the end of the *Lucullus* (*Academica* 2.147) signals a plan whereby the characters of the sequence *Hortensius*, *Catulus*, and *Lucullus* were to keep going with a series of discussions of the ethical and physical topics raised in the latter part of *Lucullus*. So perhaps there was a plan that the *Academica* was to cover logic. See Griffin (1997) 4–8 with her references, and note her counter-arguments.

[23] But it is also possible that this impression is illusory. Although the epistemological content of *Academica* makes it look like a "logical" work to us, Cicero never describes it thus. He describes it as his advocacy of the New Academy, which might mean that he thinks it gave an Academic treatment of philosophy in general (see Griffin 1997). Neither *On ends* nor the *Tusculans* is anything close to a comprehensive treatment of ethics. The Sequence gives little coverage to politics, a philosophical topic in which Cicero certainly took an interest – did Cicero think the *Republic* and *Laws* could fill that gap, even though they are not in the Late Sequence style? *DND*, *Div.*, and *On fate* cover only a limited part of physics, and not all their material is obviously physical rather than logical, or ethical. The sketched preface in *Timaeus* suggests Cicero toyed with some more general treatment of physics from a skeptical point of view.

Sequence seems designed with one eye to new philosophical readers who wanted to use it as something like a comprehensive curriculum. Thus the encyclopedia view contains truth to the extent that making a philosophical encyclopedia was *one* of Cicero's goals for the Late Sequence.[24]

But Cicero had other goals, which were often more important to him than the encyclopedia view alone would suggest. There is another part of the audience that the dialogues envisage: the learned.[25] These are Romans who already have some, or much, philosophy from the Greeks. To see who these Romans might be, it helps to remember how Cicero's texts were disseminated. We know from his letters that Cicero sent off manuscripts for the copyists whom Atticus retained. Thus there was a system of production and distribution not entirely within Cicero's control. But this was little like modern publication and distribution of books. The immediate audience for the dialogues would be people who were part of Cicero and Atticus' intellectual and social circle. Such people very often had some degree of Greek education and philosophical learning.[26] Among these were readers like Atticus himself, Varro, or Brutus, whose knowledge of

[24] Cicero *envisages* these readers who use his dialogues to get acquainted with philosophy, perhaps for the first time. But were there any such readers? We know that pirate copies were made of some of the Late Sequence, notably *On ends*, from drafts in Atticus' possession. (*Letters to Atticus* 13.21a = 327SB, 13.22 = 329SB) The respective owners of the copies are named as Cornelius Balbus and Caerellia. The former appears elsewhere in the letters as a politician and not an intellectual, so perhaps he was someone who wanted to learn about philosophy for the first time from *On ends*. Then again, perhaps he made the copies out of politeness to Atticus, or perhaps he was more learned in philosophy than he appears. Cicero says of Caerellia, an acquaintance to whom he had owed money (*Letters to Atticus* 12.51=293SB, *Letters to Atticus* 13.72=300SB), that she was *mirifice… videlicet studio philosophiae flagrans*, "no doubt aflame with a wonderous zeal for philosophy." (*Letters to Atticus* 13.21a=327SB) This strikes the eye as sarcastic, and Cicero certainly resents that Caerellia has read his private draft. But it is also possible that Cicero thought either that Caerellia was a learned and enthusiastic reader, or that she was unlearned in philosophy but earnestly hoped to learn.

[25] The obvious evidence of this readership comes from the small circle of knowledgeable contemporaries who serve as dedicatees and speakers in the dialogues, for example Brutus, Varro, Atticus, Quintus, Torquatus, or the recently deceased Cato. The sort of "study abroad" in Athens depicted at the start of *On ends* Book 5 was real. Many professional philosophers were living in Italy under Roman patrons, so that a philosophical education was available to interested aristocrats. Rawson (1985) surveys much of the evidence for these intellectual circles. Cicero implies that he was attacked for taking this interest beyond a gentlemanly minimum (*On ends* 1.1), but he was not the only one. In his depiction of them Cicero may well exaggerate the degree to which some of these men had all the arguments at their fingertips, but it is plain from Cicero's letters and from their own literary endeavors that they and others at Rome were capable philosophical hobbyists. For the intellectual culture visible in Cicero's letters, see McConnell (2014).

[26] On the distribution of books, see Kenney (1982) and Starr (1987). Murphy (1998) collects evidence for the early readership of Cicero's dialogues.

philosophy was probably comparable to Cicero's own.[27] In other words, Cicero writes in the dialogues in part for people who *already know about the material he is presenting*, or who at least could look it up, or ask a philosopher, *in Greek*. For these readers, a Latin encyclopedia of philosophy would be of little use.

This philosophically learned readership is important to bear in mind when we try to understand the Late Sequence. For it explains a common phenomenon faced by philosophical interpreters. Often Cicero, or a character, will merely mention or allude to some argument or philosophical position, or give a very spare account of it, so that modern interpreters need to turn to other Hellenistic sources to understand what Cicero, or the character, is talking about. I often follow that procedure in this book. The trick makes dramatic sense: inside the fictional world of the drama, both the character and his interlocutors are supposed to know their philosophy. But as to why *Cicero* does this for his *readers*, if you took only the encyclopedia view of the dialogues, you would face a puzzle. Why would Cicero refer to ideas in a way that will confuse his readers who would be, *ex hypothesi*, ignorant of those ideas? But once we have in mind the learned readers, we may suppose that Cicero sometimes merely mentions arguments or views because there is a part of his readership, on whom he is often focused, who will get the reference, or who can easily follow it up.

But then we might wonder, if Cicero wrote in part for readers to whom it is not his purpose to teach the material, what were they supposed to get out of the Late Sequence? And, if there is more to the Sequence than a philosophical encyclopedia, are even unlearned readers given more than just an introduction to the material? Let us look at some of Cicero's answers to these questions.

In his preface to *On ends*, Cicero distinguishes four types of his critics (1.1): (a) people who dislike philosophy entirely, (b) people who think it should not be done too much, (c) people who are educated in Greek and who would prefer to read philosophy in that language, and (d) people who think *he* should write about something else. It is to people of type (c) that he gives by far his most detailed reply. (*On ends* 1.4–10) But these are not people who are hostile to, nor necessarily ignorant of, the philosophical *content* of the Late Sequence. Against them Cicero argues:

[27] For the wealth of philosophical culture in Cicero's letters, see McConnell (2014). For more specific evidence that some recipients of Cicero's letters could be expected to get philosophical jokes, see Griffin (1995). For his Epicurean friend Matius, see Griffin (1997).

> *nam si dicent* [sc. his opponents] *ab illis* [sc. the Greeks] *has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios, in primisque familarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos?*
>
> For if they will say that the Greeks have already covered these topics, then there is no reason to read even so many of the Greek authors themselves as one is supposed to read. For what, in the case of the Stoics, did Chrysippus leave out? Yet we read Diogenes, Antipater, Mnesarchus, Panaetius, and many others, not least our friend Posidonius. Does Theophrastus give us only moderate pleasure, when he deals with topics already covered by Aristotle? (*On ends* 1.6, translation from Annas and Woolf (2001))

This group of critics, then, have quite a reading list, and Cicero implies ("we read")[28] that some of them have read it. They do not need to be filled in on the material in the Late Sequence. Instead, Cicero needs to convince them of what he argues in *On ends* 1.6: that his own project is worth writing (see also p. 23 below).

Turning to the philosophically unlearned readers, we find that even the most hostile among them, the critics of type (a), are not *wholly* unlearned (*non admodum indoctis*, *On ends* 1.1). In the *Tusculans* Cicero applies another word to his target audience: "educated" (*eruditi*).

> *sed eos, si possumus, excitemus, qui liberaliter eruditi adhibita etiam disserendi elegantia ratione et via philosophentur.*[29]
>
> But let us rouse up, if we can, those with a liberal education, both to philosophise methodically, and also to employ a polished style of discourse. (*Tusculans* 2.6, translation from Douglas (1990), modified)

Since Cicero thinks that Roman educated culture in his day extended to oratory and poetry but not to philosophy, it is clear that he means to

[28] Perhaps this is the "royal" we. But the argument seems to depend on his opponents' granting at least that one *should* read all the Greeks on the list, so it is more likely that Cicero graciously suggests that his opponents *do* read them.

[29] I read *philosophentur*, an emendation by Sauppe with some weak manuscript support, adopted, for example, by Kühner (1874) and Dougan (1905), rather than *philosophantur*, which has the support of by far the stronger part of the manuscript tradition. The context shows that Cicero's purpose is to stimulate those who have an education in eloquence to use it in a *new* way, to write well about philosophy, rather than to excite to greater efforts some people who already write well on the subject.