

## Industrial Organization

Thoroughly revised according to classroom feedback, *Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies* offers an up-to-date and rigorous presentation of modern industrial organization that blends theory with real-world applications and derives implications for firm strategy and competition policy. This comprehensive textbook acquaints readers with the most important models for understanding strategies chosen by firms with market power and shows how such firms adapt to different market environments. The second edition includes new and revised formal models and case studies. Formal models are presented in detail, and analyses are summarized in ‘lessons’, which highlight the main insights. Theories are complemented by numerous real-world cases that engage students and lead them to connect theories to real situations. Chapters include review questions, exercises and suggestions for further reading to enhance the learning experience, and an accompanying website offers additional student exercises, as well as teaching slides.

Online resources at [www.cambridge.org/belleflamme2](http://www.cambridge.org/belleflamme2)

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‘The second edition of Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz’s *Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies* is encyclopedic in its coverage of modern industrial organization, including both seminal and new models. The authors present models with exactly the right level of formal detail to equip students and practitioners with what they need to understand a plethora of issues ranging from two-sided markets to price discrimination. I commend the authors for doing the impossible – improving their initial gem.’

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Kelley School of Business, Indiana University**

‘Industrial economists have been blessed with some significant texts over the centuries. However, until Belleflamme and Peitz, no one had attempted to cover it all. *Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies* does that. It is all here. From monopoly to competition, from simple pricing to pricing with menus, from bundling to innovation. There is no topic left untouched. It is a must-have for teachers and students alike.’

**Joshua Gans, Professor of Strategic Management and Skoll Chair in Innovation  
and Entrepreneurship, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto**

‘This second edition of Belleflamme and Peitz is a strong revision of what has emerged as the “go-to” book for those teaching industrial organization to advanced students. Moreover, it is a useful reference and resource for scholars. It deserves space on the bookshelves of all industrial organization economists.’

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‘Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz’s *Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies* offers a fully up-to-date treatment of modern industrial organization, including recent work on intellectual property, new forms of price discrimination, competition policy and two-sided markets. Theoretically inclined, clearly written, and mathematically accessible to a wide audience (including advanced undergraduates), it usefully provides motivation through short business-strategy or competition-policy cases. A tour de force and a must-read for students, researchers and practitioners of the field.’

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2014 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences**

‘The revised version of the book provides an up-to-date treatment of the main topics in Industrial Organization analysis, including the advances of recent research as well as exercises. The authors take a theoretical perspective which is contrasted with a wealth of real-world cases and the analysis of issues relevant for the information economy, such as bundling, intellectual property and two-sided markets.’

**Xavier Vives, Professor of Economics, IESE Business School**

# Industrial Organization

## Markets and Strategies

2nd edition

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# Contents

*List of figures*   xiii  
*List of tables*   xv  
*List of cases*   xvi  
*Preface to the second edition*   xxi  
*Preface from the first edition*   xxiii

**Part I   Getting started   1**

Introduction to Part I   1

**1   What is *Markets and Strategies*?   3**  
1.1 Markets   3  
1.2 Strategies   6  
1.3 Models and material of *Markets and Strategies*   8  
1.4 Level, scope and organization of the book   9

**2   Firms, consumers and the market   13**  
2.1 Firms and consumers   13  
2.1.1 The firm   14  
2.1.2 Looking inside the black box of a firm   16  
2.1.3 Consumers and rational man   21  
2.1.4 Welfare analysis of market outcomes   24  
2.2 Market interaction   26  
2.2.1 The perfectly competitive paradigm   26  
2.2.2 Strategies in a constant environment (‘monopoly’)   27  
2.2.3 Dominant firm model   29  
2.2.4 Imperfect competition   33  
2.3 Market definition and market performance   33  
2.3.1 How to define a market?   33  
2.3.2 How to assess market power?   34  
*References for Part I*   39

**Part II   Market power   41**

Introduction to Part II   41

**3   Static imperfect competition   45**  
3.1 Price competition   45  
3.1.1 The standard Bertrand model   45  
3.1.2 Price competition with uncertain costs   47  
3.1.3 Price competition with differentiated products   50  
3.1.4 Asymmetric competition with differentiated products   53  
3.2 Quantity competition   54

## vi Contents

3.2.1	The linear Cournot model	54
3.2.2	Implications of Cournot competition	58
3.3	Price vs. quantity competition	60
3.3.1	Limited capacity and price competition	60
3.3.2	Differentiated products: Cournot vs. Bertrand	65
3.3.3	What is the appropriate modelling choice?	67
3.4	Strategic substitutes and strategic complements	68
3.5	Estimating market power	70
<b>4</b>	<b>Dynamic aspects of imperfect competition</b>	<b>75</b>
4.1	Sequential choice: Stackelberg	75
4.1.1	One leader and one follower	76
4.1.2	One leader and an endogenous number of followers	79
4.1.3	Commitment	80
4.2	Free entry: endogenous number of firms	81
4.2.1	Properties of free-entry equilibria	82
4.2.2	Welfare properties of the Cournot model with free entry	83
4.2.3	Welfare properties of price competition with free entry	86
4.2.4	Welfare properties of monopolistic competition	88
4.3	Industry concentration and firm turnover	91
4.3.1	Exogenous vs. endogenous sunk costs	91
4.3.2	Dynamic firm entry and exit	97
	<i>References for Part II</i>	104

## Part III Sources of market power 107

Introduction to Part III 107

<b>5</b>	<b>Product differentiation</b>	<b>111</b>
5.1	Views on product differentiation	112
5.2	Horizontal product differentiation	113
5.2.1	A simple location model	114
5.2.2	The linear Hotelling model	115
5.2.3	The quadratic Hotelling model	118
5.3	Vertical product differentiation	120
5.3.1	Quality choice	120
5.3.2	Natural oligopolies	124
5.4	Empirical analysis of product differentiation	126
5.4.1	Probabilistic choice and the logit model	126
5.4.2	Empirical analysis of horizontal product differentiation	129
5.4.3	Empirical analysis of vertical product differentiation	131
5.4.4	Nested logit and other extensions	132
<b>6</b>	<b>Advertising and related marketing strategies</b>	<b>138</b>
6.1	Views on advertising	138
6.2	Price and non-price strategies in monopoly	142

6.2.1	Price–advertising decisions: Dorfman–Steiner model	142
6.2.2	A closer look at how advertising affects demand	144
6.3	Some welfare economics of advertising	145
6.4	Advertising and competition	148
6.4.1	Informative advertising	148
6.4.2	Persuasive advertising	153
<b>7</b>	<b>Consumer inertia</b>	<b>162</b>
7.1	Uninformed consumers and search costs	162
7.1.1	Price dispersion	163
7.1.2	Consumer search with homogeneous products	167
7.1.3	Empirical investigation of price dispersion	170
7.1.4	Sequential search and differentiated products	171
7.2	Switching costs	174
7.2.1	Competitive effects of switching costs	175
7.2.2	Coupons and endogenous switching costs	184
7.2.3	Estimating switching costs	187
	<i>References for Part III</i>	192

## **Part IV Pricing strategies and market segmentation 195**

Introduction to Part IV 195

<b>8</b>	<b>Group pricing and personalized pricing</b>	<b>197</b>
8.1	Price discrimination	197
8.1.1	Price discrimination: a typology	197
8.1.2	‘Know thy customers’	199
8.2	Group and personalized pricing in monopolies	200
8.3	Group and personalized pricing in oligopolies	204
8.3.1	Group pricing and localized competition	204
8.3.2	Personalized pricing and location decisions	208
8.3.3	Geographic price discrimination	209
<b>9</b>	<b>Menu pricing</b>	<b>220</b>
9.1	Menu pricing vs. group pricing	220
9.2	A formal analysis of monopoly menu pricing	222
9.2.1	Quality-dependent prices	222
9.2.2	Information goods and damaged goods	227
9.2.3	Extension to time- and quantity-dependent prices	229
9.3	Menu pricing under imperfect competition	230
9.3.1	Competitive quality-based menu pricing	231
9.3.2	Competitive quantity-based menu pricing	236
<b>10</b>	<b>Intertemporal price discrimination</b>	<b>243</b>
10.1	Durable-good monopoly without commitment	243
10.1.1	Small number of consumers	244

## viii Contents

- 10.1.2 Large number of consumers 247
- 10.2 Durable-good monopoly with commitment 251
  - 10.2.1 Fixed capacity 252
  - 10.2.2 Flexible capacity 254
  - 10.2.3 Intertemporal pricing and demand uncertainty 255
- 10.3 Behaviour-based price discrimination 259
  - 10.3.1 Behaviour-based price discrimination by a monopolist 259
  - 10.3.2 Customer poaching 261
- 11 Bundling 270**
  - 11.1 A formal analysis of monopoly bundling 271
    - 11.1.1 Pure bundling as a device to offer a discount 272
    - 11.1.2 Mixed bundling 275
    - 11.1.3 Extensions 276
  - 11.2 Tying and metering 281
  - 11.3 Competitive bundling 283
    - 11.3.1 Bundling as a way to soften price competition 284
    - 11.3.2 When bundling intensifies price competition 286
- References for Part IV 293*

## Part V Product quality and information 295

Introduction to Part V 295

- 12 Asymmetric information, price and advertising signals 297**
  - 12.1 Asymmetric information problems 297
    - 12.1.1 Hidden information problem 297
    - 12.1.2 Hidden action problem 301
  - 12.2 Advertising and price signals 304
    - 12.2.1 Advertising signals 304
    - 12.2.2 Price signals 308
    - 12.2.3 Joint price and advertising signals 314
  - 12.3 Price signalling under imperfect competition 317
- 13 Marketing tools for experience goods 323**
  - 13.1 Warranties 323
    - 13.1.1 Warranties as a reliability signal 324
    - 13.1.2 Warranties and investment in quality control 326
  - 13.2 Branding 328
    - 13.2.1 Intertemporal branding and reputation 330
    - 13.2.2 Reputation and competition 331
    - 13.2.3 Umbrella branding 335
- References for Part V 343*

## Part VI Theory of competition policy 345

Introduction to Part VI 345



<b>14</b>	<b>Cartels and tacit collusion</b>	349
14.1	Formation and stability of cartels	349
14.1.1	Simultaneous cartel formation	351
14.1.2	Sequential cartel formation	354
14.1.3	Network of market-sharing agreements	355
14.2	Sustainability of tacit collusion	357
14.2.1	Tacit collusion: the basics	358
14.2.2	Optimal punishment of deviating firms	363
14.2.3	Collusion and multimarket contact	367
14.2.4	Tacit collusion and cyclical demand	372
14.2.5	Tacit collusion with unobservable actions	375
14.3	Detecting and fighting collusion	378
14.3.1	The difficulty in detecting collusion	379
14.3.2	Leniency and whistleblowing programmes	382
<b>15</b>	<b>Horizontal mergers</b>	389
15.1	Profitability of simple Cournot mergers	390
15.1.1	Mergers between two firms	390
15.1.2	Mergers between several firms	392
15.1.3	Efficiency-increasing mergers	393
15.2	Welfare analysis of Cournot mergers	397
15.2.1	Linear Cournot model with synergies	398
15.2.2	General welfare analysis	399
15.3	Beyond simple Cournot mergers	402
15.3.1	Successive mergers	402
15.3.2	Mergers and entry	405
15.3.3	Mergers under price competition	406
15.3.4	Coordinated effects	408
15.4	Empirical merger analyses	411
15.4.1	Event studies and direct price comparisons	411
15.4.2	Merger simulations	411
<b>16</b>	<b>Strategic incumbents and entry</b>	417
16.1	Taxonomy of entry-related strategies	418
16.1.1	Entry deterrence	418
16.1.2	Entry accommodation	420
16.2	Strategies affecting cost variables	423
16.2.1	Investment in capacity as an entry deterrent	423
16.2.2	Investment as an entry deterrent reconsidered	430
16.2.3	Raising rivals' costs	431
16.3	Strategies affecting demand variables	433
16.3.1	Brand proliferation	434
16.3.2	Bundling and leverage of market power	436
16.3.3	Switching costs as an entry deterrent	439

## x Contents

- 16.4 Limit pricing under incomplete information 442
- 16.5 Entry deterrence and multiple incumbents 446
  
- 17 Vertically related markets 452**
  - 17.1 The double-marginalization problem 452
    - 17.1.1 Linear pricing and double marginalization 452
    - 17.1.2 Contractual solutions to the double-marginalization problem 454
    - 17.1.3 Double marginalization and retail services 455
  - 17.2 Resale-price maintenance and exclusive territories 456
    - 17.2.1 Resale-price maintenance 456
    - 17.2.2 Exclusive territories 459
  - 17.3 Exclusive dealing 462
    - 17.3.1 Anticompetitive effects of exclusive dealing contracts? The Chicago critique 464
    - 17.3.2 Vertical integration and long-term contracts as partial deterrence devices 465
    - 17.3.3 Full exclusion and multiple buyers 469
    - 17.3.4 Vertical foreclosure and secret contracts 471
    - 17.3.5 Exclusive contracts and investment incentives 473
  - 17.4 Vertical oligopoly and vertical mergers 476
    - 17.4.1 Vertical oligopoly 476
    - 17.4.2 Exclusionary effects of vertical mergers 479
    - 17.4.3 Coordinated effects of vertical mergers 485
- References for Part VI 490*

## Part VII R&D and intellectual property 495

Introduction to Part VII 495

- 18 Innovation and R&D 497**
  - 18.1 Market structure and incentives to innovate 498
    - 18.1.1 Monopoly vs. perfect competition: the replacement effect 500
    - 18.1.2 Incentives to innovate in oligopolies 502
    - 18.1.3 Patent licensing 504
    - 18.1.4 Licensing by an outside innovator 504
    - 18.1.5 Licensing by an inside innovator 507
  - 18.2 When innovation affects market structure 510
    - 18.2.1 Monopoly threatened by entry: the efficiency effect 510
    - 18.2.2 Asymmetric patent races: replacement and efficiency effects 512
    - 18.2.3 Socially excessive R&D in a patent race 515
  - 18.3 R&D cooperation and spillovers 517
    - 18.3.1 Effects of strategic behaviour 519
    - 18.3.2 Effects of R&D cooperation 521
    - 18.3.3 Further analysis of R&D cooperation 524
  
- 19 Intellectual property 531**
  - 19.1 Innovation and IP: basics 532
    - 19.1.1 Information and appropriability 532