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978-1-107-06924-4 - Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics

Edited by Keimpe Algra and Katerina Ierodiakonou

Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction**Notes on sceptical method and doxographical transmission**Keimpe Algra and Katerina Ierodiakonou***About this volume**

This volume may serve as a companion to the two books *Against the Physicists* by Sextus Empiricus. These books, which offer a sceptical discussion of the main concepts of ancient physics, are part of a collection of five books *Against the Dogmatists* (*Adversus Dogmaticos*), which are in their turn nowadays known as part of a larger work, *Against the Mathematicians* in eleven books. It is usually assumed that Sextus lived and worked in the second century AD,¹ and his works are our main source of information on Pyrrhonism, the particular brand of scepticism that flourished between the first century BC and Sextus' own days, that appears to have dwindled away in later antiquity to become virtually unknown in the Latin Middle Ages, but that made a remarkable comeback in the early modern period.²

In the past the rich text of *Against the Physicists* has not received much attention in its own right, apart from a few isolated contributions on special subjects.³ It has mostly and primarily been mined as a quarry of

I am grateful for the useful and spirited discussion of a draft version of this chapter by the participants of the Symposium Hellenisticum. Special thanks go to Keimpe Algra, Gábor Betegh, Richard Bett, Charles Brittain, and Brad Inwood for the most helpful written comments, which made the chapter better; to my colleagues Verity Harte and Barbara Sattler for sharing some of their expertise on Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy of time, as a result of which the chapter improved further; and to the anonymous referee from CUP for a set of very useful additional remarks. The essay is dedicated to the memory of Michael Frede, whose loss as a friend and a colleague I deeply feel.

¹ As for Sextus' biography, we know little more than that he was a Pyrrhonist and a medical practitioner (*PH* 2.238; *M* 1.260; *M* 11.47) who must have lived and worked after the death of the emperor Tiberius (to whom he refers in the past tense in *PH* 1.84) and not later than Diogenes Laertius, who refers to him (9.116). See House 1980 for a critical examination of the relevant evidence.

² On the whereabouts of Pyrrhonism in the Latin Middle Ages and in the Byzantine world, and on its rediscovery in the early modern period – especially after the publication of the Latin translations of *PH* by Henri Estienne in 1562 and of *M* by Gentian Hervet in 1569 – see Schmitt 1983; Bydén 2002; Floridi 2002 and 2010; Lagerlund 2010.

³ Contributions on special subjects: Barnes 1988; Warren 2003. The recent *Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism* (Bett 2010) has special chapters on scepticism and ethics, and on scepticism and the sciences, but not on scepticism and physics. On the other hand, we do now have a valuable

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

information on earlier philosophies, especially on the Hellenistic schools. On the other hand, and for obvious reasons, modern scholars' engagement with Sextus' *own* philosophical position has usually centred on the more systematic first book of his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, in which he describes Pyrrhonian scepticism as a 'way of life', setting it off against other philosophical positions and describing its method and terminology.

Their specialized subject matter notwithstanding, the two books *Against the Physicists* should be regarded as part of Sextus' overall sceptical project. After all, Pyrrhonian scepticism is more than just an epistemological position. In so far as it constitutes a 'way of life' (*diagōgē*) it involves an ongoing engagement with logic, physics and ethics, but also with the knowledge claims of grammar, rhetoric and the mathematical sciences. In the end it is the consistent and ongoing process of constructing a *diaphōnia* of opposing accounts of equal strength in all these areas that will inevitably lead to the sceptic's suspension of judgment (*epochē*), resulting in a state of tranquillity (*ataraxia*).⁴ Hence the following description of Pyrrhonian physics:

We do not study natural science in order to make assertions with firm conviction about any of the matters on which scientific beliefs are held. But we do touch on natural science in order to be able to oppose to every account an equal account, and for the sake of tranquillity. This is also the spirit in which we approach the logical and ethical parts of what they call philosophy. (*PH* 1.18)

This volume aims to study how the two books *Against the Physicists* carry out this project in practice. Even if, as we saw, this to some extent constitutes a novel approach to this text, it goes without saying that the authors of the various contributions have gratefully used the results of the renewed interest in Pyrrhonism in general that we have witnessed over the last three decades or so.⁵

Each of the chapters covers one of the individual topic-related sections in Sextus' text, which means that the book as a whole covers all of *Against*

annotated translation of *Against the Physicists* in the form of Bett 2012. In general, most contributors to the present volume have not been able to take account of it, because it was published after they submitted their contributions.

⁴ *PH* 1.8; on the nature of the sceptic's ongoing 'searching', see Hankinson 1995: 297–303; see also below, n. 57, on Sextus' habit of qualifying his conclusions with riders such as 'now' or 'for the moment'.

⁵ Two recent volumes that may be regarded as indicative of the state of our knowledge of ancient Pyrrhonism and of the main questions discussed by contemporary scholarship are Bett 2010 and Machuca 2012. Some useful general studies: Barnes 1990a; Hankinson 1995; Bailey 2002.

Cambridge University Press

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Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

3

the Physicists and may indeed serve as a philosophical running commentary to it.⁶ In accordance with this overall design, the present Introduction does not attempt to introduce and summarize the individual contributions but aims to offer some thematic inroads into a number of general issues that cut across the individual chapters. It covers the place of *Against the Physicists* within the whole of Sextus' philosophical output, in particular the relation between this work and the partly parallel sections in book 3 of *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, the general structure of the text, the sceptical strategies within the individual chapters, the main types of argument used by Sextus, and the question of his sources. Some of these issues are matters of controversy, also between the contributors to this volume. Accordingly, readers should not expect the individual contributions to be governed in all respects by a single overarching view on Sextus and his methods and purposes. Nor should they assume that the views put forward in this Introduction are necessarily shared by all contributors. The aim of this Introduction is to set the stage, to connect some of the main themes that recur in the various contributions, to raise some questions and offer some possible answers. Cross-references to the individual chapters will help the reader to trace agreements and disagreements on points of detail.

Sextus and his two books *Against the Physicists*

The title of the two books *Against the Physicists* does not appear to be of Sextus' own making, although he does seem to refer to these books by the descriptive label 'notes against the physicists' (*M* 1.35; 3.116). Together with two books *Against the Logicians* and one book *Against the Ethicists*, they constitute a collection of five books *Against the Dogmatists* (*Adversus Dogmaticos*). In the manuscript tradition these five books, which contain a sceptical discussion of the most relevant subjects in the three main areas of philosophy, came to be appended to six books *Against the Mathematicians* or (alternative translation of the Greek) *Against the Professors* (*Adversus Mathematicos*), which contain a sceptical discussion of the knowledge claims of the liberal arts. As a result they were later generally referred to as books 7–11 of *Adversus Mathematicos*. Of these *M* 7 and 8 are the two

⁶ This is also why each contribution offers a more or less detailed 'break-down' of the argument of the relevant section in Sextus, sometimes as part of the running text, sometimes as a separate appendix. We have left it to the individual contributors to decide which form was most appropriate, given the overall design of their chapter. Those who want a complete overview of the contents of the two books will find it in Bett 2012: xxvii–xxxiii.

Cambridge University Press

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

books also entitled *Against the Logicians*, *M* 9 and 10 are our two books *Against the Physicists*, and *M* 11 is *Against the Ethicists*.

Sextus also wrote three books of *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (*Purrhōneioi Hupotupōseis*) of which the first offers a neat and fairly systematic outline of Pyrrhonian scepticism and the way in which it relates to other philosophies, whereas the second and third books offer a sceptical discussion of the principles of dogmatic philosophy: logic in book 2, physics and ethics in book 3. Elsewhere he refers to some other works which are now lost: the *Empirical Notes* (*Empeirika Hupomnēmata*, referred to at *M* 1.61), possibly identical with the *Medical Notes* (*Iatrika Hupomnēmata*, referred to at *M* 7.202), and a treatise *On the Soul* (*Peri Psuchēs*) which may or may not have been a separate work (referred to at *M* 6.55 and *M* 10.284).

The surviving material accordingly consists of three corpora:

- (1) *M* 1–6,
- (2) *M* 7–11, and
- (3) *PH* 1–3.

Our two books *Against the Physicists* belong to (2). About this second corpus and how it relates to (1) the following observations can be made:

- (a) It is likely that (2) should as a whole be identified as (part of) a work to which (1) refers as the *Sceptical Notes* (*Skeptika Hupomnēmata*; references at *M* 1.29; 2.106; 6.52); this suggests both that (1) and (2) were conceived as different works and that (2) antedates (1).
- (b) As noted above, there are what appear to be specific backward references to our two books *Against the Physicists* in (1), namely in *M* 1.35 and 3.116, which seem to confirm the chronological priority of (2).⁷
- (c) There are (more or less close) parallels between the texts of (1) and (2); thus the sections on wholes and parts, body, number and time in our two books *Against the Physicists* contain passages that are paralleled within the mathematical sections of (1); this becomes understandable once one realizes that the latter focus to a large extent on mathematics *as applied in physics*.⁸
- (d) The original collection of *Skeptika Hupomnēmata* may well have been larger than (2), that is, larger than the remaining five books of *M* 7–11, for Diogenes Laertius 9.116 (and a corresponding passage in the *Suda*) refers

⁷ See *M* 1.35 (ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς ἀντιρρήσεσι) and *M* 3.116 (ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς ὑπομνήματι). It is in principle possible, as Betegh argues elsewhere in this volume (p. 175, n. 86), that these references should be taken to be to the relevant section of *PH* 3, in which case *M* 7–11 might well postdate *M* 1–6 (which Betegh has reasons to believe is the case). On the other hand, this would require a similar explanation for the various other references to the *Skeptika Hupomnēmata* within *M* 1–6; and in general we may observe that the term *hupomnēma* seems to fit *M* better than *PH*.

⁸ See the useful list of parallels in Bett 2012: 161–4. See also the contributions of Betegh, Bobzien and Brennan to the present volume.

Cambridge University Press

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

Introduction

5

to it as a work in ten books;⁹ and it is possible that this work started out with a general account of Pyrrhonism, comparable to what we find in *PH* 1.¹⁰

An even larger number of parallels can be detected between the corpora (2) and (3) and in this case the relative chronology has proved to be a matter of controversy. *PH* is a *hupotupōsis*, a relatively short and elegant account in outline. It consists of two parts: book 1 deals with what Sextus calls the *katholou logos* (or ‘general account’) of Pyrrhonian scepticism, namely an exposition of the nature of the sceptical position, the modes used by sceptics, and the differences between these sceptics and other schools.¹¹ Books 2 and 3 then give the *eidikos logos* (the ‘special account’), the sceptical way of dealing with a host of individual subjects. *M*, by contrast, is a collection of *hupomnēmata*, ‘treatises’ or even ‘notes’,¹² in its present form exclusively covering the ‘special’ account.¹³ With its five books it is more than twice the size of the ‘special’ section of *PH*. As noted, numerous parallels exist between *M* and this ‘special’ section of *PH*, but it can also be observed that on the whole *PH* seems to be better organized, as one might perhaps expect, given the difference between a *hupotupōsis* and a collection of *hupomnēmata*. Indeed, *PH* contains various statements on Sextus’ part to the effect that the work only gives an outline (*PH* 1.4), that he accordingly only gives ‘few out of many examples’ and that he is concerned to be brief (*PH* 1.163),¹⁴ whereas *M* shows no such restrictions.

⁹ Some scholars have argued that the ten books of which Diogenes speaks must refer to (a version of) the whole of *M*, with two books having been coalesced into one, but this is unlikely because, as we just saw, three of the books from *M* 1–6 contain references to the *Skeptika Hupomnēmata* as to another work. Cf. Blomqvist 1974.

¹⁰ The introductory section of *Against the Logicians* (*M* 7.1) refers back to a general treatment of Pyrrhonism, i.e. something analogous to *PH* 1, and this may have been part of the lost section of the *Skeptika Hupomnēmata*, although the reference has also been taken to be to *PH* itself (but see Bett 2005: xi).

¹¹ For the terms *katholou logos* and *eidikos logos*, see *PH* 1.5.

¹² On *hupomnēmata* as more or less loosely connected sets of ‘notes’, often (though not necessarily) used as a basis for the preparation of more ordered treatises, see Dorandi 1991. With all due caution, we may perhaps compare the working procedure of Plutarch, who kept such notebooks (*hupomnēmata*; cf. *De Tranq. Anim.* 464f. and *De Cohibenda Ira* 457D–E) and used them in writing his treatises. We also know that Plutarch composed a work entitled *Selections and Refutations of Stoics and Epicureans* (no. 148 in the Lamprias catalogue), in which he had amassed ammunition against the two main contemporary rival schools, which he probably used in other works as well.

¹³ In writing both a *hupotupōsis* and *hupomnēmata* Sextus may have been following Aenesidemus, who wrote both a *hupotupōsis* and *Purrhōneioi logoi* (see Diogenes Laertius 9.78: καθά φησιν Αἰνησίδημος ἐν τῇ εἰς τὰ Πυρρώνεια ὑποτυπώσει; and 9.106: Καὶ Αἰνησίδημος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Πυρρωνείων λόγων κτλ.).

¹⁴ Cf. *PH* 3.56, where the section on mixture is introduced as follows: ‘we shall for the moment, owing to the design of our treatise (διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς συγγραφῆς), excuse ourselves from answering all their views in detail, deeming that the following remarks will amply suffice for the present’.

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

At the end of the final book 11 of *M*, the *Against the Ethicists*, Sextus claims that he has completed his journey (*diexodos*) through the sceptic system (or rather: 'way of life' (*diagōgē*), 11.257), thereby implying that he has not merely given a selection, but a complete guided tour.

For quite some time the *communis opinio* among scholars appears to have been, for the most part on the basis of stylistic investigations of Janáček, that *PH* was the earlier work and that *M* 7–11 should be regarded as a kind of 'blow-up', with additions and changes, of *PH* 2 and 3.¹⁵ This 'standard' chronology (with the sequence (1) *PH*, (2) *M* 7–11, (3) *M* 1–6) has been doubted or criticized by various scholars, among them Richard Bett, who has made the most elaborate case for a revised chronology according to which *PH* postdates *M*. The main arguments that have been used to suggest that *PH* must be the later work are:

- (i) the stylistic differences between the two works as noted by Janáček (which as such are taken to show that the two works must belong to different periods, though not necessarily which of the two is the earlier one: Bett reverses Janáček's chronology);
- (ii) the fact that *M* may be seen to show traces of an earlier form of Pyrrhonism which is no longer present in *PH*; and
- (iii) the fact that the structure of *PH* is more achieved and polished.¹⁶

As is often the case with questions like these, none of these arguments is really conclusive when taken by itself. As we have just seen, the stylistic argument (i) has been used to argue both ways, so it does not naturally and obviously favour one *particular* relative chronology. Argument (ii) may look more promising, but below (pp. 21–2) we will raise some doubts on whether the differences between the two treatises are really significant in this respect and on whether they can be taken to point to different chronological stages (corresponding to a changed attitude on Sextus' part with respect to the alleged earlier form of Pyrrhonism or the way in which it expressed itself) at all. This leaves us for the moment with argument (iii), which certainly has some *prima facie* plausibility. *PH* is in many respects the better-ordered text, and why should we not assume that the better-ordered text is the later one? Moreover, a passage such as *PH* 3.56, referred to above,¹⁷ which claims that Sextus will here not deal with all arguments in detail, may be taken to suggest that he has a store of these arguments available, and why would not this larger storehouse be *M* 9 and 10? On the other hand, there is no need to assume *a priori* that one of our

¹⁵ Janáček 1948 and 1972; see also Brochard 1923: 318–19.

¹⁶ See Bett in this volume (pp. 34–40); see also Brunschwig 1988b: 152, n. 9 and more recently Pellegrin 2010. Contrary assessment, as said, in Janáček 1963.

¹⁷ See above, n. 14.

Cambridge University Press

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Excerpt

[More information](#)*Introduction*

7

two works must be a revised version of the other one.¹⁸ It is very well conceivable that Sextus in the end had an even larger store of arguments at his disposal than we find in *M*, and his selection from this collection may just have been different for *PH* on the one hand and for *M* on the other, in accordance with the different purposes of the two treatises.¹⁹

Especially since there are no unambiguous cross-references between the two works, it appears that the question of chronological priority is hard to settle, and it will no doubt not be settled by the present volume either.²⁰ The readers should judge for themselves. Richard Bett makes a strong case for his views in the first chapter of this book. Other authors show some reservations on points of detail and adduce passages in *M* that make it hard to believe that the counterpart in *PH* must be the later version, or in general that any one of the two treatises should be seen as the source for the other.²¹ We will definitely need more detailed investigations of this kind if we are ever going to be able to clinch the issue. In the meantime, we should perhaps not unduly and exclusively focus our attention on the question of the relative chronology of the two works, and we should also envisage the possibility of explaining the differences between the two treatises in terms of the different use of common sources, the possible use of different sources and the differences in purpose and ‘type of discourse’ between the two works.

The structure of *Against the Physicists*

The two books *Against the Physicists* provide a sceptical discussion of dogmatic physics, or physical theory. Sextus starts out (9.1) with a reference to a passage in *Against the Logicians* (*M* 7.20–4), where he had argued that although physics is the older discipline, logic should be treated first, since it claims to offer a theory of criteria and proofs and as such may serve

¹⁸ For a clear instance of where the text of *M* cannot be regarded as a ‘blow-up’ of what is in *PH*, nor on the other hand the text of *PH* as an abbreviated version of what is in *M*, see Bobzien in this volume, p. 276.

¹⁹ One may compare the case of the parallels between Sextus and the account of scepticism in Diogenes Laertius 9, which do not allow us to regard one of these works as directly dependent on the other either, on which see below, p. 30.

²⁰ As for possible cross-references, Janáček 1963: 274 mentions *PH* 1.222 (πλατύτερον ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διαλαμβάνομεν) and 2.219 (πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις διαλεξόμεθα, note the future tense), as possible forward references to the *Skeptika Hupomnēmata*. However, we cannot find the references in *M* (but then of course the first part of the *Hupomnēmata* appears to be missing). Conversely, *M* 9.195 (ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβέστερον διελέχθημεν, note the aorist) just *may* be a backward reference to *PH* 3.13ff.

²¹ See, for example, Betegh in this volume, (pp. 174–5) who argues that it is unlikely that Sextus used the same doxographical source first in *M* 9 in a context for which it was not entirely suited and then went back to the original source (including its introductory sentence, left out in *M*), using it now, in *PH* 3, in conformity with its original context.

Cambridge University Press

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

as the basis for all further philosophizing. Hence *Against the Physicists* is made to follow *Against the Logicians*. The ensuing discussion of physics is then presented as an attack in broad outlines: ‘we shall attack the most important and most comprehensive (*kuriōtata kai sunektikōtata*) dogmas as in the doubts cast on these we shall find the rest also included’ (*M* 9.1).²² This is why the procedure can be compared to an attack on the foundations of a wall in a siege (*M* 9.2).

This focus on what is most comprehensive should not be taken to mean that the text contains no detailed *arguments*, for it abounds with them. The point is rather that the text focuses not on the details of the individual physical theories – as Academics like Clitomachus had done, for argument’s sake even sometimes taking for granted aspects of their opponent’s theory (*M* 10.1) – but offers a broadside attack on a number of key concepts which are used in the various systems and without which the systems would collapse. This will allow the author, indirectly, to cast doubt on more specific physical tenets as well: he will catch them all in one go, so to speak, just as people do who hunt or fish with a net, as opposed to those who pursue the quarry on an individual basis (*M* 10.3).

The key concepts that Sextus discusses are: god (9.1–195), cause (9.195–330), wholes and parts (9.331–58), body (9.359–66), place (10.1–36), motion (10.37–168), time (10.169–247), number (10.248–309) and coming-to-be and passing-away (10.310–50). The comparison, in the introduction, of these key concepts to the foundations of a city wall leads us to expect that, being the foundations of physics, they are somehow interconnected, and that the individual sections discussing each of them are also interconnected. To some extent this is indeed the case: we find some signposting in these two books which suggests that Sextus has a kind of coherent skeleton, or overall design, in mind, or at least that he wanted to suggest that such a skeleton can be thought up. The following overview – with the references to the main sections in bold print to make them stand out – may serve to show how this skeleton is fleshed out in actual practice.

Active and passive principles or causes are recognized by all who do physics (*M* 9.4). So we should start with these. But before starting with these, we may discuss a special case of an active cause: **god** (9.1–195). The

²² A similar statement can be found at the outset of *PH* 3, which also claims that the discussion is about the most comprehensive concepts (*PH* 3.1: *katholikōtera*). On the introductory section of *M* 9, see also Bett in this volume, p. 41.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06924-4 - Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics

Edited by Keimpe Algra and Katerina Ierodiakonou

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Introduction

9

discussion of god thus in a way prefaces the more general discussion of active and passive principles or **causes** (9.195–330). Being passive is connected with being affected (in a process of change or alteration), and being affected is a matter of something being added or subtracted (9.277). Since subtraction and addition, in their turn, involve the idea of wholes and parts (9.330),²³ we need a discussion of **wholes and parts** (9.331–58). The latter discussion is accordingly presented as somehow subservient to the discussion about addition and subtraction, and *eo ipso* to the discussion of active and passive causes. After all, it is argued, the difficulties concerning wholes and parts will add to the doubts already signalled in connection with subtraction and addition and with active and passive causes (9.330).²⁴ So we have a connection between the first three subjects: god (as a special case of the active cause), active and passive causes as such, wholes and parts as concepts required in the explanation of subtraction and addition and hence also in the explanation of the process of being affected by an active cause.

This part of book 9 (i.e. the first three sections) winds up in 9.358 with the claim that all this has been a discussion of the active principles (*drastēriai dunameis*), and that we will now proceed with a section that ‘touches on both the active and the material principles jointly (*koinoteron*)’ (M 9.358). This reads like a rather forced *ex post* way of linking the first three sections (on god, active and passive causes, parts and wholes) with the next section on **body** (9.359–440). For, as we saw, the first three sections covered more than ‘active principles’ alone, although all subjects covered were somehow linked to the notion of an active cause. Moreover, the section which now follows, on body, hardly deals with body *as connected with active and passive causation*. It starts with a doxographical overview on first principles (*archikōtata stoicheia*) which seems to cut across the categories of active and passive causation, offering a *diaeresis* of first principles into (a) bodies and (b) incorporeals.²⁵ It then, in narrowing its focus on body, briefly brings in the notion of active and passive causation, but only in order to do away with the definition of body as that which is capable of being affected (9.366).²⁶ It goes on to discuss body as defined by ‘the mathematicians’, namely as ‘that which has three dimensions, length,

²³ See White, in this volume, pp. 82–3.²⁴ See White, in this volume, p. 83.²⁵ This new start, cutting across the earlier distinction between active and passive principles, may be legitimized by the consideration that not all philosophers distinguished between active and passive principles, or that the most prominent defenders of a combination of active and passive principles, the Stoics, thought of both principles as corporeal. See Betegh, in this volume, p. 133.²⁶ This has a parallel in *PH* 3.38.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06924-4 - Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics

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Excerpt

[More information](#)

depth and breadth' (9.337), and this explicitly non-physical discussion, which has nothing to do with either active or passive causes, takes up the rest of the section. So the connection between this section on body and the first ones on causation appears to be rather thin.

Now, according to the doxographical part of this section on body (9.359–66) some say the first principles of things are bodies, others that they are incorporeals (such as numbers, surfaces, Ideas), and this division appears to provide the structure for the subsequent part of the discussion; for following on the discussion of body proper (9.366–440), book 10 goes on to address the incorporeals (as is explicitly announced at *M* 9.440). Nevertheless, there are some oddities in this part of the discussion as well. First, as we saw, the discussion of body very quickly transforms itself into a discussion of *mathematical* body, and in that connection it takes along surface, one of the incorporeals, as well. Secondly, the subject matter of the following sections, which are explicitly devoted to the incorporeals, does not match with the set of incorporeals mentioned in the doxographical overview (9.364). The latter comprised numbers, surfaces and Ideas. Yet, number is now the only item from this original set which is being covered. Ideas are not discussed at all. Instead we have discussions of place, motion, time, number and coming-to-be and passing-away, four of which did not figure in the original list, whereas it is not even clear whether motion and coming-to-be and passing-away are to be considered as incorporeals at all. So there is a certain mismatch between the 'programme' that has been announced and the actual material that is being presented. In the meantime a possible reason for this mismatch suggests itself as well: Sextus' dependence on his sources. Presumably the available material, both on body and on individual incorporeals, did not really fit the preconceived structure, which, as we saw, is itself dependent on a doxographical overview. We shall have to see whether this suspicion is confirmed by the rest of what we find in these two books *Against the Physicists*.

At the end of the account of bodies (9.440) the account of incorporeals is announced, and book 10 starts out by claiming that after the foregoing discussion of body and limits, criticizing both physicists and geometers, the investigation of place seems to follow next, 'for it is maintained by all of them with one accord that body either is contained in place or moves in place'. Here again, the connection is slightly strained, for 'all of them' cannot strictly speaking be taken to refer to physicists and geometers alike, the latter having as such no views on the emplacement of physical bodies. The concept of place is rather something that is connected with the