

Index

- abandoning the regular order.
 - See* regular order, abandoning
- abortion, 70, 71–74, 75, 77, 80–82, 85, 106n8, 161
 - in 1983, 88–92
 - in 1984, 96–97
 - in 1989, 106
 - in 1990, 109
- agenda control, 34, 39
 - negative agenda control, 4, 10, 34, 61, 67, 67n10
 - positive agenda control, 67n10
 - Senate majority party influence of, 7–11
- Agriculture bill
 - in 1983, 88
 - in 1984, 92–93
 - in 1997, 22t1.1
 - in 2001, 138
 - in 2003, 149
 - in 2004, 153
- amendments, 12, 38, 129.
 - See also* abortion; appropriations process; ideological distance and divides; school prayer
 - continuing resolutions and, 21
 - frequently amended bills (1981–2012), 63
 - Helms Amendment on National Endowment of the Arts (1989), 107
 - in 1983, 146–153
 - in 1996, 116
 - in 2001, 137–139
 - in 2002, 139–141, 143
 - in 2003, 148
 - in 2004, 153–158
 - limitations on by omnibus bills, 29–31
 - limited influence theory test of
 - abandoning the regular order and, 61–65
 - non-amenable omnibus conference reports, 19
 - omnibus bills and reduced amending opportunities, 29–36, 162–163
 - Senate rules on, 2
 - votes on (1981–2012), 62
 - voting regression analysis (1981–2012), 63
- anthrax, 137
- appropriations process, 10, 20n10.
 - See also* amendments; Congress; regular order, abandoning; regular order; omnibus bills
 - appropriations bills defined, 40
 - Appropriations Committee and, 15–17
 - failure to complete in 2002, 2006 and 2008 before new Congress was seated, 56

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)

172

Index

appropriations process (*cont.*)

- from 1975–2012, 23, 42
- from 1991–94, 110–111
- from 1993–2001, 122
- from 2001–8, 136
- from 2008–12, 164
- in 1981, 75–82, 78n12
- in 1982, 73n5, 73n6, 82–88, 84n29
- in 1983, 88–92, 91n50
- in 1984, 92–97, 96n63
- in 1987, 103–105
- in 1989, 105–108
- in 1990, 108–110
- in 1995, 111–114
- in 1996, 21–23, 114–120
- in 2001, 136–139
- in 2002, 139–145
- in 2003, 145–153
- in 2004, 153–158
- legislative history of bills in
 - 1981, 76
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 1982, 82
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 1983, 88
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 1984, 92
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 1995, 111
 - legislative history of bills in 1996,
 - 21, 115
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 1997, 21
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 2002, 139
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 2003, 145
 - legislative history of bills in
 - 2004, 153
 - limited influence theory test
 - and, 38–40
 - need for future research on,
 - 164–165
 - overview of, 15–21
 - potential collapse of due to
 - omnibus bills, 165
 - predictable sequence of, 39

- Presidential opportunistic
 - bargaining in, 100, 120–125
- reduced transparency in due to
 - omnibus packages, 163
- Senate majority influence in
 - as defensive vs. offensive
 - strategy, 164
- study of majority party power
 - and, 2

Baker, Howard (Senator, R-TN), xxi,
75, 77–80, 87, 98

abortion amendment and
(1983), 88–92

Beyond Ideology (Lee), 10, 14

bipartisan support, 10, 33, 33n18, 38,
65–69, 163

from 1981–84, 88, 97

from 2002–4, 143–144, 158–159

Boxer, Barbara (Senator, D-CA), 143

Budget and Accounting Act of
1921, 16

Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of
1990, 46, 49–51, 54, 60, 109,
124, 128

budget process. *See* appropriations
process

Bush, George H. W.

appropriations process (1989) and,
105–108

appropriations process (1990) and,
108–110

on omnibus bills, 101

veto threats of, 105, 107, 108, 125

Bush, George W.

appropriations process (2001) and,
136–139

appropriations process and (2002),
139–145

Presidential influence of, xxii,
158, 159

veto threats of, 150

Byrd, Robert (Senator, D-WV), 122,
143, 159

cartel theory, 5, 7, 67–68, 67n10

Carter, Jimmy, 75

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

173

- case studies, 70, 98
- Chiles, Lawton (Senator, D-FL), 93
- Clinton, Bill
 - appropriations process (1995) and, 111–114
 - appropriations process (1996) and, 114–120
 - on omnibus bills, 101, 130
 - Presidential influence of, 123, 125, 159
- Cochran, Thad, 30
- Commerce, Justice, and State bill, 73
 - in 1981, 75
 - in 1982, 85
 - in 1983, 149, 150
 - in 1996, 21
 - school prayer and, 77, 78, 80
- Conditional Party Government (CPG)
 - theory, 5, 7, 53, 60, 67–68, 67n10
 - lack of empirical support for in Senate, 7, 165
- conference reports, 19, 21, 22n13, 25, 163
- filibusters of, 35
- Congress, 2, 121.
 - See also* appropriations process; House of Representatives; Senate
- 101st (1989), 106
- 107th, 44n3, 134, 158
- 107th (2001), 136–139
- 107th (2002), 139–145
- 108th, 134, 158
- 108th (2003), 145–153
- 108th (2004), 153–158
- 109th, 136
- 110th, 136
- 111th, 133
- 96th (1979–80), 71
- 97th (1980–81), 71, 76
- 97th (1982), 82
- 98th (1983), 88–92
- decision-making in, 26
- divided control of, 11, 45, 158
- majority party power in, 3–7
- Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 17, 18, 25, 74
- Congressional Budget Office, 15, 46
- Congressional Democratic majority, xxi
- Congressional Quarterly*, 65
- Congressional Republican majority
 - in 1995, 131
 - roll of by Democrats in 2002, 134
- Congressmen in Committees* (Fenno), 4
- Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 20
- continuing resolutions, 20n10, 23n15, 25n16. *See also* by H.J. Res number, H.R. number, S.J. number
 - as undesirable alternative to omnibus bills, 20
- clean continuing resolutions, 20–21
- defined, 19
- from 1975–2012, 23
- full year, 18–21, 70, 82, 87, 98, 131
- in 1981, 75–82
- in 1982, 82–88
- in 1984, 94–97
- similarities with omnibus bills, 21
- Craig, Larry (Senator, R-ID), 140, 141, 143
- creation of in times of majority party weakness, 165
- Cuba, 136, 138, 147, 150, 154, 158
- Daschle, Tom (Senator, D-SD), 11–13, 19, 117, 148–153
 - on government shutdowns, 32
 - on omnibus bills, 28, 30, 32, 163
 - on regular order, 31
- debate, 2
 - debt ceiling debate in 1982, 84, 87
 - in the Senate, 8
- Defense bill, 51–52
 - in 1996, 22
- deficit variable, 46
- Democratic Senate majority, xxi, 60, 75, 110, 161
 - from 1979–80, 71
 - from 1988–94, 105, 129–130, 162

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations
in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)

174

Index

- Democratic Senate majority (*cont.*)
 ideological positions of
 (1978–82), 71
 in 1986, 100
 in 1987, 103, 105
 in 2001, 137
 Democrats, 2, 30.
 See also appropriations process;
 Congress; Democratic Senate
 majority; Senate majority party
 Congressional Democratic
 majority, xxi
 Democratic amendments, 21, 129,
 148, 154, 158, 162
 Den Hartog, Chris, 10
 Denton, Jeremiah (Senator, R-AL), 72,
 80, 81
 Department of Homeland
 Security, 136
 desegregation, xxi
 District of Columbia bill, 107n10
 in 1982, 85
 in 1984, 93
 in 1989, 106, 108
 in 1995, 112–114, 129
 in 2003, 148, 150
 Dole, Bob (Senator, R-KS), 101,
 110–111, 114
 Domenici, Pete (Senator, R-NM),
 31n17, 138

 education spending, 116–117, 118
 election years, 45, 55, 60, 98
Electoral Connection (Mayhew), 4
 Energy and Water bill, 29
 in 2006, 31n17
 Environmental Protection Agency, 110

 Federal Communications
 Commission, 149
 federal deficit variable, 45
 federal workforce privatization,
 147, 150
 Fenno, Richard, 4, 11, 11n3
 filibusters, 9, 19, 29, 35n19, 73, 97
 in 1982, 83, 84
 in 1983, 90–92

 in 1984, 92–93, 96
 in 2001, 138, 144
 in 2003, 149
 of conference reports, 35, 163
 Foreign Operations bill
 in 1983, 88
 in 1989, 108
 in 1996, 22
 in 2004, 155
 forest fire prevention amendments,
 139–141, 143
 Frist, Bill (Senator, R-TN), 30,
 147–153
 in 2004, 153–158
 full year continuing resolutions,
 18–21, 82, 87, 98, 131

 Gailmard, Sean, 10
 Gingrich, Newt, 32, 99, 100, 110, 129
 global warming, 30
 government shutdowns, 32
 in 1995, 110–111, 129
 threatened in 1982, 87
 Gramm, Phil (Senator, R-TX), 138
 gridlock, 2, 9, 11, 13–14
 ideological distance and, 9
 in the regular order, 32
 majority party weakness and, 6
 omnibus bills as preventing, 27,
 30, 33

 H.J. Res. 122, 111
 H.J. Res. 20, 21
 H.J. Res. 395, 104
 H.J. Res. 115, 111
 H.J. Res. 325, 76, 79
 H.J. Res. 357, 77, 79
 H.J. Res. 370, 25na, 76, 80
 H.J. Res. 395, 20, 104
 H.J. Res. 409, 25na
 H.J. Res. 465, 20n10
 H.J. Res. 631, 85
 H.J. Res. 648, 95
 H.R. 3037, 20n10
 H.R. 3610, 25nb
 H.R. 370, 82
 H.R. 4278, 25nb

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

175

- H.R. 4560, 80
- H.R. 933, 20, 21, 23n14
- Hall, Richard, 11
- Harkin, Tom (Senator, D-IA), 147
- Hatfield, Mark, 86, 87, 90n44, 91, 95–96
- Helms, Jesse (Senator, R-NC), xxi, 72, 107
 - Helms Amendment on National Endowment of the Arts (1989), 107
- Hollings, Ernest (Senator, D-SC), 78
- Homeland Security bill, 30
- homogeneity, majority party, 42–43, 56
 - abandoning regular order in Senate and, 47–52
 - as legislative influence, 7
 - from 1975–90, 74
 - from 1986–96, 101
 - from 2001–4, 133
 - House of Representatives and, 55
 - omnibus bill inclusion and, 56–60
 - return to regular order in 1996 and, 103
- House Appropriations Committee, 15–17, 113
 - evolution of subcommittee jurisdictions in 2000s, 134
 - in 1983, 88
- House of Representatives, 40, 161, 164
 - appropriations bills approval process in, 17
 - in 1983, 88
 - in 1996, 21–23, 120
 - in 2001, 136
 - in 2002, 139
 - in 2003, 145
 - limited influence theory test of
 - abandoning regular order and, 52–56
 - party characteristics and omnibus bill inclusion (1975–2012), 57
 - regular order and, 36
 - role of in political system, 1
 - rules of in legislative process, 1
 - shaping of legislative outcomes by political parties in, 5
 - strong majority control of, 2, 120, 125, 166
- How Congress Evolves* (Polsby), 11
- Humphrey, Gordon (Senator, R-NH), 106
- ideological distance and divides, 42, 44, 56. *See also* abortion; amendments; school prayer
 - abandoning regular order in House of Representatives and, 55
 - abandoning regular order in Senate and, 47–52
 - from 1986–96, 101–102
 - from 2001–4, 131
 - gridlock and, 9
 - Helms Amendment on National Endowment of the Arts (1989) and, 108
 - in Republican Senate majority (1981–84), xxi, 71–74, 161
 - in Senate (1981–2 vs. 2003–4), 133
 - in Senate majority party (1978–82), 71
 - inclusion of omnibus bills and, 56–60
 - majority party weakness and, 6
- In Omnibus dependent variable, 123
- Inhofe, James (Senator, R-OK), 119
- Interior bill, 30
 - in 1982, 85
 - in 1989, 107, 108
 - in 1996, 21
 - in 2002, 139–141, 141n9
- Iraq, 137, 141
- Jeffords, Jim (Senator, R/D-VT), 101, 136–137
- Jenkins, Jeffrey, 10
- Kennedy, Teddy (Senator, D-MA), 13, 144
- Kernell, Samuel, 126

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)

176

Index

- Krehbiel, Keith, 5
- Krutz, Glen, 26, 27, 46, 121
- Labor–Health and Human Services bill, 41, 51–52, 73, 107n10
- in 1981, 75
- in 1989, 106, 108
- in 1995, 112–114, 129
- in 1996, 21, 116
- in 2001, 138
- in 2003, 146
- in 2004, 153
- lame duck session
- in 1982, 85
- in 2002, 141
- in 2004, 155
- lawmaking, 165
- Leahy, Patrick (Senator, D-VT), 33n18
- Lee, Frances, 10
- Legislative Branch bill, 82n26
- in 1981, 75
- limited influence theory, 2, 6–7, 33–35, 37, 99, 163
- amendment decline in, 34
- electoral vs. policy goals in regular order abandoning and, 35n19
- from 2001–4, 131
- gap in omnibus bills from 1988 to 1995 and, 129
- in 1996, 120
- preference for regular order and passing individual spending bills and, 160
- Senate majority party strength and, 164
- veto threats and SAPs and, 125–128
- limited influence theory, statistical test of, 35–36, 37, 38–39
- abandoning of regular order in the Senate and, 46–52
- abandoning regular order in House of Representatives, 52–56
- amendment voting and, 61–65
- coefficients and confidence intervals (Senate, 2006–12), 49
- data and variables in, 40–46
- federal deficit variable, 45
- House and Senate party characteristics correlation matrix, 56
- legislative influence of Senate majority party and, 67–69
- model expectations and results, 68
- no floor votes and trouble on floor correlation, 56
- no floor votes variable, 40–41
- omnibus bill inclusion and, 56–60
- Lott, Trent (Senator, R-MS), 11–14, 114, 116
- on government shutdowns, 32
- on omnibus bills, 29
- on regular order, 32
- on voting on amendments, 29
- Madison, James, 15
- majority party power.
- See also* homogeneity, majority party; ideological distance and divides; limited influence theory; majority party strength; majority party weakness; margin of control; Senate majority party appropriations process in study of, 2
- in 1996, 120
- in Congress, 3–7
- in Senate vs. House, 2
- limited influence theory test and, 38–40
- vs. Presidential influence, 159
- majority party strength, 35, 100, 105, 110
- legislative influence and, 3–7, 164
- of Democratic Republican majority (1988–94), 129–130
- majority party weakness, 3, 100, 105, 112, 120, 161
- legislative influence and, 3–7
- omnibus bill creation and, 7, 82, 97–98, 129–130, 157, 161–162
- margin of control, 42, 56, 60, 161
- abandoning regular order in House of Representatives and, 55

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

177

- abandoning regular order in Senate and, 47–52
 - from 1975–2012, 43
 - from 1975–90, 74
 - from 1988–94, 129
 - from 2001–4, xxii, 131, 133, 134, 158
 - in 1981, xxi
 - in 1996, 114
 - in 2002, 145
 - inclusion of omnibus bills and, 56–60
 - return to regular order in 1996 and, 103
- Mathias, Charles (Senator, R-MD), 71
- Mayhew, David, 4
- McCain, John (Senator, R-AZ), 138
- McConnell, Mitch, 30
- media company expansion, 149, 150, 153, 158
- Military Construction bill, 29
- Monroe, Nathan, 10
- multicollinearity, 55–56, 55n6
- Murray, Patty (Senator, D-WA), 137–139
- negative agenda control, 4, 9, 10, 34, 61, 67, 67n10
- Neustadt, Richard, 121
- Nickles, Don (Senator, R-OK), 90, 141
- no floor votes, 57–61
 - abandoning of regular order in Senate and, 46–52
 - abandoning regular order in House of Representatives and, 52–56
 - from 1975–2012, 23
 - inclusion of omnibus bills and, 56–60
 - legislative history of bills in 1981, 76
 - legislative history of bills in 1982, 82
 - legislative history of bills in 1983, 88
 - legislative history of bills in 1984, 92
 - legislative history of bills in 1995, 111
 - legislative history of bills in 1996, 115
 - omnibus bill correlation and, 124
 - variable of no floor vote in limited influence theory test, 40–41
- North American Free Trade Agreement, 137
- Office of Management and Budget, 108, 115, 122
- omnibus bills, 41
 - advantages of, 26
- Appropriations Committee
 - opposition to, 31
- as non-preferred strategy for rank-and-file members, 28, 31
- bipartisan support for, 10, 33, 33n18, 38, 65–69, 163
- bipartisan support for (1981–84), 71, 88, 97
- bipartisan support for (2002–4), 143–144, 158–159
- Byrd on, 122, 159
- conference report method of creating, 19, 25
- constraints on decision to use, 31–32
- creation of in times of majority party weakness, 3, 7, 23, 35, 82, 97–98, 129–130, 157, 158, 161–162
- Daschle on, 28, 163
- decision-making in Congress and, 26
- defined, 41
- divided control of Congress and, 7, 11, 45, 109, 158
- effect on appropriation process of, 165
- election year inclusion and, 60
- end of in 1986–87, 99, 100
- from 1975–2012, 23, 42
- from 1975–76, 75
- from 1975–90, 74
- from 1981–84, 70, 99

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)

178

Index

omnibus bills (*cont.*)

from 1994–2012, 132

from 2001–4, 132, 158

from 2001–8, 136

gap in creation of from 1988–94,

xxi, 103, 162

garnering support as advantage

attributed to, 27

government shutdown in 1995 and,

110–114

gridlock prevention and, 27, 30, 33

hard legislative times use of, 27, 28

House of Representatives and, 36

in 1981, 82

in 1983, 88–92

in 1984, 92–97

in 1986, 74

in 1987, 74, 104n4

in 1990, 108–110

in 1995, 130

in 1996, 21–23

in 1997, 22t1.1

in 2002, 139–145

in 2003, 145–153

in 2004, 153–158

interviews with policymakers

on, 28–33

lack of study on reasons for rise

in, 26

Leahy on, 33n18

legislative history of bills in

1981, 76

legislative history of bills in

1982, 82

legislative history of bills in

1983, 88

legislative history of bills in

1984, 92

legislative history of bills in

1995, 111

legislative history of bills in

1996, 115

limited influence theory statistical

test and, 56–60

limiting of amendments by, 29–31

need for future research on creation

of, 164–165

need for reform of Senate

procedures and, 165

no floor vote correlation with, 124

omnibus packages defined, 56

opposition from the minority party

and, 159

opposition levels to

(1979–2012), 65

overview of creation process

of, 18–21

party characteristics and, 58

perception of as routine procedure

by Congress, xxii, 46

Presidential influence and, xxi, 114,

120, 130, 163

Presidential vetoes and, 120–125

reduced amending opportunities

and, 29–36, 162–163

reduced transparency due to, 163

return to in 1996, 99, 114–120

Senate majority's use of, 3

shocks to the political system

and, 129

similarities with continuing

resolutions, 21

omnibus packages. *See* omnibus bills

opportunistic bargaining, xxii, 100,

101, 120–125, 128, 165

overtime pay, 134, 136, 147, 150,

152, 154, 157

Packwood, Bob (Senator, R-OR),

71, 90–92

Participation in Congress (Hall), 11

partisan policy goals, 33

partisan theory of the Senate, 7, 165

Polsby, Nelson, 11

Power of the Purse (Fenno), 11, 11n3

Presidential influence, 36, 163.

See also opportunistic bargaining

need for future research on, 164

of Clinton, 114, 120, 123, 125, 159

of George W. Bush, 132, 158, 159

omnibus bills and, xxi,

120–125, 130

SAPs and, 126–129

veto threats and, 121–127

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

179

- vs. majority party control, 159
- Proxmire, William (Senator), 79
- Pryor, David (Senator, D-AR), 86
- Reagan, Ronald, 70
 - appropriations process (1981) and, 75–82
 - appropriations process (1982) and, 82–88
 - appropriations process (1983) and, 88–92
 - appropriations process (1984) and, 92–97
 - on omnibus bills, 101, 122, 130
 - resumption of regular order and, 99
 - veto threats of, 96, 104–105
- regular order, 3, 17, 18, 30, 161
 - as preferred, standard procedure of majority party, 21, 139
 - benefit of, 31
 - defined, 3
 - from 1975–2012, 23
 - gridlock in, 32
 - House of Representatives and, 36
 - in 1989, 105–108
 - in 1995, 112
 - in 1996, 21–23
 - in 1997, 221.1
 - in 2001, 139
 - in 2003, 145, 148
 - preference for passing individual spending bills and, 160
 - Presidential vetoes and, 120–125
 - problems in passing in the Senate, 29
 - return to in 1988, 99, 105, 109–110, 129
 - return to in 1996, 103
 - risks of amendment votes in, 32
 - SAPs and, 129
 - shift to omnibus bills from, 25
 - veto threats and, 125
 - weakness and difficulty managing the Senate floor and, 82
- regular order, abandoning, 3, 18, 41, 46
- amendment voting and, 61–65
- amendment voting regression analysis (1981–2012), 63
- electoral vs. policy goals in limited influence theory and, 35119
- frequently amended bills (1981–2012), 63
- from 2001–4, 131
- homogeneity and, 133
- in 1983, 92
- in 1996, 21–23
- in House of Representatives, 36, 52–56, 161
- models of in Senate, 46–52
- need for future research on, 164–165
- negative correlation with majority power strength, 35
- party characteristics and (1975–90), 74
- reduced amending and, 162–163
- SAPs and, 126–129
- Senate majority party characteristics (1986–96), 102
- Senate majority weakness and difficulty managing floor and, 7, 23, 160–161
- Senate majority weakness and difficulty managing floor and (2001–4), 136, 157, 158
- Reid, Harry (Senator, D-NV), 147, 165
- Republican Congressional majority in 1994, 110
- Republican Senate majority, 71, 76, 120, 129–130, 142, 161
- from 2002–4, 145
- government shutdown of 1995 and, 114
- ideological distance and divides in (1978–82), 71
- ideological distance and divides in (1981–84), xxi, 71–74, 161
- in 1981, xxi
- in 1995, 131
- in 1996, 21–23, 115
- in 2004, 153

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-06315-0 - Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the U.S. Senate

Peter Hanson

Index

[More information](#)

180

Index

- Republicans, 2.
 See also appropriations process;
 Congress; Republican Senate
 majority
 roll call votes, 39, 65
- S.J. Res 194, 90
 Santorum, Rick (Senator, R-PA), 101
 SAPs. *See* Statements of
 Administration Policy (SAPs)
 school integration, 73
 school prayer, 70, 73, 74, 75, 80, 85,
 96, 97, 161
 in 1984, 94–95
 school vouchers, 112, 113, 148, 150
 Senate. *See also* amendments;
 appropriations process; Congress;
 Democratic Senate majority;
 limited influence theory; majority
 party power; margin of control;
 Republican Senate majority
 appropriations bills approval
 process in, 17
 debate in, 2, 8
 difficulty of passing omnibus bills
 in, 29
 need for partisan theory of, 7, 165
 party characteristics and omnibus
 bill inclusion (1975–2012), 57
 reform of appropriations process
 and, 165
 reform of omnibus bills and, 166
 role of in political system, 1
 rules of in legislating, 1
 Senate Appropriations Committee,
 15–17, 113
 changes to after 9/11, 134
 evolution of subcommittee
 jurisdictions in 2000s and, 134
 in 1982, 87
 in 1983, 89
 opposition to omnibus bills of, 31
 Senate majority leaders, 11–13
 interviews with, 11
 Senate majority party, 28, 38,
 40, 100, 125, 128, 129–130.
 See also Democratic Senate
 majority; limited influence
 theory; majority party power;
 Republican Senate Majority;
 Senate
 agenda control and influence
 and, 7–11
 ideological positions in from
 1978–82, 71
 influence of as defensive vs.
 offensive strategy, 164
 majority size and homogeneity
 (1986–96), 101
 omnibus bills creation as
 manipulation of appropriations
 process, 3
 party characteristics and
 abandoning of regular order
 (1986–96), 102
 protecting of reputation in, 3,
 32–34, 160
 revisionist account of strong agenda
 control of, 9, 10, 34
 shaping of legislative outcomes by,
 2–3, 67–69
 strength vs. influence in, 164
 traditional view of legislative
 influence of, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10,
 34, 67–69
 weakness in as cause of regular
 order abandoning, 23, 35, 136,
 160–161
 weakness of and lawmaking
 process, 163
 weakness of and omnibus bills
 creation and, 3, 7, 35, 99, 165
 weakness of in 2001–4, 131
 September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
 134, 138, 144
 Sinclair, Barbara, 8, 9, 26, 27, 121
 Smith, Steven, 9
 Specter, Arlen (Senator, R-PA), 101
 Statements of Administration Policy
 (SAPs), 104, 123, 125–129
 defined, 104n3
 frequency of from 1985–2004, 126

| | |
|---|--|
| <i>Index</i> | 181 |
| Stevens, Ted (Senator, R-AK), 14, 85,
101, 119, 142, 146 | in 2003, 150
in 2004, 154 |
| strength of majority party.
<i>See</i> majority party
strength | <i>Unorthodox Lawmaking</i> (Sinclair),
26, 27 |
| Symms, Steven (Senator, R-ID), 72 | veto threats, 121–127
from Clinton, 123
from George H. W. Bush, 105, 107,
108, 125
from George W. Bush, 132, 150
from Reagan, 96, 104–105 |
| Transportation bill
in 1982, 85
in 2001, 137–139, 138n2
in 2003, 147 | weakness of majority party.
<i>See</i> majority party weakness |
| Treasury-Postal bill, 73
abortion amendment and
(1983), 88–92
in 1981, 75
in 1982, 85
in 1983, 88–92
in 1996, 21, 116 | Weicker, Lowell (Senator, R-CT), xxi,
71, 77–80, 90–92
in 1984, 96–97 |
| Treasury-Transportation bill
in 2001, 144 | <i>Why Not Parties?</i> (Monroe and
Roberts), 9 |