A central aim of this book is to integrate the two most important aspects of the early Buddhist notion of liberation: philosophy and meditation. While the early Buddhist texts normally state that awakening involves the perfection of both philosophical understanding and deep meditative concentration, traditional and modern scholars of early Buddhism have exhibited a marked tendency to divorce the two: the Buddha’s achievement is generally understood as either a philosophical understanding – which meditation can, possibly, allow one to realize more fully – or a meditative experience that philosophy cannot capture and to which it is fundamentally alien. In what follows I will attempt to demonstrate and explain how, for the early Buddhist tradition, philosophy was not only an integral part of meditation but even the acme of meditative practice. This is not because philosophy was for the early Buddhists an intuitive form of wisdom, but because philosophical analysis was used by them very differently than the way it most commonly functions today. For them, philosophical analysis was meant to change the very structure of perception; the most meaningful and valued moments of meditation, those in which liberation took place, were composed of direct perceptions of embodied philosophical understandings. These were, in fact, philosophical perceptions, not philosophical understandings.

The main point this study will make is that the “four noble truths” (4NTs) were originally not four “truths” but rather four elements in a coherent set of meditative observations. These meditative observations were not concerned in any way with the doctrine of the 4NTs as it is commonly taught; that life is pain, the cause of which is desire and that will end in nibbāna, which itself will be attained once the noble eightfold path is perfected. If the early Buddhist texts are to be trusted, it appears that the original set of “four observations” was rather a unique, highly specified method of reflection, which was practiced to perfection in a meditative setting. These observations focused on particular, concrete,
2 The Structural Relationship between Philosophy and Meditation

and specific mental contents. It will take some work before this point can be fully fleshed out, and in order to get us started, we will begin by examining the most important context in which the four observations are at work – in the central theory of liberation in the Nikāyas. This will be the main focus of the present chapter.

At the outset, we must deal with a problem of terminology. I employ the terms I have used so far – liberation, philosophy, meditation – with a good degree of dissatisfaction, not to say disillusionment. Although I agree that the Buddhist path is or can be highly transformative and meaningful, I find notions such as “liberation,” “enlightenment,” and “awakening” overused, laden with fantasy, and inherently vague. These last terms, as I believe they are used today, all suggest that “liberation” is a fixed and final event, which involves a complete knowledge of ultimate truth, an absolute sense of freedom or joy, or a full achievement of the true goal for all mankind. But liberation may be something more specific, less absolute, but nevertheless still deeply meaningful and transformative, which relates to particular persons and cultural contexts. Indeed, the Buddhist texts even speak of “wrong liberation” (micchā vimutti) and count many types of liberation, which suggests that we are not speaking only of one definitive event. We may say that liberation is an ideal the texts correspond with.

Furthermore, while there is no reason to doubt that the Buddha had profound liberating experiences, which apparently included a confident sense of realization, calm, and well-being and which must have stimulated undeniable mental and emotional change, the available terms we have to characterize these experiences – such as “religious,” “spiritual,” or “mystical” – all introduce a wide range of associations that are irrelevant to the context. At the time of his so-called awakening, for instance, the Buddha had yet to found a “religion” and his experience may have been just as “corporeal” as it was “spiritual.” What “mystical” means is

1 The Mahācattārisika-sutta of the MN (117) demonstrates a profound distinction between Western and Indian notions of “liberation.” In this text (MN III.77) the Buddha speaks of “right” and “wrong” “liberation,” caused, ultimately, by right or wrong views. The very fact that the term “wrong liberation” can be conceived of suggests that “liberation” can have many textures and that it was not understood only as a yes-or-no, black-or-white event. The term also appears a number of times in the Sallekha-sutta (MN 8) as well as at SN II.169, SN V.20, V.38, and AN II.221–25. It is particularly common in the “book of tens” of the AN since it is annexed together with “wrong knowledge (micchā-nāna)” to the eight corresponding “wrong” counterparts of the eightfold noble path to form a list of ten. In this context the well-known list of “eight liberations,” best known from the Mahāniddāna-sutta of the DN, should also be mentioned. See also Collins’s (1995: 160–66) illuminating suggestion to view nibbāna as a process, rather than as a final event and the discussion of different types of liberation in de Silva (1978) and Análayo (2009: 148–56).

2 Collins’s (1995; 2010) notion of nirvāṇa as narrative and systematic “closure” is of interest in this respect.
itself quite a mystical question, and the spontaneous meanings coming out of the monotheistic creeds (such as “union with the Godhead”) or out of Occidental philosophy (“what cannot be captured by words”) are out of place. The notion of “trance” is also problematic since in the Buddhist case we are speaking of experiences that involve a nearly inconceivable amount of control and that are designed to the smallest detail. Similar problems arise in relation to the terms “philosophy” and “meditation” themselves, both reserved for distinctly Western forms of scientific, analytical, or religious inquiries. This should remind us that all too often our immediately available concepts, as well as the thought patterns we are accustomed to, conceal more than they reveal and leave us dangling in our own culturally conditioned world of religious meaning.

A short exposition of the central terms I refer to as “meditation” and “philosophy” is therefore in order so as to facilitate an appreciation of the types of mental attitudes we will be discussing. The early Buddhist texts (I explain just what I intend by the “early” in the final section of this chapter) guide the Buddha’s students through highly specified forms of mental habitation, generally dubbed in English “meditation” while terms such as “trance,” “concentration,” or “meditative/mystical states” are also common. “Concentration” conveys the gist of the Pàli (or Sanskrit) samàdhi, although samàdhi has a more specific sense than the associations brought about by the common English use of the word. Samàdhi comes from the root sam+ā<dbhā>, meaning literally “to put together,” and thus usually denotes a state in which the mind becomes fully concentrated and is characterized by “one-pointedness” (ekaggatā). Samàdhi involves a markedly quiet state of mind in which no distractions occur and in which mental contents are experienced in exceptionally rich fashion. Specifically, the Buddhist texts speak of a series of samàdhi states termed jhāna (Skt dhyāna), derived from Sanskrit dhi (root dhyai), which denotes an intelligence that can be more theoretical or intuitive. In this particular context, jhāna speaks of specific states of mind in which awareness is deeply concentrated, self-contained, powerful, rich, and meaningful. In these jhānic states, thought and certain forms of sensation are said to subside while there is an evident sense of purified, calm well-being. It is precisely in these states of jhāna (or in similar states outlined in

---

1. The Relationship between Philosophy and Meditation

---

1. Analayo (2003: 72) rather speaks of the term coming from the verb samàdhati, “put together, to collect.” As this study focuses on Pàli scriptures, I will generally mention the terms as they are used in Pàli without supplying their Sanskrit equivalent.

the texts but defined differently) that true knowledge is said to arise, or that philosophy is said to function. Indeed, this is an enigma we will have to address.

The early texts describe a second central type of meditation, which relies on sustained reflection and analysis. This method aims to develop sati, “mindfulness,” and was later referred to as vipassanā or “insight meditation.” Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion of this second type of meditative practice, and there I will also show how it connects to samādhi. Suffice it for now to say that this method involves intense observation of mental content, which is aided by a familiarity with Buddhist conceptual schemas. There are other important terms for meditation in the early texts, most importantly bhāvāna (literally “bringing into being” or “practice”), which are of lesser concern for the present context. In the present chapter, which focuses on the early theory of liberation, the meditations of the samādhi genre are our primary interest.

Naturally, we may wonder just what kind of philosophy can be contemplated in spheres so remote from where it is normally cultivated.5 What should we make of a philosophy that does not involve active thinking, which in some sense is beyond words? Before we attempt to answer these questions, we must appreciate that our common intuitions about “philosophy” are somewhat removed from the corresponding Buddhist approaches. In the modern West, philosophy may be defined as the persistent, patient effort to capture truth with words. At least as it is practiced today, philosophy is primarily a method of analysis that relies on arguments and carefully reasoned thinking. It is thus inherently conceptual, and truth, if it can ever be obtained securely, relies on a logical structure, whose building blocks are arguments.6 While Buddhist philosophers practiced this sort of enterprise in different stages of Buddhism’s philosophical maturation,7 including in its early stages, early Buddhist thought should be seen as an instantiation of ancient philosophy, which has a strong practical orientation, and which aims to transform

6 According to Siderits (2007: 5), “Philosophy, then, is the systematic investigation of questions in ethics, metaphysics and epistemology (as well as several related fields). It involves using analysis and argumentation in systematic and reflective ways.” For Siderits, what makes someone a philosopher, including in Buddhism, is that his claims are subject to rational scrutiny. Studies such as Morgan (2000) suggest that there is more to philosophy than reasoned argument and that ancient philosophy in particular is closely related to myth. Scholars of Buddhist philosophy such as Siderits, however, hope to show that Buddhism is philosophical by more modern standards.
7 Kapstein (2001: esp. ch. 1); Siderits (2007).
human life. The value of such philosophy does not lie in abstract, theoretical reflection; it is not meant to be put in a book, but is meant to be lived – that is, it is meant to be cultivated, practiced, and experienced. Early Buddhist philosophy – “the love of wisdom” we recall, not the love of arguments – is closer in spirit to Socrates drinking the poison he knows will kill him than to modern analytic philosophy. Pierre Hadot describes the character of the ancient, classical philosophy of the Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman periods in the following words:

In the view of all philosophical schools, mankind’s principal cause of suffering, disorder, and unconsciousness were the passions: that is, unregulated desires and exaggerated fears. . . . Philosophy thus appears, in the first place as a therapeutic of the passions. . . . Each school had its own therapeutic method, but all of them linked their therapeutic to a profound transformation of the individual’s mode of seeing and being. The object of spiritual exercises is precisely to bring about this transformation.9

We will see that early Buddhist thought is an extreme form of this practically oriented, personally relevant, lived philosophy of “spiritual exercises.”

In Indian Buddhist cultures of mental cultivation, philosophy becomes a form of being, or more specifically a “way of seeing” (Skt. dāśāṇā, dṛṣṭī). Terms such as paññā, nāṇa, and aṭṭa, which can all mean something like “knowledge” or “understanding,” tend to refer more to concrete knowledge than to abstract forms of thinking. When one “knows,” for example, that one’s body is not-one’s-self (anatta), this act of knowing refers to a particular way of observing the body. This vision obviously possesses theoretical significance, but the latter is secondary to the primary practical one. As Halbfass (1988: ch. 15, 1991: ch. 7) has shown, this approach to philosophy is characteristic of the Indian philosophical milieu as a whole.10

---

8 Jordan (1990) speaks of contrasts between ancient and modern philosophy, the first and most meaningful of which is the practical aspect of ancient, primarily Greek, philosophy, as opposed to the theoretical orientation of the modern one. This difference has an institutional counterpart in the modern philosopher’s job at the university, compared to the ancient learning in distinct schools. According to Jordan, the ultimate goal of early philosophy was to create understanding in a robust practical sense. See also Hadot (1996: 61): “One cannot read an ancient author the way one does a contemporary author”; as well as Hadot (2002).

9 Hadot (1996: 83). Kapstein (2001: 7) quotes Hadot as well: “For Plato, training for death is a spiritual exercise which consists in changing one’s point of view. We are to change from a vision of things dominated by individual passions to a representation of the world governed by the universality and objectivity of thought. This constitutes a conversion (metastrophe) brought about with the totality of the soul.”

10 See especially Halbfass’s (1988: 272) remarks on the Buddhist approach to philosophy and on the “soteriological negligence” involved in pure speculation (dṛṣṭidṛṣṭiḥ). See also Kapstein’s (2001: ch. 11) discussion of Heinrich Zimmer’s approach to Indian philosophy and to philosophy in
6 The Structural Relationship between Philosophy and Meditation

Returning to our main theme, the early Buddhist notion of philosophy is most easily appreciated in the context of the discussion of liberation. We will carefully analyze the central theory of liberation in the early texts below. For now, let us begin by getting some sense of its most salient features. The texts first relate the successive entrance into four deep meditative states, the four jhānas. At this point it will do to look at the second and the fourth of these. The Buddha says:

Following the quieting of thought and analysis, I entered upon and abided in the second jhāna, which is the inner serenity of mind that is unified, devoid of thought and analysis, born of concentration, and characterized by pleasure and joy.

... Following the abandonment of [bodily] pleasure and pain, and following the earlier passing away of mental pleasure and pain, I entered and abided in the fourth jhāna, in which there is no pleasure and pain and which is characterized by equanimity, mindfulness and purity.

The terse words of the text must be examined attentively. Clearly these are limpid, excessively calm states of mind, which are integrally distinct from normal, waking consciousness. Here the mind becomes unified, serene, concentrated, and mindful; it transcends conceptuality and sensation at least to a substantial degree. Yet it is in these states that the texts now speak of the awakening to liberating knowledge. However puzzling this may be, the texts are unambiguous about the possibility of knowledge arising in these states as they now describe three understandings that take place in the fourth jhāna. The first is the Buddha’s perception of his own former births; the second is a penetration of the law of karmic determination. The third knowledge, the event of enlightenment, is this:

Then, when my concentrated mind was pure, clean, untarnished, free of defilements, supple, workable, steady, beyond vacillation, I directed the mind to the knowledge of the destruction of the inflows. I realized truly “this is suffering,” I realized truly “this is the arising of suffering,” I realized truly “this is the cessation of suffering,” I realized truly “this is the path that leads to the cessation of suffering.” I realized truly “these are inflows,” I realized truly “this is the arising of inflows,” I realized truly “this is the cessation of inflows,” I realized truly “this is the path that leads to the cessation of inflows.” Knowing and seeing thus, my mind was liberated from the inflows of desire, from the inflows of [craving for] existence and from the inflows of ignorance.

general, which is in line with the “philosophies of life” or “transformative philosophy” of philosophers like Nietzsche, Dilthey, and most importantly Schopenhauer.
1. The Relationship between Philosophy and Meditation

The connection between philosophical understanding and deep, quiet meditation is the chief characteristic of this approach to liberation. The Buddha here realizes the reality of suffering and comprehends the causal processes that bring about its arising and cessation. He attains a full grasp of Buddhist philosophical truth.

If we are to take the tradition seriously, it must be explained how the authors of this seminal presentation of enlightenment felt that philosophical understanding can occur in such a quiet state of mind. Nonetheless, there is no scholarly work that offers a convincing or even a plausible explanation of what the occurrence of wisdom in samādhi might actually mean. How can it be that a profound experience of knowledge can occur when the mind is deeply absorbed in a concentrated and almost stilled trance? What does it mean to know something, such as the 4NTs, in a silent mind that has transcended or annulled conceptuality? Rather than attempting to answer these questions, scholars have tended to adopt one of the following two avoidance strategies: either (1) meditation is said to be a preliminary technique of mental cultivation, which precedes the moments of insight and prepares the mind for them or (2) philosophy is said to be epiphenomenal to the liberating experience, which is understood to be a type of samādhi, most commonly of jhāna. When we are in need of a creative explanation for the nature of knowledge in jhāna, the experts on these topics have been inclined to circumvent the problem.11

11 It is important to see that these scholarly positions echo the main ways in which the historical Buddhist traditions inclined to cope with the same difficulty. As Buddhism matured, philosophy developed and jhāna fell from favor. The earlier stages of this process are outlined in Gombrich (1996: ch. 4). See also Sujato (2006). A prime example of this approach is the modern Vipassanā traditions, with their emphasis on correct understanding; see Hart (1987: ch. 7, 8) and Mahasi Sayadaw (1990: 50). The dismissal of jhāna is strong in Mahāyāna Buddhism as well. In Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakavatāra, for instance, the chapter on dhīna includes but one verse compared to the 226 verses of the following chapter on wisdom.

Other traditions retained the notion that enlightenment fully transcends regular forms of human cognition and is thus similar to jhānic stillness. Candrakīrti, who was foundational for the early Tibetan Prāsangika tradition, is again a good example (see Almogi [2009]; Dunne [1996]; MacDonald [2009]; Vose [2009]). Examples from non-Mahāyāna traditions demand too much interpretation regarding what is early or late in meditation theory. That this position was raised already in the early Buddhist meditative context is evidenced by SNip 875–77.

An exception to the dissociation of wisdom and samādhi – and there were surely many more – is the approach of the Sarvāstivādin abhidharma as discussed in Cox (1992). Traditional approaches often employ an alternate application of samatha and vipassanā meditations. Relying on texts such as the Anupada-notta (MN iii: III. 26), Crange (1994) suggests that the practitioner applies wisdom after meditative states have been achieved so as to realize their impermanence, suffering, and non-selfhood (216, 262–63). In Crange’s study, wisdom and concentration are intimately related but are practiced one after another rather than simultaneously. See also King (1992: esp. ch. 6), who relies on Buddhaghosa in saying that vipassanā ensures that jhāna will not be a mere yogic trance; Vipassanā is used in jhāna to purify it and maintain its Buddhist emphases.
Let us examine an example for each of the two scholarly strategies of interpretation just outlined. Both examples come from recent books by two of the most distinguished and widely read scholars of early Buddhism – Richard Gombrich’s *What the Buddha Thought* and Johannes Bronkhorst’s *Buddhist Teachings in India*. Although I find much value in both these works, they both suffer from one fundamental flaw: they allow no real connection between philosophy and meditation.

The front cover of Gombrich’s *What the Buddha Thought* exemplifies much of what is primary for our concerns. In minimalist style, on a bright white background, only two items appear (aside from the name of the author): the title of the book and a picture of a beautiful Thai bronze of the Buddha. The straightforward title, which emphasizes the Buddha as a thinker and a philosopher, appears far removed from the image of the Buddha next to which it is placed. Like so many other artistic presentations of the Buddha, particularly those made south of the Himalayas, this statue presents the Buddha in serene meditation. It should be evident to anyone who gazes at this Thai portrayal of the Buddha that he is doing anything but *thinking*. In fact, the competent artist probably wished to portray the Buddha in mental realms that are precisely beyond the ones in which thinking occurs. This non-thinking Buddha is seated in meditation and is at most observing or reflecting on the mental events he experiences in his focused and stilled mind. These reflections, if they are at all intended, may lend themselves to a “philosophy” when they are abstracted from the mental context in which they take place, but it would be quite difficult to understand them as the Buddha’s “thought” in the sense intended by Gombrich.

This discrepancy on the cover is representative of the book’s contents. In the opening paragraph of his preface, Gombrich, in characteristically commendable clarity, states: “This book argues that the Buddha was one of the most brilliant and original thinkers of all time.” (p. vii). Gombrich proceeds to class the Buddha with “Plato and Aristotle, the giants who created the tradition of Western Philosophy” (p. 1), and later even defines the Buddha as “a remarkable brain” (p. 17). Referring to a question he raised in an earlier publication as to whether the Buddha intended a philosophy, Gombrich admits that the Buddha may not have been “interested in *presenting* a philosophically coherent doctrine” since “the evidence that his concern was pragmatic, to guide his audience’s actions, is overwhelming.” But Gombrich is also certain “that the evidence that he had

---

8 The Structural Relationship between Philosophy and Meditation

On page 4, Gombrich adds David Hume to this short but august list.
evolved such a structure of thought and that it underpinned his pragmatic advice is no less compelling.”

The pragmatic and even anti-metaphysical approach to the Buddha’s “thought” is a popular theme in the modern study of Buddhism. But the pragmatic element in the Buddha’s teachings expresses only an initial, rather timid step in the direction of understanding Buddhist philosophy in its true context as a meditative phenomenon. It is therefore important to notice Gombrich’s removal of meditation – specifically *samādhi* or *jhāna* meditation – from the context of the discussion. Gombrich does emphasize that the Buddha’s teachings are not abstract reasonings but rather that they relate to conscious human experience. Nonetheless, he ignores the fact that from the perspective of the texts, the most dramatic events in which philosophy functions – when the Buddha becomes enlightened – take place in *samādhi*.

The difficulty would have been less pressing if Gombrich had been less emphatic about his wish to appreciate the Buddha in his own historical context. Gombrich is clear that he sees his method as historical (p. 4) and that he is attempting “a successful interpretation of the Buddha... as the source for a successful history of Buddhist ideas” (p. 3). Moreover,
The lack of attention devoted to meditation in Gombrich’s book is vexing since he himself supplied the most compelling account of the way in which “insight worsted concentration” in early Buddhist spiritual culture. In this important publication, Gombrich (1996: ch. 4) convincingly argued that enlightenment was not originally conceived to be possible without \( \text{samādhi} \) meditation and that it was only later that monks began to contemplate a spiritual option of “release [only] through wisdom” (\( \text{paññā-vimutti} \)). Gombrich’s near dismissal of meditation is also odd because What the Buddha Thought offers what may be the most forceful articulation of the position that parts of the Pāli Canon can be relied on as historical documents (Chapter 7). Gombrich recommends a critical reliance on the texts, yet any presentation of the Buddha’s thought that is based on these texts must take into account that the awakening to the reality of Buddhist truth is said to take place in deep meditation. Ultimately, the disregard of meditative praxis remains a shortcoming in Gombrich’s effort at a historical presentation of the Buddha’s thought.

The second dominant scholarly approach to the early Buddhist path to liberation stresses \( \text{samādhi} \) meditation at the expense of philosophical truth. Studies such as Paul Griffiths (1981; 1983; 1986), Tilmann Vetter (1988), Alexander Wynne (2007), and Johannes Bronkhorst (2009) all display inspiring historical sensitivity in emphasizing the centrality of meditative \( \text{jhānic} \) states in the context of the early Buddhist path to awakening.\(^{18}\) Not only do these scholars emphasize \( \text{jhāna} \), but they go so far as to view liberation as the experience of \( \text{jhāna} \) itself (or of other forms of deep \( \text{samādhi} \)).\(^{19}\) Thus, they suppose not only that philosophy and knowledge are unable to contribute to these experiences but that philosophy is inherently alien to the meditative experiences described by the texts. These scholars read the textual descriptions of \( \text{jhāna} \) in a way that allows for no conceptual content, perhaps even for no cognitive content whatsoever. Such an understanding is articulated in exceptional force with regard to the state called “the cessation of perception and feeling” (\( \text{saṅñasāvedayita-nirodha} \)), which is normally said to follow such placid states as the “base of nothingness” (\( \text{ākiñcaññāyatana} \)) and “the base of neither perception


\(^{19}\) Among these scholars, Bronkhorst and Vetter emphasize the fourth \( \text{jhāna} \), Wynne focuses on the formless attainments of “the base of nothingness” and “the base of neither perception nor non-perception,” and Griffiths focuses on the state of “cessation.” Harvey (1995: ch. 10–12) emphasizes the concept of cessation in the understanding of early Buddhist theories of liberation as well.