

1 Was the Nanking Massacre a Fabrication of the Tokyo Trial?

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I.

The Japanese history textbook controversy that took place 20 years ago caused a strong resurgence of the Japanese right wing.^{**1} In their clamour for justifying Japan's invasion of China, the Japanese right wing's main point of attack was the denial of the Nanking Massacre. *The Fabrication of the Nanking Massacre* (hereafter referred to as "*The Fabrication*") by Tanaka Masaaki is the most representative work in this genre of revisionist criticism. In order fundamentally to deny the Nanking Massacre, *The Fabrication* made up a so-called "fact", that is, that the world had never heard of the massacre before the Trial and that it had been completely fabricated by the Tokyo Trial. In the seventh chapter of *The Fabrication*, "The Tokyo Trial", there is a section entitled "the 'Nanking Massacre' as it First Became Known". As it is not very long, the entire section is quoted below:

In December of the 12th year of Showa (1937), both the outer and inner defence lines of Nanking, China's capital, were easily broken through under a blitzkrieg attack by the Imperial Japanese Army. Nanking fell on 13 December the same year. A jubilant Japanese nation celebrated the victory. People paraded in the streets waving banners, holding lanterns, celebrating the victory, and hailing their magnificent military achievements.

But eight years later, Japan was defeated in the Great East Asia War, being forced to surrender under the attack of the Allies. This defeat led to a trial against Japan called "The International Military Tribunal for the Far East" initiated by

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¹ On 26 June 1982, major Japanese newspapers including *Asahi Shimbun* (《朝日新聞》) reported the results of the textbook authorisation process conducted by the Ministry of Education of Japan, which was announced the previous day. The results were strongly criticised by China, Korea, and other countries for downplaying the invasion. But Japan's right wing insisted that the media "misreported" the incident, in particular with reference to the change in the word "invaded" to "advanced". Tanaka Masaaki's book is more usually known in English as *What Really Happened in Nanking: The Refutation of a Common Myth* (1987).

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the 11 victorious Allies. Up until then, there had been no precedent of victorious nations subjecting defeated nations to an international trial. The defeated countries of World War II, namely Germany and Japan, were subjected to such international trials.

Japan was unilaterally tried for war crimes against the world, actual or fabricated, committed during a period of 17 years, from 1 January of the third year of Showa (1928) to 2 September of the twentieth year of Showa (1945) when Japan signed the surrender agreement.

During the trial, it was alleged that the Japanese Army committed all sorts of inhuman acts in Nanking, massacring hundreds of thousands of Chinese including women and children. The atrocities, which included arson, violence, rape and looting, continued for seven weeks. *It was through the Tokyo Trial that the Japanese people learnt about these “appalling facts” for the first time* [emphasis in the original text]. On hearing this, the Japanese people were shocked and felt deep guilt and shame.

Up until then, nobody in Japan had ever mentioned such a massacre in Nanking. Therefore, the shock was like a bolt out of the blue. Even General Matsui Iwane, commander of Central China Expeditionary Force, who was executed in connection to this incident, did not hear this rumour until after Japan was defeated in August 1945. He said:

“Not long after the war, I learnt about the organised mass killings and appalling atrocities committed against ordinary people, POWs and women in Nanking from an American broadcast. I was shocked. I made enquiries with my former subordinates and this news turned out to be fabricated. I never received any report or information concerning this incident when I was still in service in China, nor after I returned to Japan, not until after the war ended. While I was in Shanghai, I frequently met with reporters from different countries and I never heard of this incident; therefore it must be a lie.”

The news of the “Nanking Massacre” was also like a bolt out of the blue for General Matsui Iwane. Confirming General Matsui’s accounts, Lieutenant General Tani Hisao of the 6th Division, tried by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Government because he was held responsible for the “Nanking Massacre” and executed by shooting outside the city of Nanking, said in his affidavit: “I did not know about the atrocities in Nanking until I read about them in the newspaper last year (the 20th year of Showa) and was deeply shocked. Standing as one accused of participating in the battle, this was the first time I heard about this incident.” That is to say, this is an incident even the army commander and the commander of the division knew nothing about.

Not only did the commanders of the troops know nothing about it, over a hundred media staff who entered Nanking with the troops likewise knew nothing about it. The aforementioned special correspondent Hara Shirō from *Yomiuri Shimbun* was also explicit about this. Another military correspondent, Goshima Hirotsugu of *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun*, who was with the first troop that had entered Nanking also published an article called “The Truth of Nanking Massacre” in the magazine *Shūshin* (May Edition of the 43rd year of Showa, 1938). He wrote:

“I heard a rumour about the massacre incident in Nanking not long after I returned to Shanghai from Nanking. I tried to call other newspapers to

confirm this information. However, no newspaper office claimed to have seen or heard about this incident. This might be the result of China's old tricks of exaggeration, or it could be the case that the bodies of those killed in the regular battle in Xia Guan were left in streams and lakes and [this] was later described as slaughter."

None of the commanding officers, soldiers, or even military correspondents knew about this incident, let alone Japanese citizens.

A letter to the author from Sōki Yoshinobu (Kumamoto-shi kokufu) says, "You must be aware that the 'Nanking Massacre' first became known to Japanese people on 9 December 1945 when it was broadcast by NHK.² No one believed it when they first learned of it and many wrote to NHK in protest. It was said that the broadcast script was provided by the occupation army. Therefore, it can only be construed as pure fabrication."³

Why would the Tokyo Trial "lay blame" on Japan? *The Fabrication* believes that the accusers tried to achieve the following three main aims: (1) "To condemn Japanese history." "To condemn the traditional Japanese historical view of Tennoism, i.e., the patriotism, nationalism and clan system centred around the Emperor, as inferior, barbaric and wrong", in order to negate everything about the Japanese history, tradition and culture. (2) "To nurture a sense of guilt." The Trial not only defined all the wars waged abroad since Meiji Restoration as "aggressive wars", it also described Japanese troops as villains committing monstrous crimes like looting, arson, rape and violence, in order to imprint a "sense of previous sins" and "self-flagellation" in the minds of Japanese. (3) To exact "revenge". As Indian judge Pal, who was the only judge out of the 11 judges holding a dissenting view on Japan's crimes, said "This is to fulfil the desire for revenge in the form of legal procedures and it has nothing to do with international justice." It makes one feel as if "we have regressed to the barbaric era several centuries ago".⁴

² NHK is a national broadcasting station. It is their policy to uphold objectiveness and justice and to remain free from political and commercial influences. Therefore, it has constantly been attacked by Japan's right wing since the war. For instance, at the beginning of last year, the right wing's major publication 《正論》 condemned NHK's "treasonable act" of reporting the sexual slavery institutionalised by the Japanese army. (加瀬英明著: "NHKよ、それを売国行為と呼ぶのです", 《正論》, 産経新聞社, Tokyo, April Issue, 2001, pp. 56–67). At the same time, NHK's "neutral" stance has also been criticised by the left wing. For instance, the left wing pointed out that NHK acquiesced to the right wing's pressure and abridged the original programme and affecting its original "meaning" (西野瑠美子著: "NHK -- 消された映像", 《マスコミ市民》, マスコミ市民月刊, Tokyo, May Issue, 2001, pp. 2–9).

³ 田中正明: 《"南京虐殺"の虚構 -- 松井大将の日記をめぐって》, 日本教文社, 1984, pp. 287–289.

⁴ Ibid, pp. 282–284. See also "The Dissenting Opinion of Radhabinod Pall" in T. Brook (ed.) *Documents on the Rape of Nanking* (Ann Arbor, 1999), pp. 269–297

In essence, what *The Fabrication* states is that if it had not been for the Tokyo Trial, Japanese people would not have known about the Nanking Massacre and the associated atrocities committed by the Japanese troops, which included looting, rape and arson, and, therefore, it is hard not to believe that these atrocities were fabricated crimes imposed on Japan by the “victors”. There is no need to refute this argument for the simple reason that “not knowing” about something does not mean that that something is “non-existent”. The existence of the “Nanking Massacre” is an indisputable truth and it cannot be denied simply because it was “not known”. However, the issue is being discussed here for the following four reasons: (a) the claim that “no one had ever heard of it” is itself a fabrication; (b) although the Great Massacre School has attempted to clarify the issue, the clarification has been too brief and simple; (c) *The Fabrication* has attracted many believers and followers through to the present, while “the ignorant public”, including many Japanese people, appear willing to accept this “false rumour”; and (d) as the Nanking Massacre is the most painful chapter in modern Chinese history, it is indeed an issue of great significance.

First, let us take a look at how the viewpoint of *The Fabrication* has been inherited by Japanese right-wing writers in recent years. Yoshimoto Sakae said in his book *Fabrication of Nanking Massacre Demolished*:

This “Nanking Massacre” incident was first mentioned in Japan on 8 December 1945, when *Asahi Shimbun* published a special report provided by the GHQ. It was entitled “The History of Pacific War – the Collapse of Japanese Militarism”, and signed “Presented by SCAP GHQ”. After Nanking fell, it read: “The Japanese troops committed appalling acts of cruelty in the biggest atrocity of modern history. According to eye-witness accounts, it can be confirmed that twenty thousand men, women and children were massacred.” The news was like a sudden shock for the Japanese people.⁵

Below is an extract from a section entitled “the Massacre that was never reported in December 1937” in the book *How the Nanking Massacre was Manufactured – Deception of the Tokyo Trial* written by Fuji Nobuo:

After the fall of Nanking, those who first entered the city not only included 120 or so journalists and photographers, but also some renowned critics, poets and writers including Ōya Sōichi, Kimura Ki, Sugiyama Heisuke, Noyori Hideichi, Saijō Yaso, Kusano Shinpei, Hayashi Fumiko and Ishikawa Tatsuzō. In addition, from spring to summer 1938, more celebrities visited Nanking.

Embedded journalists and photographers often joined the frontlines with soldiers and it was their duty to report the activities and the progress of the battle at the frontline. If there really was a massacre after Japan had occupied Nanking,

⁵ 吉本榮：《南京大虐殺の虚構を碎け》，新風書房，1998，pp. 7–8.

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as the Prosecution claimed, this incident would have been witnessed by military journalists and photographers as well as the above-mentioned critics, poets and writers.⁶

Itakura Yoshiaki wrote in his book *The Truth about Nanking Incident*:

“The Nanking Massacre” first became an issue during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. In fact there had been no such saying as “Nanking Massacre” until that time.⁷

Suzuki Akira said in his book *The New Mystery of “Nanking Massacre”*:

“The International Military Tribunal for the Far East” is more widely known as the “Tokyo Trial”. It was only after the “Tokyo Trial” that the existence of “Nanking Massacre” became widely known to the world.⁸

Matsumura Toshio states in his book *The Big Question about Nanking Massacre*:

By carefully reviewing the documents available during the period from the 12th year of Showa (1937) to the following 13th year (1938), and documents of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and the Nanking Military Tribunal, as well as new data and testimonies prepared by the Chinese after this issue re-emerged, one can clearly see how the hearsay [n.b. in the context of the article, “hearsay” can be interpreted as “rumour”] about this incident developed over the years.⁹

Takemoto Tadao and Ôhara Yasuo state in *The Alleged “Nanking Massacre”*:

No high-ranking Japanese official knew about “Nanking Massacre” at that time.¹⁰

Below is an excerpt from *History the Textbooks Do Not Teach*, published by the Liberal View of History Study Group:

Even in Western literature and documents recorded before the end of the war, the Nanking Massacre was widely regarded as false and mis-reported. There was not a single document that could verify the occurrence of the Massacre. However,

⁶ 富士信夫: 《“南京大虐殺”はこうして作られた -- 東京裁判の欺瞞》, 展転社, 23 Nov. 1998, p. 339.

⁷ 板倉由明: 《本当はこうだった南京事件》, 日本図書刊行会, 2000, p. 44. The so-called “saying” cannot deny the fact. As was said by the new central figure of Japan’s “Great Massacre School” Kasahara Tokushi, the saying “Doolittle Raid” was not settled until the war ended but no one criticised it as fabricated. (くまぼろし派、中間派、大虐殺派三派合同大アンケート), 《諸君!》, 文藝春秋社, February Issue, p. 199.)

⁸ 鈴木明: 《新“南京大虐殺”のまぼろし》, 飛鳥新社, 1999, pp. 408–409.

⁹ 松村俊夫: 《“南京虐殺”への大疑問》, 展転社, 1998, p. 396.

¹⁰ 日本会議国際広報委員会編: 《再審“南京大虐殺” -- 世界に訴える日本の冤罪》, 明成社, 2000, p. 65.

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in the postwar Tokyo Trial, the issue of the Nanking Massacre appeared out of the blue. The Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan vaguely mentioned that tens of thousands of Chinese were killed and the Chinese government expanded the figure raised by Bates seven times and asserted the Massacre took 300,000 lives.¹¹

Ara Ken'ichi mentioned in *Diurna: Nanking Incident*:

A large amount of the so-called evidence and testimonies for the Nanking Incident is believed to contain untrue information. From the moment these documents were submitted to the court, there were large numbers of major media reports covering this issue, making it even harder to tell the truth of the Nanking Incident. It becomes more confusing for us to decide what kind of evidence and testimonies we should believe in.¹²

Fujioka Nobukatsu and Higashinakano Osamichi's *Research on the "Nanking Atrocity"* claimed that not only did the Japanese have no idea about the "Nanking Massacre" but "The League of Nations, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek did not know about the Nanking Massacre" and even used this statement as the subheading for one of the sections of the book.¹³

The above quotes are from a small selection of the Japanese right-wing works filling the Japanese book market.¹⁴

¹¹ 藤岡信勝、自由主義史観研究会編：《教科書が教えない歴史》2，産経新聞社，1996，p. 72.

¹² 阿羅健一：《聞き書 南京事件》，図書出版社，1987，p. 298.

¹³ 藤岡信勝、東中野修道：《ザ・レイブ・オブ・南京の研究 — 中国における"情報戦"の手口と戦略》，祥傳社，1999，p. 196.

¹⁴ Apart from the Nanking Massacre, the denial of the Tokyo Trial's determination of Japan's invasion has been widespread as well: "The illegality of the so-called Tokyo Trial was consistently recognised by world jurists." (大井満：《仕組まれた"南京大虐殺" — 攻略作戦の全貌とマスコミ報道の怖さ》，展転社，1998，p. 299); "From the aspect of law, everyone would say the Tokyo Trial is impenetrable!" (小室直樹、渡部昇一：《封印の昭和史 — "戦後五〇年"自虐の終焉》，徳間書店，1995，p. 165); "The major reason for Japanese servile character was the conviction made by the International Military Trial for the Far East saying 'Japan was an aggressor'." (原子昭三：《世界史から見た日本天皇》，展転社，1998，p. 114); "The so-called Tokyo Trial was illegal punishment imposed on the defeated by the victor." (小室直樹：《大東亜戦争ここに甦る — 戦争と軍隊、そして国運の大研究》，クレスト社，1995，p. 5); "The international military trial for the Far East was not a legal trial but an obscene trial drama centering on 'warning' and 'revenge'." (西部邁著、新しい歴史教科書をつくる会編：《国民の道徳》，扶桑社，2000，p. 135); "Supranational decision makers exposed criminal countries in the name of the human race. In fact, it was a part of the countries in command of supranational institutions that immorally and intolerantly decided the outcome of wars by force, in order to gain better a position in the world." (西尾幹二著、新しい歴史教科書をつくる会編：《国民の歴史》，扶桑社，1999，p. 467); "Everyone knew the testimony said then was perjury, though counter arguments were not allowed." (東中野修道：《"南京大虐殺"の徹底検証》，展転社，2000，p. 375); "Whether from the aspect of law, procedure, or recognition of facts, the Tokyo Trial was wrong. Its result was merely a 'victors' trial'." (藤岡信勝：《汚辱の近現代史 — いま克服のとき》，徳間書店，1996，p. 102 citing *Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*.)

This article aims to deal with the following three issues: (1) Was it the case that Matsui Iwane and the civil and military authorities of Japan had no knowledge of the Nanking Massacre? (2) Why were ordinary Japanese people ignorant of the incident? (3) Was it the case that Japanese “journalists”, “photographers”, “critics”, “poets” and “writers”, as well as the perpetrators themselves, Japanese officers and soldiers who entered Nanking, had no knowledge of the atrocities committed during the Nanking Massacre? The third question will be answered in two sections.

II.

Before proving Matsui Iwane’s knowledge of this incident, let us first discuss the question: were the Japanese civil and military authorities informed? If so, how much did they know about it?

Japanese troops entered Nanking on 13 December 1937. At first, some Nanking residents as well as foreigners in Nanking looked forward to welcoming the Japanese army, hoping it would bring an end to the bombardments that started in mid-August, and, in particular, to the looting and arson committed by the retreating troops before the fall of Nanking, and that order in the city would be restored. But the atrocities committed by the Japanese army soon destroyed these hopes. The *New York Times* journalist F. Tillman Durdin was ordered to leave Nanking by the Japanese army on 15 December 1937. He sent back a report from a US warship docked in Shanghai on 17 December. This was one of the first reports about the atrocities committed by the Japanese army written by a Western journalist, it reads:

The collapse of Chinese authority and the break-up of the Chinese Army left many Chinese in Nanking ready to respond to order and organization, which seemed in prospect with the entry of the Japanese troops. A tremendous sense of relief over the outlook for a cessation of the fearful bombardment and the elimination of the threat of serious disorders by the Chinese troops pervaded the Chinese populace when the Japanese took over control within the walls.

It was felt Japanese rule might be severe, at least until war conditions were over. Two days of Japanese occupation changed the whole outlook. Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians, the eviction of Chinese from their homes, mass executions of war prisoners and the impressing of able-bodied men turned Nanking into a city of terror.¹⁵

¹⁵ 洞富雄編：《日中戦争史資料》9“南京事件”II，河出書房新社，1973，p. 280. Hata Ikuhiko quoted differently here in *The Nanking Incident*; for example, at the end of the first paragraph, one sentence was added “There were even some citizens welcoming the spearhead of the Japanese army.” “Merely three days” was changed to “merely two days” in the second paragraph. (見秦郁彦：《南京事件——虐殺の構造》，中央公論新社，1999，p. 3.) See also F. Tillman Durdin, “Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking” *New York Times*, 18 December 1937, p. 1 and 10.

The conduct of Japanese troops soon became known to the outside world. Based on documents and literature currently available, Japanese authorities very soon thereafter learned about what had really happened.

Japanese civil and military authorities back home were able to obtain information about their troops through two major channels. The first channel was the foreign media and section III of this article will elaborate on relevant materials. The second channel consisted of Japanese embassies and consulates, in this case mainly the Japanese embassy in Nanking, which collected information from two major sources: letters of complaints and protests received by the embassy, and various intelligence documents collected by the embassy and Japanese news agencies.

As recorded in *The Diaries of John Rabe*, on the second day after the Japanese army entered Nanking, John H. D. Rabe drafted a letter in the name of Chairman of the International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone, intending to hand it over to the Japanese military authority. On 15 December, he met with officials from the Japanese army and the Japanese embassy, and presented the letters to them asking the Japanese army to maintain order in the city and treat disarmed Chinese soldiers with leniency. In the International Committee's letter addressed to the Japanese embassy on 16 December, it referred to several incidents including the looting of committee members' cars by Japanese soldiers and listed 15 incidents which had been carefully verified.¹⁶ In a long letter by the International Committee on 17 December addressed to the Japanese embassy, it referred to the looting of corpse-collecting vehicles owned by the World Red Swastika Society, arrests of members of the World Red Swastika Society and "volunteer police", and the "robbery, rapine and killing initiated by your soldiers".¹⁷ In the International Committee's letter to the Japanese embassy on 18 December, it discussed large-scale rape and the capture of 50 uniformed police and 46 "volunteer police" from the Ministry of Justice, and enclosed "Memorandum on Incident at the Ministry of Justice" signed by the Secretary of the International Committee Lewis S. C. Smythe.¹⁸ In a letter of the same date, M. S. Bates, Chairman of the Relief Committee of Nanking University, also mentioned looting, rape and murder. From 16 December, the International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone wrote to the Japanese embassy almost every day reporting on the atrocities committed by

¹⁶ John H. D. Rabe, *The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe*, Jiangsu People's Publishing House and Jiangsu Education Publishing House, 1998, pp. 185–189.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 191–196.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 201–207.

members of the Japanese army.¹⁹ Candidate Official Fukuda Tokuyasu,²⁰ Consul General in Shanghai Okazaki Katsuo²¹ and Second Secretary Fukui Jun²² were the main Japanese embassy officials dealing with Rabe and the others.

Fukuda Tokuyasu once said in an interview:

I was the recipient of their [referring to the International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone] complaints. They protested about everything they encountered and it was hard to tell whether what they protested about was true or false. I had to convey their protests to the military, “Since this incident has taken place, please deal with it by any means.” That was my role, to deal with these protests.²³

A myriad of protests reached the local army as well as the highest Japanese military and political authorities. Major General Anami Korechika, Chief of the Personnel Bureau, wrote the following words in his notebook when he attended the War Ministry’s meeting on 22 December, “The behaviour of the Nakajima division in respect to women [n.b. this refers to the rape and abuse of women], murder, and violation of military conduct, were beyond description in terms of the decadence of national conscience and the miseries of war.”²⁴ Due to these atrocities committed by Japanese in Nanking, the South China Battle targeting Kwangtung, scheduled to begin on 25 December, had to be abandoned.²⁵

¹⁹ As Bates said, “We almost visited the Japanese embassy every day and handed in our protests and requests as well as concrete reports about the violence and crimes.” (Collaborated by Central Archives, Second Archives of China and Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, *A Selection of the Archives about Japanese Imperialism’s Invasion of China: Nanking Massacre*, Zhong Hua Book Company, 1995, p. 1023.)

²⁰ The Chinese version of *The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe* made a mistake in Fukuda Tokuyasu’s name in Chinese characters. Fukuda later became the Secretary of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. He held the posts of Defence Minister, Administrative Minister, Postmaster General, and Member of Parliament.

²¹ The Chinese version of *The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe* made a mistake in Okazaki Kazuo’s name in Chinese characters. Okazaki held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1950s.

²² The Chinese version of *The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe* made a mistake in Fukui Jun’s name in Chinese characters, and as have many historical books today, e.g., *A Selection of the Archives about Japanese Imperialism’s Invasion of China: Nanking Massacre*, and *The Archives about Nanking Massacre Committed by Japanese Army* (collaborated by Second Archives of China and Nanjing Archives, Jiangsu Classics Publishing House, 1997). Fukui at the time of the Nanking Massacre was the Acting Consul General of Japan in Nanking.

²³ 田中正明：《“南京虐殺”の虚構——松井大將の日記をめぐる》, p. 36.

²⁴ 秦郁彦：《南京事件——虐殺の構造》, p. 172.

²⁵ This cancellation has generally been attributed to the reason that the battle might harm Western interests, for instance: “The reason was that they blew up American warship *Panay* and bombarded British warship *Ladybird* when they attacked Nanking, for which serious diplomatic negotiations were taking place. Since the attitude of Britain and America was quite ominous, we should thoroughly consider the severe, negative

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According to the memoirs *From Ichigayadai to Ichigayadai* written by Colonel Kawabe Torashirō, Chief of the War Plans Section, the First (Operations) Bureau, General Staff, he once drafted a “Severe Warning” on behalf of the Chief of the General Staff his majesty Kan’in-no-miya to Matsui Iwane.²⁶ The so-called “Severe Warning” was the same document as the Ultimatum on Military Discipline and Morals released on 4 January 1938. The Ultimatum deemed the atrocities by the Japanese army so serious that it described them as “damaging to the holy mission of the entire army”.²⁷ *The Annals of the War in Nanking* devoted a whole section to this incident with the heading “A Special Requirement from the Chief of the General Staff”,²⁸ acknowledging the seriousness of the matter. Prior to this document, there had already been an ultimatum issued on 28 December 1937, co-signed by the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War demanding that the army should “maintain military discipline”. On the same day the Undersecretary of the Ministry of War also telegraphed the Chief of Staff and Chief of Intelligence of the Central China Area Army about the atrocities committed by the Japanese army. Due to pressure from public opinion in different countries, the Japanese army had to adopt measures to control the behaviour of Japanese soldiers. The Japanese military authorities sent Anami Korechika to China on a special mission to investigate the military discipline of the army at the end of December.²⁹ At the end of January the following year, they sent Major General Homma Masaharu,³⁰ Chief of

consequences that would be brought by the implementation of this military scheme.” (井本熊男著：《作戦日誌で綴る支那事变》，芙蓉書房，1978，p. 184.) But judging from original documents, it appears also to have been related to the Nanking Massacre. As Iinuma Mamoru wrote in his diary on 30 December, “Area Army’s Staff Officer Nakayama came to communicate with the Chief of Staff about the illegal behaviour conducted against foreign embassies and other violations of military conduct. He also presented a telegraph signed by the Minister of War, General Chief of Staff requiring the Area Army to be cautious during this time. It said that the battle against Kwangtung was foregone due to this reason.” (《飯沼守日記》，南京戦史編輯委員会編：《南京戦史資料集》，非売品，偕行社，1989，pp. 229–230.) The atrocities committed by members of the Japanese army were an important reason for pressure applied by the international community.

²⁶ 河辺虎四郎：《市ヶ谷台から市ヶ谷台へ》，時事通信社，1962，p. 153.

²⁷ 《軍紀風紀に関する件通牒》，《南京戦史資料集》，p. 565.

²⁸ 南京戦史編輯委員会：《南京戦史》，非売品，偕行社，1989，p. 398.

²⁹ Nukata Akira, retinue of Anami Korechika said: “I followed Chief of Personnel Anami to Nanking to report to Commander Matsui Iwane, according to the Chief, the battle instruction gave by ‘Nakajima Kesago, Colonel of the 16th Division, was against humanity.’ He therefore criticised it and lamented the decadence of morale.” (《陸軍省人事局長の回想》，cited in 洞富雄：《決定版・南京大虐殺》，徳間書店，1982，pp. 22–23.)

³⁰ Homma Masaharu later defeated MacArthur in the Philippines, but was executed soon after the war. Tanaka Masaaki was extremely dissatisfied about it, saying, “MacArthur was highly enthusiastic in taking revenge on Major General Homma Masaharu who had