Name Index

Note to Index: An f after a page number indicates a figure; an n after a page number indicates a note on that page; a t after a page number indicates a table.

Aaron, H., 201–202, 203n3, 203n5, 204, 208t, 213, 216, 242
Acemoglu, D., 42n10, 163, 163n3
Ackert, L., 20–21, 323, 330–331
Adams, J. E., 183
Ahmad, E., 252
Alesina, A., 160n2, 269
Alm, J., 163, 328n2, 331, 333
Anderson, C. M., 301–302
Anderson, S., 163, 164n5
Andreoni, J., 197, 302n2
Anomaly, J., 117n
Aristotle, 91, 98
Arrow, K., 151
Atkinson, A. B., 175, 207n9, 218n25
Bagnoli, M., 332
Bahl, R., 204n7
Ballard, C. L., 212n16
Ballentine, J. G., 202n2
Barlow, R., 218
Baron, D. B., 197
Barzel, Y., 47n17
Bates, D., 32–33n4, 47n17, 86
Bates, R. H., 32–33n4
Baumol, W. J., 6–7
Becker, G., 124n10
Ben, P., 61
Bentham, J., 119n4
Bentley, A., 124n10
Bergstrom, T. C., 204n7, 205, 212, 224n29
Besley, T., 5n3, 6n4, 251
Bierbrauer, F., 151–152, 156
Bird, R., 202n1
Blumenthal, M., 331
Broadway, R., 4n1, 16, 164, 187n25, 197, 245, 250
Bonaparte, N., 139
Borcherding, T. E., 204n7, 205, 224n29
Bordignon, M., 197
Bowen, H. R., 196
Brautigam, D., 11n8
Brennan, G., 60, 117, 119n5, 197, 250–251, 266
Breton A., 5n3, 15, 161, 165, 165n6, 170, 250n1, 250n2
Brosio, G., 15, 18, 19–20, 245, 251–252, 266–267, 268–270
Bryant, K., 49n19
Buchanan, J. M., 2, 5, 5n3, 6–7, 7n6, 9, 9n7, 15, 36, 60, 60n1, 100, 119n5, 120, 127, 130, 161, 163, 164n4, 165, 170, 172, 185, 212, 218, 250–251, 266, 267, 331
Bueno de Mesquita, B., 32–33n4
Bush, G., 45
Buzar, S., 257
Calhoun, J. C., 269
Camerer, C. F., 154–155
Carpenter, J. P., 301–302
Casahuga, A., 254
Case, K. E., 203n3, 203n4
Cassone, A., 251
Cervellati, M., 197
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cettolin, E., 21, 35n6, 290, 328–329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaudry-Shah, A. M., 203n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen, Y., 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherry, T., 304, 330n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chipman, J., 122n9, 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christaller, W., 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian, C., 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarke, E., 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clower, R., 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coase, R. H., 127n14, 130–131, 133–134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coate, S., 251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coats, J. C., 302n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman, J. S., 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congleton, R. D., 5n2, 9, 9n7, 11–13, 31, 102n2, 104n6, 111, 111n9, 117, 136, 137–138, 163, 172, 185, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corchón, L., 63n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croson, R. T. A., 304, 330, 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d’Aspremont, C., 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deacon, R. T., 204n7, 205, 224n29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond, P. A., 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudley, L. M., 10, 63n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusfeld, B., 302n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgeworth, F. Y., 7–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egas, M., 301n1, 301, 302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engleman, D., 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epstein, G. S., 104n6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaréz, D. R., 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esteban, J., 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnobarometer, 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurobarometer, 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faguet, J. P., 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falk, A., 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falkinger, J., 300–301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeley, M., 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fehr, E., 301, 301n1, 302, 306, 321, 322, 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feld, L. P., 303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fehr, E., 9–10, 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fischbacher, U., 302, 306, 321, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fischel, W. A., 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fjeldstad, O.-H., 11n8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foley, D., 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt, H., 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frey, B. S., 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frykblom, P., 330n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gächter, S., 301, 301n1, 302, 302n2, 306, 321, 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galbiati, R., 303–304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garfinkel, M. R., 76, 76n8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaus, G. F., 118n1, 122n9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gayer, T., 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genicot, G., 77n10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerard-Varet, L.-A., 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillespie, I. H., 203n3, 203n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillette, A., 20–21, 323, 330–331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glaeser, E. L., 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gneezy, U., 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golosov, M., 163, 163n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodman, R. P., 204n7, 205, 212, 224n29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon, S., 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene, K., 203n3, 203n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greif, A., 11n8, 32–33n4, 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grofman, B., 19–20, 117, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gronberg, T. J., 302n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorseclose, T., 125n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grosskopf, B., 302n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groves, T., 151, 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guth, W., 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guzmán, R., 118n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton, A., 20, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton, B. W., 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlin, A., 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbaugh, W., 302n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardin, R., 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, G. W., 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrod, R. F., 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hart, H. L. A., 4n1, 164n5, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayek, F., 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head, J. G., 3n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hechter, M. and Kanazawa, S., 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellwig, M., 149, 150n10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herrmann, B., 301, 301n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hettich, W., 14–16, 30, 30n1, 60n1, 117, 183, 187n25, 187n26, 206, 227, 245, 248, 273n1, 273n2, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hicks, J., 122–123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill, R., 251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillman, A. L., 5n2, 104n6, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirschman, A. O., 14, 160n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirshleifer, J., 46–47, 47n17, 63n3, 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitler, A., 54n27, 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstadter, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmás, T. H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huemer, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hume, D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurwicz, L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilevsky, Z.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, B. R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jegen, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jia, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johansen, L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, R. N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josselin, J.-M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judt, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaldor, N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaplow, L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy, J. F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy, P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keser, C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiser, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kjerstad, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konow, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konrad, K. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosfeld, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krajibich, L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kranich, L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kroll, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laband, D. N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laffont, J. L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebamoff, M. F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledyard, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lefebvre, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leiser, B. M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard, H. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levi, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levy, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libecap, G. D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lijphart, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipman, B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke, J. 93, 100, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockwood, B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lösch, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis XIV (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukes, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lurás, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacRae, D., Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maital, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malath, G. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcoux, N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marchand, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marciano, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marks, M. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masclot, D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthias, D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McAdams, R. H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McBride, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McClelland, G. H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKee, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean, R. P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McNell, W. H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrill, S., III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mertins, V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mieszkowski, P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milante, G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milgram, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirrlees, J. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell, W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongrain, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montesquieu, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan, W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morrow, J. D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moselle, B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mueller, D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muench, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munger, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munger, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musgrave, R. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutti, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myerson, R. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napoleon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narveson, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neenan, W. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikiforakis, N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noh, S. J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normann, H. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North, D. C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nosenzo, D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nousair, C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nozick, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Driscoli, G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oates, W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberholzer-Gee, F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odinga, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okada, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olson, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orbell, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostrom, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palfrey, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patinkin, D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pauly, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacock, A. T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennock, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perroni, C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persson, T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pestieau, P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piggott, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigou, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plott, C. R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pommerenheim, W. W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postlewaite, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puttermann, L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rae, D. W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rai, B. K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsey, F. P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangel, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawls, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reidy, D. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renner, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuben, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricciuti, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rickman, D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rider, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riedl, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riker, W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, J. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers, D. L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosen, H. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round, J. I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rousseau, J.-J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubin, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustichini, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmon, P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuelson, P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanchez, F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandmo, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarin, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sato, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaps, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scharf, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlag, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider, F. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schofield, N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schulze, W. D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott, C., 203n3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sefton, M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schili, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sened, I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepsle, K. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shogren, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoven, J. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shupp, R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simons, H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singh, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siverson, R. M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skaperdas, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slack, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slemrod, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophocleus, J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spolaore, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stergios S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stern, N. H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigler, G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stokey, E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straume, O. R., 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stringham, E., 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strobel, M., 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strumpf, K., 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabellini, G., 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan, F., 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzi, V., 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaler, R., 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirsk, W. R., 202n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomson, W., 147n6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoni, C., 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiebout, C., 18, 104n6, 187, 244–246, 254, 267–268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilly, C., 32–33n4, 47n17, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torgler, B., 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treisman, D., 250, 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tremblay, J.-F., 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tridimas, G., 14–16, 30, 30n1, 117, 183, 204n6, 206, 227, 245, 248, 273n1, 273n2, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman, D., 124n10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsebelis, G., 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsyvinski, A., 163, 163n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker, S., 328n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tullock, G., 2, 5n3, 7, 111, 120, 127, 130, 161, 267, 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyran, J. R., 303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ursprung, H. W., 104n6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usher, D., 160n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valenti, L., 11n8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van de Kragt, A., 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van der Weele, J., 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Winden, E., 302, 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertova, P., 303–304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vesterlund, L., 302n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vickrey, W., 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villeval, M. C., 322–323, 328n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagner, R. E., 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walker, J., 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walker, M., 145–146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace, S., 204n7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis, J., 8–10, 32, 38–39, 40–41, 42n9, 43n11, 44n13, 44n14, 48, 82–84, 86–87, 93, 138, 273, 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter, J. R., 11n8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, G., 32n25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber, M., 3, 29, 32–33n4, 138, 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weingast, B. R., 3, 32, 38–41, 42n9, 44n13, 50n21, 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wertheimer, A., 11, 91–92, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whalley, J., 201–203, 208t, 212n16, 212n17, 224, 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whittington, D., 124n11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicksell, K., 2, 4, 5n3, 5, 6, 6n4, 7–9, 23, 30–31, 31n2, 33–34, 36, 42, 46, 50, 54–55, 84, 86–87, 121n7, 143n1, 161, 168, 168n10, 185, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildasin, D., 188n27, 202–203, 208t, 222–223, 243, 262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson, O., 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, J., 188n27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winer, S. L., 14–16, 30, 30n1, 60n1, 117, 183, 187n25, 187n26, 204n6, 206, 245, 248, 273n1, 273n2, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wintrobe, R., 60n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiseman, J., 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yitzhaki, S., 187n26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngman, J., 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeckhauser, R., 117, 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimmerman, D., 202n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zodrow, G., 17–18, 202n1, 242, 244–245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
adherent organization, 39, 55–56, 82–83
agnosticism, 198–199
AGV mechanisms, 151
Alien and Sedition Acts, 54
allocations
mechanisms for, 144–145
minimal-government allocation, 195
political economy, 144
proportional allocation rule, 20
See also efficiency/efficient allocation;
equilibrium; incentive compatibility in
public goods
anarchy
atomized, 62–65, 72–73
organized, 62, 69–73, 74
structured, 9–10 (see also proprietary state)
anonymous relationship(s), 46–47, 83
asymmetrical equilibrium, 79–80
asymmetric centralization, 19, 254n6
autocracy, 61
Badinter majority system, 258, 269
bandit
roving (roaming) bandit, 10, 61, 85–86,
87
stationary, 32–33n4, 47n17, 61, 85
baselines, 11, 137–138
and coercive proposals, 11, 96–97, 97t
acceptance worse than baseline, 97
characteristics of, 97
conditional punishment, 97, 109–110
subjective nature of, 98
and completely voluntary relationships,
93t, 93–94
and conditional punishments, 109–110
ex ante (exit option), 92, 93–94, 97
in governmental relationship(s), 92
idealized knowledge baselines, 113
and less than completely voluntary
relationships, 94t
matrix representation of, 92–100, 136
natural, 98–100, 102
Hobbes on, 99
institutional solutions, 100
Locke on, 100
during natural disasters, 98–99
and rent-extraction concept, 92–93
and rights-based arguments, 92
status quo, 112t, 112–113
status quo ante, 93–94, 97
transaction costs, 94–96
and volitional, coerced behavior, 109–113
fraudulent offers, 112–113
status quo baseline, 112t, 112
universal normative baselines, 111–112
using ideal baselines to measure coercion,
110–111
and voluntary relationships
average net return from listening/
evaluating proposals, 95
conditional punishments, 95–96
elimination of baseline, 94
emigration, 92
insurance policies, 96. See also
counterfactual
bills of rights, 113, 168, 269
Brinks security, 61

Calculus of Consent (The) (Buchanan & Tullock), 7, 9, 127

centralization
advantages of decentralization over, 249–252
asymmetric, 19, 254n6
regional differences in levels of provision in France, 250n2. See also decentralization
charismatic authority, 139
checks and balances, 100, 269

Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (Musgrave-Peacock), 4

Coase Theorem, 127, 127n14

Coasian bargaining, 12. See also Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky (KHS)/Coasian Bargaining (CB) comparison

Cobb-Douglas utility, 180, 184–187, 209–210, 233

coercion
act of (coercing), 17
collective choice procedure (second source of), 3–4
constitution of, 2–4, 30–31
coercion constraints, effect on social welfare
maximization, defining, 30n1, 91, 137, 168–172, 248–249
degree of
and decentralization, 263
and ideal baseline to measure, 92–93
and linear income taxation, 191
endogenous, 13, 196, 305
external, 3, 55
formal definition of, in public finance, 166f, 166f, 164–166, 168, 172, 195–196
history of, in public finance, 4–6
individual-as-dictator definition, 166–167, 177–178n20, 197
individual-in-society definition, 164–166
internal, 55–56
justification for, 119–122
contractarian consent of the governed,
119–121
Hobbesian view, 119–120
Lockean natural rights, 119

utilitarian justification, 119, 121

katanagasmos (coercion), 171
measurement of (see measurement of coercion)
limits on
fiscal policy rules to limit coercion, 163–164
proportional tax system to limit coercion, 163
tax rules to limit coercion, 163
partial (see public goods game)
productive, 171 (see also public goods game)
in public goods settings (see incentive compatibility in public goods; public goods game)
reciprocal, 4n1
resistance to (see resistance game)
trade-off between social welfare and coercion, 178–187, 196–198
in competitive electoral system, 183–185, 198
trade-off in simplified setting, 181–183, 183f

Wicksellian, 33–36
coercion-constrained optimal linear income
taxation, 172–178, 196–198
counterfactual in, 173–174
elements that are absent from traditional optimal taxation, 174–175
marginal cost of funds (MCF) for policy analysis, 176
optimal coercion-constrained level of public good, 175–176
optimal coercion-constrained tax rate, 176–178
shadow price of coercion, 174, 176
welfare maximization under aggregate coercion constraint, 173–176, 186–187

coercive proposals, 11, 96–97, 97t
acceptance worse than baseline, 97
characteristics of, 97
subjective nature of, 98

collective choice (mechanism)
consociational, 20, 258–259, 269–270
majority rule, 13, 15–16, 20, 127, 182, 185, 274
median voter, 138, 196, 202, 206f, 205–207, 254–255, 255f, 256
proportional, 20, 269
super-majoritarian(ism), 19–20, 267, 269
unanimity, 19–20, 267
veto rules, 19–20, 267
commitment
and enforcement, 156–158
  guardians, 158
timing issues, 156–158
intertemporal problems of, 33–34, 34t, 35
investment in, 77–80
self-commitment (see public goods game)
Committee for Inter-Community Relations (CICR), 259
common knowledge, 14, 18, 152–254, 274, 305
competitive proprietary equilibrium, 85
competitive proprietary rule, 62, 69–73, 74, 93t, 93, 94
concurrent majority, 269
conditional cooperation, 21, 290, 302. See also
  public goods game
conditional provision rule, 332
conditional punishment (system), 95–96
  problem of, 34–35
Committee for Inter-Community Relations (CICR), 259
common knowledge, 14, 83, 152–254, 274, 305
competitive proprietary equilibrium, 85
competitive proprietary rule, 62, 69–73, 74, 93t, 93, 94
concurrent majority, 269
conditional cooperation, 21, 290, 302. See also
  public goods game
conditional provision rule, 332
conditional punishment (system), 95–96, 97, 109–110
consensus, 6, 52–55, 197. See also
  unanimity
consociational arrangements, 20, 258, 259, 269–270
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function, 204, 224–226
constitutions of coercion, 2–4, 30–31. See also
  violence
constraint(s)
ex ante, 117, 137
ex post, 3, 152–155
horizontal equity constraint, 197
incentive compatible, 143–144, 158
on social welfare maximization, 168–176, 186–187
on use of violence in weak governments, 43. See also incentive compatibility in public goods; information
contractarians/contractarian theory, 91, 100, 105, 113–114, 114n10, 118–121
contractual organization, 39–40, 83
contributions
voluntary, 20–21, 94, 197, 274–275, 290
  (see also public goods game)
counterfactuals, 4, 11, 15
counterfactual tax payment, 17
ideal baselines as, 137–138
individual-as-dictator, 166–167, 177–178, 197
individual-in-society, 15, 164n5, 164–166, 166f
net fiscal incidence, 201, 204n6
Cournot coercion, 84, 87
credible commitments, 40, 55–56
deadweight loss, 17, 66, 203, 222. See also
taxation
decentralization (decentralized)
advantages over centralization, 249–253
and efficiency, 187, 253–256, 301–302
extensions of welfare-coercion trade-off analysis for, 187–188
formal, 19
and homogeneity assumption, 249, 254
and interplay between coercion and redistribution, 260–263
reducing coercion through, Macedonia, 256–259
simple stylized model, 253–256
theorem (Oates), 18–19
through devolution of function to lower government, 253–254. See also fiscal federalism
decentralized punishment, 301–302
decision makers (DMs). See resistance game
Declaration of Independence, American, 120
democracies
and impersonality 56
KHS criterion as not implementable in, 170
liberal democracy, 3–4, 273–274, 290
despotic regimes, 290–291
dictator games, 330n4
dominant coalition, 32, 39, 40–41, 43–44, 55–56, 87
double balance, 44n13
efficiency/efficient allocation
and commitment by rulers, 75–80
and decentralization, 187, 253–256, 301–302
and decision rules, 161
and fines/punishments, 103, 104, 109, 114
non-coercive, 6
non-coercive, incentive compatible, 145–147
Pareto (see Pareto)
Subject Index

use of mechanisms to reduce inefficiency. See also incentive compatibility in public goods; Samuelson rule (condition)
elasticity of substitution, 204, 204n7, 210, 224–226, 226t
elections, contested
  in Kenya, 45
  in United States, 45
emigration
  baseline effect on, 92
  rent extraction effect on, 103–109, 114. See also exit; migration
England, transfer of power from monarch to landholders, 83
equilibrium
  asymmetrical, 79–80
  Bayes (Bayesian), 147–149, 152, 155
  coercive, 17, 38
  competitive proprietary, 70–73, 85
  decentralized, 19
interregional numerical model, 201–202, 207–208
Lindahl, 18, 143, 145, 147, 155, 198–199, 214. See also Lindahl equilibrium
monopolistic, 85
Nash equilibrium, 65, 70–72, 78–79, 108, 145, 147, 184
numerical for incidence analysis, 203
partial equilibrium net fiscal incidence, 216n22, 242
productive, 63–65, 67–68, 70, 72–73, 75
symmetrical, 70–71, 108. See also allocations
  ethics, 91, 122, 133
  and idealized knowledge baselines, 113
  and universal normative baselines, 112
  ethnic differentiation, 20, 270. See also
Macedonia
  ethnic heterogeneity, 269. See also Macedonia
euvoluntary, defining, 118n3, 122n8
ex ante baselines, 92–94, 97
exchange theory of government origin, 120
  exit
  ex ante baselines, 92–94, 97
  exit costs, 104–109, 114
experimental studies on mechanisms, 301–302
experiments. See net fiscal benefits, measures of distribution/incidence of; public goods game; resistance game
externality, 125–130
  and collective decision making, 127, 130
  expected externality mechanisms, 151
  internalized, 125
  negative, 129–130
  reciprocal, 125, 130–131
fairness, 22, 130, 147n6, 197
Federalist Papers (Madison), 252, 268
Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen (Wicksell), 4
fiscal federalism
  empirical literature on preference matching, 252–253
  in median voter framework, 254–255, 255f, 256
  regulation of liquor sales in US, 253
  theoretical literature on decentralization and coercion, 249–252
  political identity, 252
  predatory governments, 250–251
  folk-theorem, 75–76
forecast, 277–278
  accuracy distribution, 287f, 287–288, 288f, 289
  forecast error, 280
France
  centralization in, 250n2
  equal access in, 48, 55
  power of king/emperor in, 83
  fraudulent offers, 112–113
  free riding, 1, 14, 36
  ex post/ex ante dilemma in free riding problem, 332–333
  insufficient information for punishing, 301
  in liberal vs. rent-extracting state, 101–104
  and public goods game, 317, 319, 321
  and resistance game, 284, 319, 321
games
  dictator game, 330n4
  threshold (see resistance game)
  true game, 158. See also public goods game
general equilibrium model
  computable, 273n1
  interregional numerical, 201–202, 207–208
  for net fiscal incidence analysis, 203
  numerical general, 17
general laws, 55
Georgia. See net fiscal benefits, measures of distribution/incidence of
Gore, Al, 45, 45n15
governance
advanced democracy, 20–21, 56
kleptocracy, 61
Leviathan, 3, 60–65, 100, 266
liberal democracy, 3–4, 273–274, 290. See also government; limited access
societies; open access societies
government
benevolent, 2, 9, 19, 195–196, 301
predatory, 250–251
weak, 42n10, 42, 43. See also governance
gross domestic product (GDP), 11, 114, 128–131

group
Olsonian, 41
as unitary actor, 46–47

heterogeneity
and efficient provision of public goods, 304
ethnic heterogeneity, effect on coercion of majority, 20, 269
in housing values, 244–245
of preferences, problems with, 18–20, 181, 183–185, 267(see also homogeneity)
of preferences and decentralization, 253–254, 256
of preferences and uniform tax price, 273
and socially optimal tax plan, 9, 15
as undermining decentralized enforcement mechanism, 301
highly divided society, 19. See also Macedonia
history, of coercion in public finance, 4–8
Hobbesian jungle, 110

homogeneity
in housing values, 244–245
of jurisdictional boundaries, 251, 267–268
and localized decision making, 19–20, 268–269
and migration, 267–268
and mobility, 18, 244
of preferences and decentralization, 19–20, 249, 254
horizontal equity constraint, 197

idealized knowledge baselines, 113
impersonal relationship(s)
in application of tax law, 9, 31–32
and conceding option of using violence, 49–50
defining, 45–46

and democracies, 56
in limited access societies, 52
in open access societies, 51–52, 56–58
and organizations, 47–57

incentive compatibility in public goods,
145–147
commitment/enforcement issues, 156–158
discussion of, 195, 198–200
efficiency/non-coercion trade-off with incomplete information, 147–152
dominant strategy equilibrium, 153–155
ex ante information, 147–148, 150–152, 199–200
ex ante non-coercive, effective allocations and voting, 152
ex post incentive compatible allocation, 153–155
interim information, 147–150, 199
and guardians, 158
temporal issues, 156–158
and voluntary participation, 146, 153–155.
See also Lindahl equilibrium
incentive-compatible constraints, 143–144, 158, 198–199
individual-as-dictator, 166–167, 177–178n20, 197. See also counterfactuals
individual-in-society, 15, 164n5, 164–166, 166f. See also counterfactuals
information
complete, 118, 127–130, 155
ex-ante, 147–148, 150–152, 155, 199–200
incomplete, 147–152, 155
interim, 147–150, 199. See also constraints; incentive compatibility in public goods
Inter-Community Relations Committee, 259n10
interim incentive compatibility, 153
interim information, 147–150, 199
interim voluntary participation constraints, 148–150, 156–157
invisible hand, 6
Jim Crow laws, 268
jurisdictional boundaries, and homogeneity, 267–268
Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky criterion (KHS), 15
compensation principle, 12, 167–168, 170
test, 256
Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky (KHS)/Coasian
Bargaining (CB) comparison, 12, 118, 122–130, 136
breach of low transactions cost assumption, 118, 130–133
CB with varying rights assignments, 132–133
KHS with no compensation
CB as euvoluntary in existing property rights regime, 118, 125–127
CB as fundamentally voluntary, 118
isomorphism of KHS and CB results, 118, 127–130
KHS as fundamentally coercive, 118, 122–125
subjectivity problem, 137
willingness to pay, 126, 132–133
katanagasmos (coercion), 171
Kenya, contested elections in, 45
Kibaki, Mwai, 45
kleptocracy, 61. See also governance
knowledge common, 14, 83, 152–153, 254, 274, 305
idealized knowledge baselines, 113
Korean peninsula, 262–263
laboratory experiments. See public goods game; resistance game
legitimate violence, 38, 42, 50
Leviathan, 3, 60, 65, 100, 266
liberal democracy
coercion in, 3–4, 273
majority rule in, 274
resistance in, 273–274, 290. See also governance
limited access societies, 41, 42
capacity for violence in, 44
internal coercion within dominant coalition, 55–56
requirements for dispersion of violence capacity, 51
transition from limited to open access society, 56
unanimity-impersonality trade-off in, 52
what is limited in, 43
Lindahl equilibrium, 18, 143–145, 147, 198–199, 214
allocation function, 147
allocations, 145, 198–199
and complete information, 155
and incentive compatibility in public goods, 145, 147, 198–199
Lindahl-equivalent tax prices, 208t, 214–215, 215n20, 216–217, 220–221, 221t, 222, 237–238
with no excess burden/no tax exporting, 208t, 217t, 218
and Samuelson public good quantity, 208t, 219–220, 220t, 238
Lindahl fees, 102n3
Lindahl market analogue pricing rule, 204
Lindahl net fiscal incidence, 16–17, 201, 203–207
Lindahl solution, 16–18, 182–183, 202. See also Lindahl equilibrium
linear public goods game. See public goods game
linear (progressive) tax
and aggregate coercion constraints, 190–192
and degree of coercion, 191
and individual coercion constraints, 188–190
See also coercion; taxation
literacy, effect on opening of open access societies, 84
lump-sum taxation, 101–103, 104n4, 105–106, 151, 177, 210
Macedonia, 19–21
Badinter majority system in, 258, 269
civil war in, 257
commissions to improve interethnic relations in, 259
and consociational arrangements, 20, 258–259, 269–270
ethnic make-up of, 257
language issues, 258
marginalization during old regime, 257
national level community relations committee in, 259n10
Ohrid Agreement provisions, 257–258
policy outcomes of decentralization, 259
and redistribution-coercion interplay, 262
reducing coercion through decentralization in, 256–258, 259
majority rule, 13, 15–16, 127, 182, 185, 274
marginal benefit curve (MBC), 205, 207
marginal cost of funds (MCF), 176, 186
marginal evaluation, of public goods, 13
marginal willingness to pay (MWP), 82, 201–202, 206
Subject Index

measurement of coercion
coercion measure by level of public good, 170f, 170–171
constraint specifications, 171t, 171
example using analogy to social role of money, 169
individual-in-society counterfactual, 166f
using individual vs. group level of coercion constraints, 169–170
written/unwritten constitutional provisions, 168–169. See also coercion mechanisms, 13–14
allocation, 13
design of, 14
experimental studies on, 301–302
decentralized costly punishment, 301–302
heterogeneity of actors as limitation, 301
insufficient information for punishing free riders, 301
lack of appropriate punishment technologies, 301
voluntary contributions triggered by conditional cooperation, 302
Falkinger, 300–301
Groves-Ledyard, 300
performance functions of, 144–145
median voter, 138, 196, 202, 206f, 205–207, 254–255, 255f, 256
migration, 11, 104–106, 108, 114, 244, 251, 262–263, 267–268. See also proprietary state: exit
minimal-government allocation, 195
minimum contributing set (MCS), 332
minority veto, 269
monopolistic proprietary rule, 62, 65–68, 85
monopolistic rule, 73. See also proprietary state monopoly, on violence, 7, 8, 29. See also Weberian state
motivation crowding-out, 322, 323
MRI imaging, 14
narrowcasting, 266–267
Nash equilibrium, 65, 70–72, 78–79, 108, 145, 147, 184. See also equilibrium natural baselines, 98–100, 102
Hobbes on, 99
institutional solutions, 100
Locke on, 100
during natural disasters, 98–99
natural rights, 91, 119
natural state, 37–41, 82–83, 83f
administration of coercion as anonymous, 57
Lockeian, 100, 110
Nozckian, 110
neoclassical theory of the state, 39–40
net fiscal benefits, measures of
distribution/incidence of, 21, 226–228
benchmark equilibrium of tax prices/public goods demand, 213t
definition of net benefits, 201
demand curves for public goods, 225t
elasticity of substitution, 204, 204n7, 210, 224–226, 226t
future research issues, 228
general equilibrium model for net incidence analysis, 203
interregional applied equilibrium model, 201–202, 207–212, 213t, 213, 214, 242
applied Georgia model, 209–210, 211t
Rest of the United States (ROUS) model, 209, 210
Lindahl net fiscal incidence, 203–207
Lindahl market analogue pricing rule, 204 incidence in median voter model, 205–206, 206f, 207
Lindahl tax prices/Samuelson public good provision, 221t
mathematical specification of model, 202, 209t, 208–209, 211, 228–231, 232, 234–237
Lindahl-equivalent tax prices and Samuelson public good quantity, 208t, 237, 238
Lindahl-equivalent tax prices with no excess burden and no tax exporting, 208t, 238
Lindahl tax prices with no excess burdens/no tax exporting and Samuelson public good quantity, 208t, 238
median voter rule for public good provision, 208t
Samuelson provision of public good, 208t, 238
simulation steps, 237–238
median voter equilibrium, conditions to become Lindahl equilibrium, 206–207
public good quantity as Pareto optimal, 206–207
unanimity, 207
results, 202–203, 214–218, 224, 242
excess burdens of taxes/consumer surplus from public goods, 202
exclusively Georgia perspective, 202–203
inefficient supply of public goods due to political process, 202
Lindahl-equivalent tax prices, 214–215, 215t, 216
Lindahl-equivalent tax prices and Samuelson public good quantity, 219–220, 220t
Lindahl-equivalent tax prices with no excess burden and no tax exporting, 216–217, 217t, 218
regressive net fiscal benefits distribution, 202, 243
regressive to progressive net fiscal incidence distribution, 203
tax exporting effects/median voter public good provision, 222–223, 223t, 224
tax exporting/importing across regions, 202, 243
shortcomings of, 243–246
summary of experiments, 214
voting equilibrium with inefficiency in public goods supply, 207f
net fiscal incidence counterfactual, 204n6
defining, 241
non-coerced population, 21. See also public goods game
normative public economics, 186, 195
North Korea, 262–263
Oates model, 268
Olsonian group, 41
open access societies capacity for violence, consolidation of, 44
criteria for, 53
impersonality in, 51t, 51–52, 56–58
literacy effect on opening of, 84
rent creation in, 51
requirements for consolidation of violence capacity, 51
transition from limited to open access society, 56
unanimity-impersonality trade-off in, 52
unanimity in, 53
what is open in, 43–44
optimal tax, 9, 15, 163n3, 172–178, 186, 196–198. See also taxation
ordering (of society). See limited access societies; open access societies organizations adherent, 39, 55–56, 82–83
and concealing use of violence to government, 49–50, 53, 57–58
contractual, 39–40, 83
See also rents organized anarchy, 62, 69–74
organized violence, 32–33, 49–50, 57–58
Others. See resistance game out-of-equilibrium transfer demands, 274–275, 275n3, 283–284, 289
Pareto theory, on coercion, 91
criterion, 15, 132, 167
inferior outcomes and horizontal equity constraint, 197
and Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky compensation, 118, 122, 128–129, 131–132
optima, 123, 126, 206–207, 214
strict, 15, 167. See also efficiency partial coercion. See public goods game partial equilibrium net fiscal incidence, 216n22, 242
participation constraints, 14
and incentive-compatible constraints, 198–199
interim voluntary, 148–150, 156–157
in mechanism design, 11, 13, 16, 195
and non-participation, 199
voluntary, 153, 158. See also constraints personal relationship(s), 37, 42, 83, 92
personal rights, 51
Pigouvian fines, 102, 102n3, 103, 109, 114
podesta, 77
poor, the application of rights to, 168
and provision of public goods, 219–220, 253
transfers from rich as coercion, 2, 6, 15
transfers to as rent extraction, 111n9.
See also social welfare positive theory of the self-enforcing fiscal system, 168n9
power to tax, 6, 6n4, 42n10, 168n9. See also taxation predatory governments, 250–251
predatory taxation, 266

© in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org
### Subject Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference(s)</th>
<th>Province(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>formation of, 136–139</td>
<td>18–19 provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homogeneous, 19–20, 249, 251, 254</td>
<td>provision point (PP), 330, 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matching, 248–250</td>
<td>public economics, and utilitarianism/social planning, 5–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private contracts, 3</td>
<td>public finance history of coercion in, 4–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probabilistic spatial voting model, 183–186</td>
<td>proprietary, 9–10, 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability discounting, 123</td>
<td>public goods demand for, 82–84, 173, 175, 180, 212, 213t, 225t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>procedural justice. See resistance game property tax, 54–55, 244–246</td>
<td>elasticity of substitution, 204, 204n7, 210, 224–226, 226t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proportional income tax, 165n8, 180</td>
<td>government vs. citizen preference for spending on, 332–333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proportional representation, 20, 269</td>
<td>inefficiency in supply of, 202, 207f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proprietary public finance defining, 60</td>
<td>level of, 170f, 170–171, 175–176, 212–213, 250n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous research on, 60–61</td>
<td>marginal evaluation of, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proprietary state, 9–10, 85f</td>
<td>threshold, 274, 304. See also public goods game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atomized anarchy, 62–65</td>
<td>public goods economy, defining, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collective protection and self-governance in, 64–65</td>
<td>public goods game, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>producers and bandits in, 62–64</td>
<td>beliefs about others’ contributions, 310–317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment, reducing inefficiency through, 75–80</td>
<td>in baseline and coercion treatments, 312–313, 313f, 314–315, 315t, 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive proprietary rule (organized anarchy), 69–75</td>
<td>countervailing forces at work regarding the effect of lifted expectations, 316–317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and free-rider problem, 73</td>
<td>free riding, 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and inefficiency, 74–80</td>
<td>in low- and high-coercion treatments, 311f, 311–312, 314–315, 315t, 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long-run equilibrium, 72–73</td>
<td>compensation for subjects, 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short-run equilibrium, 70–72</td>
<td>contributions to public good results, 307–310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and viability of democratic rule, 73–74</td>
<td>group level, 308, 308f, 324t, 324f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emergence of, 61–62</td>
<td>non-committed (non-coerced) group members, 308–309, 309f, 310t, 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>folk theorem as mechanism for commitment, 74–80</td>
<td>discussion and conclusion, 321–323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and coordination problem, 76</td>
<td>motivation crowding-out, 322–323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and lack of need for organizations, 76</td>
<td>partial commitment, 322–323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and multi-period interactions, 76</td>
<td>self-commitment, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and static, inefficient equilibrium, 75</td>
<td>discussion of, 328–329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monopolistic proprietary rule, 62, 65–68</td>
<td>experimental design and procedures, 304–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ruler better at extraction than bandits, 68</td>
<td>beliefs elicitions, 306–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tax rates in, 65–66</td>
<td>beliefs elicitations, using interval scoring rule, 306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state building and commitment, 77–80</td>
<td>beliefs elicitations, using quadratic scoring rule, 306–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degree of commitment, 77</td>
<td>contributions to public good, 305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deterring entry, 79</td>
<td>discussions and conclusions, 321–323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nash equilibrium, 78–79</td>
<td>beliefs elicitation, 306–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nash equilibrium, commitments higher than those in, 79–80</td>
<td>beliefs elicitation, 306–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>podestas in medieval Genoa, 77</td>
<td>beliefs elicitation, 306–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>symmetry of rulers, breaking, 79–80</td>
<td>beliefs elicitation, 306–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supply of public goods in, 84–86</td>
<td>beliefs elicitation, 306–307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protection technology, 64–65, 68, 69–74</td>
<td>beliefs elicitation, 306–307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© in this web service Cambridge University Press

www.cambridge.org
Subject Index

multi-period, comparison with resistance game, 289
overview of, 302–303
partial coercion, 21
related experimental literature, 303–304
collective agreements on obligatory contribution levels, 304
effect of obligations on beliefs of others’ contributions, 303–304
effect of obligations on voluntary contributions, 303
non-binding recommendations on contributions to threshold good, 304
results, 303, 307–321
self-commitment and contributions, 317–321
free riding, 319, 321
group level contributions of non-committed subjects, 324t, 324f
levels of contributions, 317–318, 318f, 319f, 321
of non self-committed subjects, 320f voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), 304
punishment
conditional, 95–97, 109–110
decentralized, 301–302
pure public good, 273n2
q-referenda, 152, 155
quadratic scoring rule, 306–307
random effects, 284t, 284–285, 285t, 286–287
rational choice model, 136–137
Rational Choice theory, 136–137
rationality
common knowledge of, 152–153
toward policy, 33
redistribution
vs. coercion by social planner, 166–168f
before decentralization, 260–261, 261f
with decentralization, 261–262
and disappearance of coercion, 260–263
in divided societies, 262
in re(unification) of countries, 262–263
relationship(s)
anonymous, 46, 47, 83
impersonal (see impersonal relationship(s))
personal, 37, 42, 83, 92
voluntary (see voluntary relationship(s))
rent extraction, 11
and baselines, 92–93
competition among societies with exit costs, 106–109
competition among societies without exit costs, 104–106
and free riding, 14, 36
mobility of non-elites, effect on, 103–104, 104n6, 105–109, 114
reducing in federalist milieu, 114
reducing using civil law and takings clauses, 114
reducing using zero-rent extraction baseline, 114–115
transfers to poor as, 111n9. See also rent(s);
rent seeking
rent(s)
individual specific, 48–49
in limited access societies, 43
in open access societies, 51. See also organizations
rent seeking, 5n2, 21
expenditures, 111
expenditures as percent of GDP, 111
resistance
difficulties to cooperating against, 273–274, 290
successful, 274. See also resistance game
resistance fund, 274, 277, 287f, 287–288, 288f, 289
resistance game, 20–21
average earnings of DM, observed/ predicted, 275
clustered standard errors, 286n8
comparison to multi-period public goods game, 289
compensation for participants, 276n5, 277
conclusions, 289–291
consequences of increasing resistance threshold, 275
Decision Forms for DMs, 295
Decision Forms for Others, 294–295
decision maker, 274
decrease in probability of resistance in later rounds, 275, 289
descriptive statistics of sample, 279t, 278–281
average earnings, DMs and Others, 280–281
contributions to resistance fund, 278–280
resistance game (cont.)
  demographics of subjects, 280
  RFB forecast error, 280
  transfer demands, 278
  transfer demands, percentage resisted, 280
  discussion of, 330–331
  econometric models of strategy choices of
  DMs/Others, 284–287
  DM strategy choice, 284t, 284–286
  Others strategy choice, 285t, 286–287
  equilibrium strategies used by subjects,
  277–278
  experimental design and method, 275–278
  findings, 275, 278–289
  free riding, 275, 284
  instructions for participants, general,
  291–292
  instructions for participants, specific,
  292–293
  “Others,” 274
  out-of-equilibrium transfer demands,
  274–275, 275n3, 283–284, 289
  Post-Experiment Questionnaire, 277,
  297–299
  Practice Decision Forms for Others,
  293–294, 296
  Practice Exercises for DMs, 294, 296
  Practice Exercises for participants, 294
  Pre-Experiment Questionnaire, 296–297
  resistance fund balance (RFB), 274, 277
  donations, 274
  forecast accuracy of, 287f, 287–288, 288f,
  289
  similarity to Mertins’s procedural justice
design, 276–277
  transfer demands/resistance, frequency of
distribution, 281f, 281–284
  modes in frequency distribution of
  transfer demands, 281–282
  transfer demand increase, effect on
  resistance, 282f, 282–283, 283f
  Rest of the United States (ROUS) model. See
  net fiscal benefits, measures of
distribution/incidence of
  revelation, 131, 133
  truthful, 14
  revelation principle, 148, 153, 154
  revenue maximizing ruler, 32–33n4, 39f, 66–67
  revenues
  for coercion, 189
  and demand for public goods, 173, 175, 180
  for financing policy, 249
  and net fiscal incidence of state and local
taxes/expenditures, 209–210, 215–216,
  218, 236–237, 242, 244–246
  and proprietary state, 9–10
  and rent-extraction, 102
  and unanimity, 34–35, 54–55. See also
taxation
  rich, the
  application of rights to, 168
  and provision of public goods, 189,
  219–220, 253
  transfers to poor as coercion, 2, 6, 15
  rights-based arguments, and baselines, 92
  roaming (roving) bandit, 10, 61, 85–86, 87
  rule of law, 8
  for elites, 77, 79–80
  impersonal, 3, 8–9, 37, 51, 51n22
  Samuelson rule (condition)
  public good provision, 175, 201, 208t, 220t,
  219–220, 221t, 238
  voting, 205, 206–207, 218, 242
  Wicksell-Lindahl, 13. See also
efficiency
  sanctions, 2–3, 138, 301, 328n2, 331
  scale economies, 10
  security, 9–10. See also proprietary state
  self-commitment. See public goods game
  self-enforcing fiscal system, positive theory of, 168n9
  shirking, 21, 100, 102–103
  single actor theories of the state, 32–33n4
  social insurance, 111n9
  social interaction, 1, 22
  socialist calculation debate, 132
  social orders. See limited access societies; open
  access societies
  social planner
  coercion-constrained, 173–176
  coercion-unconstrained, 15, 162, 174, 177,
  185. See also social welfare; social
  welfare-coercion trade-off
  social solidarity, 8, 167, 174, 177, 189
  social welfare
  coercion effect on social planning, 15–16,
  and decentralization, 187–188
  non-welfarist, 16, 169
Subject Index

social well-being, 2, 184, 197, 274. See also social welfare-coercion trade-off
in competitive electoral system, 183–185, 198
in simplified setting, 180–183
counterfactual, 180
trade-off, 181–183, 183f
society
highly divided, 19 (see also Macedonia)
impersonal, 51–52, 56–58. See also limited access societies; open access societies
socioeconomic differences, 253n5. See also poor, the; rich, the
sociological perspective, vs. Rational Choice theory, 136–137
society
standard of reference, 12, 16, 202. See also counterfactual
standing, 124, 124n11, 125, 130
state, failure of, 4
stationary bandit, 32–33n4, 47n17, 61, 85
status quo, 112t, 112–113
status quo ante, 93–94, 97, 101
strategic behavior, 1. See also free riding
structured anarchy, 9–10. See also proprietary state
subjectivity of coercion, 12–13
super-majoritarianism, 19–20, 267, 269
Sweden, 114
symmetrical equilibrium, 70–71, 108
taxation
broad-based, 9n7, 172
compulsory withholding, 22
counterfactual tax payment, 17
deadweight loss, 17, 66, 203, 222
differential tax incidence, 241, 262
distortionary, 202–203, 207n9, 217, 221–222, 227
linear tax (see linear (progressive) tax)
lump-sum, 101–103, 104n4, 105–106, 151, 177, 210
non-discriminatory, 9
optimal tax, 9, 15, 163n3, 172–178, 186, 196–198
power to tax, 6, 6n4, 42n10, 168n9
predatory, 266
property tax, 54–55, 244–245, 246
revenues (see revenues)
tax audit, 22, 331–332
tax avoidance, 197
tax compliance, 22, 35, 56, 138, 303, 322–323, 331–332
tax evasion, 22, 105, 197, 322–323
semi-officially sanctioned, 251
tax exporting, 17, 202–203, 222–223, 223t, 224, 243
tax withholding, 22, 329. See also coercion-constrained optimal linear income taxation
tax policy
ad valorem tax system, 54–55
property tax, nineteenth century U.S., 54–55
tax legislation paired with expenditure legislation, 30–31. See also taxation
tax price, 165, 173
Lindahl, 220–221, 221t, 222
Lindahl-equivalent, 216–217, 217t, 218–220, 220t
marginal, 161
tax share, 165, 173, 177–178, 190, 196, 204–205
Tea Party activists, 138
Theory of Public Finance (Musgrave), 7
third party(ies)
absence of, 36
and conditional cooperation, 322
and contractual relationships, 39, 40, 83
government as, 31, 35
producers and security agents, 64–65
Tiebout coercion, 83–84, 87
Tiebout mechanism, 18, 244, 246
Tiebout model(s), 18, 199, 244–246, 267–268
Tiebout sorting, 208n11
totalitarian regimes, costs of resistance in, 273–274
traditional authority, and coercion preferences, 138–139
transaction costs
and baselines, 94–96
low transactions cost assumption, 118, 130–133
Subject Index

transaction costs (cont.)
and neoclassical theory of the state, 40
and quorum rule, 267
true game, 158

unanimity
collective choice mechanism, 19–20, 267
and net fiscal benefits, 207
in open access societies, 53
unanimity criteria, 30, 34
unanimity-impersonality trade-off
in limited access societies, 52
in open access societies, 52
unanimity rule, 30–31, 56
unitary actor, 40, 46–47, 47n17
United Kingdom (UK), equal access in, 48
United States (US)
Bill of Rights, 168
contested elections in, 45
equal access in, 48
general laws in, 55
idea of consensus in early, 52–53
Jim Crow laws and local control in, 268
and proposed value-added tax, 241
rent-seeking expenditures as percent of GDP
in, 111. See also net fiscal benefits,
measures of distribution/incidence of
universal normative baselines, 111–112
and ethics, 112
use to assess normative properties of choice
settings, 111–112
use to simplify analyses, 111
utilitarian justifications for initiation of
coercion, 118
utilitarian theory of distributive justice,
113–114
utility, diminishing marginal, 113–114,
114n10
utility functions, 16
Constant Elasticity of Substitution, 204,
204n7, 210
value-added tax, 241
VCG mechanism, 151
veil of ignorance, 14, 114, 114n10, 199, 200
violence
capacity of government for, 43n12
legitimate, 38, 42, 50
organized, 32–33, 43, 49–50, 57–58, 82–83
and Weberian conception of state, 7–8, 29.
See also violence, threat of; violence
specialists
violence, threat of, 29–30, 137
and credibility, 41
as inherent in coalitions, 41
as inherent in relationships, 36
and monopolies, 43, 56
and proprietary states, 61–62
and rule of law, 36–37
Wicksellian coercion as form of, 30
Violence and Social Orders (NWW), 8, 38
violence specialists, 39f, 38–40
voice, 14
voluntary, definitional difficulties, 137
voluntary association, Olsen’s, 36
voluntary consent
problem of voluntary consent and coercion,
33–36
specialists, 39f, 38–40
voluntary contributions, 20–21, 94, 197,
274–275, 290
mechanism (VCM), 304. See also public
goods game
voluntary participation, 146, 160–161
and ex ante information, 147–148, 150–152,
199–200
voluntary participation constraints, 153, 158
voluntary relationship(s)
and baselines
average net return from
listening/evaluating proposals, 95
conditional punishments, 95–96
decision of baseline, 94
emigration, 92
insurance policies, 96
completely voluntary, 93, 93t, 94
characteristics of, 93–94
defining, 91
less than completely voluntary, 94t
voluntary tax payment, 36
voluntary vs. coercive governance, 100–109
competition among rent-extraction societies
with exit costs, 106–109
continuum of exit costs, 106–108
Nash equilibrium, 108
competition among rent-extraction societies
without exit costs, 104–106
baseline, 105
liberal state vs. rent-extracting state, 101–104

© in this web service Cambridge University Press
payoff matrices, 103
voting
  probabilistic spatial voting model, 183–186
  q-referenda mechanism, 152, 155
Weberian state, 7, 8, 29, 32, 43, 61, 138
welfare. See social welfare
welfarist approach, 169, 197
  See also coercion
Wicksell(ian) criteria, 34
  unanimity criteria, 30, 34
willingness to pay (WTP)
  and Coasian bargaining, 126, 132–133
  and demand for public services, 82, 84
  and different levels of coercion, 87
  and Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky compensation, 129, 132, 133
  marginal willingness to pay, 82, 201–202, 206
  and net fiscal incidence, 204, 213–215
  and spatial model of state coercion, 86–87
  and supply of public services, 85
Yugoslavia. See Macedonia