

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics,
and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

Index

- Aehrenthal, Alois von, 134, 135, 136
 Afflerbach, Holger, 6
 Agadir crisis (1911). *See* Moroccan Crisis (1911)
 agency
 debate over role in outbreak of war, 18–21
 Albania, 80, 178, 233
 struggle for control of, 36
 Albertini, Luigi, 31–32, 54, 56–57, 195, 214
 Alexander II, Tsar, 122
 Alexander III, Tsar, 126
 alliances
 influence on rivalry dynamics, 84
 Allison, Graham, 271
 Alsace-Lorraine annexation, 24, 76, 83, 120, 254
 analytic perspectives, 5–6
 Andrew, Christopher, 262
 Anglo-Russian entente (1907), 21, 129
 Anglo-Russian rivalry, 74
 Apis. *See* Dimitrijević, Dragutin
 archival evidence
 approaches to research on, 11
 arms races
 influence on rivalry dynamics, 84
 Artamonov, Victor, 41
 Austria-Hungary
 application of preventive war criteria, 217–222
 “blank check” given by Germany, 147
 consequences of fear of Serbia, 57–58
 decision to go to war with Serbia, 42–45
 decision-making interdependence with Berlin, 147–149
 extent of Germany’s influence, 218
 German influence on actions in the Balkans, 177–180
 German support for war with Serbia, 43–45
 Halt in Belgrade proposal, 27
 internal political crises in June 1914, 39
 misjudgment of Russian response, 43–45
 perceptions of Russia’s revival, 104–108
 pre-war rivalries and alliances, 80–81
 response to assassination in 1914, 42–45
 response to Russian mobilization before 1914, 36
 response to the Second Balkan War, 180
 rivalry with Russia, 221
 road to the July 1914 ultimatum, 231–232
 role in the outbreak of war, 17–18, 30, 217–223
 signs of impending break-up, 102
 threat from Serbian nationalism, 221
 ultimatum to Serbia in July 1914, 245–246
 See also Triple Alliance
 Balkan League, 49, 178
 Balkan Wars, 35, 36, 49, 96, 102, 103, 136, 150–151, 231, 238
 avoiding inadvertent war, 177–180
 closure of the Turkish Straits, 79
 consequences of Turkey’s defeat in 1911, 80
 German position, 215–216
 Balkans
 French support for Russia, 18
 influence of the Franco-Russian alliance, 47–53
 Russian focus before 1914, 76–77
 bargaining theory
 application to the outbreak of war, 167
 Bark, P. L., 236, 247, 248
 Barnes, Harry Elmer, 31
 Barrère, Camille, 259
 Belgium
 German demands on, 55
 influence on Britain’s involvement, 56
 invasion by Germany, 30, 81, 82, 137, 193, 197
 revised Schlieffen Plan for invasion, 156–157
 Benckendorff, A. K., 242

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

Index

295

- Berchtold, Leopold von, 42–45, 46, 108, 136, 178–179, 180, 190, 232
- Berlin–Baghdad Railroad, 238
- Bertie, Francis, 90
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 22, 23, 27, 38, 43, 46–47, 95, 98–99, 102, 103, 104, 128, 136–137, 144, 148, 154, 155–156, 158, 178–179, 180, 237
- consideration of British intentions, 160–162
- conspiracy to blame Russia for the war, 180–192
- domestic and political constraints on mobilization, 159–162
- expectation that France would restrain Russia, 267
- fear of Russian growth, 173
- manipulation of the German public, 192–197
- policy preferences, 164–166
- question of preventive motivation, 212–217
- relative influence on decision-making, 164
- telegrams to the kaiser in July 1914, 190–192
- timing of the declaration of war on Russia, 192–197
- unwillingness to go to war over Morocco, 215
- better-now-than-later thinking, 201–202. *See also* preventive war among the Great Powers of Europe, 164
- logic of preventive war, 139
- bias
- blame for the outbreak of war, 13–14
 - issue in political science analysis, 15
- Biliński, Leon, 41
- bipolarization of the major powers, 65–67, 68–74, 80–81
- Bismarck, Herbert von, 127–128
- Bismarck, Otto von, 116
- cauchemar des coalitions* (nightmare of coalitions), 120
 - logic of preventive war, 117
 - use of preventive war as a diplomatic tactic, 120–123, 124–128
- Black Hand terrorist organization
- Franz Ferdinand assassination plot, 40–41
 - influence in Serbia, 39–41
- blame for the outbreak of war
- assumptions and bias, 13–14
- Bloch, Jean de, 265
- Bobroff, Ronald P., 88
- Bonar Law, Andrew, 55
- Bosnia, 203
- Bosnia-Herzegovina, 39, 48
- Bosnian crisis (1908), 218, 230–231
- Bosworth, R. J. B., 78–79
- Boulanger, Georges, 125
- Boulangism, 124
- Bremer, Stuart A., 218
- Britain
- challenge to global leadership, 81–83
 - economic crisis in July 1914, 55–56
 - economic warfare policy, 55–56
 - entry into the war, 47
 - factors influencing intervention and alliances, 77–78
 - French need for Britain to enter the war, 53
 - German consideration of Britain's intentions, 160–162
 - inability to remain neutral, 174
 - initial preparations for war, 262
 - internal political crisis in June 1914, 39
 - Ireland Home Rule question, 39
 - Lloyd George war memoirs, 16
 - perceptions of Russia's revival, 89–94
 - preoccupation with Ireland, 54
 - pre-war rivalries and alliances, 80–81
 - rivalry with Germany, 16–17, 81–83
 - Russian uncertainty about, 241–243
 - steps toward entry into the war, 54–56
 - tensions with Germany, 38
 - ultimatum before declaration of war, 197
 - uncertainty of support for France, 256–257
 - See also* Triple Entente
- Buchanan, George, 92, 106, 194, 233, 242, 243
- Bülow, Bernhard von, 132–133, 237
- Bulgaria, 36, 48, 151, 238
- defeat in the Second Balkan War, 80
 - First Balkan War, 150–151, 235
 - Second Balkan War, 180
- bureaucratic politics
- use of preventive motivation, 205
- Bush Doctrine, 119
- Caillaux, Joseph, 254–255
- Cambon, Jules, 96
- Cambon, Paul, 256
- Cardona, Luigi, 57
- Castelnau, Édouard de, 95
- cauchemar des coalitions* (nightmare of coalitions), 120
- Churchill, Winston, 27, 135
- Ciganović, Milan, 40
- Clark, Christopher, 14, 19, 39–41, 43, 50, 53, 61, 140, 151, 165, 271
- Clausewitz, Karl von, 253, 268
- Clemenceau, Georges, 261, 269

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

296 Index

- Clerk, G. R., 89, 90–91
cognitive bias
 issue in political science analysis, 15
Cold War, 3, 12
Concert of Europe, 20
Conrad, Franz, von Hötendorf, 21, 44–45, 57, 58, 139, 155, 179
 arguments for a preventive war, 133–136
 hard-line advocate of war, 215
Constantinople, 79
constructivism
 application to the outbreak of war, 167
Conze, Eckart, 118
Copeland, Dale, 33, 130–131, 200, 203, 205, 214, 217–218, 221, 222
Copenhagen complex, 130–132
Corbett, Julian, 131
counterfactual analysis, 26–28
 counterfactual arguments, 24–28
 minimal rewrite criterion, 26–27
 necessary condition counterfactuals, 25–26
crisis dynamics
 and rivalry interactions, 84
Crowe, Eyre, 89, 90, 91–92
cult of the offensive, 17
Cyrenaica, 134
Czernin, Otto, 105, 106
- Danilov, Iu. N., 248
Dardanelles, 79
decision-making by political leaders
 considerations in the approach to war, 252–253
 French considerations, 253
 influences on the process, 9
 mindset of the European leaders, 60–63
 processes leading to war, 4
 risk assessment, 252, 269–272
 theoretical perspective on France, 38, 269–272
decline in strategic power
 motivation for preventive war, 199–201
defensive realism, 17, 145–146
 application to the outbreak of war, 167
Delcassé, Théophile, 97, 130
détente notion
 pre-war influence on Great Powers, 87
Deutsch, Felix, 100
diffusion of war
 mechanisms in the First World War, 222–223
 research questions, 28–29
Dimitrijević, Dragutin, 39, 40–41, 58
diplomatic constraints on German mobilization, 159–162
diplomatic historians
 approach to research, 9–13
Disraeli, Benjamin, 122
Dobrorolskii, S. K., 250
documentary evidence
 approaches to research on, 11
 German White Book, 191–192
 initial release by governments, 13
 publication of, 31
 record of the First World War, 4–5
domestic constraints on German mobilization, 159–162
domestic pressures argument
 comparison with the preventive war perspective, 170–171
 problems with, 172
Doumergue, Gaston, 93, 98
Dual Alliance, 128, 152
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, 252, 269
dyads of participants in the First World War, 219–220
- economic crisis in July 1914, 55–56
economic imperialism, 16
economic warfare policy of Britain, 55–56
Elman, Colin, 12
Elman, Miriam Fendius, 12
Entente Cordiale (1904), 256
Esher, Viscount Reginald, 131
European powers. *See* Great Powers of Europe
- Falkenhayn, Erich von, 46, 137, 154, 158, 195, 196
Fay, Sidney, 16, 31, 228
Ferguson, Niall, 25, 152–153, 264–265
First World War 168
 alternative explanation to preventive war, 217–222
 application of preventive war criteria, 217–223
 appraisal of preventive war criteria, 208–217
 causal complexity, 4
 cost in lives, 62
 debate over the causes, 3–5
 diffusion mechanisms, 222–223
 dyads of participants, 219–220
 historical puzzles, 168–169
 immediate and long-term impacts, 3
 implications of explanations for outbreak, 65
 long-term reverberations, 62
 preventive war explanation, 197–198

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

Index

297

- why it broke out in 1914 and not sooner, 173–177
- Fischer, Fritz, 7, 9, 12, 14, 32–33, 118, 145, 180–181, 195, 217, 228
- Fisher, Sir John, 131–132
- Flotow, Hans von, 49, 57
- Foch, Ferdinand, 253
- France
 - advances in Morocco, 78
 - alliances prior to 1914, 37–38
 - commitment to Russia, 18
 - decision-making in a theoretical context, 269–272
 - decision-making in the approach to war, 253
 - desire to maintain Italy's neutrality, 259
 - domestic political debate on the war, 253–256
 - financial support for Russian railroads, 257–259
 - financial unreadiness for war, 263–265
 - German declaration of war against, 193
 - influence in the Balkans, 18
 - internal political turmoil in June 1914, 38–39
 - lack of readiness for war in 1914, 253–256
 - military unreadiness for war, 259–263
 - need for Britain to enter the war, 53
 - perceptions of Russia's revival, 94–98
 - political leadership unreadiness for war, 265–266
 - precarious financial position by 1914, 263–265
 - pre-war Anglo-French relations, 77–78
 - pre-war rivalries and alliances, 80–81
 - refusal to take preparatory military measures, 256–257
 - rivalry with Germany, 81–83
 - role in the Balkans, 18
 - role in the outbreak of war, 24, 53
 - slow mobilization of Russian ally, 257–259
 - support for Russia, 244–245
 - uncertainty of Britain's support in war, 256–257
 - underestimation of German capabilities, 262–263
 - unreadiness of the French people for war, 266–269
 - unreliability of allies in 1914, 256–259
 - vulnerability in a situation of war, 266–269
- See also* Triple Entente
- Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 7, 115, 123, 187, 265
- Franco-Russian alliance, 83
 - influence in the Balkans, 47–53
 - role in starting the war, 47–53
- Franco-Russian rivalry, 74
- Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 36, 134, 178–179
 - assassination in Sarajevo 1914, 18, 41, 138, 231, 232
 - assassination plot, 40–41
- Franz Joseph, Emperor, 36, 101, 133, 135–136, 137, 179
 - conditions for going to war, 42
- future research
 - diffusion of war, 28–29
 - observations on the slide to war, 57–62
 - use of counterfactual arguments, 24–28
- George V, King, 256, 257
- German decision-making
 - and perceptions of relative decline, 167–168
 - and the Russian “Great Programme” of rearmament (1914), 151–152
 - apparent change of policy on July 29–30, 1914, 168, 180–192
 - belief in the inevitability of war, 163
 - better-now-than-later thinking, 164
 - “blank check” given to Austria-Hungary, 147
 - consideration of Britain's intentions, 160–162
 - constraints on rearmament in 1913, 151–156
 - diplomatic constraints on mobilization, 159–162
 - domestic constraints on mobilization, 159–162
 - erosion of potential effectiveness of the Schlieffen Plan, 149–156
 - expectations of a short war, 162–163
 - fear of relative decline in power, 172–173
 - fears of a declining military situation, 151–156
 - impact of the Balkan Wars, 150–151
 - inability to win the arms race, 151–156
 - influence of hegemonic ambitions, 144–146
 - influence of shifts in relative power, 162–163
 - interdependence with decisions in Vienna, 147–149
 - misperceptions of political leaders, 162–163
 - people's war argument, 159–162
 - plans for invasion of Belgium, 156–157
 - policy preferences of the main decision-makers, 164–166
 - preemptive pressures, 156–159

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

298 Index

- German decision-making (cont.)
 preventive war to maintain the status quo, 144–146
 relative influence of leading decision-makers, 164
 revised Schlieffen Plan, 156–157
 revisionist preventive war strategies, 144–146
 role of preventive logic, 139–140, 164
 sources of preventive logic, 149–156
 status quo versus revisionist preventive war strategies, 144–146
 threat from Russian pre-mobilization activities, 157–159
 timing of declarations of war, 168
- German paradigm
 and the role of other states, 9
 challenges to, 7, 9, 15–18, 23–24
 erosion and new observations, 57–62
 new approaches to research on, 33–35
 origins and ongoing arguments, 30–35
 perspectives on preventive war, 21–23
 role of other powers, 30
 roles of Russia and France, 23–24
 summary of current thinking, 33–35
- German–Russian rivalry, 74
- German war planning, 173–177
 actions in the days leading up to war, 180–192
 attempts to secure British neutrality, 174
 avoiding inadvertent war in the Balkans, 177–180
 conspiracy to blame the war on Russia, 180–192
 declaration of war against France, 193
 fear of Russian growth, 173
 generation of popular support for war, 175–176
 German need for total war, 180–197
 growing sense of threat from Russia, 176
 influence on Austro-Hungarian actions in the Balkans, 177–180
 invasion of Belgium, 193
 making Russia appear to be the aggressor, 176–177
 manipulation of the diplomatic environment, 176–177
 naval preparations, 174–175
 perceived need for a preventive war, 175
 preparations for a great war, 176
 preventive war explanation, 197–198
 recognition that Britain may intervene, 175
 secret conspiracy of civilian leaders, 192–197
 timing of the declaration of war on Russia, 192–197
 War Council (December 1912), 174–176
 German White Book, 191–192
- Germany
 alternatives to preventive war before 1914, 132–133
 conditional support for Austrian war with Serbia, 43–45
 Copenhagen complex, 130–132
 dependence on Britain's neutrality, 47
 extent of influence on Austria-Hungary, 37, 218
 historical rivalry with Russia, 227
 impression that France wanted to avoid war, 267–268
 internal political crisis in June 1914, 38
 international condemnation of preventive war, 137
 invasion of Belgium, 30
 Liman von Sanders crisis with Russia, 79–80
 misjudgment of Austrian actions, 45–47
 misjudgment of Russian response to Austrian action, 43–45
 motivations for preventive war, 7–8
 path to war, 45–47
 perceptions of Russia's revival, 38, 98–104
 position during the Balkan Wars, 215–216
 power transition hypothesis, 208
 pre-war Anglo-German relations, 77–78
 pre-war rivalries and alliances, 80–81
 proponents of preventive war (1886–1888), 124–128
 publication of diplomatic documents, 31
 question of preventive war, 208–217
 relations with Russia, 216, 220–221
 rivalry with Britain, 16–17, 81–83
 rivalry with France, 81–83
 Russian resistance to, 246–251
 Schlieffen Plan, 83, 149–152, 155–158, 195
 sinking of the RMS *Lusitania*, 30
 tensions with Russia in early 1914, 38
See also Triple Alliance
- Gibraltar, 78
- Giolitti, Giovanni, 78–79
- global leader decline
 structural transition, 68–74
- global leadership
 rivalry between Britain and Germany, 81–83
- Goremykin, Ivan, 48, 90, 106, 230, 236, 248

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

Index

299

- governments
 - initial release of documents, 13
 - publication of diplomatic documents, 31
- Great Powers of Europe
 - better-now-than-later thinking, 164
 - complexity of pre-war decision making, 87
 - détente and anticipation of war, 108–110
 - influence of the notion of détente, 87
 - internal political crises in June 1914, 38–39
 - role in the outbreak of war, 9
 - unconditional commitments to one another, 18
- “Great Programme” of rearmament (Russia 1914), 151–152, 240
- Great War. *See* First World War
- Greece, 80
 - First Balkan War, 150–151
 - Second Balkan War, 180
- Grey, Sir Edward, 27, 32, 36, 38, 58, 89, 92–94, 98, 104, 183, 188–189
 - belated involvement in the European crisis, 54
 - economic considerations in going to war, 56
 - estimation of the cost of going to war, 55
- Grigorovitch, I. K., 239
- guilt over the outbreak of war
 - assumptions and bias, 13–14
- Habsburg monarchy
 - perceptions of Russia’s revival, 104–108
 - signs of impending break-up of the empire, 102
- Haldane, Richard, 174
- Halt in Belgrade proposal, 18, 25, 27, 46, 162, 165, 212, 214, 221
- Hart, Albert Bushnell, 30, 57
- Hartwig, Nikolai, 40, 48–49
- Heeringen, Josias von, 173, 175
- Herrmann, David, 258
- Herwig, Holger, 151
- Hewitson, Mark, 33
- Hildebrand, Klaus, 118
- Hillgruber, Andreas, 118
- historians
 - approach to research, 9–13
 - debate on the First World War origins, 3–4, 8
- Hitler, Adolf, 3, 31, 146
- Hoffmann, Dieter, 33
- Hohenlohe, Chlodwig von, 122
- Holland
 - avoidance in the revised Schlieffen Plan, 156–157
- Holstein, Friedrich von, 125
- Holsti, Ole, 10
- Hoyos, Alexander, 43, 107
- Humbert, Charles, 261, 269
- Ianushkevich, N. N., 249, 250
- India, 89, 91, 107
- intelligence operations
 - information intercepts in the lead up to war, 49–52
- interdisciplinary approach, 9–13
- internal political crises
 - June 1914, 38–39
- international conflict theory
 - influence of the First World War, 4–5
- international relations scholars
 - approach to research, 9–13
 - debate on the First World War origins, 4–5
- international relations theory
 - implications of explanations for the outbreak of the war, 65
 - preventive war explanation for the First World War, 167–169
 - range of explanations for the First World War, 167
- international structural change
 - debate over role in outbreak of war, 18–21
- international system
 - changes following crises in 1911–1914, 35–39
- Iran, 201
- Iranian Revolution, 202
- Iran–Iraq War (1980), 202
- Iraq, 201, 203
- Ireland
 - Home Rule question, 39
- Israel, 146, 201
- Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912), 35, 150
- Italy
 - gains from the war, 62
 - internal political strife in June 1914, 39
 - invasion of North Africa, 134
 - participation in the Triple Alliance, 56–57
 - pre-war rivalries and alliances, 80–81
 - results of the Balkan Wars, 36
 - status in the Triple Alliance, 107–108
 - uncertain position of neutrality, 259
 - war with Turkey (1911), 78–79
 - See also* Triple Alliance
- Izvolksky, Alexander, 96–97, 230, 267
- Jagow, Gottlieb von, 100, 101, 102, 103–104, 156, 177, 182, 195, 196, 260
- Japan, 146
- Jaurès, Jean, 266

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

300 Index

- Jervis, Robert, 60
 Joffre, Joseph, 53, 133, 256–257, 262–263
 Jonnart, Charles, 263
 Jovanović, Jovan, 41
 July Crisis (1914), 110, 138
 German consideration of British intentions, 161–162
 Kaiser's desire to solve, 216
 new approaches to research on, 33–35
 Russian decision to mobilize, 243–251
 study by Albertini, 31–32
 summary of current thinking on, 33–35
- Kahneman, Daniel, 60
 Kaiser, David, 213, 221
 Kaunitz coalition, 120
 Kennan, George, 3
 Kennedy, Paul, 3
 Kiderlen, Alfred von, 178, 215
 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 62
 Knox, Alfred, 90
 Kokovtsov, Vladimir, 90, 94, 99, 101, 230, 235, 236, 237–238
 Krivoshein, Alexander, 48, 232–233, 236, 238, 247–248
 Kugler, Jacek, 200
- Lambert, Nicholas, 55–56
 Lansdowne, Lord, 131
 League of the Three Emperors, 121
 Lebow, Richard N., 203
 Lee, Arthur, 131
 Levy, Jack S., 217
 liberal theory
 application to the outbreak of war, 167
 Libya, 36, 78
 Lichnowsky, Max von, 174, 186, 188, 189
 Lieber, Keir, 17, 82, 145
 Lieven, Dominic, 228
 Liman von Sanders crisis, 38, 79–80, 90, 97, 103, 106, 231, 234–235, 238, 242
 Lindblom, Charles E., 210
 Lloyd George, David, 16, 32
 Loë, Walter von, 126
 Louis, Georges, 94
 Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 243
 Lucius von Stœdten, Hellmuth, 101
 Ludendorff, Erich, 154
 Luneva, Iu. V., 229
 Luxembourg, 193, 194
 Luzzatti, Luigi, 132
- Macedonia, 80
 MacMahon, Patrice de, 120
- Magyars, 39
 Malobabić, Rade, 40
 manpower mobilization
 increases before 1914, 36–37
 Marxism–Leninism, 228
 May, Ernest, 61
 McDonald, Patrick, 152, 154
 McMeekin, Sean, 88, 229, 239
 Mendelssohn, Robert von, 100
 Menning, Bruce, 51
 Mérey, Kajetan von, 134, 135, 136
 Messimy, Adolphe, 256–257, 261, 263
 Metternich, Paul Wolff, 132
 Michelet, General, 261
 Middle East, 62
 militarism, 16
 military–industrial complex
 use of preventive motivation, 205
 Miquel, Johannes von, 121
 Molden, Berthold, 106–107
 Moltke, Helmuth von, 22, 23, 37, 46–47, 58, 59, 103, 121, 127–128, 144, 145, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154–155, 179, 185
 argument for preventive war, 174–175
 expectation of a long war, 162
 hard-line advocate of war, 215
 making Russia appear to be the aggressor, 176–177
 need for public support for war, 159
 on France's military weakness in 1914, 260–261
 policy preferences, 164–166
 preventive motivation, 209
 relative influence on decision-making, 164
 revised Schlieffen Plan, 156–157
 role in the conspiracy to initiate war, 194, 195–197
 threat from Russian pre-mobilization activities, 157–158
 Mombauer, Annika, 12, 14, 58, 77–78, 118, 145, 152, 155, 162
 Montenegro
 First Balkan War, 150–151
 Monts, Count, 130
 Moran, Daniel, 119
 Moroccan Crisis (1905), 21, 128, 131
 Moroccan Crisis (1911), 35, 95, 98, 134, 149, 150, 215, 254, 262
 Morocco, 103
 French advances in, 78, 83
 motivated reasoning, 15
 Mulligan, William, 75–76, 213–214, 216
 Mussolini, Benito, 31

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

Index

301

- nationalism, 16
- Naumann, Friedrich, 130
- naval power
 - Anglo-German rivalry, 16–17
- necessary condition counterfactuals, 25–26
- Neilson, Keith, 88
- Neitzel, Sönke, 118
- newspaper press
 - role in the outbreak of war, 16
- Nicholas II, Tsar, 38, 107, 173, 235, 236, 243, 244, 247
 - exchange of letters with the kaiser, 46–47, 52
 - reluctance to approve Russian mobilization, 249, 251
 - visit to the kaiser, 237
- Nicolson, Arthur, 54, 89, 90–91, 104, 108
- nonlinear rivalry ripeness (NRR) model, 67–74
 - bipolarization of the major powers, 68–74
 - cascading effects in intersecting rivalries, 67
 - complexity of rivalry fields up to 1914, 68–74
 - components, 65–67
 - global leader decline, 68–74
 - indicators of potential for conflict, 68–74
 - pinball dynamics of the 1914 case, 68
 - pinball dynamics of the pre-war rivalry field, 74–85
 - regional leader ascent, 68–74
 - rivalry intensity, 68–74
 - significance of rivalry dynamics in the outbreak of war, role in onset of war, 85–86
- North, Robert, 9–10
 - offense–defense arguments, 85
 - offensive realism, 17, 145–146
 - Organski, A. F. K., 200
 - Ottoman Empire, 18, 49, 240, 242
 - decline in the pre-war period, 78–80
 - Paléologue, Maurice, 50, 53, 94, 97–98, 245
 - Palmer, R. R., 32
 - Pansa, Alberto, 96
 - pan-Slavism, 48, 100, 101, 124, 125, 126, 245
 - Pašić, Nikolai, 40–41, 49
 - peace research, 34
 - Persia, 91, 98, 106, 241
 - perspectives on First World War research, 9–13
 - perspectives on the First World War outbreak, 5–6
 - Poincaré, Raymond, 24, 37, 44, 93, 94, 96–97, 102, 254–255, 263, 268
 - acknowledgment of France's military shortcomings, 268–269
 - actions up to the outbreak of war, 53
 - decision-making style, 272
 - fears for the future of France, 268–269
 - Franco-Russian alliance, 258
 - French support for Russia, 244–245
 - letter to King George V, 256
 - reluctance to declare war on Germany, 267
 - support for Serbia, 48
 - uncertainty of Britain's support, 257
 - visit to Russia in July 1914, 49–50, 53, 256–257, 265–266
 - Pokrovskii, M. N., 228
 - political restraints on preventive war, 137–138
 - political scientists
 - approach to research, 9–13
 - cognitive bias issue, 15
 - politics
 - influences on decision-making, 9
 - Pollio, Alberto, 57
 - positivist research focus, 12
 - postmodernism
 - influence on research approaches, 12
 - Pourtales-Cronstern, Friedrich von, 99, 100, 104, 187, 189, 194, 195
 - “powder-keg” models, 19–20
 - power
 - and preventive war, 139
 - multiple dimensions of, 146–147
 - response to perceived shifts in, 7–8
 - power distribution
 - motivation for preventive war, 202–203
 - power transition hypothesis
 - German challenge to Britain, 208
 - power transition theory, 16
 - power transitions
 - interaction with rivalry dynamics, 82–83
 - preemptive logic
 - distinction from preventive logic, 141–142
 - preemptive wars, 201
 - preventive logic, 139
 - distinction from preemptive logic, 141–142
 - role in decision-making, 142–144
 - role in German decision-making, 139–140
 - preventive motivation, 142–144, 203
 - and definition of preventive war, 205–207
 - use by the military–industrial complex, 205
 - use in bureaucratic politics, 205

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

302 Index

- preventive war
 - alternative explanation for the First World War, 217–222
 - alternatives for Germany before 1914, 132–133
 - and hegemonic ambitions, 144–146
 - arguments of Conrad von Hötzendorf, 133–136
 - as a European norm before 1914, 117–119
 - as a legitimate instrument of state policy, 116, 117
 - as a state strategy, 142–144
 - better-now-than-later logic, 139
 - better-now-than-later thinking among the Great Powers, 164
 - breadth of definition, 140–141
 - Copenhagen complex as restraint on, 130–132
 - defining terminology, 142–144
 - domestic and diplomatic constraints on Germany, 159–162
 - explaining the absence of, 115
 - explanation for the First World War, 167–169, 197–198
 - German need for total war, 180–198
 - German perceptions of relative decline, 167–168
 - growing restraints on, 138
 - international condemnation of Germany, 137
 - logic of, 117, 139
 - moral and ethical restraints, 119–120, 138
 - motivations for, 7–8
 - multiple dimensions of power, 146–147
 - negative views within and outside Germany, 216
 - people's war argument, 159–162
 - perspectives on, 21–23, 116
 - political function of the concept, 120
 - political restraints on, 137–138
 - possible aims of, 144–146
 - preemptive pressures on Germany, 156–159
 - proponents among German general staff officers (1886–1888), 124–128
 - question of legitimacy, 119–120
 - reputational consequences as deterrent, 132
 - response to relative decline, 146–147
 - revisionist preventive war strategies, 144–146
 - risks associated with, 119–120
 - Russian mobilization as justification for Germany, 136–137
 - sources of restraint before 1914, 119–120
 - strategies for different types of threat, 146–147
 - strategy to maintain the status quo, 144–146
 - theoretical conditions for, before 1914, 115–116
 - use by Bismarck as a diplomatic tactic, 124–128
 - windows of opportunity before 1914, 115–116
- preventive war criteria
 - applied to Austria-Hungary, 217–222
 - applied to the First World War, 217–223
- preventive war perspective
 - comparison with other systemic explanations, 171
 - comparison with the domestic pressures argument, 170–171
 - comparison with the spiral model, 169–170
- preventive war, theory of
 - application of criteria to Germany, 208–217
 - better-now-than-later thinking, 201–202
 - classical realist approach, 203–204
 - criteria to define preventive war, 203–207
 - criticisms, 203
 - decline in strategic power as motivation, 199–201
 - evidence for occurrence of preventive wars, 203
 - power distribution as motivation, 202–203
 - presence of preventive motivation, 205–207
 - range of perspectives on, 199
 - relative importance of preventive motivation, 203
 - risks associated with preventive war, 204–205
 - timing of war initiation, 201–202
- Princip, Gavrilo, 40–41, 43, 58
- prospect theory, 272
- Protić, Stojan, 41
- Prussia, 80
- Radowitz, Joseph Maria von, 121
- rational actor theory, 271–272
- realist approach to preventive war, 203–204
- Redl, Alfred, 36
- regional leader ascent
 - structural transition, 68–74
- regional leadership
 - rivalry between France and Germany, 81–83
- Reininghaus, Gina von, 45, 58
- Reinsurance treaty (1887), 127

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

Index

303

- relative decline
 - as driver for preventive war, 167–168
- responsibility for the outbreak of war
 - assumptions and bias, 13–14
- revisionist views on the origins of the war, 31
- Reynolds, Michael, 88, 229
- Ribot, Alexandre, 263, 264
- Rich, David Alan, 229
- Riezler, Kurt, 130, 181, 182, 190
- risk assessment
 - decision-making of French political leaders, 269–272
 - risks associated with preventive war, 204–205
- rivalry dynamics 85
 - between nations, 20
 - Britain and Germany, 16–17
 - complexity and unpredictability, 84–85
 - in power transition situations, 82–83
 - influence of alliances, 84
 - influence of arms races, 84
 - interactions with crisis dynamics, 84
 - pinball dynamics of the pre-war rivalry field, 74–85
 - role in the onset of war, 65–67
 - significance in the outbreak of war, 85–86
 - streams of interacting rivalries, 74–84
 - See also* nonlinear rivalry ripeness (NRR)
- model
- RMS *Lusitania*
 - sinking by German submarine, 30
- Rodd, Rennell, 54
- Röhl, John, 33, 58, 162, 260
- Romania, 36, 38, 48, 107, 151
- Rößler, Konstantin, 120
- Rothschild, Lord, 264–265
- Royal Navy, 129
 - threat to the German fleet, 130–132
- Rupprecht of Bavaria, Crown Prince, 160
- Russia
 - attempts to create a treaty with Britain, 38, 241–243
 - Austro-Hungarian perceptions of Russia's revival, 104–108
 - Bolshevik government, 4
 - British perceptions of Russia's revival, 89–94
 - consequences of defeat by Japan (1905), 76–78
 - decision to mobilize, 243–251
 - desire to control the Turkish Straits, 49
 - focus on the Balkans before 1914, 76–77
 - French financial support for railways, 257–259
 - French perceptions of Russia's revival, 94–98
 - German conspiracy to blame Russia for the war, 180–192
 - German perceptions of Russia's revival, 98–104
 - German response to pre-mobilization activities, 157–159
 - “Great Programme” of rearmament (1914), 89, 151–152, 163, 176, 240
 - hindrances to Russian mobilization, 238–243
 - historical distrust of Germany, 227
 - historiography, 228–229
 - humiliation of the Bosnian crisis (1908), 230–231
 - implications of the Russian revival, 108–110
 - improvements in the railroad network, 89
 - inability to mobilize to support France, 257–259
 - increasing willingness to risk war, 229–238
 - interest in controlling the Turkish Straits, 79–80, 228–229, 238–240
 - internal political crisis in June 1914, 39
 - July Crisis 1914, 243–251
 - Liman von Sanders crisis with Germany, 79–80, 234–235
 - long-term radicalization, 229–238
 - mobilization, 18, 46–53
 - mobilization as German justification for preventive war, 136–137
 - mobilization before 1914, 36
 - mobilization in response to Austrian action, 43–45
 - mobilization intended as a deterrent, 227
 - pan-Slavists, 48
 - perceptions of Russia's revival, 88–89
 - pre-war rivalries and alliances, 80–81
 - pre-war significance in international politics, 87–88
 - problems with the partial mobilization tactic, 248–251
 - question of allegiance to Serbia, 245–246
 - readiness to resist Germany, 246–251
 - rearmament prior to 1914, 37–38
 - relations with Germany, 216, 220–221
 - responses to its growth in power, 20–21
 - role in the crisis of 1914, 33
 - role in the outbreak of war, 23–24
 - support from France, 244–245
 - tsarist regime, 4
 - uncertainty about Britain's intentions, 241–243

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

304 Index

Russia (cont.)

unpreparedness for war, 238–243

visit of Poincaré and Viviani in July 1914, 44, 256–257

See also Triple Entente

Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), 8, 74, 76, 89, 150, 237, 248

San Giuliano, Antonio, 49, 56–57, 134

Sazonov, Sergei, 38, 48–49, 50, 51–52, 53, 101, 102, 106, 185–186, 187, 189, 196, 231, 232, 239–240

argument for Russia to take a hard line, 247–248

attempts to strengthen the Triple Entente, 242–243

French support for Russia, 245

growing consideration of the military option, 233–235

problems with Russian partial mobilization tactic, 248–251

Russian allegiance to Serbia, 245–246

Schellendorff, Bronsart von, 126, 128

Schilling, M. F., 234, 247

Schlieffen, Alfred von, 116, 129–130

Schlieffen Plan, 17, 59, 77, 83

activation in August 1914, 195

erosion of potential effectiveness, 149–156

revised to avoid Holland, 156–157

Schmidt, Stefan, 50

Schmitt, Bernadotte E., 31, 32, 228

Schoen, Wilhelm von, 102, 268

Schroeder, Paul W., 20, 118

Schroeder, Stephen, 118

Second World War, 3, 12

secret alliances, 16

security dilemmas, 85

Serbia

Austro-Hungarian decision to go to war, 42–45

consequences of Serbian terrorism, 57–58

domestic turmoil up to 1914, 39–41

expansion due to the Balkan Wars, 80

financial support from France, 48

First Balkan War, 150–151

gains from the war, 62

influence of the Black Hand organization, 39–41

knowledge of the assassination plot, 40–41

nationalist and territorial claims, 17–18

results of the Balkan Wars, 36

Second Balkan War, 180

threat to Austria-Hungary, 221

ultimatum from Austria in July 1914,

231–232, 245–246

Serret, Marcel, 95–96

Siegel, Jennifer, 88

Simon, Jules, 269

slide into war thesis, 4, 16

future research, 57–62

mindset of the European leaders, 60–30

summary of observations, 57–62

Snyder, Jack, 17, 146, 208

Soroka, Marina E., 88

spiral model

comparison with preventive war

perspective, 169–170

problems with, 171–172

spread of war. *See* diffusion of war

Stalin, Joseph, 228

state policy

preventive war as legitimate instrument, 116, 117

state system

as a cause of war, 16

Steinberg, Jonathan, 130–131

Steiner, Zara, 54

Stevenson, David, 6, 52, 61, 230, 231, 232

Stolypin, P. A., 230, 233, 235–236, 238

Strachan, Hew, 52, 61

structural change

debate over role in outbreak of war, 18–21

structural neorealist theory

application to the outbreak of war, 167

structural rivalries

Britain–Germany, 81–83

France–Germany, 81–83

structural transitions

global leader decline, 68–74

regional leader ascent, 68–74

structure and agency, 9

causal complexity of processes leading to war, 4

debate over influence, 18–21

influences on decision-making, 9

Stumm, Wilhelm von, 182

substitutability of policies, 204, 205

Sukhomlinov, Vladimir, 233, 240

systemic explanations

and the preventive war perspective, 171

problems with, 172

Szápáry, Friedrich, 50, 105, 106, 107–108, 179

Tankosić, Voja, 40

Taylor, A. J. P., 32, 118

temporary advantage as motive for war, 202

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04245-2 - The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making

Edited by Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez

Index

[More information](#)

Index

305

- terrorism
 consequences of the 1914 Sarajevo assassinations, 62
 Thiers, Adolphe, 120
 Thurn, Douglas, 105, 106
 timing of the war, 201–202
 why it occurred when it did, 8
 Tirpitz, Alfred von, 129, 130, 131, 174–175, 195–196
 lack of preventive motivation, 209–210
 Trachtenberg, Marc, 229
 Transylvania, 38, 39
 Treaty of Versailles (1919)
 War Guilt clause, 3, 31, 255
 Triple Alliance, 107–108, 134, 135, 230, 235, 259
 role of Italy, 56–57
 status during 1911–1914, 37
 Triple Entente, 117, 129, 136, 230, 242, 259, 265
 Russian attempts to strengthen, 242–243
 status during 1911–1914, 37–38
 Tripolitania, 134
 Tschirschky, Heinrich von, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189, 193
 Tuchman, Barbara, 32
 Turkey, 36
 attack by Italy (1911), 78–79
 First Balkan War, 150–151
 weakness and defeats in the pre-war period, 78–80
 See also Liman von Sanders crisis
 Turkish Straits, 18
 Russian interest in controlling, 49, 79–80, 228–229, 238–240
 Turner, L. C. F., 228–229
 Tyrrell, William, 89, 91–92, 93

 United States, 55
 revisionist views on the origins of the war, 31
 views on the origins of the war, 30–31
 unmotivated cognitive bias
 in political science analysis, 15

 Van Evera, Stephen, 17
 Viviani, René, 38–39, 44, 98, 257, 268
 visit to Russia in July 1914, 49–50, 53, 256–257, 265–266

 Waldersee, Alfred von, 125–128
 Waldersee, Georg von, 37

 Wandel, Franz von, 173
 War Guilt clause
 Treaty of Versailles (1919), 3, 31, 255
 War in Sight crisis, 120–123
 Weines, Adolph von, 125
 Wenninger, Karl von, 192
 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 23, 33, 45, 129, 131, 132, 154, 156, 180, 260
 concerns about the prospects of general war, 210–212
 consideration of British intentions, 160–162
 decision to support Austrian military action, 43
 dependence on Britain's neutrality, 47
 desire to solve the July 1914 crisis, 216
 enthusiasm for monarchical diplomacy, 102
 exchange of letters with the tsar, 46–47, 52
 manipulation by Bethmann-Hollweg in July 1914, 190–192
 meeting with the tsar (1912), 98
 order for general mobilization, 195
 path to war, 46, 47
 policy preferences, 164–166
 relative influence on decision-making, 164
 Röhl's study of, 58
 telegram to the tsar on July 30, 191–192, 249
 unawareness of impending declaration of war, 195
 unawareness of the plans for war, 198
 unwillingness to go to war over Morocco, 215
 visit from the tsar, 237
 William I, German emperor, 123, 124, 127–128
 Williamson, Samuel, 218, 221, 231
 Wilson, Henry, 54, 95
 Wilson, Keith, 88
 Witte, Sergei, 97, 237
 Wolff, Theodor, 182, 260
 world economy
 near-collapse in July 1914, 55–56

 Young Turk revolt, 80
 Yugoslavia, 62

 Zabern incident, 38
 Zimmerman, Alfred, 180
 Zimmermann telegram, 31
 Zuber, Terence, 17