1

I. 4:1

2 kinds of puzzle about foundations of knowledge.

(1) how on earth is this proved? e.g. infinite primes.

(2) What's reality? What is number? Are Space & Time real? What is matter? What is substance?

Can't check them.

Irrelevant to science & life.

One can't by intellect get clear about use of language: though we use it by instinct.

Language consists of propositions; & several different senses of "proposition".

(1) Rule out $2 \times 2 = 4$, pure mathematics "propositions". They're different instruments from

(2) There's a piece of chalk here.

Any attempt to define must be futile.

It works, by being a picture of reality.

Pictures, because we compare them with reality.

E.g. "Is there a pencil here?"

Consider them not as descriptions, but as prescriptions, according to which you can act.

Signal must be prearranged. 4:2

How a picture?

At whatever time I rap once, he is to go.

Simple symbols are arbitrary; but when we combine them, obvious I've pictured order.

Signal is "that I am rapping desk now".
A spatial order can correspond to a temporal one.

There's a special, & general arrangement.

Engine-driver has to interpret condition of arm sticking out & now.

You have to apply general rule to special case.

Proposition must be picture in so far as it can convey something now.

A policeman gives a picture of what you're going to do.
His words must have same multiplicity as what you have to do.

Suppose I had only use of integers, language would not have sufficient multiplicity.

4:3 Lever with 2 positions can't regulate velocity continuously.

Putting lever midway corresponds to talking nonsense.

To prescribe, I must describe what I want done.

Since prescription, so description, must have same multiplicity as thing described.

Essence of symbol is that it can in a particular way be compared with reality: they agree or disagree with reality, but only in so far as they are pictures.

Has a word by itself a meaning?
Depends what you mean:
(1) It is a thing which can function (2) In fact it doesn't.
Need proposition express relation or predicate?

In raps no relation?

You can describe without verbs, substantives & adjectives.

Even in our language you can. There are hundreds of different kinds of words. 4:4

This table is brown. The weather is fair. I am tired.

I can't substitute "tired" for "brown", without giving nonsense.
Hence it's misleading to call both adjectives.[1]

In Jabberwocky[2] you can say which are adjectives, substantives & verbs.

[1] Moore's summary notes: <Any word is of a different kind from another, if substitution yields nonsense.> (10:01)

[2] 'Jabberwocky' is a nonsense poem by Lewis Carroll, which appears at the end of the first chapter of *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There* (Carroll 1992, 116–18).

2

4:5 II.

Puzzles about foundations of our knowledge.

Real & persistent troubles.

Thought? or language?

E.g. What is number?

"Battle of Hastings in 1066" those who say this, know perfectly what they mean.

When we talk about Time & Space in philosophy, we're not explaining to people what they mean.

We're not troubled about thought, but about clarification of thought.

= internal relations of thought; e.g. does this word mean same in this context & in that.

Only way to do this is to get hold of expressions of thoughts.

I can demonstrate that solution to a philosophical problem consists in finding something unclear in our symbolism.

E.g. "is" is used in 3 different ways.

The door is brown

I am

2×2 is 4

4:6 The solution is to discover that it's misleading to use same word in different meanings.

This doesn't make things trivial: This kind of difficulty of expression is tremendous.

Difficulty is to get one which gives a clear idea of how the word is used: an expression which prevents grammatical mistakes.

Propositions are in some sense pictures.

(1) "Picture" may mean "looks like"; & in this sense if it looked more like Wittgenstein[3] than Moore, we should say it wasn't of Moore. This is not my sense.

(2) Picture = is intended to be a picture. And in this case only can it be correct or incorrect picture.

Prescription. You want to make a man move his hand.
E.g. U, D, L, R[4]; & e.g. 3U = 3 up.



(U4)(D3)(L2)

Untrue simplifying assumption. 4:7

Suppose U4 made me mechanically go up etc..

In that case language would be on a level with drugs.

But did I understand the symbols?
Only answer would be that I reacted to them somehow.

In that case the multiplicity must be the same for (4 = ||||).

[3] In Moore's lecture notes the names appear as the abbreviations 'W.' and 'M.'.
[4] I.e. Up, Down, Left, Right.

But symbolism doesn't work in this way: I might say: I understand what you mean, but I won't do it.

(1) To understand = to think the proposition.

Relation between thought & reality is same (in important respect) as expectation, or volition or seeking to reality.

When I expect, what I expect doesn't occur in expectation.

How do we make sure that a man does understand what we mean?

Suppose a man says you didn't understand.

4:8 This would be taken as a sign that I did[5] understand.

There is always a gap between what occurs in expectation, & the expected thing, which has to be filled up by understanding.

But expectation, we feel, is somehow similar to what fulfils it (if anything).

How can I see that this is what I expected or not?

Imagine an answer to my expectation, positive or negative.

The expectation is a picture in a different sense.[6]

This is the same red as I saw yesterday
This is the same red as that
} have different meanings.

We can compare reality & expectation, & compare the degree in which it resembles expectation: e.g. we can say this comes near what I expected. Just as "this isn't quite the same colour as I saw yesterday".

How can I judge the distance between things I can't put side by side?

[5] Sic. [6] Moore later added: <From what? something similar to what is expected>.

That a is an expectation of b 4:9

= (1) b is a positive answer to a

(2) b & a have same logical multiplicity.

(2) is shewn by fact that we can use same words as in

I expect to see a red patch

I see a red patch

The expectation & fulfilment have something in common, which is their logical multiplicity.

How do we understand?

By means of conventions. How are we taught them?

Some obviously true sentence is said, & child is left to guess what it represents.

We teach by using language.[7]

And these conventions are made by giving a verification of the proposition.

This establishes a connection between language & your expectations.

You understand: = sentence arouses in you something related to reality, in same way as expectation to reality. 4:10

Music-writing can be regarded as prescription how to move your fingers, or description how you moved them.

"I see the (surface of the moon)."

"I see the (moon)."

Whether 2 words are really of same kind, is shewn by whether substitution makes nonsense.

[7] Moore later added, following on from 'We teach': <(a language by using that language)>.

You can't always substitute "the surface" for "the moon" without nonsense: e.g. "the moon's area is ... square yards" but "the area of the moon's surface is ... square yards".[8]

Both expressions are all right; & express same thing in entirely different ways.

I see the moon = I see its surface.[9]

[8] Moore's summary notes: <"I see the moon" and "I see the surface of the moon" mean the same, but "the surface of the moon" is a different kind of expression from "the moon", because in some propositions to substitute "the moon" for "the surface of the moon" would make nonsense e.g. in "the area of the moon's surface is 2,000,000 square miles".> (10:01)

[9] Moore later drew an arrow connecting this line to the phrase 'Both expressions' in the previous sentence; he then added: <(Nonsense is "I see the surface of the surface of the moon".)>

3

III. 4:11

How propositions work.

Proposition like Measuring-rod.

And this not a simile, but an example: i.e. measuring-rod may be a proposition.



"At this time the mercury will stand at a certain point".

Each dash is a picture.

2 things are required for them to work as a picture or proposition.

(1) That possibilities for position of dashes, should be same as possibilities of position of Mercury & hand.

= must be in same space

(2) We can compare them with actual present position of Mercury & hand.



"O is that high."

Might express either that O is, or that Q is.

4:12 Hence (3) I must have made arrangement about application of measuring-rod.

You can say: Advance 2 feet, & measure what you there find

or: Advance 3 feet, & measure what you there find.

(1) It must have length = be in same space.

(2) I must have made an arrangement for finding object to which it is to be applied, if it is to stand for a proposition.

"This desk is that /4 feet/ high." is a proposition; but the symbol is not merely the words.

E.g. you must explain "this desk" e.g. by pointing.

N.B. All the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that a proposition should be compared with reality, are rules of the application of language.

If desk is blown up: "It is this height" has no sense.

If it is moved, & I don't know how to find it: ~~It is also~~

"The present King of France is bald" is nonsensical, if you don't adopt Russell's analysis.[10]

If the existence of the King is part of the proposition.

[10] Russell 1905 is the canonical statement of Russell's analysis; there is a more accessible exposition in Russell 1919, chapter 16.