Introduction

The Roman Catholic Church is the only truly global institution the world has ever known. It is centrally managed, rigidly hierarchical, and has offices everywhere. It is probably the planet’s largest employer. It has its own legal system, its own state, and its own small army. Its leader is a global celebrity, Europe’s last absolute monarch, and under certain circumstances claims to be infallible. Some 1.2 billion people profess its faith, about 16 per cent of the world’s population, and every year tens of millions are educated in its schools, nursed in its hospitals, married in its churches, and buried in its cemeteries. From China to Chile, its buildings mark the landscape and its devotions console the afflicted. In the English-speaking world alone, there are today some 250 colleges and universities associated with the church in the United States, while the constitutions of three Canadian provinces guarantee public support for Catholic schools, which also educate nearly 20 per cent of Australian children, 8 per cent of New Zealanders, and 87,000 New Yorkers. As many as one in six American hospital beds are provided by Catholic institutions, and one in ten in Australia. Despite its recent scandals, the Catholic Church matters.

In the English-speaking world, Catholicism has long been associated with the Irish. As the St Benedict’s Young Men’s Society of Sydney, Australia, boasted in 1861, ‘in every clime, in the dark forests of America, beyond the Rocky Mountains, in the Islands of the Pacific Ocean, in the burning deserts of Africa, on the hot plains of Hindostan, in the wild bush of Australia, the priests of Ireland are to be found spreading and cultivating the holy religion of St. Patrick’. In many places and for many people, Irish and Catholic became synonymous: as the

2 Freeman’s Journal (Sydney) [FJ], 8 May 1861.
index to James Jupp’s 2004 study *The English in Australia* put it, for Catholics ‘see also Irish’ and for the Irish ‘see also Catholics’. This conflation remains true for many of the some 70 million people who today claim Irish ancestry; and despite the migration of millions of Italians, Germans, Croats, Poles, and many others, Catholicism in the anglosphere retains in many places a distinctively green hue. This has had several consequences, among them that the clerical sexual abuse crisis roiling the Catholic Church has at times seemed to be a largely Irish phenomenon; it has not gone unnoticed that what linked scandal-ridden places such as the eastern United States, Newfoundland, or Australia (and indeed Ireland itself) was a long-standing Irish ecclesiastical domination. This is neither entirely accurate – the scandals have crossed borders and ethnicities, as recent events in Germany, the Netherlands, and Chile have made clear – nor attributable to some mysterious flaw in the Irish character. Yet it is the case that the church that the Irish built has been particularly susceptible, in part because of the kind of church the Irish built: unaccountable power, social deference, and self-segregation have proved a fertile terrain for predators.

The conflation of Irish and Catholic dates back to the nineteenth century. In 1897, for example, Cardinal Patrick Francis Moran of Sydney marked the consecration of Melbourne’s St Patrick’s Cathedral with a celebration of what he called the ‘marvellous expansion’ of an ‘Anglo-Celtic Empire’ that had come to number some 200 Irish bishops, 16,000 Irish priests, and 20 million Irish Catholics. This empire far exceeded that of Britain, he boasted, because it followed the English language as it achieved ‘an ever-widening and unique position among the languages of the world’. Everywhere English was spoken, ‘through the Celtic Soldiers of the Cross, the Catholic Church extends her conquests’. The result, Moran concluded, was that the ‘the sun never sets on the spiritual empire of St. Patrick’s Apostolate’, and ‘the faith of Ireland’s sons, like a golden chain, binds the whole English-speaking world to God’.  

Moran’s audience would have recognized that he was echoing the language of Charles Wentworth Dilke, who had followed England round the world and then written about it in his 1868 classic *Greater Britain*. ‘Everywhere’, Dilke recalled, ‘I was in English-speaking, or in English-governed lands. If I remarked that climate, soil, manners of life, that mixture with other peoples had modified the blood, I saw, too, that in

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4 *The Advocate* (Melbourne), 6 November 1897.
essentials the race was always one.’ This left him with a ‘conception, however imperfect, of the grandeur of our race, already girdling the earth, which is destined, perhaps, eventually to overspread’. The legacy of ‘the England of Elizabeth’ was not to be found in ‘the Britain of Victoria’, he concluded, ‘but in half the habitable globe’. ‘If two small islands are by courtesy styled “Great”, America, Australia, India, must form a Greater Britain.’

The Irish were quick to repurpose this concept. It helped that ‘Greater Ireland’ had a long pedigree: a handful of medieval sources described a Hibernia major far to the west, for example, while at least one twelfth-century Norse text referred to a Greater Ireland, or Írland hið mikla. Eager nationalists claimed that this proved not only that St Brendan had discovered North America, which was a long-cherished myth, but that the Irish were still there when the Vikings arrived. Under Dilke’s influence this slipped easily into assertions of a more modern ‘Greater Ireland’. Shortly after Greater Britain appeared, for example, an Irish newspaper in South Australia pointedly observed that ‘England’ now had to ‘take account of another Ireland beyond the Western waves, and another in that great Empire of the future beneath the Southern Cross’. ‘Millions of Irishmen in America and Australia’, it concluded, ‘constituting a greater Ireland, still consider themselves part of the Irish nation, and think and plan and pray for the freedom and happiness of their traditional fatherland.’

Five years later, another Australian newspaper delightedly reported on the celebrations of Daniel O’Connell’s centenary, not only ‘in almost every town and village throughout the Australias’ but also in ‘the greater Ireland across the Atlantic’. By the turn of the century, the concept had become so deeply embedded that on the one hand James Joyce could have a character in Ulysses boast of the nationalist reinforcements waiting ‘in our greater Ireland beyond the sea’, while on the other the Irish Recruiting Council could claim ‘that Greater Ireland, from Adelaide to Brisbane, from San Francisco to New York, is heart and soul behind the men in Flanders’.

This Greater Ireland was widely assumed to be essentially Catholic. As the ‘priests and laity of Dunedin’ put it in 1889, ‘as we are the devoted children of Rome, so it is our joy and pride, while duly fulfilling our duties

7 The Irish Harp and Farmers’ Herald (Adelaide), 23 July 1870.
8 FJ, 14 August 1875.
as New Zealand colonists, to form a constituent part of the greater Ireland'. Nearly forty years later, Laurence J. Kenny boasted to the American Catholic Historical Association that from 'Armagh to Baltimore, from Los Angeles to Auckland, from Melbourne to Manila, from Zanzibar to Sierra Leone, from the Cape of Good Hope to Riga, are, from the right hand of the chair of Peter, the sons of Innisfall are the heralds of the pure and true gospel: verily, their sound has gone forth to the ends of the earth. Would America too, he wondered, convert and truly become 'Ireland it Mikla, a Greater Ireland'? Although Kenny's imagery was triumphalist, it was not fantastic: by the early twentieth century, Irish Catholics and their descendants in the English-speaking world very often had more in common with their coreligionists across the globe than with their neighbours across the street. They understood themselves to be members of a common cultural, religious, and in some cases political space and saw no contradiction between their identification as Irish and their status as Americans, South Africans, or Newfoundlanders. This was relatively simple in the republican United States, where the first Catholic newspaper (published in Charleston, South Carolina) printed the first amendment to the constitution on its masthead, but it was also true in the British world, where the bulk of the Irish and their descendants considered themselves both committed Irish patriots and contented citizens of Empire. In 1914, for example, the Galway-born archbishop of Melbourne, Thomas Carr, urged Irish Australians to 'fight for the mother country and the best balanced constitution in the world', which many thousands did, while his colleague Henry Cleary left his position as bishop of Auckland to serve as a chaplain for Irish New Zealanders on the Western Front and later accepted the Order of the British Empire. In Canada, the nationalist Ancient Order of Hibernians not only backed the war effort of 'that great Empire' of which they boasted Canada was an integral part but denounced the opposition of their American brethren as anti-British. As Mark McGowan has pointed out, for ‘many Irish Catholics in Canada, constitutional Irish nationalism and fighting the war were two sides of the same coin’, and his tag ‘Imperial Irish’ could equally well be applied to their coreligionists in Newfoundland, South Africa, New Zealand, and elsewhere.

10 Evening Star (Dunedin), 8 October 1889. 11 Quoted in Carey and Barr, 19.
Zealand, or Australia. Fierce critics of Britain could be fiercely loyal to the British Empire.

Yet there is nothing intrinsically enduring about Irishness. Consider the fate of Irish Protestants, who also migrated in great numbers and who also insisted on their own membership in a Greater Ireland. In parts of the United States, some Canadian provinces, and all of South Africa, they were a majority of Irish migrants, and they formed strong local majorities across Australia and New Zealand. Every American president with parents or grandparents born in Ireland was a Protestant, while as late as 1871 Irish Protestants and their descendants outnumbered Irish Catholics by two to one in Ontario. Yet it is the descendants of the Catholic migrants who are most often thought of as Irish: John F. Kennedy’s nearest relationship to Ireland was his great-great grandparents.

Take the case of New Zealand, where around 45 per cent of Irish migrants in the nineteenth century belonged to one of the island’s Protestant denominations. They reached every level of society, from the Londonderry-born William Massey, prime minister from 1912 to 1925 and an enthusiastic Orangeman, to Rutherford Waddell, the Down-born Presbyterian minister, Dunedin social reformer, and tentative ecumenist. Orange Lodges were omnipresent, and the Orange Order enthusiastically played its part in political and sectarian conflict. Yet like their coreligionists in Ontario, New South Wales, or South Africa, New Zealand’s Irish Protestants abandoned their Irish identity with what Gerard Horn has aptly described as ‘indecent haste’. The Orange Order has effectively vanished, not only from New Zealand but everywhere except Northern Ireland and parts of Scotland. As Donald

15 See, for example, Leigh-Ann Coffey, ‘Drawing strength from past migratory experiences: The Church of Ireland Gazette and southern Protestant migration in the post-independence period’, in Barr and Carey, Greater Ireland, 52–70.
16 Both of Andrew Jackson’s parents were born in Co. Antrim, James Buchanan’s mother was born in Co. Donegal, and Woodrow Wilson’s grandfather was born in Co. Down; Donald Harman Akenson, The Irish in Ontario: A Study in Rural History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1984), 27–8.
Akenson observed, Irish Protestants ‘blended so quickly with the dominant culture in New Zealand that they are hard to trace’, while Irish Catholics ‘simply refused to go away’. The same is true across the English-speaking world, where Irish Protestants first became Protestants and then simply Canadians or Australians or Europeans. The only exception is the American south, where ‘Scotch-Irish’ remains a recognizable identity. Irish Protestants vanished while Irish Catholics did not.

This phenomenon can be seen at every level. In the United States, for example, there are hundreds of ‘Irish’ gift shops that sell items ranging from ‘Cead Mile Failte’ coffee mugs to ‘Genuine Connemara Marble Rosary Beads’. Belleek china in the Northern Ireland firm’s famous shamrock pattern can share a shop window with a selection of first communion gifts. The conflation of Irish and Catholic in such places is total and unselfconscious. The same is true of the symbolism associated with Glasgow Celtic football club or the ‘Vatican Army’ that supports New Zealand’s Marist Rugby Football Federation. This would have gladdened the heart of Daniel O’Connell, but what accounts for the endurance of Irish Catholic identity in the English-speaking world?

The obvious answer is the Roman Catholic Church. Yet the Catholic Church in Greater Ireland was always comprised of more than just the Irish, both in the nineteenth century and later. In 1850, for example, one Irish bishop estimated that, while there were approximately one million Irish Catholics in the United States, there were also some 500,000 Germans and 200,000 French, while in the Canadian Maritimes the Irish were often in a minority even of anglophone Catholics. Although the vast migration associated with the Great Famine and its aftermath was necessary to secure Irish control of their church, it was not sufficient. Power had to be seized.

This was because before the mid-1840s the Irish rarely held the ecclesiastical reins anywhere except Ireland itself. The Catholic Church in Australia was dominated by English Benedictines, New Zealand was under the control of the French Society of Mary, America was largely the preserve of French and German bishops, many associated with a French religious order, and India was contested by the Portuguese, the French, several other European nationalities, and a significant indigenous Catholic population. What French Canadians did not dominate

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in Canada, Scots did. Only South Africa and Newfoundland were wholly Irish missions. In each case, the incumbents fiercely resisted Irish incursions, and, in each case, they succumbed to a deliberate, ruthless, and organized Irish campaign to gain control of the church. Ireland’s empire was planned. It was not acquired in a fit of absence of mind.

It was also largely the work of one man: Paul Cullen, rector of the Irish College in Rome (1832–49), archbishop of Armagh (1849–52), archbishop of Dublin (1852–78), and from 1866 Ireland’s first cardinal. Working first on behalf of others, and then on his own account, Cullen systematically planted like-minded allies, former students, relatives, and Dublin diocesan priests in senior positions across the English-speaking world. These men in turn pursued policies and built institutions that made Catholicism’s Greater Ireland possible, allowed it to cohere, and then helped it to thrive. What they created was the largest, most important, most enduring, and most historiographically convincing of all imperial networks. It was global in reach, ideologically coherent, centrally led, and its legacy can still be seen at any St Patrick’s Day parade anywhere in the world.

It was also an example of what Tony Ballantyne has described as the ‘horizontal linkages’ that bound the constituent parts of the British Empire to one another. Ballantyne’s point was that the traditional understanding of that empire as a series of largely discrete bilateral relationships (political, cultural, economic) between the metropole and the periphery did not fully capture the complexities of the British imperial world. People, information, goods, ideas, and armies also moved between colonies and not simply between the colonies and ‘home’. He preferred the image of a spider’s web or webs, arguing that if we conceive of the empire not as a single web but as a complex accumulation of overlapping webs, it is possible to envisage that certain locations, individuals or institutions in the supposed periphery might in fact be at the centre of complex networks themselves’. 23

This was certainly true of Catholicism’s Greater Ireland, where Rome largely replaced London as the metropole and Dublin assumed the vice-regal functions exercised in Britain’s South Asian empire by Delhi. Indeed, Ireland served as the sort of alternative imperial ‘nodal point’ described by Thomas Metcalf, ‘from which peoples, ideas, goods, and institutions – everything that enables an empire to exist – radiated outward’. 24 Yet it also reflects the fact that the Catholic Irish moved freely

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through the English-speaking world. Consider three Canadian examples: Philip Francis Little was born in 1824 in Prince Edward Island to Irish parents, moved to Newfoundland, became its first premier, then a judge, and retired to Ireland where he was active in Home Rule politics and where one of his sons featured in James Joyce’s fiction and another fought in the civil war and then helped found Fianna Fáil; Timothy Warren Anglin was born in Cork, the son of an employee of the East India Company, before moving to New Brunswick where he edited a newspaper for Irish Catholics and entered provincial and then federal politics as the champion of Irish Catholics; Thomas D’Arcy McGee was born in Ireland, emigrated to the United States, returned to Ireland, rebelled, fled, edited a newspaper in Boston, moved to Montreal, became a Father of Canadian confederation, and was shot dead by a fellow Irishman in Ottawa. Irish Catholics moved in every direction: John Boyle O’Reilly rebelled with the Fenians, was transported to Australia, escaped to America, and became the editor of McGee’s old newspaper, the Boston Pilot; John O’Shanassy migrated from Ireland to South Australia and then Victoria, where he became the second anglophone Catholic premier in the British Empire (Little was the first) and was knighted by both the queen and the pope. The same was true of tens of thousands of others who followed gold or jobs or family across the globe; if California or the Cape did not work out, Victoria or Otago might. They were served by a similarly mobile clergy: M. Ursula Frayne, for example, founded the Sisters of Mercy not only in Newfoundland but also in Western Australia and Victoria. Thomas Croke was the second bishop of Auckland before he became the patriotic archbishop of Cashel; one of his brothers was a prominent priest in northern California (where he co-owned the leading Catholic newspaper, The Monitor) and another made his career as a businessman in Ballarat, while one of their sisters was a nun in Co. Cork and another a nun in New South Wales.25

Everywhere the Catholic Irish were bound together by thick webs of shared history, shared devotions, and shared institutions, including a global Irish Catholic press.

Yet this Irish spiritual empire was only possible because ecclesiastical power in the English-speaking world was centralized in the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, known as the Propaganda Fide or simply the Propaganda. Founded in 1622 to improve papal oversight of the mission to India, by the nineteenth century it had become what amounted to the pope’s colonial office. As the English

25 See ‘Articles of co-partnership’, 12 October 1880, Archives of the Archdiocese of San Francisco [AASF], Joseph Sadoc Alemany papers [AP], 1880/27.
convert John Henry Newman unhappily observed in 1863, ‘the whole English-speaking Catholic population all over the world is under Propaganda, an arbitrary, military power’. It could appoint a bishop but also depose him, grant a marriage or refuse it, suspend a priest or absolve him, open a university or close it. It was, Newman fumed, ‘our only court of appeal’. Letters from across the world arrived in its splendid palace on the Piazza di Spagna, where they were opened, read, and summarized by a small group of bureaucrats known as minutanti. They were overseen by a secretary, who reported to the cardinal prefect, who in turn chaired the monthly meeting of a larger group of cardinals that decided everything from an episcopal appointment in Boston to a marriage dispensation in Ceylon to a liturgical dispute in Syria. Its decisions were then submitted to the pope for his approval before being put into formal language and communicated by the minutante responsible for the relevant region. The entire apparatus, including the semi-detached cardinals of the congregation, never amounted to more than twenty at any one time.

If the key to the church was the Propaganda, the key to the Propaganda was the cardinal prefect: the minutanti had influence, and the cardinals authority, but the cardinal prefect had power, which he might or might not share with his secretary. Only eight men held the office between 1826 and 1916 and only two during the greatest period of Irish ecclesiastical expansion before 1874. (More than forty ministers had responsibility for Britain’s colonies in the same period.) The first was Giacomo Fransoni, an aristocratic papal diplomat who had served as the nuncio in Lisbon before his appointment in 1834. By all accounts gentle, well-liked, and attentive to detail, Fransoni was part of the conservative faction in the curia associated with the cardinal secretary of state Luigi Lambruschini, and in the late 1830s was their preferred candidate in the event of a papal election. Yet he was also close to Gregory XVI, and his diplomatic skills are suggested by his ability to navigate the pope’s frequent interventions in the congregation’s affairs. In so far as he had an agenda, it was to ensure good ecclesiastical governance in the mission churches, by which he meant they should be well organized, well disciplined, and obedient to Rome. During his more than two

decades in office, he was served by four secretaries, the last and most important of whom was Alessandro Barnabò.

Born to a noble family in Foligno in 1801, Barnabò was taken at the age of ten to France as hostage against the good behaviour of the region’s nobility. While there, he was educated in a military school, which a later observer thought accounted ‘for his prompt and energetic bodily movements and the quick decision on all matters brought before him’. It may also have produced his formidable work ethic: he once boasted that he had read every letter written by the congregation. On his return, he trained for the priesthood, studied law and philosophy in Rome, and was ordained in 1833. After parish work and a stint elsewhere in the curia, he joined the Propaganda in 1838, became secretary in 1847, and succeeded Fransoni in 1856.

In many ways, Alessandro Barnabò was the Propaganda. He read every paper, took every decision, and exercised an essentially despotic control until a few months before his death in early 1874. He was short, strong, temperamental, voluble, and did not suffer fools. While still secretary to the congregation he was reputed to have badly beaten two men who had tried to rob him ‘just under the shadow of the Colosseum’. His frugality was widely remarked, as was his modesty: one Irish seminarian recalled that at the reception to mark his elevation to cardinal he kept his back to a pillar with his hands behind him ‘to prevent the hand-kissing universal in Rome from all below to all above’. Another Irish observer was impressed that his free time was apparently spent in a punishing round of confessions, retreats, and visits to schools and orphanages. Nor was Barnabò much bothered by social niceties: he had a cruel sense of humour, which he applied widely, and was prepared to challenge the pope, sometimes furiously. As John Henry Newman revealingly complained, he was a ‘mere clerk – to whom routine, and dispatch, are everything and gentleness, courteousness, frankness and consideration are words without meaning’.

Yet the Propaganda was not simply a bureaucracy: it was also a school. Founded in 1627 by Urban VIII, the Collegio Urbano was located in the Palazzo di Propaganda Fide where it educated seminarians from mission territories. For many years, this was largely understood to mean the ‘Oriental’ churches in the lands under Ottoman control, but there was

28 R. V. Howley, ‘Cardinal Barnabò: A reminiscence’, Catholic World, April 1903, 81. Howley was the clerical brother of Michael Howley, a future bishop of St John’s, Newfoundland.
31 See Dowd, Rome in Australia, 1: 189–90.