Introduction

The problems of peace, security and disarmament were long-term preoccupations for the internationalist movement in France. On 5 June 1911 a national congress of French peace societies convened to consider the conditions necessary for international disarmament. Discussion revolved around a report by Théodore Ruyssen, president of the Association de la paix par le droit. Ruyssen had concluded that

> Any lasting solution to the problem of disarmament must be subordinated to achieving durable security through the construction of a juridical international system capable of pushing aside or resolving disputes between nations.

Only compulsory international arbitration, Ruyssen argued, could provide the security necessary for nations to accept arms reductions.[1]

Thirteen years later French premier Édouard Herriot appeared before the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations to give a celebrated speech on the problems of security and disarmament. Herriot here unveiled a new French policy for international security aimed at establishing a regime of compulsory arbitration that would provide the security necessary to allow for significant international disarmament. 'Arbitration, security, disarmament', Herriot proclaimed, 'are the three master pillars of the edifice of peace we must construct.'[2]

The prescriptions of Ruyssen in 1911 and Herriot in 1924 were part of an internationalist current in French thinking about peace and security that flowed through the First World War and into the inter-war period. Ruyssen's Association de la paix par le droit was the largest and most influential peace association in France. His juridically inspired analysis of the challenge facing international disarmament reflected the views of the overwhelming majority of his colleagues in the French peace movement. Herriot, meanwhile, was leader of a centre-left coalition government, the Cartel des gauches, that had come to power in May 1924 with a mandate to change the course of France's foreign

[1] P.-E. Decharme (ed.), *VIIème Congrès nationale des sociétés françaises de la paix: compte-rendu du congrès (4, 5, 6 et 7 juin 1911)* (Clermont-Ferrand, 1911), 196–7.
[2] Société des nations, *Journal officiel*, 1924, Herriot before the League Assembly, 5 September 1924.

policy. The triple-formula *arbitrage–sécurité–désarmament* outlined by Herriot to the League Assembly provided the conceptual foundations for new Cartel policy. It would shape French responses to the challenge of European security until the mid-1930s.[3] But Herriot's formula was essentially a rearticulation of the vision of international security outlined by Ruyssen in 1911 and pursued by French internationalists of all stripes before, during and after the First World War.

The impact of French internationalism has been ignored in the historiography of international relations in the era of the Great War. The foreign and security policies of France are nearly always characterised as 'realist' in inspiration and dominated by traditional practices such as the balance of power and military alliances. The prevailing view is that French policy was essentially a bid for strategic predominance over Germany. There is virtual consensus, moreover, that French policy elites were all but immune to the politics of internationalism.[4] The distinguished historian P. M. H. Bell, for example, argues that internationalist 'idealism' was an issue that 'came between the British and the French'. France, Bell asserts, was 'an old European country' whose policy elites 'thought primarily in terms of interests and power'. In Britain, conversely, internationalism 'touched a strong responsive chord'.[5]

As a concept, 'internationalism' defies easy definition.[6] It is generally associated with an outlook that attaches vital importance to the economic, social and cultural benefits of cooperation at the international level. A particularly

[3] France, Ministère des affaires étrangères (hereafter MAE), 1918–1940, *Série SDN*, 'Arbitrage, Sécurité, Désarmament', vols. 706–824.

[4] There is, by contrast, a large and growing literature on pacifism, non-state actors and support for Franco-German cooperation and the League of Nations. See esp. N. Ingram, *The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France, 1919–1939* (Oxford, 1991); J.-P. Biondi, *La Mêlée des pacifistes* (Paris, 2000); S. Lorrain, *Des Pacifistes français et allemands pionniers de l'entente franco-allemande* (Paris, 1999); C. Birebent, *Militants de la paix et de la SDN: les mouvements de soutien à la Société de nations en France et au Royaume-Uni, 1918–1925* (Paris, 2007); J.-M. Guieu, *Le Rameau et le glaive: les militants français pour la Société des Nations* (Paris, 2008); C. Bouchard, *Le Citoyen et l'ordre mondial (1914–1918): le rêve d'une paix durable au lendemain de la Grande Guerre* (Paris, 2008).

[5] P. M. H. Bell, *France and Britain, 1900–1940: Entente and Estrangement* (London, 1996), 116–17. The assumption that French policy was based on 'realist' power politics is so pervasive that listing the relevant literature would take up too much space. Among the most influential works specifically on French policy during the war and during the peace conference are G.-H. Soutou, *L'Or et le sang: les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1989); D. Stevenson, *French War Aims Against Germany, 1914–1919* (Oxford, 1982); D. Stevenson, 'France and the German Question in the Era of the First World War' in S. Schuker (ed.), *Deutschland und Frankreich vom Konflict zur Aussöhnung: Die Gestaltung der westeuropäischen Sicherheit 1914–1963* (Munich, 2000), 1–18; J.-B. Duroselle, *La Grande Guerre des Français* (Paris, 1994); P. Miquel, *La Paix de Versailles et l'opinion publique française* (Paris, 1972); J. Bariéty, *Les Relations franco-allemandes après la première guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1977).

[6] The following passage is indebted especially to P. Anderson, 'Internationalism: a breviary', *New Left Review*, 14 (March–April 2002), 5–6; but see also M. Geyer and J. Paulmann, *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Politics and Society from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001); P. Clavin, 'Conceptualising Internationalism between the World Wars' in

important form of internationalism, for the purposes of this study, was a doctrine that looked to the creation of institutions beyond the nation-state as the best means to promote economic progress and prevent war. Recent scholarship has underlined the importance of liberal and internationalist conceptions in the foreign policies of both Britain and the United States. Keith Neilson distilled the findings of a generation of work on British policy when he underlined the extent to which decision-making elites in London were 'caught between nineteenth century concepts of the balance of power, the experimentation that was collective security and old-fashioned alliance diplomacy'.[7] Work on the conceptual foundations of American policy during this period has advanced along similar lines. Historians have tackled issues ranging from Theodore Roosevelt's approach to world order to the ideological content of 'Wilsonianism' and the American movement to promote arbitration and the rule of law.[8] The prevailing picture of French foreign and security policy, conversely, has scarcely changed over the past thirty years. France's international posture continues to be represented in monochrome fashion as inspired exclusively by the power political assumptions of the pre-1914 era.[9]

D. Lacqua (ed.), *Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars* (London, 2011) and G. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, 2013).

[7] K. Neilson, *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order* (Cambridge, 2006), 318; see also, and among others, T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865–1914* (Cambridge, 2011); J. Ferris, *The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–1925* (London, 1987); B. McKercher, 'Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919–1939' in M. Dockrill and B. McKercher (eds.), *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1950* (Cambridge, 1996), 79–114; B. McKercher, 'Austen Chamberlain and the Continental Balance of Power' in E. Goldstein and B. J. C. McKercher (eds.), *Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865–1965* (London, 2003), 207–36; E. Goldstein, 'The British Official Mind and the Lausanne Conference' in ibid., 185–206.

[8] See, again among many others, J. R. Holmes, *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order* (Washington, D.C., 2006); T. J. Knock, *To End all Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton, 1992); L. Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (London, 2002); E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anti-colonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007); R. Kennedy, *The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America's Strategy for Peace and Security* (Kent, Ohio, 2009); S. Wertheim, 'The league that wasn't: American designs for a legalist–sanctionist League of Nations and the intellectual origins of international organization, 1914–1920', *Diplomatic History*, 35, 5 (2011), 797–836; see also the many important insights into Anglo-American policy conceptions offered in P. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I* (Cambridge, 2006).

[9] Notable exceptions to this general rule are a number of important essays by G.-H. Soutou, such as 'L'Ordre européen de Versailles à Locarno' in G.-H. Soutou and C. Carlier (eds.), *1919: Comment faire la paix?* (Paris, 2001), 301–31 (although, as we shall see, Soutou has elsewhere characterised French policy in highly traditional terms); see also M. Trachtenberg, *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923* (New York, 1980); N. Jordan, 'The reorientation of French diplomacy in the 1920s: the role of Jacques Seydoux', *EHR*, 117, 473 (2002), 867–88; and S. Jeannesson, 'Jacques Seydoux et la diplomatie économique dans la France de l'après-guerre', *RI*, 121 (2005), 9–24. None of the aforementioned scholars detects the influence of internationalist conceptions in French policy, however.

The logical corollary of this historiographical consensus is the conclusion that the Great War made no impact on French policy elites other than to reinforce existing beliefs in power politics. France's leadership, according to standard interpretations, remained unswervingly committed to traditional practices based on the balance of power. Post-war security policy was aimed overwhelmingly at keeping Germany down. This strategy, it is argued, culminated in an attempt to compel Germany to accept the Versailles order by seizing control of the Ruhr industrial basin in February 1923. Only after this hardline approach failed did France's leadership change course and adopt a more conciliatory policy. This change, significantly, is nearly always interpreted as having been imposed on France by Britain and the United States. The failure of earlier coercive strategies, it is argued, left French decision makers with no choice but to accept Anglo-American political and financial intervention and to adapt French security policy accordingly. The settlements of London in 1924 and Locarno in 1925 are thus represented as a comprehensive defeat for French designs. The international politics of 'Briandism', meanwhile, are usually represented as an aberration that came out of nowhere and disappeared without a trace.[10]

This general interpretation of French security policy has endured without serious challenge since the early 1980s. It has remained largely unaffected by important and innovative research that has transformed our understanding of this entire period. Work on the cultural history of the Great War, for example, has made little or no impact on the historiography of French foreign and security policy.[11] Nor has the recent resurgence of interest in the international history of the 1920s resulted in any significant revision of the standard narrative. An ambitious reassessment of the post-war period by Patrick Cohrs, for example, represents French policy in essentially static terms as a 'bid to establish a continental hegemony *against* Germany'.[12] An important recent

[10] S. Schuker, *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan* (Chapel Hill, 1977); see also S. Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933*, 2nd edn (London, 2003); J. Bariéty, *Les Relations franco-allemandes après la première guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1977); C. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton, 1975); W. McDougall, *France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe* (Princeton, 1978); D. Artaud, *La Question des dettes interalliées et la reconstruction de l'Europe 1917–1929*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1978); C. Wurm, *Die französische Sicherheitspolitik in der Phase der Umorientierung, 1924–1926* (Frankfurt, 1979); B. Kent, *The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918–1932* (Oxford, 1989); J. Jacobson, 'Is there a new international history of the 1920s?', *AHR*, 88, 3 (1983), 617–45; J. Jacobson, 'Strategies of French foreign policy after World War I', *JMH*, 55 (1983), 78–9.

[11] It is also true that the cultural history of the First World War largely ignores the international political dimensions of that conflict: see A. Prost and J. Winter, *Penser la Grande Guerre: un essai d'historiographie* (Paris, 2004).

[12] Cohrs, *Unfinished Peace*, 604 (emphasis in original); when characterising the French 'form of statesmanship' Cohrs quotes Herbert Hoover's judgement that French policy had

study of international relations in the post-war decade by Robert Boyce makes no mention of internationalism as an influence on France's security policy in the early and mid-1920s.[13]

This book offers an alternative interpretation. It will not argue that French policy makers were inspired throughout by an internationalist vision of peace and security. It will instead contend that internationalist ideas were more influential in the making of foreign and security policy than is generally assumed. Strategies for security were more varied and ambiguous than most historians have recognised. Amid the wide array of policy conceptions under consideration it is possible to identify two distinct currents of thought about the problem of security in Europe. The first, defined for the purposes of this study as the 'traditional' approach, favoured security through strategic preponderance and alliance politics. The alternative, a French variant of internationalist thought best described as 'juridical internationalism', advocated enmeshing Germany in a multilateral system based on the rule of law and backed up by provisions for the use of collective force.

The problem of German power was central to all French thinking about security in Europe. Germany had invaded France twice in living memory. Its larger population and more powerful industry placed France at a permanent disadvantage in the European strategic balance. Prescriptions for dealing with German power marked the clearest dividing line between traditional and internationalist conceptions of security. The traditional approach envisaged organising the European balance of power *against* Germany. The internationalist alternative envisaged *including* Germany in a system of inter-state cooperation under international law.

The traditional conception of security rested on two mutually dependent assumptions. The first was that military conflict was a permanent feature of politics among nations. The second was that international relations were driven chiefly by the pursuit of power. Proponents of the traditional approach assumed a permanent adversarial relationship with Germany. National safety, according to this understanding of security, rested inevitably on a superior combination of economic and military power and strong allies. The balance of power and alliance politics together constituted the core conventions of the traditional approach. Traditional prescriptions for the security of France therefore stipulated that Germany must be weakened, isolated and surrounded by a powerful combination of allies. This was the solution advocated consistently by the foreign ministry and army high command for most of this period.

maintained Europe's 'whole economic and political life . . . in an atmosphere of war': ibid., 69; this is also the vision of France's security policy advanced by Sylvain Schirmann in *Quel ordre europeen? De Versailles à la chute du IIIème Reich* (Paris, 2006), 11–69.

[13] R. Boyce, *The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization* (London, 2009), 77–141; see also S. Jeannesson, *Poincaré, la France et la Ruhr (1922–1924)* (Strasbourg, 1998); C. Fischer, *The Ruhr Crisis, 1923–1924* (Oxford, 2003); Z. Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford, 2005); S. Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations: review essay', *AHR*, 112, 4 (2007), 1091–117.

Traditional practices of security were embedded in the institutional cultures of these two crucial organs of state.

The internationalist vision of security, conversely, was rooted in a specifically French variant of peace activism that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite their common roots, this movement must be distinguished from the more liberal strains of pacifist internationalism in Britain or the United States. It was a product of the legalist political culture of the Third French Republic. As a result it was more muscular. French internationalists called for the establishment of a robust regime of binding international law supported by collective force. It was this general conception that inspired the proposals of both Ruyssen and Herriot. The prominence of force in their common vision reflected the link between the use of force and the principle of justice that is a defining feature of French politics. French internationalists had campaigned prominently for this conception of international order at the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Léon Bourgeois, a leading political figure of the Third Republic and head of the French delegation at both conferences, led a campaign to establish a system of compulsory international arbitration for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Arbitration and collective force became the twin pillars of the French 'juridical internationalist' movement. The emphasis on the use of force is particularly important because it provided a measure of common ground between internationalist and more traditional visions of security that would eventually open the way to combining the two approaches in the mid-1920s.

French internationalists had very little direct influence over policy making for most of the period considered in this book. The traditional approach provided the conceptual parameters for the formulation of security policy during the early and middle phases of the Great War. This policy was characterised by long-standing practices of balancing power and alliances supplemented by secret conventions and joint war planning. But the unprecedented scale and ferocity of that conflict, along with the huge sacrifices it demanded, eventually created political space for the internationalist alternative. By mid-1917 internationalist conceptions of 'peace through law' were increasingly prominent at the centre and on the left of the French political spectrum. This trend was reinforced by an omnipresent official discourse that represented the conflict as a struggle to establish the rule of law in international politics. The internationalist movement also benefited enormously from the public proclamations of American president Woodrow Wilson. The American president's call for transforming international politics generated widespread enthusiasm that stimulated support for a new approach to security. By the war's end France was committed to establishing a new international organisation to secure the peace. A high-profile inter-ministerial commission was created under the leadership of Bourgeois and charged with designing a blueprint for a 'society of nations'.

The traditional approach to security nonetheless remained at the centre of official policy prescriptions into the post-war decade. This reflected the extent to which it was ingrained in the cultural reflexes of both security professionals and government ministers. Support for the internationalist agenda continued to grow after 1918, however. This process gained momentum after traditional attempts to transform the strategic balance, in particular the occupation of the Ruhr under Premier Raymond Poincaré, failed to deliver security. The advent of the Cartel des gauches in 1924 brought the internationalist approach to the centre of the French policy machine. The foreign and security policy that emerged thereafter was an amalgamation of the traditional power political reflexes of France's security professionals and the multilateral and legalist inclinations of the French internationalists. Within the Quai d'Orsay a growing number of officials – nearly all of whom were from the generation recruited into the foreign ministry after 1900 – were converted to the idea of enmeshing Germany in a multilateral security system underwritten by Britain and France. Such an approach was much closer to the internationalist conception of security than previous policies aimed at creating a vast anti-German coalition. This process culminated in the Locarno Accords of October 1925.

Another internationalist current that shaped policy debates focused on the promotion of greater economic cooperation. This current emerged as part of the steady growth of financial, industrial and commercial links between the European states in the decades before 1914. Research into this subject stresses the role of business leaders – primarily from the coal and steel-producing sectors in France, Germany and Belgium – in leading the way towards greater industrial integration in western Europe. French heavy industry was part of a regional system of industrial, financial and commercial cooperation that had proved very profitable before the war.[14] As we shall see, an inclination to restore cooperation with German heavy industry once peace returned persisted within France's industrial and policy elite right through the conflict. This tendency manifested itself in plans to devise a transatlantic system of post-war economic cooperation into which Germany would be integrated. But it also inspired projects for direct Franco-German financial and industrial cooperation that first surfaced during the Paris Peace Conference and gained momentum thereafter.

[14] See among others J.-F. Eck, S. Martens and S. Schirmann (eds.), *L'Économie, l'argent et les hommes: les relations franco-allemandes de 1871 à nos jours* (Paris, 2009); C. Strikwerda, 'The troubled origins of European economic integration: international iron and steel and labor migration in the era of World War I', *AHR*, 98, 4 (1993), 1106–29; Soutou, *L'Or et le sang*, 141–61; G.-H. Soutou, 'Le Coke dans les relations internationales en Europe de 1914 au plan Dawes', *Relations internationales*, 43 (1985), 249–67; R. Poidevin, *Les Relations économiques et financières entre la France et l'Allemagne de 1898 à 1914* (Paris, 1969); M. Lévy-Leboyer (ed.), *La Position internationale de la France: aspects économiques et financières XIXème–XXème siècles* (Paris, 1977), 347–61; J.-N. Jeanneney, *François de Wendel en république: l'argent et le pouvoir 1914–1940* (Paris, 1976).

A number of scholars have underlined the extent to which post-1919 French responses to the problems of reparation and economic reconstruction were based on the principles of multilateral cooperation and engagement with Germany.[15] But the link between this fundamentally internationalist policy orientation and French projects to construct a multilateral security regime in Europe has not been made. Indeed, in some cases the history of French thinking about security has been all but subsumed into the history of reparations and war debts. This fixation with 'the primacy of economics'[16] has even led to the judgement that French policy elites were inclined to 'define national security in economic terms'. The crucial reorientation in French policy in 1924, according to this view, demonstrated 'the dominance of reparations over security'.[17] The argument in this book, conversely, is that policy towards reparations and war debts must be understood within the larger context of debates about the security of France.

The challenge posed by economic security will therefore be considered through the analytical lens of contending 'traditional' and 'international' approaches to security. This provides an interesting new perspective on the role of economic considerations. It illuminates, in particular, the presence of both currents in thinking about economic security within the French policy elite. It also suggests, however, that economic considerations were not as dominant in national security policy as is often assumed. This was the case not only during the war but also in the 1920s. The issue of reparations was bound up intimately with the quest for political and territorial security.

Three aspects of this book distinguish it from other international histories of this period. The first is its chronological span – which rejects the traditional starting and ending points of 1914 and 1919. The year 1914, for example, is usually treated, along with 1789, as a great watershed of the modern era. Most studies either start or end with the outbreak of the First World War. The problem with this tendency is that it obscures the pre-1914 sources of wartime policy making. The same is true of 1919. Focus on the Versailles order and its discontents has meant that pre-war and wartime trends that carried over into the post-war period have too often been ignored. This book will trace the impact of traditional and internationalist impulses across these watersheds. The era of the First World War did not begin in 1914, and it did not end in 1919. We will therefore take up its story before 1914 and end after the Locarno

[15] See esp. Trachtenberg, *Reparation* and W. McDougall, 'Political economy versus national sovereignty: French structures for German economic integration after Versailles', *JMH*, 51, 1 (1979), 4–23.
[16] The title of the fourth chapter in Steiner, *Lights that Failed*, 182–250.
[17] Jordan, 'Reorientation of French Diplomacy', 877 and 879; Cohrs similarly characterises reparations as 'the core question of postwar politics': *Unfinished Peace*, 158. An important exception is Robert Boyce's *Great Inter-war Crisis*, which consistently analyses reparations policy as part of the wider question of national security.

Accords in 1925. The result is a more complete picture of the impact of the First World War on the practice of foreign and security policy.

A second important aim is to bring together three historiographical currents that have long existed in relative isolation. The dominant interpretation of French foreign and security policy is based on an untenable divorce between the history of French policy, on the one hand, and more recent work on transnational civil society, on the other. The past three decades have seen the emergence of a very significant body of research on both the international and the specifically French dimensions to transnational peace movements. But this research is virtually absent from the history of French foreign and security policy.[18] The same is true of recent work on the cultural history of the First World War. Over the past three decades several waves of path-breaking research have transformed our understanding of the First World War as a social, and especially a cultural, watershed in the history of modern Europe.[19] Yet this important work has made only limited impact on mainstream international history. One important strand in this literature emphasises the extent to which France's war effort was held together by a system of representations of the war as a crusade for civilisation, the rule of law and national survival. These representations operated at all levels of society, from political elites to schoolchildren. The great majority of the French population, according to this school of interpretation, internalised this construction of the war's meaning and considered the struggle both legitimate and necessary.[20] The argument that follows stresses the extent to which high policy was influenced by such representations. This process was important in establishing a central principle of French internationalism – the need to enforce the rule of law in international society – as one of France's major war aims.

A third distinctive aspect of this study is the systematic attention paid to the relationship between the cultural predispositions of policy actors and the wider structural context in which security policy was made. To tackle this problem in the specific case of French foreign and security policy, I have borrowed several concepts from the 'practice theory' of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. I have used Bourdieu's conceptualisation of 'culture' as a historically derived set of predispositions that interact with the wider structural environment to form a basis for everyday practices. This process produces what Bourdieu termed a 'practical

[18] It is also fair to say that the activities of European (though not American) transnational civil society are too often studied without sufficient engagement with the history of international politics.

[19] For an excellent survey and analysis of much of this literature see Prost and Winter, *Penser la Grande Guerre*. The most impressive study of French security policy during and immediately after the Great War, David Stevenson's *French War Aims Against Germany*, was written when work on cultural history of the First World War was in its infancy.

[20] S. Audoin-Rouzeau and A. Becker, 'Violence et consentement: la "culture de guerre" du Premier Conflit mondial' in J.-P. Rioux and J.-F. Sirinelli (eds.), *Pour une histoire culturelle* (Paris, 1997), 251–71; L. Smith, 'The "Culture de guerre" and French historiography of the Great War of 1914–1918', *History Compass*, 5–6 (2007), 1967–79.

logic' that conditions the strategies generated by social actors. A central argument of this book is that a practical logic based on the traditional conception of security dominated the cultural reflexes of soldiers, diplomats and many political leaders during and immediately after the First World War. This logic came under pressure as early as 1917, however, as internationalist principles gained in popularity within the parliamentary and public spheres. It is possible to detect the influence of these ideas in the policy prescriptions of various key actors during the Paris Peace Conference. But the traditional approach did not lose its status as a practical logic until the advent of the Cartel in May 1924.[21]

If this study is successful in making a case for the importance of French internationalism, it will also contribute to the discipline of international relations theory. French thinking about war and peace during this period is utterly absent from standard accounts of the 'genealogy' of this discipline.[22] Even studies of 'idealism' between the two world wars ignore the active role played by French internationalists in efforts to derive a theoretical basis for peace in the 'real' world.[23] The result is a misrepresentation of the early phase of international relations theory, and in particular thinking about international organisation, as an exclusively Anglo-American enterprise.[24] In reality a small but vibrant community of academics, politicians and pundits elaborated a distinctly French perspective on the problem of international peace. Its leading figure was Léon Bourgeois but it also included such dynamic figures as Ruyssen, the international lawyer Georges Scelle and the sociologist Célestin Bouglé. The contributions of French international theorists have been ignored in standard narratives of the emergence of international politics as a distinct discipline after the First World War.[25] Excavating a distinctly French vision of

[21] The term 'security professionals' refers to the diplomats and senior military officials responsible for the framing of policy choices and the execution of policy decisions.

[22] See, for example, S. Smith, 'The Self-images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory' in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge, 1995), 1–37; B. Schmidt, *Political Discourses of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany, 1998).

[23] The classic example is E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd edn (London, 2001). Carr's criticisms were aimed at British and American liberal internationalists; he ignored French contributions to this literature altogether. French 'thinkers' are also entirely absent in D. Long and P. Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995); recent examples of this trend are the anglocentric focus in D. Bell (ed.), *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2007) and D. Gorman, *The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge, 2012), esp. 175–212.

[24] See, for example, M. Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (London, 2012), 116–41.

[25] A lone partial exception is a study of thinking about world order by Andrew Williams. Williams acknowledges the importance attached to international law and arbitration by French statesmen; but he does not identify a distinctly French conception of 'world order', and follows the historical literature when he characterises the French programme for a League of Nations as 'a continuation of the wartime alliance': see A. Williams, *Failed*