

#### MIND, LANGUAGE, AND METAPHILOSOPHY

This volume presents a selection of the philosophical essays which Richard Rorty wrote during the first decade of his career, and complements four previous volumes of his papers published by Cambridge University Press. In this long neglected body of work, which many leading philosophers still consider to be his best, Rorty develops his views on the nature and scope of philosophy in a manner which supplements and elucidates his definitive statement on these matters in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. He also develops his ground-breaking version of eliminative materialism and sets out original views on various central topics in the philosophy of language, concerning private language, indeterminacy, and verificationalism. A substantial introduction examines Rorty's philosophical development from 1961 to 1972. The volume completes our understanding of Rorty's intellectual trajectory and offers lucid statements of positions which retain their relevance to current debates.

RICHARD RORTY (1931–2007) was Professor of Comparative Literature and Philosophy at Stanford University.

STEPHEN LEACH is an Honorary Fellow of the Research Institute for Law, Politics and Justice at Keele University. He is the author of *The Foundations of History* (2009), and co-author, with James Connelly and Peter Johnson, of *R. G. Collingwood: A Research Companion* (2014).

JAMES TARTAGLIA is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Keele University. He is the author of *Rorty and the Mirror of Nature* (2007) and *Philosophy in a Meaningless Life* (forthcoming), and editor of *Richard Rorty: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers* (2009).





# MIND, LANGUAGE, AND METAPHILOSOPHY

Early Philosophical Papers

RICHARD RORTY

EDITED BY
STEPHEN LEACH AND JAMES TARTAGLIA





# **CAMBRIDGE**UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107039780

© Stephen Leach and James Tartaglia, 2014

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2014

Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives plc

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Rorty, Richard.

Mind, language, and metaphilosophy: early philosophical papers / Richard Rorty; edited by Stephen Leach and James Tartaglia.

pages cm Includes index.

1SBN 978-1-107-03978-0 (Hardback) – 1SBN 978-1-107-61229-7 (Paperback)

1. Philosophy, American–20th century. 2. Philosophy, Modern–20th century. I. Title.

B945.R521L43 2013 191–dc23 2013026803

ISBN 978-1-107-03978-0 Hardback ISBN 978-1-107-61229-7 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.



## Contents

Foreword by Daniel C. Dennett		page v11
Ack	rnowledgments	ix
	Introduction Stephen Leach and James Tartaglia	I
I	Pragmatism, categories, and language	16
2	The limits of reductionism	39
3	Realism, categories, and the "linguistic turn"	55
4	The subjectivist principle and the linguistic turn	69
5	Empiricism, extensionalism, and reductionism	96
6	Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories	106
7	Do analysts and metaphysicians disagree?	132
8	Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental	147
9	Wittgenstein, privileged access, and incommunicability	172
Ю	In defense of eliminative materialism	199
II	Cartesian epistemology and changes in ontology	208
12	Strawson's objectivity argument	227
13	Verificationism and transcendental arguments	260
14	Indeterminacy of translation and of truth	2.71



vi	Contents	
15	Dennett on awareness	290
16	Functionalism, machines, and incorrigibility	299
Index of names		316



### Foreword

The acclaim and controversy that has surrounded Richard Rorty's later work, starting with *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* in 1979, has tended to eclipse the influence of his major contributions to analytic philosophy of mind in the 1960s and 1970s. Like Hilary Putnam, whose papers from that era remain classics in spite of their author's abandonment of them, Rorty shaped the field for subsequent decades with a series of insightful, constructive, imaginative papers harnessing the insights of Sellars and Quine, and developing his own distinctive varieties of pragmatism and naturalism. Rorty's version of eliminative materialism was both the first and the subtlest, and anybody interested in defending any variation today would be well advised to mine his work for insights. The same can be said for his delicate and undoctrinaire treatment of functionalism.

I would venture to say that today's combatants in the skirmishes over property dualism, supervenience, mental causation, and their subsidiary issues would find that most of their moves and countermoves were anticipated and preempted by Rorty's discussions more than forty years ago. "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories" (1965), "Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental" (1970), "In Defense of Eliminative Materialism" (1972), and "Functionalism, Machines, and Incorrigibility" (1972) ought to be required reading for all aspiring philosophers of mind today, as they were for us when they first appeared, and they are only the best known of his works from that period. Fortunately, Rorty wrote admirably clear and vivid philosophy which holds up well at this remove in time, so this volume will be a joy to read, both for those who remember the impact these essays had when they were published and for those who know Rorty only as the lightning rod of the later culture wars.

DANIEL C. DENNETT





# Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Mary Varney Rorty and Alan Malachowski for making this volume possible, as well as Matthew Festenstein for some useful suggestions, and they would also like to thank Hilary Gaskin, Anna Lowe, Gaia Poggiogalli, and Linda Randall at Cambridge University Press, all of whom made invaluable contributions to the production of this volume. The articles have, wherever practicable, been formatted to conform with the layout of the four previous volumes of Rorty's papers published by Cambridge University Press, but otherwise they are reproduced in their original form except for the correction of a few typographical errors.

"Pragmatism, categories, and language" was published in *Philosophical Review*, 70: 197–223 (1961).

"The limits of reductionism" was published in *Experience, Existence, and the Good: Essays in honour of Paul Weiss*, 100–16, edited by Irwin C. Lieb (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1961).

"Realism, categories, and the "linguistic turn" was published in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume 2, Issue 2: 307–22 (1962); DOI: 10.5840/ipq19622214

"The subjectivist principle and the linguistic turn" was published in *Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on his philosophy*, 134–57, edited by George L. Kline (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963). While every effort has been made, it has not been possible to identify the current copyright holder for this chapter. If any omissions are brought to our notice, we will be happy to include the appropriate acknowledgements on reprinting.

'Empiricism, extensionalism, and reductionism' was published in *Mind*, 72: 176–86 (1963).



#### Acknowledgments

'Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories' was published in *Review of Metaphysics*, 19: 24–54 (1965).

'Do analysts and metaphysicians disagree?' was published in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, Volume 41: 39–53 (1967).

'Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental' was published in *Journal of Philosophy*, 67, issue no. 3: 399–429 (1970).

'Wittgenstein, privileged access, and incommunicability' was published by *American Philosophical Quartely*, 7: 192–205 (1970).

'In defence of eliminative materialism' was published in *Review of Meta-physics*, 24: 112–21 (1970).

'Cartesian epistemology and changes in ontology' was published in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, 273–92, edited by John E. Smith (London: Allen and Unwin / New York: Humanities Press, 1970). While every effort has been made, it has not been possible to identify the current copyright holder for this chapter. If any omissions are brought to our notice, we will be happy to include the appropriate acknowledgements on reprinting.

'Strawson's objectivity argument' was published in *Review of Metaphysics*, 24: 207–44 (1970).

'Verificationism and transcendental arguments' was published in *Nous*, 5: 3–14 (1971).

'Indeterminacy of translation and of truth' was published in *Synthese*, 23: 443–62 (1972).

'Dennett on awareness' was published in *Philosophical Studies*, 23, issue no. 3: 153–62 (1972).

'Functionalism, machines, and incorrigibility' was published in *Journal of Philosophy*, 69: 203–20 (1972).