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Introducing the Conceptual Framework

The history of peacemaking between Israel and her Arab neighbours showed that it was the change of mind of the hawks and the shift in their positions, not the preaching of the doves, that allowed Israel to exploit chances of peace at vital crossroads. The major breakthroughs in peacemaking were made and legitimized by the hawks.

– Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israeli Foreign Minister at Camp David negotiations, 2000[1]

Why do leaders make peace? Why do some leaders who defiantly vow that they will never negotiate, never make concessions to an enemy, sometimes dramatically shift course and do precisely that? How does this shift in perception happen – a shift from seeing your adversary as an enemy deserving a bullet to a partner deserving a handshake? This book analyzes the conversion of leaders from hard-liners to negotiators of peace, and the way these conversions influence the timing and probability that peace can be achieved. Although changes within the enemy and in the regional and international context are necessary elements in explaining decisions to negotiate, the perceptions of individual leaders make a significant difference in determining if and when a peace agreement will end a conflict.

Changes in the international and regional balance of power are often insufficient to explain accommodation with a long-standing enemy. There can be generation-long gaps between these changes and eventual cooperation. Just as important as the actual changes in the structural environment is the recognition of such changes by leaders. This engenders the debate between the more deterministic structural adjustment model of adaptation to environmental change, in which actors will respond similarly to environmental change, and the learning model that expects that different perceptions of changes in the environment will lead to varied reactions. I necessarily ask questions put forth in the literature on

[1] Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 313.

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learning: Are some types of people more likely to learn than others? Through what processes do political leaders learn? How quickly do they learn? From what types of events do they learn?[2]

Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein point out that the field of foreign policy analysis knows "surprisingly little about why, how, and when leaders initiate dramatic change in foreign policy."[3] Despite the gravity of elite decisions in foreign policy change, the scholarly literature typically either ignores the impact of individual leaders, or underestimates the complexity of their roles by positing that hard-liners will always respond objectively to new information concerning changes on the part of their opponent or changes in domestic and international circumstances. Rose McDermott argues that "[t]he dominant paradigm, rational choice, does not tend to focus on individual leaders except to the extent that they are seen as similarly calculating men whose main desire is to stay in power."[4] Other scholars have concluded that hard-liners are resistant to change and, therefore, need to be replaced for change to occur.[5]

[2] Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield." *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 311; George W. Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 27–31, 297.

[3] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Afghanistan, Carter, and Foreign Policy Change: The Limits of Cognitive Models," in *Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George*, eds. Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 95.

[4] Rose McDermott, *Political Psychology in International Relations* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2004). For a forceful argument against scholars ignoring leaders, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001). Also see Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality & Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Greenstein argues that rational-actor analyses have difficulty explaining the variance in goals and behavior of different leaders.

[5] Ernest May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics* 24, Issue Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations (Spring 1972), 66, 76; Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 233; Robert Randle, "The Domestic Origins of Peace," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392 (November 1970): 11; Roy Licklider, "What Have We Learned and Where Do We Go from Here?" in *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 306; I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*, ed. R. Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 20–34; Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, "Enduring Rivalries: The Early Years," *International Political Science Review* 17, no. 2 (1996): 141–56. Fred Charles Ikle does not delineate whether and why hawks might be capable of change; see his *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). Richard Ned Lebow is an exception, arguing that leaders do not necessarily need to be replaced, and that resolution requires a reorientation in thinking by leaders; see his "Transitions and Transformations: Building International Cooperation," *Security Studies* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 154–79. He sets up useful conditions for possible transformation but does not elaborate on the reasons why leaders will adopt particular goals and lessons that will prompt them to seek accommodation.

Given that the psychological literature regarding balance theory states that people will manipulate information to fit beliefs, rather than adapt beliefs to new information, many psychologists would agree with this conclusion.[6] However, the fact that some hard-liners *do* shift their attitudes, whereas others do not, is contrary to both expectations and calls for explanation.

In contrast to the argument that leaders necessarily need to be replaced in order to reach accommodation, I engage in a theory-building exercise analyzing which types of hawkish leaders are more likely to convert into peacemakers. Fred Greenstein has suggested that a leader's personal variability will have a heightened effect under a specific set of criteria: First, he argues, personal attributes will become more decisive in highly ambiguous environments, in which there is unclear or even contradictory data that is open to multiple interpretations. Second, the leader must be in a strategic position, such that decisions made have systematic strategic impact. Third, the leader is emotionally involved in the subject. The six Israeli prime ministers I examine in this book meet all of these criteria.[7] All of these leaders were working in such environments, as the Middle East was undergoing, and continues to undergo, dramatic changes with ambiguous consequences; each was strategically positioned, and each was emotionally involved in the foreign policies discussed.[8] All the prime ministers started out as hawks who were opposed to recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and against the creation of a Palestinian state. Yet their differences in ideology and core attributes significantly affected their perception of events and their subsequent desire and ability to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Although much scholarship on Israeli foreign policy has usefully explained the influence of its security culture and the military bureaucracy, these approaches fail to adequately explain the reversals of policy by some prime ministers toward the Palestinians. Ilan Peleg argues that the beliefs of leaders are especially important to the formation of foreign policy in deeply divided societies such as Israel.[9] Aaron

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[6] Keith L. Shimko, *Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), 29.

[7] Greenstein, *Personality & Politics*, vii, 144, and "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," *The American Political Science Review* 61, no. 3 (September 1967): 634, 639. Also see Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner, eds., *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971). Peter Katzenstein agrees that in times of profound change, ambiguous signals allow for variability in how states define their security interests; see his *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 201.

[8] Some studies have examined American leaders who had less knowledge of or less interest in foreign policy issues, and thus the results concerning change have been more ambiguous. See Shimko, *Images and Arms Control*, 111. John R. Zaller argues that the more informed a person, the less susceptible he or she is to attitude change; see his, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 19.

[9] Ilan Peleg, "Israeli Foreign Policy Under Right-Wing Governments: A Constructivist Interpretation," *Israel Studies Forum* 19, no. 3 (2004): 102. For a particularly useful analysis of

Klieman has argued that "the student of Israeli decision making is advised to pay greater attention to the biographies of national leaders than to formal organizational charts."[10] The constant state of crisis regarding war and peace issues often increases the influence of the prime minister.

Hawks and doves are, of course, idealized types at the ends of a continuous spectrum. "Hawks," or "hard-liners," have a high threat perception, a low sense of urgency to resolve a dispute, a high predilection to use force, and a belief that the probability of peace is low. They are afraid that accommodations will be interpreted as weakness which will be exploited, and they view the opponent as a monolithic enemy – unchanged throughout the history of the conflict and, as importantly, *unchangeable*, having permanently aggressive and unrealistic goals and no justified motives. "Doves," or peacemakers, on the other hand, see the adversary's – or at least a faction of the adversary's – aims as limited and somewhat legitimate, and have a lower threat perception. They also believe that accommodation will be reciprocated – whereas aggressive moves can escalate the conflict – thus, accommodative moves should at least be tried before coercive ones. They place a higher value on settlement per se.[11]

I do not claim that leaders "should" have learned a particular lesson from the events under examination; rather, I assess whether new information presented by the events was entirely ignored, or how it was interpreted. It is not always prudent for hard-liners to change. In some cases, information may be ambiguous or their image of the enemy as hostile may indeed be accurate. However, when new information is ignored or misinterpreted, it inhibits adaptation to a more "reality-oriented" strategy. Nonrational resistance to change is often at the root of cases in which leaders fail to notice events of obvious importance that contradict their beliefs, and thus they maintain constant policies in the face of changing circumstances.[12]

the influence of the military bureaucracy, see Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006).

[10] Aaron Klieman, *Israel & the World After 40 Years* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1990), 89.

[11] Alexander L. George, *The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1967), 21; Holsti, "The Operational Code as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems: Final Report to the National Science Foundation Grant SOC75–15368" (December 1977), 48, 96, 105–6; Efraim Inbar, *War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labor Party Positions on National Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1991), 15; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 297–310. Often hard-liners see their most extreme counterparts as reflecting what everybody on the other side thinks or as inherently dictating the policy of the opponent.

[12] Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, 392; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 307; Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 63.

ANALYTIC APPROACH

This study explores explanations as to why certain leaders are more likely than others to perceive changes in the opponent and in the regional environment. I move among five separate but related ways to describe individual cognition and attitude: ideology (drawing on Alexander George's work on the operational code), individual time orientations (derived from Robert Jervis's use of the rate and magnitude of incoming information), cognitive openness, emotional intelligence, and risk propensity. Ideology is key to explaining the varied goals pursued by different leaders, which in turn influences the extent to which each leader changes. To explain the different rates and ways in which attitudinal change occurs in leaders who hold the same ideology, however, it is necessary to analyze the leaders' perceptions of time, their cognitive rigidity, emotional intelligence, and risk propensity.

I conclude that although a change in both the opponent and the environment is necessary for leaders to change their image of an enemy, a combination of five additional elements makes change more probable: (1) a weak commitment to an ideology that would prevent responsiveness to changing circumstances, or a commitment to a pragmatic ideology that is more responsive to shifts in the environment; (2) a present or future time orientation; (3) either a flexible cognitive system or exposure and openness to a significant advisor who has a different view of the opponent; (4) emotional intelligence, which increases the possibility of being exposed to diverse opinions; and (5) risk propensity, which can increase the probability of making concessions to an enemy. Ideologies that do not act as obstacles to change in image may act as permissive causes. This type of ideology may permit change but will not necessarily lead to change without other factors – changing conditions, a time horizon that is not immersed in the past, or an advisory system that exposes the leader to different points of view. Advisory systems can both reflect cognitive style and, in combination with ideology, explain change or lack thereof.

DETERMINANTS OF CONVERSION: THE INFLUENCE
OF IDEOLOGY AND COGNITIVE STYLE ON PERCEPTIONS
OF THE ENEMY

Ideology

The degree of commitment to the ideology and the content of the ideology are important in explaining subsequent behavior. Ideologies filter and shape the perception of "facts" to fit a particular outlook on the world. Similarly to George's concept of the "operational code," ideology refers to a general belief system about the nature of history and politics, the political environment, the fundamental character of one's political opponents, the prospects for the

eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations, and
the predictability of the future.[13] I also use Myron Aronoff's definition; that is,
ideology is "a more concrete, rationalized, and systematized version of the
general political culture articulated by groups and regimes to give legitimacy to
their identities and justify their goals."[14] Holsti argues that ideology can serve
"as a direct guide to action, as a framework for definition of the situation . . . or
as a set of operationally-useful symbols."[15] Those whose ideology is a direct call
to action will be less likely to change, as they are more likely to reject information
that does not conform to their ideology. Psychological experiments show that
raising ideological differences makes it harder for decision makers to achieve a
resolution.[16]

Since all six Israeli prime ministers discussed in this text were highly influ-
enced by their respective ideologies, I also focus on the ideologies' *content*, as
opposed to the intensity of the leaders' beliefs alone. I analyze both Likud and
Labor ideologies as different Zionist ideologies, with different "linked beliefs"
that define different "identities and political projects." Ideology is key to
explaining the different goals pursued by leaders and the extent to which each
leader changes. I suggest that the ideological components that thwart a change in
attitude toward an enemy include a long, optimistic time horizon preventing
adherents from recognizing the urgency of peace or policy failure; specific, rigid
goals contradicting those of the enemy; the perception that the world is hostile;
and the belief that security is possible without peace.[17]

1. Is Time on Israel's Side?
I define ideology's "time horizon" as the relationship between time and the
achievements of central goals built into the logic of the ideology itself. An
ideology with an optimistic, extended time horizon – one that perceives its
struggle as extending into the distant future – encourages a perception that a
strategy "failing" in the short term will win "in the next hundred years." If one
believes that time is on one's side and is optimistic about reaching one's goals,
one is less likely to reassess strategies that do not seem to be working in the short

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[13] George, *The "Operational Code,"* vi–vii.
[14] Myron J. Aronoff, "Ideology and Interest: The Dialectics of Politics," in *Political Anthropology
    Yearbook I*, ed. Myron J. Aronoff (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1980), 8. Also See
    Myron Aronoff and Jan Kubik, *Anthropology and Political Science: A Convergent Approach*
    (Brooklyn, NY: Berghahn Books, 2012).
[15] Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia," in *Enemies in
    Politics*, eds. David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen (Chicago: Rand McNally &
    Company, 1967), 49.
[16] Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, 28; D. Druckman and K. Zechmeister,
    "Conflict of Interest and Value Dissensus," *Human Relations* 23 (1970): 431–38.
[17] In order to verify whether the leader genuinely believes the ideology or is only using it instru-
    mentally, I analyze when the ideology was introduced, how it was reinforced, and whether
    leaders' ideological beliefs kept them from achieving other important goals.

run, compromise goals, or change images of an enemy.[18] One is also more apt to perceive inaction as bearing a lower risk than action. If, as scholars such as Jerel Rosati have argued, change is motivated by perceived failures, then leaders who are less likely to perceive strategies as failing due to their extended time frames will be less likely to change.[19] In addition, when a destructive stalemate prompts peace negotiations, a leader with a long-term, optimistic time horizon may not perceive the stalemate, or at least perceive it as one that will not last.[20]

2. Ideological Goals: General and Adaptable, or Specific and Rigid?

The second proposition in regard to the content of ideology is that hard-liners whose ideological goals are directly in conflict with those of the enemy are less likely to change their image of an adversary. If they revise their perception of an opponent, this reconsideration threatens the attainment of their ideological goals.[21] For instance, if security is central to an ideology, differing interpretations over time as to what is needed to maintain security will arise. The more abstract the stated general goals of an ideology, the more variety there may be in policy preferences that could meet the goals. The more specific the ideological goal, the less maneuverability there is for vastly different policy preferences that might achieve the goal. In addition, if the goal of the ideology requires as a matter of faith that territory has to be maintained, it, according to prospect theory, would further explain the greater weight put on conceding land as it is interpreted as a loss that would be traded for an uncertain gain.[22]

3. Is the World With Us or Against Us?

The third proposition regarding ideological content is whether the world is perceived as being inherently hostile; if so, one is more likely to perceive conflict

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[18] Holsti discusses philosophical beliefs concerning "On whose side is time?" He builds on Alexander George's questions concerning the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values; George, *The "Operational Code,"* 23.

[19] Rosati argues that failures often trigger change; Jerel Rosati, "The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics," *International Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 67; Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" about foreign policy resulted from trial and error and the failure of the Afghanistan war; see Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," *International Organization* 48 (1994): 155–83.

[20] I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[21] George argues that signals may not be recognized due to the "rewards and costs" associated with them. See his *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy*, 73; Philip E. Tetlock, "Content and Structure in Political Belief Systems," in *Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence*, eds. D. A. Sylvan and S. Chan (New York: Praeger, 1984), 107–28, and "Cognitive Style and Political Ideology," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45 (1983): 74–83.

[22] Rose McDermott, *Political Psychology in International Relations*, 269. Also see Rose McDermott, *Risk Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1998).

with an opponent as unstoppable.[23] International pressure is ineffective, since such an actor already sees these international voices as adversaries. This exemplifies the ideological perception of heightened threat, which magnifies the enemy's goals to their most extreme form – the destruction of one's nation. Conversely, if one does not perceive the world as hostile, then one will be more open to the idea that one has allies – to whom one can turn for aid and assistance, and whose suggestions need to be considered seriously – and that even one's adversaries can change over time.

4. How Much Will Peace Contribute to Security? Does Peace Require Territorial Compromise?

Finally, my fourth proposition is that leaders adhering to ideologies which posit that security can be attained without peace will be less inclined to take risks to achieve peace. For instance, Likud ideology has traditionally called for an iron wall of military defense that would eventually force the Arabs to accept Israel's existence in the Greater Land of Israel. Peace was seen as a long-term prospect, entailing Palestinian acquiescence to Israeli rule, with limited autonomous rights. Vladimir Jabotinsky, in his 1923 essay "On the Iron Wall," argues that "the only way to reach an agreement [with the Arabs] is an Iron Wall – that is to say, strength and security in Eretz-Israel whereby no Arab influence will be able to undermine its foundations."[24] Israel would have to continually protect this iron wall from repeated attacks, until continued military successes would prove that Israel could not be eliminated. As Jacob Lassner and S. Ilan Troen argue, "The Zionist Right demands more convincing proof than the Zionist Left before being willing to relax the logic of the iron wall."[25] Although on the one hand Jabotinsky paid lip service to the idea that Israel would "negotiate" with the Palestinians, his understanding of negotiation was quite narrow, encompassing ideas of limited political autonomy within the Israeli polity. It did not entail compromise on an independent Palestinian state in any part of Greater Israel and did not see a point of trying to reach an agreement until Palestinians were willing to recognize Israeli sovereignty in the whole of the land.[26] This idea – that there was no point to negotiations while Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria was challenged – provided a framework in which peace was not urgent and a relatively high degree of security could be provided without peace.

[23] This relates to the nature of political life. George, The "Operational Code," 21.
[24] Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky and Mordechai Sarig, The Political and Social Philosophy of Ze'ev Jabotinsky: Selected Writings (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1999), 102–5.
[25] Jacob Lassner and S. Ilan Troen, Jews and Muslims in the Arab World: Haunted by Pasts Real and Imagined (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 338.
[26] Ian Lustick, "To Build and to Be Built By: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall," Israel Studies, 1, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 196–223.

Cognitive Style

Ideology deals with a leader's participation in collective ways of viewing the world. Leaders with the same political ideology, however, will differ in the ways and rates at which they change their image of an enemy in similar circumstances. To explain these differences, one must turn to elements of cognitive style, such as an individual's time orientation, the structure (as opposed to the content) of his or her beliefs – the person's position on a continuum from cognitive flexibility to cognitive rigidity – emotional intelligence, and risk propensity. Time orientation and cognitive style can be characterized as components of personality as they are tendencies or characteristics that vary by individual.[27] Although Philip Tetlock finds that ideology is correlated with levels of cognitive rigidity, my case studies reveal variance in cognitive rigidity among leaders who hold the same ideology.[28]

1. Time Orientation

In discussing leaders' time orientations, I analyze two separate but related ways in which individuals think about time in relation to events and goals. The first kind of time horizon, as discussed earlier, is the way the ideology views time in relation to the achievement of its goals. The ideological analysis of the time frame looks at optimism only as it relates to winning a conflict with an enemy, even in the distant future. The second kind of time orientation is an element of personality and pertains to the relative amount of time each leader devotes to thinking about the past, present, or future. Although underanalyzed in the scholarly literature, an individual's perception of time is a core element of cognitive style.[29] As Rose McDermott states, "Some people remain preoccupied with the past, others manage to stay focused in the present, while still others concentrate on the future."[30] Ilona Bobiewee and Philip Zimbardo argue that time perspective "is one of the most powerful influences on virtually all aspects of human behavior" and that each individual's time perspective varies and influences individual choices.[31] Whether a leader refers more to the past, present,

27 James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), 7; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," *Political Science Review* 61 (1967): 641; Fred I. Greenstein, "Can Personality and Politics Be Studied Systematically?" *Political Psychology* 13, no. 1 (1992): 107.
28 Philip E. Tetlock, "Cognitive Style and Political Ideology," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45, no.1 (1983), 118–26.
29 Milton Rokeach and Richard Bonier, "Time Perspective, Dogmatism, and Anxiety," in *The Open and Closed Mind: Investigation into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems*, ed. Milton Rokeach (New York: Basic Books, 1960).
30 Rose McDermott, *Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 10. Also see J. Hornik and D. Zakay, "Psychological Time: The Case of Time and Consumer Behavior," *Time and* Society, 5 (1996): 385.
31 Ilona Boniwell and Philip Zimbardo, "Time to Find the Right Balance," *The Psychologist* 16, no. 3 (2003): 129–31; Ilona Boniwell and Philip G. Zimbardo, "Balancing Time Perspective in Pursuit

or future in trying to understand events and to shape decisions can influence
whether or not that individual changes his or her image of an enemy, as well as
the rate and mechanisms of any change. It is certainly the case that individuals
have varied interpretations of the past. As Lassner and Troen persuasively argue,
a variety of "interpretations of the past contribute to how Jews assessed present
and future relations."[32] Therefore, my argument concerning individual time
orientation not only rests on a preoccupation with the past, but also on one's
interpretation of that past and the extent to which the present is conceived of as
mirroring the past. I argue that leaders who are emotionally attached to and
focused on a violent, conflict-ridden past, who view that violent history as
repeating itself, and who view this past as a living reality, will be less likely to
change their perception of the opponent even if the balance of power changes or
the enemy becomes more moderate.[33]

This hypothesis has most often been analyzed at the level of groups and states,
with the conclusion that an excessive reliance on the particular history of a
dispute, at the expense of analysis of changes and future possibilities, may inhibit
reconciliation among groups. This study confirms the findings of several schol-
ars who have pointed to the detrimental effects of focusing on the past. For
example, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond conclude that peace
agreements must look forward rather than backward, and Roy Licklider argues
that some forgetting is necessary for reconciliation after civil wars.[34] Yaacov
Vertzberger argues that some individuals have a greater propensity than others
to view the past as a living reality with which to evaluate the present, whereas
Jervis has argued that some individuals use what he calls "the representativeness
heuristic" to find similarities between present and past events and make (often
misplaced) generalizations.[35] Therefore, one could argue that the more the past
informs one's present – especially when one has an emotional attachment to a
history of conflict with an enemy – the more one would expect the enemy's past
behavior to be reflected in its present behavior.

An excessive reliance on the particular history of a dispute, to the detriment of
an analysis of the present changes and possibilities for future changes, can be

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of Optimal Functioning," in *Positive Psychology in Practice*, eds. P. Alex Linley and
Stephen Joseph (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 165.

[32] Jacob Lassner and S. Ilan Troen, *Jews and Muslims in the Arab World*, 325.

[33] Although people can view the past as multivaried and contested, the prime ministers who have a
past orientation with the implications I analyze do not perceive the past as continuous and
uniform. They tend to view a Hobbesian past in which present enemies are perceived as analogous
to previous different enemies across centuries of history.

[34] Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, *How Nations Make Peace* (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1999), 230–39; Roy Licklider, "Memory and Reconciliation After Civil Wars:
The U.S. and Nigerian Cases," presentation for the Center for Historical Analysis at Rutgers
University, February 14, 1995.

[35] Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and
Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990),
321; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 145, 203, 331.