

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-03787-8 - Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism

Richard Fumerton

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

- acquaintance, 50, 55, 98–119, 127, 148, 153, 161–165, 171, 174, 186–187, 216, 231, 233, 239–241, 247, 257 *See also* foundationalism
 - speckled hen problem, 107–111
- Addis, Laird, 29, 58, 173
- adverbial theory, 15, 52, 54, 108, 151
 - of intentional states, 55–56
 - of sensory states, 54–55, 101, 112
- Alston, William, 130
- Anscombe, Elizabeth, 250
- Armstrong, David, 29, 34, 76, 135, 250
- Ayer, A. J., 67, 113
- Basile, Pierfrancesco, 225
- behaviorism, 64–72, 76, 87, 117, 118, 119, 209, 215
- Bergmann, Gustav, 29
- Berkeley, George, 67, 68, 212, 213, 216, 219
- Bickle, John, 75
- Bigelow, John, 21
- Black, Max, 37
- Brentano, Franz, 53–54
- Broad, C. D., 13
- Butchvarov, Panayot, 260
- causal overdetermination, 246–256
- causal theory of perception, 4–5, 24–25, 114, 176, 212
- causal theory of physical objects, 67, 175–177, 195, 197, 198, 212–217, 245–246, 258
- causation, analysis of, 17, 30, 248–249
- Chalmers, David, 3, 22, 24, 26, 152, 203, 205–206, 216
- Chisholm, Roderick, 69, 115, 238, 255
- Churchland, Paul, 21, 161
- Conee, Earl, 21, 159–160, 161–163
- consciousness, 21, 102, 134, 135, 140, 145, 147, 255, 263 *See also* acquaintance, dualism, intentional states, introspective access, panpsychism, phenomenalism, qualia, self hard v. easy problem, 21–27, 56
- correspondence theory of truth, 40, 42, 45, 106–107, 169–173 *See also* fact
- Crane, Tim, 49
- Davidson, Donald, 41, 242
- de dicto* ascription of belief, 10–11, 32–34
- de dicto* modality, 194–195, 197
- de re* ascription of belief, 9–11, 32–34
- de re* modality, 194–195, 197, 198
- Dennett, Daniel, 25, 154

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-03787-8 - Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism

Richard Fumerton

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

- Descartes, René, 2–6, 11–12, 20, 24, 29, 31, 99, 112, 120, 136, 259
- descriptivism, 7–11, 79, 83–85, 100, 162, 168, 178–180, 184, 186, 192–195, 198, 231, 264
- direct acquaintance *See* acquaintance
- direct awareness *See* acquaintance
- direct realism
- disjunctivism, 144–146
 - epistemological, 141, 216, 222, 259
 - metaphysical, 50, 141
- Donnellan, K. S., 178–181
- Dowell, J. L., 48
- Dretske, Fred, 170
- dualism, 6–21, 62, 92, 102, 166, 246 *See also* phenomenalism, qualia
- event, 41–42
 - fact, 39–40
 - property, 36–39, 48, 58–60, 142, 154–157, 169, 220, 239
 - proposition, 42–44
 - sentence, 44
 - substance, 29–35, 258
- Dunne, J. W., 13
- epistemic possibility, 140, 232, 253, 257
- evidentialism, 94, 126, 127, 132
- fact, 3, 40, 80, 104, 106, 173, 174, 180, 207, 243 *See also* truth-maker
- and properties, 45, 162, 170
 - dualism, 136
 - physicalism, 40
 - vs. event, 41
 - vs. proposition, 9, 10–11, 32, 45, 128, 163–164, 167–169, 169–181, 182
- Fales, Evan, 110, 175, 250
- Farrell, B. A., 13
- Feigl, Herbert, 13, 247
- Feldman, Richard, 109, 240
- Firth, Roderick, 69
- Fodor, Jerry, 70
- folk theory, 47, 72, 89, 134, 155 *See also* dualism, physicalism
- foundationalism, 92–93, 98–119, 127, 132, 216 *See also* internalism vs. externalism, justification, regress
- argument
 - epistemic vs. conceptual regress
 - arguments, 93–98, 184–186
 - foundational knowledge, 2, 239–245
- Fumerton, Richard, 4, 88, 120, 127, 128, 131, 197, 216, 245
- functionalism, 26, 76–90, 117, 118, 119, 137, 139, 202, 211, 215, 229 *See also* behaviorism
- Geach, Peter, 65
- Gertler, Brie, 107
- Gettier, Edmund, 200
- Goldman, Alvin, 121, 122, 129, 131, 164
- Harman, Gilbert, 27, 234, 237–239
- Harré, Rom, 30
- Hempel, Carl, 48–49, 79, 250
- Henderson, David, 125–126, 242
- Horgan, Terence, 125–126
- Hume, David, 16–18, 30, 128, 146, 152, 190, 213–214, 219–220, 222, 245, 246, 247–249, 259–262
- identity *See also* reduction, reference, reference fixing
- direct vs. indirect thought, 206–207
 - foundationalism of thought, 189–192

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-03787-8 - Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism

Richard Fumerton

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

- indiscernibility of identicals *See*
 - Leibniz's law
- intentional states, 21–27, 53, 89, 101, 113, 119, 234–239, 244
- intentionality, 58, 234–239 *See also*
 - consciousness, hard v. easy
 - problem, intentional states,
 - internalism vs. externalism,
 - content controversies
 - as mark of the mental, 52–58
- internalism vs. externalism
 - content controversies, 146, 153, 181, 241, 243, 245
 - epistemic controversies, 119–130, 163–165
- introspective access, 49, 51, 119, 135, 172, 242, 263 *See also* acquaintance
- Jackson, Frank, 13–21, 27, 36, 56, 151, 155, 221, 233–239
- Johnston, Mark, 116
- justification, 2–4, 64, 94–119, 164, 186 *See also* acquaintance, foundationalism, internalism vs. externalism
 - doxastic vs. propositional, 94
 - internal vs. external, 119–130
- Keynes, John Maynard, 132
- Kim, Jaegwon, 81
- knowledge argument, 18–21, 57, 150–157
 - responses to
 - ability hypothesis, 157–160
 - acquaintance hypothesis, 161–165
 - Jackson's rejection of the knowledge argument, 233–239
 - new modes of representation, 169–181
- Kripke, Saul, 43, 74, 85–86, 87, 184, 192–194, 196–197, 204–206, 207, 208
- Leibniz, Gottfried, 6, 221
- Leibniz's law, 6, 9, 11, 165
- Lepore, Ernest, 70
- Lewis, C. I., 67, 69
- Lewis, David, 20, 21, 153, 156, 157–159, 192
- Ludlow, Peter, 13
- luminosity, 50–51, 104–106
- Madden, Edward, 30
- Markie, Peter, 107, 109
- Martin, Noah, 139
- Mary thought experiment *See* knowledge argument
- Maxwell, Grover, 52, 67, 141, 152, 216
- McHenry, Leemon, 225
- Meehl, Paul E., 13
- Mellor, D. H., 51
- Melnyk, Andrew, 49
- Mill, John Stuart, 69, 183–184, 214–215
- mind–brain identity theory, 72–75, 221 *See also* physicalism
 - token, 73
 - type, 72, 160
- Montero, Barbara, 60
- Moore, G. E., 15, 27, 61, 63, 234, 260
- Nagasawa, Yujin, 13, 14
- Nagel, Ernest, 79
- Nagel, Thomas, 13, 18, 23, 155
- naturalism *See* physicalism
- Nemirow, Laurence, 21, 157
- Nida-Rümelin, Martine, 166, 202, 204
- Nuccetelli, Susanna, 139
- panpsychism, 152, 225–231
- Pappas, George, 200
- Pargetter, Robert, 21
- phenomenalism, 67, 69, 213, 215

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-03787-8 - Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism

Richard Fumerton

Index

[More information](#)*Index*

- phenomenology, 59, 71, 88, 142, 174, 233, 239, 247, 257, 259–264 *See also*
 - acquaintance, causal theory of objects
- physicalism, 46, 49, 60–64, 132–143 *See also*
 - behaviorism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory, panpsychism
- event, 41–42
- fact, 39–40
- property, 36–39
- proposition, 42–44
- sentence, 44
- substance, 29–35
- Plantinga, Alvin, 124, 126
- property
 - essential vs. accidental, 30–34
 - intrinsic vs. relational, 17, 19, 59, 70–71, 90, 135, 148, 150, 151–152, 163, 177, 192, 207, 210–218, 237, 252, 253, 257
 - mental vs. physical, 36–39
 - realist vs. trope theorist, 39
- Putnam, Hilary, 121, 153, 168, 172, 184, 199
- qualia, 20, 21
 - arguments for, 102–103 *See also* knowledge argument
 - rejection of, 233–239
- Quine, W. V. O., 8, 131, 265
- radical empiricism, 171, 208, 210–218, 220
- Ramsey, F. P., 215
- reduction, 60, 67, 68, 72, 143, 209, 264, 265 *See also*
 - behaviorism, causal theory of objects, functionalism, phenomenalism,
 - physicalism, self, Humean idea of
- informative identities, 88, 187–189, 205–206, 206–207, 209, 220, 241
- Reed, Baron, 107
- reference *See also* descriptivism, reference fixing
 - direct, 141, 168, 183–189
 - indirect, 67, 83, 141, 185, 217, 228
 - opaque contexts, 8
 - transparent contexts, 9
- reference fixing, 85–87, 196–197, 205–206
- regress arguments
 - for epistemic foundationalism, 93–98
 - for foundational thought and reference, 184–186, 239–241
- Russell, Bertrand, 8, 13, 38, 52, 67, 79, 141, 162, 168, 179, 185–188, 190–191, 194, 197–199, 206, 216, 225, 265
- Ryle, Gilbert, 71
- Scriven, Michael, 79
- Searle, John, 58, 226
- self, 2, 224, 269–270 *See also* unity of consciousness
 - Humean idea of, 259–264
 - problem with reductive analyses, 266–267
- Sellars, Wilfrid, 115, 162
- skepticism, 2–5, 95, 128, 130–132, 144–145, 259
 - with respect to the intrinsic nature of physical objects, 210–218, 221–224
- Smart, J. J. C., 11–13, 20, 42, 104, 169, 173, 221, 246
- Sosa, Ernest, 107, 122–124

Index

Sprigge, Timothy, 225	truth-makers, 32, 40, 45, 99, 119, 141, 144, 164 <i>See also</i> fact
Stalnaker, Robert, 92	
Stanley, Jason, 158	
Stoljar, Daniel, 13, 14, 152, 216, 218	unity of consciousness, 226, 264
Strawson, Peter, 179, 259	Ushenko, Andrew Paul, 107
substance vs. bare particulars, 29–35	verificationism, 64–67, 70
supervenience, 3, 60, 61–63, 126	Williamson, Timothy, 50, 51, 104–107, 113–115, 116
Swain, Marshall, 200	