Introduction

The impact of commerce on international and domestic politics emerged as a major concern of European thinkers and statesmen in the context of 'archaic globalization', a process powered by an increase in the intercontinental exchange of commodities between 1600 and 1800.[1] After the Napoleonic wars, British hegemony aided and abetted an unprecedented acceleration in the growth of international trade, marking the onset of 'modern globalization'.[2] As a result, the controversy on commerce not only increased in intensity but also changed in nature. First, between the 1820s and the 1840s, Britain became the first European country to dismantle its arsenal of mercantilist restrictions. It also began to use its naval and economic clout to promote the lowering of trade barriers throughout the world. The absolute freedom of trade, still dismissed as 'an Oceana or Utopia' by Adam Smith in 1776, now appeared as a concrete possibility, although one tinged with fear that it might entrench British supremacy.[3] Second, the growing industrial specialization of Europe resulting from the acceleration of international trade had unforeseen and troubling social consequences, especially the spread of a new form of urban poverty exemplified by the destitution of British factory workers.[4] The controversy on commerce became a debate over British poverty as well as British power, and, outside Britain, the means of escaping both. It was to denote the intensification of the concern with commerce and the emergence of new sets of beliefs that terms such as 'free trade', *libre-échange* and *Freihandel*

[1] Christopher A. Bayly, '"Archaic" and "Modern" Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 1750–1850', in Anthony G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History* (London, 2002), pp. 47–73; on early modern debates about archaic globalization, see Istvan Hont, *The Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).

[2] On nineteenth-century globalization, see Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford, 2004) and Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton, NJ, 2014).

[3] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations: Books IV–V*, ed. Andrew Skinner (London, 1999), p. 48.

[4] Gareth Stedman Jones, *An End to Poverty? A Historical Debate* (London, 2004), esp. pp. 133–62.

or 'protectionism', *protectionnisme* and *Protektionismus* were forged in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

I

The book retraces the beginnings of this controversy on modern globalization and the rejection of 'British' free trade in France, from the fall of the first Napoleonic Empire in 1814–15 until the advent of the second in 1851. Intellectual arguments for free trade dated back to the second half of the eighteenth century and were not exclusively British. Rather, they were elaborated by French (François Quesnay, Turgot, Abbé Raynal) and Scottish (David Hume, Adam Smith) Enlightenment philosophers.[5] The single most influential text calling for the constitution of a global market was probably Raynal's *Histoire des deux Indes*, a European best-seller which went through fifty French-language editions and countless translations between 1772 and 1790.[6] Yet, after 1815, it was in Britain that free trade gradually became a dominant ideology and official policy, a transformation often symbolized by the successful campaign of the Anti-Corn Law League for the repeal of agricultural protection in the 1840s. Historians have shown that the British enthusiasm for free trade was not only rooted in the persuasive powers of classical political economy but owed at least as much to a complex set of moral, religious and geopolitical considerations.[7] It proved an enduring feature of British intellectual and political life, lasting at least until the Edwardian era.[8]

[5] Emma Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001); on liberal ideas about trade in eighteenth-century France, see also Catherine Larrère, *L'Invention de l'économie au XVIII^e siècle: du droit naturel à la physiocratie* (Paris, 1992) and Simone Meyssonnier, *La Balance et l'horloge: la genèse de la pensée libérale en France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1989).

[6] Anthony Strugnell, Andrew Brown, Cecil Courtney et al., 'Introduction générale', in Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens, Tome 1: livres I à V*, ed. Anthony Strugnell, Andrew Brown, Cecil Courtney et al. (Paris, 2010), pp. xxvii–lii; Robert Darnton, *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France* (New York, 1996), p. 63.

[7] Boyd Hilton, *Corn, Cash and Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments, 1815–1830* (Oxford, 1977) and *The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought* (Oxford, 1988); on the entanglement of economic with political and moral concerns in nineteenth-century British political economy, see Donald Winch, *Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750–1834* (Cambridge, 1996) and *Wealth and Life: Essays on the Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1848–1914* (Cambridge, 2009).

[8] Anthony Howe, *Free Trade and Liberal England* (Oxford, 1997) and 'Free Trade and Global Order: The Rise and Fall of a Victorian Vision', in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Victorian Visions of Global Order* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 26–46; Lars Magnusson, *The Tradition of Free Trade* (London, 2004), esp. pp. 46–69; Frank Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain* (Oxford, 2008).

Semantic and linguistic innovations marked the novelty and Britishness of free trade as an ideology. Whereas in English 'free trade' previously referred to a specific 'trade or business which may be pursued without restrictions' as in 'a free trade in corn', in the 1820s it acquired the more general sense of 'trade or commerce conducted without the interference of customs duties designed to restrict imports' from the rest of the world, as in 'a system of free trade'.[9] For example, in an entry of his *Rural Rides* dated November 1825, William Cobbett, the conservative turned radical critic of industrialization, derided 'this new project of "free trade" and "mutual gain" ' as 'humbug'.[10] In the 1830s and 1840s, this new meaning of 'free trade' inspired the forging of neologisms in foreign languages, such as *libre-échange* in French. Searching Google Books, I found no occurrence of 'libre échange' in reference to the circulation of commodities in French-language publications before 1829 and six occurrences between 1830 and 1833, four of which appear in translations of English writings.[11] It was Frédéric Bastiat, an avid reader of British periodicals and admirer of the Anti-Corn Law League, who gave a hyphenated version of the expression wider currency when he launched the newspaper *Le Libre-échange* in 1846. *Freihandel* was also calqued from English into German at the same period.[12]

While nineteenth-century free trade was British, France soon came to embody its 'other', protectionism. The earliest occurrence of 'protectionist' I could identify in existing databases was part of a speech delivered on 5 June 1834 by the Hull MP and free-trader, Thomas Perronet Thompson, on the reciprocity of shipping duties between Britain and France.[13] The speech alluded to the extreme agitation of French public opinion over trade policy, and it is noteworthy that Thompson was at the

[9] 'Free trade', *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3rd edn, June 2007 (www.oed.com, accessed 19 March 2014).

[10] William Cobbett, *Rural Rides*, 3rd edn, 2 vols. (London, 1885), vol. I, pp. 400–3.

[11] Search for 'libre échange', 1820–1833, in Google Books, works in French (http://books.google.fr, accessed 19 March 2014). The four translations were: James S. Buckingham, *Discours préliminaire prononcé à l'Athénée à l'occasion d'un cours sur les Indes orientales*, trans. Benjamin Laroche (Paris, 1830), p. 40; 'Note sur l'agriculture de la France', translated from the *Morning Chronicle*, in *Journal d'Agriculture et des Manufactures des Pays-Bas*, 12 (1830): 212–17, at p. 213; 'Progrès constitutionnels de la Prusse', translated from *Blackwoods*, in *Revue Britannique*, 3rd series, 4 (1833): 193–214, at p. 205; and 'De la fabrication et du commerce des soieries en France et en Angleterre', translated from the *Westminster Review*, in *Revue Britannique*, 3rd series, 6 (1833): 53–76, at p. 72. The other two occurrences were in two Saint-Simonian publications: *L'Européen, Journal des Sciences Morales et Économiques*, I (1830), p. 66, and Emile Barrault (ed.), *Religion saint-simonienne: recueil des prédications*, 2 vols (Paris, 1832), vol. II, p. 7.

[12] Lutz Mackensen (ed.), *Ursprung der Wörter* (Wiesbaden, 1998), p. 140; and Friedrich Kluge (ed.), *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* (Berlin, 1967), p. 217.

[13] For Thompson, 'to attempt to play the protectionist or prohibitionist in places where we had no power, appeared to him an impossibility, not to say an absurdity', quoted in *The Times*, 6 June 1834.

time in close correspondence with John Bowring, who was engaged in a campaign to reduce the influence of the 'anti-free-traders' in France.[14] Yet the word only took hold in English in the 1840s. After the account of Thompson's speech in 1834, the next two occurrences of 'protectionist' in *The Times* date from 1843, followed by five occurrences in 1844 and fifteen in 1845.[15] These occurrences mostly referred to the British supporters of the Corn Laws, who founded the Society for the Protection of Agriculture in February 1844.[16] A letter from Lord Fitzwilliam, a Whig politician, to George Pryme, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge, dated 28 February 1844, stressed the term's novelty: 'I am glad to see that you have been giving your mind to the *protectionists*, as they are now called.'[17] In France, opponents of free trade after 1830 preferred to style themselves the defenders of *travail national* (national labour) or of the *système protecteur* (protective system). *Protectionnisme* and its derivatives in French were probably imported from English. The earliest occurrence of *protectionniste* I could identify, in a work extolling the Anti-Corn Law League's crusade for free trade published in 1845 by Bastiat, also referred to British defenders of the Corn Laws.[18] *Protectionnisme* retained a pejorative connotation and was not widely used until the end of the century. Similarly, *Protektionismus* was introduced in German in the 1840s, but it only gained wide currency in the 1880s.[19]

After 1850, and the collapse of support for protection in Britain, France came to be seen, in Britain and elsewhere, as the incarnation of protectionism. 'Two systems', free trade and protection, the American economist and adversary of British free trade, Henry Carey, wrote in 1858, 'are before the world … Leader in the advocacy of the first has been, and is, Great Britain. Leader in the establishment of the second, and most consistent in its maintenance, is France.'[20] So ingrained did the perception of France as the land of protectionism become that in 1876 increases in the tariffs of the United States and Canada led *The Times* to exclaim, with melancholy surprise: 'It is not the French population alone or chiefly

[14] Thomas Perronet Thompson to John Bowring, 28 October 1834, Hull, Brynmore Jones Library (hereafter BJL), Thompson MSS, 4/5.
[15] Search for 'protectionist', 1830–45, in The Times Digital Archive, 1785–2008 (http://gale.cengage.co.uk/times.aspx, accessed 19 March 2014).
[16] On the defence of the Corn Laws, see Anna Gambles, *Protection and Politics: Conservative Economic Discourse* (London, 1999), esp. pp. 56–85.
[17] George Pryme, *Autobiographic Recollections*, ed. Alicia Bayne (Cambridge, 1870), p. 306.
[18] Frédéric Bastiat, *Cobden et la ligue* (Paris, 1845), p. 394.
[19] Wolfgang Pfeifer (ed.), *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1993), vol. II, p. 57.
[20] Henry Carey, *Letters to the President on the Foreign and Domestic Policy of the Union* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1858), p. 133.

which is protectionist.'[21] At the turn of the twentieth century, Germany sometimes rivaled France as Britain's economic other and symbol of protectionist policies.[22] But the image of France as intrinsically hostile to free trade has remained influential to this day. *The Economist*, a periodical which has consistently advocated free trade since its foundation in 1843, still lambasts the protectionism of 'Fortress France' as fervently as in the nineteenth century.[23]

The coinage of new words or phrases tends to mark ideological crystallization rather than intellectual innovation. Free trade and protectionism, or *libre-échange* and *travail national*, were not coherent doctrines, but slogans. Yet their very nature of slogan, evoking a variety of economic, political and moral considerations, makes them useful keys to interrogate contemporary ideas about the early stage of what is now construed as nineteenth-century globalization. Adopting a simultaneously comparative and connective perspective, the book examines the reception, attempts at reinterpretation and eventual rejection of British free trade in France. As such, it is a contribution to both the history of the transformations of liberalism in France after 1815 and to a transnational history of political and economic ideas.

II

The book analyses the elaboration and dissemination of a politico-economic discourse that was neither hostile to capitalism nor political liberalism, but rejected the cosmopolitan project of a global market as destructive of social stability as well as national independence. Although the premises of this discourse can be found in the attacks of counter-revolutionary thinkers on the political economy of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith before 1820, it was the adoption of free trade by Britain and the fear of British-style pauperism that led a majority of French liberals to endorse the protection of 'national labour' and stress its compatibility with market economics and representative institutions. In the 1840s, just as free trade achieved ascendancy in Britain, it was relegated to the margins of French intellectual and political life. The national political economy of

[21] *The Times*, 22 January 1876, quoted in Henry Carey, *Commerce, Christianity and Civilization versus British Free Trade* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1876), pp. 3–4.
[22] Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation*, pp. 93–100.
[23] Compare, for instance, 'Protectionism in France', *The Economist*, 26 May 1894, with 'Protectionism in France: Fair Is Foul', *The Economist*, 26 June 1993, or 'French Protectionism: Fearful Fortress France', *The Economist*, 29 October 2005.

the French protectionists drove an enduring wedge between French liberalism and classical economics and contributed to the divergence between French and British liberalism after 1830.

The outcome of the controversy on international trade in France can only appear predictable with the benefit of hindsight. Before the early nineteenth century, France was home to a vibrant and influential tradition of *laissez-faire* ideas. Under the influence of Physiocratic thinkers, the Bourbon monarchy proved keen to introduce free-market reforms in the grain and colonial trades.[24] The treaty that liberalized exchanges between Britain and France in 1786 resulted from a French initiative.[25] Until the 1790s, Adam Smith, often viewed as a successor of Quesnay and Turgot, was widely praised or disparaged, throughout Europe, as an advocate of 'French' ideas of political and economic liberty.[26] In France, *The Wealth of Nations* went through four translations and ten editions by 1802.[27] In the early years of Napoleon Bonaparte's rule, French debates about Smith set advocates of different interpretations against one another rather than his followers against his opponents.[28]

Only the imperatives of economic warfare against Britain, with the advent of the Continental Blockade, temporarily silenced advocates of a liberal trade policy after 1805. The first three chapters of this book highlight the resurgence of support for a radical conception of economic liberty after the fall of Napoleon. In Chapter 1, I examine how the reactionary political economy of the Bourbon Restoration revived liberal

[24] On economic reforms in France after the Seven Years' War, see Steven L. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV*, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1976), esp. vol. 1, pp. 97–163; Jean Tarrade, *Le Commerce colonial de la France à la fin de l'Ancien Régime: l'évolution du régime de 'l'exclusif' de 1763 à 1789*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1972), esp. vol. 1, pp. 167–285; on Physiocracy, see Liana Vardi, *The Physiocrats and the World of Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 2012) and Pernille Røge, 'Political Economy and the Reinvention of France's Colonial System, 1756–1802' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010).

[25] Orville T. Murphy, 'Du Pont de Nemours and the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786', *Economic History Review*, new series, 19 (3) (1966): 569–80; and Marie Donaghay, 'Exchange of Products of the Soil and Industrial Goods in the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786', *Journal of European Economic History*, 19 (2) (1990): 377–401.

[26] Emma Rothschild, 'Political Economy', in Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 748–79, at pp. 751–3; and Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments*, pp. 52–71.

[27] Kenneth Carpenter, *The Dissemination of the Wealth of Nations in French and in France, 1776–1843* (New York, 2002), pp. xxi–lxiii; on the popularity of Smithian political economy in France in the 1790s, see also Gilbert Faccarello and Philippe Steiner (eds.), *La Pensée économique pendant la Révolution française, 1789–1799* (Grenoble, 1990); and James Livesey, 'Agrarian Ideology and Commercial Republicanism in the French Revolution', *Past and Present*, 157 (1997): 94–121.

[28] Richard Whatmore, *Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say's Political Economy* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 171–3.

frustrations about commercial prohibitions and the regulation of colonial trade. Chapter 2 considers the emergence of a militant discourse in favour of *liberté commerciale*, an early translation of free trade, in the 1820s, while Chapter 3 looks at the intensification and dissemination, with the active encouragement of the British government, of protests for trade liberalization in the wake of the 1830 Revolution.

The endorsement of protection by a majority of liberals after the mid 1830s did not therefore result from a French Colbertian atavism. Historians of Old Regime France have in any case demonstrated that the legacy of Jean-Baptiste Colbert was not one of unmitigated interventionism and, more broadly, that eighteenth-century economic debates were not structured around the opposition between mercantilism and *laissez-faire*.[29] Much more important were the contests between advocates and adversaries of luxury and divergent appreciations of the danger posed by the rapid growth in the public debt.[30] To the extent that contemporaries debated the implications of 'archaic globalization' before the French Revolution, they can more helpfully be divided between defenders of a moderately reformist 'science of commerce' epitomized by Montesquieu and the supporters of a more radical Physiocratic agrarianism, rather than between liberals and *dirigistes*.[31] Even for the early decades of the nineteenth century, the modern dualism between liberalism and interventionism fails to account adequately for the complex and changing views of contemporaries on the international circulation of commodities.[32]

Yet, by comparison with the abundance of works on British free trade or even German responses to the later stages of nineteenth-century globalization, historians have paid scant attention to the protectionist turn of French liberalism after 1830.[33] Historians of economic thought pursuing

[29] Philippe Minard, *État et industrie: la fortune du colbertisme dans la France des lumières* (Paris, 1998), esp. pp. 292–314; see also Jean-Claude Perrot, *Une histoire intellectuelle de l'économie politique, XVII^e–XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1992).

[30] John Shovlin, *The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, NY, 2006); Michael Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, NJ, 2007); Anoush F. Terjanian, *Commerce and Its Discontents in Eighteenth-Century French Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2013).

[31] Paul Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), pp. 21, 168–94.

[32] William M. Reddy, *The Rise of a Market Culture: The Textile Trade and French Society* (Cambridge and Paris, 1984); Jean-Pierre Hirsch, *Les Deux rêves du commerce: entreprise et institution dans la région lilloise (1780–1860)* (Paris, 1991); Nicolas Bourguinat, *Les Grains du désordre: l'État face aux violences frumentaires dans la première moitié du XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 2002), pp. 53–111.

[33] Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, 2010); Cornelius Torp, *Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung: Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland, 1860–1914* (Göttingen, 2005).

a doctrinal approach, mainly concerned with the elaboration of modern economic analysis, have usually dismissed nineteenth-century French debates as of limited intellectual significance.[34] The handful of works dealing with support for free trade in France have dated its emergence to the 1840s and attributed it to diffusion from Britain.[35] The even scarcer works that have seriously examined the views of French adversaries of free trade tend to describe them in the anachronistic language of modernization theory and development economics.[36] Interest in the nineteenth-century controversy over free trade in France has also suffered from the long prevalence of a materialist interpretation, which attributed the dominance of protectionism to the influence of rent-seeking industries. The multi-volume reference work, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, edited by Ernest Labrousse and Fernand Braudel, brushed aside nineteenth-century debates about free trade in four pages, reaching the conclusion that 'the pressure of opinion [in favour of protection] did not rest on a precise ideology' but 'merely corresponded to the influence of dominant interests'.[37] This influential view has often confined works on the French debates over free trade and protection to a history of industrial lobbying.[38]

The last three chapters of *Free Trade and its Enemies* analyse instead the elaboration, dissemination and triumph of a new anti-free-trade ideology after 1835. In response to the clamour for free trade, Chapter 4 argues, several liberal publicists invented new justifications for protection that either stressed the need to meet the British industrial challenge or called for autarky in order to prevent the spread of British-style pauperism. In Chapter 5, I study the dissemination of this nationalist economist

[34] See, for example, Joël Ravix, 'Le Libre-échange et le protectionnisme en France', in Yves Breton and Michel Lutfalla (eds.), *L'Économie politique en France au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1991), pp. 485–523; on the limits of the doctrinal approach, see Winch, *Riches and Poverty*, esp. pp. 15–16.

[35] See, for example, Alex Tyrrell, '"La Ligue Française", the Anti-Corn Law League and the Campaign for Economic Liberalism in France during the Last Days of the July Monarchy', in Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan (eds.), *Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays* (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 99–116.

[36] Francis Démier, 'Nation, marché et développement dans la France de la Restauration' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Paris X, 1991), esp. pp. 2–11; another, older but equally presentist exception, concerned with tracing the origins of the 'doctrine of national economics', is René Maunier, 'Les Économistes protectionnistes en France de 1815 à 1848', *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 19 (3) (1911): 485–514.

[37] Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse (eds.), *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1977–93), vol. III.1, pp. 155–9.

[38] See, for example, Jürgen Hilsheimer, *Interessengruppen und Zollpolitik in Frankreich: die Auseinandersetzungen um die Aufstellung des Zollstarifs von 1892* (Heidelberg, 1973), and Michael S. Smith, *Tariff Reform in France, 1860–1900: The Politics of Economic Interests* (Ithaca, NY, 1980).

discourse through the influence of new pressure groups and the debates between protectionists about the limits of national solidarity at the turn of the 1840s. Finally, Chapter 6 shows how the Association pour la Défense du Travail National, founded in the wake of the Anti-Corn Law League's victory in Britain, successfully defended the protection of national labour by portraying free trade as an 'English' doctrine and its French supporters as traitors.

The book examines the protectionist turn of French liberalism not only in the intellectual context created by earlier debates about archaic globalization but also in the economic context of modern globalization and the political context of post-Revolutionary reconstruction. The difference between archaic and modern globalization was qualitative as well as quantitative, with the latter form of globalization reaching more deeply into domestic economic structures and daily lives. In the eighteenth century, international trade grew 10 per cent per decade and remained limited to goods with a high value-to-weight ratio. Between 1820 and 1914, it surged 40 per cent per decade and extended to all commodities. The advent of a global market, as measured by the convergence of commodity prices and resulting in a much higher level of national or regional specialization, only began in the 1820s.[39] For France, the new global division of labour implied a gradual specialization in *demi-luxe* (semi-luxury) industries such as Lyonnais silk products, *articles de Paris* (marquetry, knick-knacks, furniture, glove-making, etc.) and the production of wine.[40] Such a specialization was unappealing to the French ruling class. On the one hand, it implied a form of economic growth that seemed more difficult to translate into political power than Britain's textile manufacturing, metal-working or coal-mining. On the other, it encouraged the growth of sectors with a workforce that enjoyed a deserved reputation for political restlessness, be it Parisian artisans, Lyonnais silk-workers or southern winegrowers.

French protectionism was therefore a response to the pressures of the new global market. To some extent, it helped to shape what some economic historians, rejecting Anglocentric accounts of industrialization, have described as the French path of economic growth in the nineteenth century, less spectacular but more balanced than Britain's, and which achieved

[39] Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 'When Did Globalization Begin?', *European Review of Economic History*, 6 (1) (2002): 23–50; see also Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 29–55, and Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton, NJ, 2009), pp. 378–87, 395–407.

[40] Patrick Verley, 'Essor et déclin des industries du luxe et du demi-luxe au XIX^{e} siècle', in Jacques Marseille (ed.), *Le Luxe en France: du siècle des 'Lumières' à nos jours* (Paris, 1999), pp. 107–23.

a similar rate of per-capita income growth over the years 1815 to 1914.[41] However, French protectionism is better construed as an ideology than as an economic policy. France after 1815 did not withdraw from international trade, remaining instead the second largest commercial power after Britain until the 1880s.[42] Overall, it is not clear that the level of protection from foreign competition was higher in France than in Britain, at least until the 1870s. But, as even economic historians mostly interested in quantitative data could not help noticing, although British and French statesmen reduced tariffs at a similar pace after 1820, 'the British talked of free trade, while the French … always spoke of going no further than moderate protection'.[43] It is this contrast in the political language about international trade that the book seeks to explain.

French hostility to British free trade was closely linked with what François Furet identified as the main imperative of French politics after 1814: 'terminer' (ending or completing) the Revolution.[44] While historians of political ideas used to treat the years 1814–60 as an awkward parenthesis between the Revolution and the emergence of modern republicanism, recent scholarship has highlighted the ideological creativity of the period and of liberal thinkers in particular. In a context of constitutional convergence with Britain, French liberals adapted the legacy of the Enlightenment to offer compelling theories of representative government that eschewed republican Jacobinism as an aberration and stressed the need for intermediate bodies and a restricted franchise.[45] In *Free Trade and its Enemies*, I try to nuance this picture by

[41] Patrick O'Brien and Cağlar Keyder, *Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780–1914: Two Paths to the Twentieth Century* (London, 1978); Patrick O'Brien, 'Path Dependency, or Why Britain Became an Industrialized and Urbanized Economy Long before France', *Economic History Review*, new series, 49 (2) (1996): 213–49; François Crouzet, 'The Historiography of French Economic Growth in the Nineteenth Century', *Economic History Review*, new series, 56 (2) (2003): 215–42; Jeff Horn, *The Path Not Taken: French Industrialization in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1830* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).

[42] Paul Bairoch, *Commerce extérieur et développement économique de l'Europe au XIX^e* siècle (Paris, 1976), pp. 219–38; Jean-Claude Toutain, 'Les Structures du commerce extérieur de la France, 1789–1970', in Maurice Lévy-Leboyer (ed.), *La Position internationale de la France: aspects économiques et financiers, XIX^e–XX^e siècles* (Paris, 1977), pp. 53–74.

[43] John V. Nye, *War, Wine, and Taxes: The Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689–1900* (Princeton, NJ, 2007), p. 12; see also Nye's articles, 'The Myth of Free-Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Economic History*, 51 (1) (1991): 23–46; and 'Guerre, commerce, guerre commerciale', *Annales ESC*, 47 (3) (1992): 613–32. On the limits of Nye's methodology, see my review, in *H-France Review*, 9 (2009): 422–5.

[44] François Furet, *La Révolution de Turgot à Jules Ferry, 1770–1880*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1988), vol. II: *Terminer la Révolution: de Louis XVIII à Jules Ferry*.

[45] For overviews, see Jeremy Jennings, 'Constitutional Liberalism in France: From Benjamin Constant to Alexis de Tocqueville', in Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 349–73, and Jeremy Jennings, *Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteeenth Century* (Oxford, 2011). Important contributions to this reappraisal include: Pierre