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Emotive Language in Argumentation

This book analyzes the uses of emotive language and redefinitions from pragmatic, dialectical, epistemic, and rhetorical perspectives, investigating the relationship between emotions, persuasion, and meaning and focusing on the implicit dimension of the use of a word and its dialectical effects. It offers a method for evaluating the persuasive and manipulative uses of emotive language in ordinary and political discourse. Through the analysis of political speeches (including President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize address) and legal arguments, the book offers a systematic study of emotive language in argumentation, rhetoric, communication, political science, and public speaking.

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For my family, with love. – F.M.

For Karen, with love. – D.W.

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