Telecommunication Network Economics

Presenting a balance of theory and practice, this up-to-date guide provides a comprehensive overview of the key issues in telecommunication network economics, as well as the mathematical models behind the solutions. These mathematical foundations enable the reader to understand the economic issues arising at this pivotal time in network economics, from business, research, and political perspectives. This is followed by a unique practical guide to current topics, including app stores, volume-based pricing, auctions for advertisements, search engine business models, the network neutrality debate, the relationship between mobile network operators and mobile virtual network operators, and the economics of security. The guide discusses all types of players in telecommunications, including users, access and transit network providers, service providers (including search engines, cloud providers and content delivery networks), content providers, and regulatory bodies. Ideal for graduate students, researchers, and industry practitioners working in telecommunications.

Patrick Maillé has been with the Networks, Security and Multimedia Department of Telecom Bretagne (Institut Mines-Telecom) since 2002. He has written or co-written more than 60 papers on game theory and economic concepts applied to telecommunication ecosystems.

Bruno Tuffin has been with Inria in Rennes, France, since 1997. He has written or co-written more than 100 papers and two books on Monte Carlo and quasi-Monte Carlo simulation techniques for the performance evaluation of telecommunication systems, and on developing new Internet-pricing schemes and telecommunication-related economic models.

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-03275-0 - Telecommunication Network Economics: From Theory to Applications Patrick Maillé and Bruno Tuffin Frontmatter <u>More information</u> Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-03275-0 - Telecommunication Network Economics: From Theory to Applications Patrick Maillé and Bruno Tuffin Frontmatter More information

Telecommunication Network Economics

From Theory to Applications

PATRICK MAILLÉ Telecom Bretagne

BRUNO TUFFIN





University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107032750

© Cambridge University Press 2014

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2014

Printed in the United Kingdom by CPI Group Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-107-03275-0 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

Preface

1

2

1.1	The er	volution of telecommunications and the associated economic		
1.1	model			
1.2		eed for modeling and analysis		
1.2	1.2.1			
		The Braess paradox		
		Spectrum auctions		
		The network neutrality debate		
1.3		cription of the actors		
1.4		of the book		
1.5	Outlin	e of the book		
Mat	hematic	al foundations: optimization, game theory, auctions		
2.1	Basic	economic theory		
	2.1.1	Representing actor preferences		
	2.1.2	Effect of prices on demand		
	2.1.3	Global performance of an outcome		
2.2	Mathe	Mathematical tools		
	2.2.1	Continuous optimization methods		
	2.2.2	Fixed-point results		
2.3	Game	theory		
	2.3.1	Vocabulary and definitions		
		Non-atomic games		
	233	Bayesian games		
	2.3.4	Congestion games		
	2.3.4 2.3.5	Potential games		
	2.3.4 2.3.5 2.3.6	Potential games Stackelberg games		
	2.3.4 2.3.5 2.3.6 2.3.7	Potential games		

page ix

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-03275-0 - Telecommunication Network Economics: From Theory to Applications
Patrick Maillé and Bruno Tuffin
Frontmatter
More information

vi	Cont	tents				
		2.4.2 The revelation principle	78			
		2.4.3 Auctions: a specific type of mechanism	79			
		2.4.4 First-price auctions	80			
		2.4.5 Iterative open auctions	80			
		2.4.6 Second-price auctions	81			
		2.4.7 Revenue-equivalence results	81			
		2.4.8 Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions2.4.9 Combinatorial auctions	82 83			
		2.4.9 Combinational auctions 2.4.10 Double-sided auctions	83 84			
		2.4.10 Double-sided auctions 2.4.11 Towards <i>computational</i> mechanism design	84 86			
	2.5		86			
3	Economics of access service providers					
	3.1	History and evolution of access pricing models	88			
	3.2	Expectations of users and ISPs, impact on other actors	91			
	3.3	Flat-rate pricing	94			
	3.4	Volume-based pricing	97			
	3.5	Congestion and value-based pricing	102			
		3.5.1 Pricing and connection acceptance control	103			
		3.5.2 Multiclass pricing	106			
		3.5.3 Auctions	116			
		3.5.4 Interference-based pricing for wireless networks	119			
		3.5.5 The Kelly mechanism	121			
	3.6	Economics of bundling	123			
4	Economics at the content and application level					
	4.1	A bit of history	126			
	4.2	e	129			
		4.2.1 Auctioning for advertising slots: basic principles	131			
		4.2.2 Auctions between advertisers	132			
		4.2.3 Extensions of the basic auction model	138			
		4.2.4 Pay-per-click or pay-per-view?	141			
		4.2.5 Learning	145			
		4.2.6 Existing tools/companies	146			
	4.3	Paid applications versus free applications with advertisements	147			
	4.4	e	149			
	4.5	Economics of peer-to-peer systems	153			
	4.6	Economics of content delivery networks	157			
5	Inte	ractions among network service providers	162			
5	Inte 5.1	ractions among network service providers Introduction	162 162			

	Contents	vii				
	5.2.1 Why use auctions?	163				
	5.2.2 Auction rules and evolution	165				
	5.2.3 Evolving from simultaneous ascending auctions	173				
	5.2.4 to incentive auctions	175				
5.3	1 1	176				
	5.3.1 Association models based on user utility	176				
	5.3.2 Aggregated demand models	185				
	5.3.3 Providers competing in multiple-time-scale decision games	194				
<i></i>	5.3.4 To license or not to license resources?	197				
5.4	Client but competitor: the (unsustainable?) situation of MVNOs	198				
	5.4.1 Exploiting secondary markets5.4.2 Can MNO–MVNO associations survive? Observations from	199				
	5.4.2 Can MNO–MVNO associations survive? Observations from different countries	200				
		200				
5.5	TI TI	200				
5	5.5.1 An example	202				
	5.5.2 The problem of incentivizing intermediate entities	202				
	5.5.3 Some proposals for ad-hoc networks or multi-hop cellular	200				
	networks	209				
5.6		212				
6 Int	Interactions among content or application service providers					
6.1	Introduction	217				
6.2		218				
	6.2.1 General models	218				
	6.2.2 Online TV competition	220				
	6.2.3 An illustrative model of competition among free CPs with					
	advertising	221				
6.3		225				
6.4	The economics of network security	231				
	6.4.1 Economic models for security analysis	232				
	6.4.2 Competition among security providers	235				
	6.4.3 Collaboration/competition issues	238				
7 Re	ations between content/application providers and access service providers	239				
7.1	The evolution of economic relations between content/application and					
	network providers	239				
7.2	Value chain, vertical integration	241				
	7.2.1 Value chain and multi-sided markets	241				
	7.2.2 Vertical integration	243				
7.3	The network neutrality issue	248				
	7.3.1 Introduction and historical facts	248				
	7.3.2 Arguments of proponents and opponents of neutrality	250				

viii	Contents					
		7 7 7	Madaling and and astronyly analidans? interpretions and			
		7.3.3	Modeling content and network providers' interactions and analyzing neutrality issues	255		
	7.4	Searcl	h neutrality	261		
	,	7.4.1	The debate	261		
		7.4.2	Do search engines return biased results?	263		
		7.4.3	Do we need regulatory intervention?	264		
		7.4.4	Neutral versus non-neutral search engines: a simple model	265		
		7.4.5	The case of a general set of keywords	269		
		7.4.6	Personalization of search results: what I want to see versus			
			what I need to see	271		
	Refe	erences		272		
	Inde	ex		288		

Preface

Network economics is a very hot topic, at the same time from a research point of view (with several conferences devoted to the theme, plus a devoted section in most of the other main telecommunication conferences), from a political point of view (as highlighted by the network neutrality debate, the increasing discussion on volume-based pricing, etc.), and of course from a business point of view (encompassing advertisement pricing definition, spectrum selling and sharing, bundling of offers, etc.). We believe that it is very good timing to release a book on the issue, describing both the theory and key specific applications, because of all the economic issues that constantly pop up in telecommunications. It is probably a cornerstone time for a redefinition of the Internet business model. While writing (scientific) papers on network economics, we also had the feeling that there was some room for a (new) book in the area. Indeed, there was to the best of our knowledge no recent work mixing mathematical theory and deep analysis of the economic stakes that had appeared in telecommunications. As illustrations of the issues we have in mind, we can mention the network neutrality debate, the relations between mobile network operators and mobile virtual network operators, the management of application stores, the economics of security, auctions for advertisements on different media (content pages, applications, or search engines), etc. In all those cases the interactions among their components need to be described, together with a solid scientific foundation, leading towards a careful analysis. Our book is designed to have a balance between theory and practice. Finally, after around ten years of research experience in the area, we think that this book is an opportunity to put together all the pieces of our activity and to push the analysis one step further.

This book is a monograph, but we believe that it can be also considered as a textbook at the Master level, for instance, because it will include all the necessary theoretical material.

We would like to thank Mia Balashova, Samantha Richter and Phil Meyer from Cambridge University Press for their assistance, encouragement, and patience during the preparation of this book. We also express our gratitude to Dr Steven Holt for his careful reading and the numerous improvements he suggested, and to Arindam Bose for helping implement them. Finally, we thank Maria Maillé for providing the cover picture. Any mistake, error of judgement, or treatment imbalance in the book is our sole responsibility. Х

Preface

About the authors

Patrick Maillé graduated from the Ecole Polytechnique and Telecom ParisTech, France, in 2000 and 2002, respectively. He has been with the Networks, Security and Multimedia department of Telecom Bretagne since 2002, where he obtained his PhD in applied mathematics in 2005, followed by a six-month visit to Columbia University in 2006. His research interests are in game theory and economic concepts applied to telecommunication ecosystems (resource pricing, routing, consequences of user selfishness for network performance). He has authored or co-authored more than sixty papers on those topics.

Bruno Tuffin received his PhD in applied mathematics from the Université de Rennes 1 (France) in 1997. Since then, he has been with Inria in Rennes. He spent eight months as a postdoc at Duke University in 1999. His research interests include developing Monte Carlo and quasi-Monte Carlo simulation techniques for the performance evaluation of telecommunication systems, and developing new Internet-pricing schemes and telecommunication-related economic models. He has published more than one hundred papers on those issues. He has also led or participated in several French and European projects, and co-organized several conferences. He is currently Associate Editor of *INFORMS Journal on Computing, ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation*, and *Mathematical Methods of Operations Research*. He has written or co-written two books devoted to simulation: *Rare Event Simulation Using Monte Carlo Methods*, published by John Wiley & Sons in 2009, and *La simulation de Monte Carlo* (in French), published by Hermes Editions in 2010.