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Introduction

Old Barriers, New Openings

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The inspiration for this collection is straightforward. "Study problems, not periods," Lord Acton advised; yet the 1980s – whether or not these years mark a distinct period – pose a significant problem for contemporary historians because of the rapidity of so many momentous changes in the world. The history of these years has only just begun to be examined, and for many scholars, it centers on a return to the high politics of the Cold War: the years between 1979 and 1989 saw a heightening of military tension between the superpowers, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the reinvigoration of conflicts across Latin America and Africa, reaching its worst point around 1983. This was followed by so dramatic a reduction in hostilities that contemporaries would declare the Cold War over by the end of the decade.

The effects of this change were particularly dramatic in and for Europe. Indeed, 1989 has entered the canon of international history with dates such as 1648, 1815, and 1914 as one of Europe's major turning points. Germany would soon be reunified, the Soviet Union dismantled, and Europe, in U.S. president George H. W. Bush's popular phrase, could become "whole and free."[1] This narrative, tilted heavily toward the very end of the decade, has overlooked or underplayed nearly every other event from the onset of détente in the 1970s to the wars of Yugoslav succession.[2]

[1] Speech in Mainz, May 31, 1989; see http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6–890531.htm (last accessed October 1, 2012).

[2] See, *inter alia*, John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Mary Elise Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., *The Fall of*

To many Europeans, the 1980s tell a different story. The year 1989 was a dramatic moment, to be sure, albeit one that few people predicted to the hour. Perhaps more significant in retrospect were the vastly different reactions to it throughout Europe. The Central European experience of 1989 was not shared uniformly by all Europeans, or even uniformly within Central Europe, least of all within Germany. This point, which would seem to be obvious to any historian writing about any major world event, remains contested within the historiography of this decade.[3]

The picture is not any clearer at its putative beginning. For all that the so-called second Cold War (ca. 1979–85) was an important development in the lives of many people in Europe – at its nadir around 1983 – it did not predetermine every aspect of the dramatic transformation that followed. For one thing, Europe and European concerns had ceased to be at the center of the world – or even, for that matter, of the Cold War – by the 1970s. Although the revolutions of 1989 dominated headlines then and since, they did not alter this reality, nor did they occur independently from globalization, which may have had as much to do with bringing about the revolutions in 1989 than any single sequence of political negotiations within or over Europe. The shape of Europe at the end of the century was not prescribed fully by the end of the Cold War, whenever and wherever it began. There was more to the story.[4]

Another important element, of course, was the long-evolving process of European integration. Whether and to what degree the putative end of the Cold War in Europe – or, alternatively, its acceleration a few years earlier – breathed new life into that process is open to debate. Both its power over nation-states and its territorial reach had grown consistently since the 1950s. The 1980s alone saw the European Community welcome Greece, Spain, and Portugal as new member states well before opening its doors to the nations of the former Communist bloc. When this took place formally in 2004, a reunited Germany was already more than a decade old, with the

the Berlin Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); the special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History*, "Revisiting 1989: Causes, Course and Consequences," (August 2009); Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti, eds., *Europe and the End of the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2008); Andreas Rödder, *Deutschland, einig Vaterland: Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung* (Munich: Beck, 2009).

[3] One of the earliest attempts at grappling with the variations is Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London: Cape, 1993).

[4] See, e.g., Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and the chapters in Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

former GDR having become part of not only the Federal Republic but also the EC in 1990. Another decade earlier, in 1980, the Community signed its first trade agreement with a Comecon member, Romania.[5] And in 1986 came the Single European Act (SEA), which set into motion the process leading to the Maastricht Treaty six years later and the formal establishment of the European Union.

This enumeration of events epitomizes a basic fact about the integration project: enlargement not only reinforced the Community's economic and demographic potential, but also demonstrated the new political role it had acquired, or aimed to acquire, by the 1980s. In all three Mediterranean countries, EC membership helped stabilize the young democratic system and was accompanied by a new focus on human rights and democratization, in and beyond Western Europe.[6] What perhaps looked like a late glimmering of Wilsonianism was indeed an expression of a new European idea, reinforced by actors such as the European Parliament with its more self-assertive role since the introduction of direct elections in 1979. Moreover, the SEA and even more the Maastricht Treaty demonstrated that the integration was moving incrementally beyond its focus on the economy and now increasingly included competences in fields as diverse as the environment, energy, home affairs, and culture.[7]

None of this happened in a vacuum; but neither did the end of the Cold War. To establish how best to connect the multiple narratives of and about Europe during these years is the central aim of this volume. Specifically, it weaves a transatlantic, Cold War perspective into the standard narrative of European integration – and vice versa. Why did European integration take so big a stride forward at the precise moment of greatest hostility between the superpowers? Is it possible to show that one set of tensions led to progress in mitigating or reversing another? Were the two trajectories essentially reinforcing, or independent? And where did the United States – and, broadly speaking, transatlantic relations – fit in the European story? How does the European integration narrative flow within

[5] David Kennedy and David E. Webb, "Integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 28 (1990), 633–75; Suvi Kansikas, *Trade Blocs and the Cold War: The CMEA and the EC Challenge, 1969–1976* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Helsinki, 2012).

[6] See Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).

[7] N. Piers Ludlow, "European Integration in the 1980s: On the Way to Maastricht?" *Journal of European Integration History*, 19 (2013).

the wider framework of an Atlantic Community?[8] Was this a case of benign U.S. neglect? Or were there important, albeit indirect and perhaps even unrecognized, steps taken by Americans that facilitated the deepening, and paved the way for the later widening, of European institutions and governance? What does the relative paucity of European discourse in the United States during the early and middle 1980s – in contrast with earlier moments of high global tension, namely the late 1940s, mid-late 1950s, and early 1960s – suggest about the nature of the years leading up to 1989, and those that followed? Might the U.S. government have devoted more attention in public to nonmilitary issues like trade, the environment, and monetary policy earlier in the decade? And how did European attitudes toward the United States – which also reached new lows in the early part of the decade – affect those priorities? Were transatlantic scars still too raw to reopen from the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s, which saw some disputes over market access and energy policy grow nearly as bitter for some people as those over life and death in Vietnam? These are just a few of the questions raised by the chapters in this volume. Its overall aim in suggesting answers to them is to establish and advance an agenda for research on the decade, loosely demarcated.

SCOPE, ORIENTATION, AND COVERAGE

The first task for the study of any historical period is to address its chronology. It includes when the decade began, when it ended, how it compares to earlier periods, and even whether the usual ten-year demarcation makes historical sense. As already suggested, the 1980s may be more of a "non-decade" or "long decade" than one would otherwise gather from the calendar. Recent research on the 1970s, for example, suggests that it was hardly the "dark ages" of European integration that most contemporaries and an earlier wave of research thought it to be.[9] Yet, according to Matthias

[8] For precedents, see Valérie Aubourg, Gérard Bossuat, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *European Community, Atlantic Community*? (Paris: Soleb, 2008); Giles Scott-Smith and Valérie Aubourg, eds., *Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America*? (Paris: Soleb, 2011).

[9] Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 1–39, here 8; as a contemporary example, see Sicco Mansholt, *La Crise* (Paris: Stock, 1974); one of the earliest, more positive reassessments of the decade is Joseph H. H. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 39–63; for more recent work by historians, see, e.g., Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani, eds., *Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011).

Schulz and Thomas Schwartz, the 1970s was the first decade in which European integration was acknowledged as an impediment to transatlantic relations: the United States continued to support the former rhetorically but did little to encourage or help it in practice, which had not been the case during the 1950s and early 1960s.[10] Others like Geir Lundestad have gone even further to characterize U.S. support for, and interest in, European integration between 1977 and 1984 as going "from bad to worse."[11]

The term "Eurosclerosis," coined in the 1980s to characterize the decade starting in the mid-1970s, may suffer a similar divided fate as research moves further into the 1980s. Instead, some have argued that the Community experienced "a sequence of irregular big bangs" during the years from 1973 to 1986, while others have disaggregated these years into even smaller units.[12] Obviously, distinct policy fields had different trajectories – for instance, with the Common Agricultural Policy being a problem child during most of the decade, whereas the Common Fishery Policy, the direct elections of the European Parliament, or the first Schengen Agreement on border controls signified new steps and modes of integration. Its pace and effects varied much from place to place, as they had always done. At the formal level, the 1980s saw considerable movement: on the one hand, three new countries joined the EC, but on the other, Greenland became the first and (so far) only country ever to leave the Community. Such variations mattered, and continue to matter. They are also a sharp reminder against any simplistic and teleological narratives of European integration.[13] Yet it should still be possible to stand back and address the most important turning points and continuities.

Contending periodizations have produced different verdicts of achievement and failure. For this reason, we propose extending both the

[10] Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, "The Superpower and the Union in the Making: U.S.-European Relations, 1969–1980," in Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, eds., *The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 355–73.

[11] Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 201.

[12] See, e.g., Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), 296; Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 526; Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 4th edition (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010).

[13] On this problem, also see, e.g., Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori, eds., *European Union History: Themes and Debates* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010); Mark Gilbert, "Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 (2008), 641–62.

chronological and geographic scope of the decade and its topical parameters from the heretofore narrow and separate discussions of security or economic integration to national, regional, and global culture and the elaboration of each in the presence of the other. That is to say, by addressing the Atlantic and European dimensions of politics, economics, and society together, we may rediscover what many people probably understood at the time: the transatlantic narrative had one logic and hierarchy, with geopolitics at the top, while the European integration narrative had another that was defined by the language of center and periphery. But neither one could escape the other.

The chapters in this volume thus do more than blur the standard chronology. They also claim that, when seen in their interrelated totality, the transatlantic and European narratives accomplish something remarkable for one another during these years. Transatlantic relations improved dramatically, which helped further (again, indirectly) some real achievements in European integration insofar as Americans neither stood in the way nor gave the impression that hand-holding was needed or wanted. In other words, there was the semblance of a rise in sovereignty – for the Atlantic Alliance, which was no longer held hostage to intramural battles over codfish, grain, pipelines, or missiles; for the European Community, which was no longer expected to submit to the blessing or approval of non-Europeans; and for the members of the soon-to-be-former Soviet bloc, which was no longer so fearful of Soviet power and therefore could finally contemplate choosing a different set of European and transatlantic alignments.

All this was imagined and executed during a very short period of time in the mid-1980s, and ironically, soon after contemporaries said things could not get any worse for the West. For not only did the global basis of transatlantic relations continue to shift from a superpower duopoly to a more multipolar arrangement, but so did subjects like energy, the environment, and human rights continue to reappear in transnational fora.[14] Even within Europe, there was a shift away from bipolarity as European governments (no longer just De Gaulle's France) took independent positions from the United States, for example, over the boycott of the 1980 Moscow

[14] E.g., Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Bruce Mazlish, *The New Global History* (London: Routledge, 2006); chapters by Niall Ferguson and Charles Maier in *Shock of the Global*; Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald, eds., *Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969–1984* (Trier: WVT, 2004); Antonio Varsori, ed., *Alle origini del presente. L'Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2007).

Olympics; the imposition of an embargo on Soviet grain; the construction of a Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe; and on the trade and other disputes following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. None of these disputes was fatal to the Alliance, as the following chapters address, both separately and cumulatively; in fact, as some scholars have even argued about earlier challenges to U.S. hegemony, they may even have strengthened it.[15]

The transformation of relationships in and between Europe and the United States must be understood in a global context. World merchandise trade more than tripled between 1973 and 1983 – from $578 billion to $1,835 billion. In 1993, it stood at $3,639 billion.[16] Between 1978 and 1985, the number of intergovernmental organizations (IOs) jumped from 290 to 380, and the number of international NGOs from 2,400 to 4,700.[17] The number of IOs as well as of NGOs experienced the fastest growth of any time since 1945. In sum, the world, especially the Atlantic world, was more closely connected than ever, while at the same time, Japan was perceived as both a political and strategic asset and as a real economic threat, while several other important economic actors in Asia emerged. The West was a beneficiary of globalization, but also now one of several contenders for global preeminence.

It is within this context that the so-called second Cold War – the collapse and replacement of superpower détente – occurred alongside the acceleration of European integration leading to the SEA. Each took place amid a transformation of global politics and society away from the bipolar order that had begun to compete, even within Europe, with alternative concepts, eventually including the "European common home" later championed by Mikhail Gorbachev. This concept – a Soviet rendition of the pan-Europeanism from the interwar period, which placed all European nations, including Russia and its fellow members of the Soviet bloc, into a single, regional idea – did not come suddenly into existence, but rather emerged over time, and with considerable variations across the Soviet bloc, as Europe's own position in the world began to supersede East-West divisions over the course of the 1970s. This context helps explain why the second Cold War did not look perfectly like a replay of the late 1940s

[15] See Michael Creswell, *A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
[16] World Trade Organization, *International Trade Statistics 2000* (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2000), 28.
[17] Yearbook of International Organizations, 1909–1999, table 2, online version: http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/ytb299.php (last accessed on October 1, 2012).

and early 1950s: while those years put Europe back on the center stage of world politics, the most recent literature reveals that the continent's eastern and western parts still managed to decouple themselves to a surprising extent from this simple formulation.[18] A few years later, Gorbachev depicted Western Europe as his partner in reform, impressed, as he put it, by the EC as a "new giant developing one with a population of 350 million people, which surpasses us in its level of economic, scientific and technological growth."[19]

If the last generation of Soviet rulers – and even more than them the intellectual elites of East-Central Europe – really did regard Europe and "Europeanness" as a positive orientation because of the perceived promise of closer relations with the European Community, the perception would, in effect, flip the Cold War pattern of causation on its head. It would mean that the progress of European integration of the mid-late 1980s, rather than being one of several results of the end of the Cold War, was in effect one of its primary stimuli, while at the same time, the role of the European Community in ending the Cold War – if only because of Gorbachev's views of it – was more important than most accounts have allowed. As the chapters by Piers Ludlow, Antonio Varsori, Angela Romano, and Philipp Gassert demonstrate, borders between conditions, causes, and consequences blur considerably by the middle of the decade, so much that a Panglossian interpretation of the entire period may present a strong temptation for authors of the grand narrative. In assigning subjects and scholars we tried our best to resist it. Indeed the various chapters differ on several points: for example, on the main thrust and import of peace

[18] Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), chapters 1 and 2; and Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989* (New York: Central European University Press, 2010), 18ff, 492–96, 641–43; Marie-Pierre Rey, "'Europe Is Our Common Home': A Study of Gorbachev's Diplomatic Concept," *Cold War History* 4 (2004), 33–65; and, by the same author, "Perestroika and Its Effects Revisited: Gorbachev's New Thinking and Europe, 1985–89," in Bozo, Rey, and Nuti, *Europe and the End of the Cold War*; José M. Faraldo, Paulina Gulińska-Jurgiel, and Christian Domnitz, eds., *Europa im Ostblock. Vorstellungen und Diskurse (1945–1991)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008); Jacques Levesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010).

[19] Gorbachev at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Warsaw on July 15, 1988, published in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991* (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 608.

movements on either side of the Atlantic vis-à-vis nuclear arms control and disarmament; the causal relationships between economic and political trends; the degree to which both were mediated by globalization, or more by internal (i.e., European) factors; the relative influence of second-tier states like Italy or Poland in advancing a wider process of historical change; and, ultimately, the structural, or stochastic, character of such change in the late twentieth century or, as several chapters suggest, a series of challenge and response cycles that recall the theories of Arnold Toynbee. The possibility of considering these and related questions is just one of the advantages of reconstructing the intertwined histories of Europe during this period from the inside out rather than derivatively from the outside in, or the top down.

Within Western Europe there was an effort to extend economic and political integration and to bolster Western military and economic strength beyond it. This took place, as Angela Romano describes, while the allies simultaneously advanced their opening to the East by way of the CSCE process with follow-on conferences to the 1975 meeting that produced the Helsinki Final Act, their associated Helsinki Watch Groups and related activities that sought to protect and promote human rights. European integration gained traction, we argue, precisely because of the perceived need to present an image of strength, not only to "other" Europeans (that is, in the Soviet bloc) whose rhetoric had come to equate reform in their countries with the wider coming together of Europe, but also to Americans, who regularly demanded a commitment to the same Helsinki process throughout Europe, particularly in these countries, as well as to some Western Europeans who, rightly or wrongly, questioned policies put forward by the United States.

That did not happen uniformly, to be sure: the chapters by Frédéric Bozo and Antonio Varsori, for example, illustrate important distinctions later on in French and Italian approaches. Images of what Europe could, and should, be continued to diverge throughout the long decade. However, this preliminary survey of the 1980s suggests that the deepening and widening of the transatlantic and European processes of integration were permeable inasmuch as they played off their mutual strengths, as well as the specter of mutual dilution. This does not necessarily mean that each was consistently present in the thought and action of most people on both sides of the Atlantic; the Polish crisis from 1980–81, for example, reveals, in Robert Brier's chapter, that the language of Western unity differed from place to place but rarely took into account the EC per se, whereas Romano demonstrates the indirect effect such differences had

on European cohesion within the framework of the 1980–83 Madrid follow-on meeting of the CSCE. In these instances, the need to stand together for the purpose of gaining Soviet concessions on human rights for the most part overrode transatlantic disputes over the best approach to take, which, in turn, allowed the NATO caucus in Europe to encourage unity among EC members in this and similar forums.

On the domestic level, the complexities of each story present an unpredictable yet logical pattern of causation from moment to moment, as well as transitively: for example, in noting Brier's description of the similarities between Poland and Chile; or in recalling how important the Falkland Islands conflict was to Thatcher's political career, and how critical Thatcher subsequently was to making Gorbachev acceptable to Western skeptics, leads us to wonder whether a Chilean dictator or an Argentine junta was indirectly responsible for the peaceful end of the Cold War, however tendentious that may sound. Or in highlighting, as several authors do, that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative prompted much collective soul-searching in Europe and, apart from whatever effects it may have had on Soviet calculations, evidently reinvigorated the drive for integration in Western Europe. It may also be possible, therefore, to draw an admittedly circuitous line of causation between the SDI and the SEA. This was, as historians like to say, a very pregnant decade. When considered cumulatively and in light of fluctuating politics in each major country, as the chapters in this volume also describe, the two European narratives become nearly impossible to separate, and in fact appear to attract one another as would the force between the two poles of a magnet.

How and when did they come together? There were two phases, with the first having begun around 1977, lasting through the end of 1986, and then another one following from 1987 to 1992. The chapters of this book follow along this chronology. The first phase featured a reactive, even defensive, stance on both sides of the Atlantic vis-à-vis national and regional interests amid worsening global tensions, but it was neither new nor clear-cut. One recalls that the early 1970s brought the first enlargement of the EC and the reorientation of the United Kingdom, not necessarily away from the Atlantic, but toward a more composite position that sought to harmonize both transatlantic and European interests. That compromise survived and, arguably, thrived, as Western governments moved to recover from their mid-decade crisis over monetary and energy policies with important successes, particularly after 1975: the establishment of a post–Bretton Woods system for the coordination of monetary policy; the advent of a global human rights agenda within the framework