## CONTENTS

	Preface xi
	Table of cases xiii
	Introduction 1
	PART I The anatomy of attempting 7
1	Attempts and intention 9
	1.1 Understandings of intention 10
	Intention and reasons for action 10
	Intention and planning 16
	Intention as being on the way to intentional action 21
	1.2 Intentional action as the sole category of intention 26
	Intending as an epistemic perspective 31
	Constructing intentions 32
	Summary 34
	1.3 Intention and attempts 34
2	Attempts and action 38
	2.1 Attempting as a species of intentional action 39
	Basic 'actions' are not (intentional) actions and cannot be attempted 40
	Internal actions are intentional actions and can be attempted 45
	(Descriptions of) attempts are narrower than (descriptions of) intentional actions 48
	Intentional action and responsibility 52
	The epistemic perspective in attempting 56
	The fusion of actus reus and mens rea in attempts 58
	2.2 Action in attempts 59
	All 'beings on the way', however inchoate, are attempts 60
	Successful actions as attempts 64
	'Trying to try' is indistinguishable from trying 65

viii

3 Attempts and subjectivity 66 3.1 Agent relative subjectivity 68 Why there might be no truth of the matter 75 3.2 Third-party subjectivity 78 Intangibility 79 Invisibility 80 Multiple application 81 Multiple accounts 85 Attempts and possibility 87 4 4.1 The distinction between what is attempted and what happens in an attempt 88 90 Meeting objections Alternatives 94 Attempting what is known to be impossible 95 4.2 The need for descriptive accuracy: implications for 'impossibility' 98 The implications for criminal law 105 PART II 5 Actus reus and mens rea 107 5.1 Acts are not (mere) physical movements: implications for the mens rea/ actus reus distinction 109 Michael Moore on the validity of the mens rea/actus reus distinction 110 After Moore: the fusion of actus reus and mens rea 117 Three objections 119 5.2 Actus reus and mens rea: when is criminal blame warranted? 123 Liability based on an equivalence between complete offences and attempts 126 Impossibility and extraordinariness in criminal 6 attempts 134 6.1 Ex post analysis in criminal attempts: practice and scholarship 135 Various kinds of 'impossible attempts' 138 6.2 Blameworthiness for extraordinary attempts 143 Harmfulness as a rationale for distinguishing extraordinary attempters 146 6.3 Legal impossibility 152 7 Criminal attempts and moral luck 154 7.1 Equivalence theory 156 What is right about equivalence theory 156 What may be wrong with equivalence theory 159

CONTENTS

CONTENTS ix 7.2 An alternative basis for the 'equal blame' thesis 164 7.3 Non-equivalence theory 166 Argument from risk 166 Argument from communicative response 168 7.4 Argument from punishment 169 **Reckless attempts?** 8 176 8.1 Recklessness as a kind of intentional action 176 Recklessness as a moral term 181 8.2 If an offence can be committed recklessly, should it also be possible to attempt the offence through recklessness? 184 (Apparent) attempts that are not attempts to bring about the end 185 set 8.3 Should there be an inchoate form of recklessness? 188 Attempts and inchoate recklessness compared 188 Inchoate recklessness and 'complete' recklessness compared 192 9 Inchoate theft and inchoate rape 194 9.1 The problems that arise in identifying the objects of attempts 195 9.2 Attempted theft and appropriation 197 9.3 Rape and attempting circumstances 204 9.4 What could the inchoate offences look like? 210 Bibliography 219

Index 226