

1 Introduction

Do political party ideologies matter in international relations? Politicians speak of “the national interest,” singular, in defending their national security policies, claiming to set aside their ideological differences in matters of “high politics.” Yet, arguments between politicians reveal fundamental differences in how political parties conceive of national interests. Indeed, government turnover can result in major alterations in foreign and security policy. Political party ideologies are the root cause for such changes. They consist of interrelated values that signal group membership and suggest appropriate ways of dealing with other actors, both domestically and internationally. Thucydides (1951: 43–4) already argued that preferences are based on the interrelationship between the values of security, wealth and the honor of one’s political community. Since politicians belonging to political parties derive specific policies from the core values they uphold, their ideologies constrain their policies. The study of core values and their interrelationships help us understand what “national” interests drive governments’ policies at particular points in time.

In the realm of international cooperation, members of political parties in government are faced with three fundamental questions: what policy issues should be institutionalized multilaterally? With whom should one share responsibilities? To what degree should these responsibilities be shared? Governments are left to choose between acting unilaterally or multilaterally in policy fields such as security, attuning their actions to a political community which they perceive themselves to be a part of. Governments also must decide between delegating responsibilities to a supranational organization or retaining control by devising intergovernmental institutions. These value dimensions manifest themselves in the form of three core values in the realm of cooperation: multilateralism, political community and sovereignty. Since the subject of this book is European security, Europe is the political community in question.

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Not only do political parties matter for the foreign and security policies of individual states, but the aggregation of political party ideologies at the international level has important consequences in international relations. Insofar as party ideologies drive domestic political competition over the definition of the national interest, international cooperation among democracies cannot be divorced from the preferences of national political parties. Politics does not stop at the water's edge. Instead, the world of politics is one of ideological conflict. When the ideologies of parties in government are congruent across countries, opportunities for international cooperation arise. Parties in power form policy-entrepreneurial coalitions based on ideological congruence. However, when we observe ideological incongruence across governing parties, governments fail to form such coalitions and attempts to initiate international cooperation are likely to fail. In general, party ideologies define and delimit the scope of possible compromises.

European security cooperation

The particular instances of international cooperation with which this book is concerned are the various European security institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).¹ Since the 1950s, NATO has provided a comprehensive security guarantee and military policy forum for its member states. Nonetheless, over the years European governments have faced many choices when devising their security and defense policy. They could renationalize security, or they could transform NATO into a security institution geared towards a new set of threats and challenges. They could reform existing institutions such as the WEU or the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or European governments could create an entirely new multilateral institution. While European states have pursued all of these options at various junctures, they have repeatedly returned to attempts to build a new autonomous European institution in NATO's imposing shadow.

This choice is puzzling. Since European multilateral security policy has successfully been addressed in NATO, there would appear to be no need to create an additional, autonomous security institution – understood to be “explicit arrangements, negotiated among

¹ Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force (December 2009), ESDP has been renamed Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Because the book's time frame ends at the year 2000, however, I will refrain from using the new acronym.

international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior” (Koremenos *et al.* 2001: 2). Why create an institution that fulfills a mandate very similar to NATO’s, that resembles NATO in institutional design, that has largely the same membership as NATO, and that draws on resources already designated for NATO? This is a costly choice. There are costs to national autonomy as states assume yet more international commitments and obligations. The choice also involves the diplomatic costs of negotiating with allies over institutional design and the financial costs associated with founding a new institution. Another important cost for European governments has been the political fallout of managing US attempts to deny European governments an autonomous security institution outside of NATO.

Yet various European governments persisted in their efforts. Over the past six decades, European governments repeatedly turned their attention to new security institutions in NATO’s shadow. They did so in 1950–4 with the European Defense Community (EDC), from 1960 to 1963 with the Fouchet Plans, in 1970 with the European Political Cooperation (EPC), in 1975 with the Tindemans Report on the European Union, in 1981 with the Genscher-Colombo initiative, from 1990 to 1992 with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), from 1995 to 1997 with the renegotiation of the Maastricht Treaty that cumulated in the Amsterdam Treaty, and again from 1999 to 2000 with the creation of ESDP. Each attempt substantially overlapped with NATO in terms of membership, mandate and resources (Hofmann 2009).

The outcomes of these attempts varied among outright failure (e.g. EDC, Amsterdam Treaty), compromises that led to weak institutionalization (Maastricht Treaty), and success with the ESDP, which also substantially overlaps with NATO. ESDP is the only attempt that resulted in a robust European security institution. To be considered robust, an institution must be autonomous and endowed with the resources and capacities to fulfill its mandate. Since its creation, ESDP has conducted over 20 crisis management operations and has competed with NATO for member states’ resources and attention. Thus, it is not surprising that, at each attempt, the US government has voiced concern about European security autonomy (Hoffmann 2003: 1030). In perhaps the most forceful statement about such attempts, then-US ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns called ESDP “the most serious threat to the future of NATO” (Burns quoted in Koch 2003).

I derive two research questions from these observations. First, why do states try to create additional institutions in a pre-existing institutionalized policy space? And second, why do we observe variation in the outcomes of these attempts? In other words, what explains the

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different outcomes of attempts to create a European security institution? Why did the proposal to include a European security dimension in the Amsterdam Treaty fail? Why was CFSP created in such a weak form despite the end of the Cold War and the changes that came with it? And why were European states able to build a security institution with ESDP? These questions address the creation of intersecting centers of authority and power on the international level in the form of institutionalized cooperative arrangements that overlap.

The argument: political parties and institutional overlap

I trace the answers to the questions back to the ideologies of political parties. The impetus for proposals to create security institutions lies in individual political party *ideologies* and the ability to institutionalize such proposals depends on the *degree* of ideological *congruence* between political parties in power in key European states. Since party ideologies affect the security policy of states, the creation of an additional security institution in Europe has been a political project that stands and falls with cross-national ideological congruence. The existence and form that the proposed institution has assumed across various attempts has depended on the configuration of party ideologies both within and among national governments on the European level.

The emphasis on ideologies in this explanation suggests that what much of the International Relations (IR) literature understands as national interests are generated through policy debates amongst domestic actors. Parties disagree on security policy, the extent to which international cooperation furthers state interests, with whom cooperation should take place, and the forms it should take. My theoretical approach draws upon insights in two theoretical domains – Comparative Politics (CP) and IR – because neither one alone can adequately explain the puzzle. I account for the variation in relations between states by integrating arguments about parties, belief systems, domestic institutions and international cooperation. As a result, I explain why the same states sometimes cooperate with one another and at other times do not.

Political parties, the central domestic actors in this account, rotate into and out of government bringing with them often divergent ideologies. In examining the substance of political party ideologies, I look for the manifestation of three core values: multilateralism in the use of force, sovereignty and Europe. Multilateralism is shorthand for a continuum that runs from unilateralism to multilateralism-as-an-end-in-itself.

Sovereignty represents the intergovernmentalism through supranationalism continuum. It is less obvious that we can characterize Europe on a continuum but, for consistency's sake, I will represent Europe as capturing the range of understandings of Europe-as-a-geographic-space to Europe-as-a-political-community. Political parties have linked these values in different ways: in general, parties have either defined the relationship between the values independently of one another or they have prioritized one or two values over others, making them the actual core of the ideology from which the meaning of other values is derived. For example, should a party value multilateralism-as-a-means-to-another-end, this is an indication that multilateralism is not a core value of this party but is instead derived from either sovereignty or Europe (both other "possible ends").

Based on the core values, embodied in a party ideology, national governments formulate distinctive security policies and value alternative (potential) multilateral security actors differently. Following from this, parties find different strength and weaknesses in existing institutions, as reflected in core values, which then affects their policies towards the creation of an institution that would overlap with an existing one. Such configurations make it difficult to study individual international institutions in isolation. Thus, NATO factors into the decision whether or not to create an additional institution via political ideologies. NATO becomes politically meaningful through parties' interpretations of it.

Proposals for a European security institution have always taken place in the context of NATO's supreme presence in the European security order. The existence of NATO has provided states with various options in security policy. They could privilege NATO, participate in European proposals while continuing to value NATO, or privilege an autonomous European security institution to the detriment of NATO. Their choices, I argue, reflect the core values of parties in power around multilateralism, sovereignty and Europe. Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said of EC security cooperation, "As any builder knows, it is important to get the foundations and the framework of the structure right first" (Hurd 1994: 427). The blueprints that define these structures, in my formulation, are party ideologies.

Under the Conservatives, for example, the United Kingdom's (UK) government vetoed the merger of the WEU and the EU in 1991 and 1996, and instead pushed for a European security pillar *inside* NATO. The Conservatives did so because they continued to privilege NATO as the pillar of British security policy. Staying with the example of the United Kingdom, the Labour Party has a very different understanding

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of the European Union and NATO than the British Conservatives, despite EU issues being very unpopular with British voters. In October 2000, for example, Prime Minister Tony Blair stressed that he wanted the European Union to become a “superpower but not a superstate” (Black and Watt 2000). The *Guardian* judged this stance to be “positive and engaged and in striking contrast to the Tories’ negative policy towards the EU” (Black and Watt 2000). The ideological congruence between Labour and other parties in power in key European states, particularly the Rally for the Republic (RPR) in France and the Social Democrats (SPD) in Germany, created conditions under which proposals for a new security institution could move forward. Proposals for ESDP reflected values shared by Labour, the RPR and the SPD around the role of multilateralism in security policy, the place of their respective states within Europe, and intergovernmental rather than supranational institutions. ESDP thus emerged despite NATO reforms that took it in the same direction as proposals for ESDP.

Alternative explanations

I examine my own argument in relation to three alternative explanations to avoid spuriousness. First, from Comparative Politics, I examine an alternative approach that is close to my own explanation. Despite this superficial similarity, this approach conceptualizes ideology differently, conceiving of it on a single left–right continuum. This one-dimensional explanation challenges my understanding of ideology, which draws on three values: multilateralism in the use of force, sovereignty and Europe. I argue that the content of security policy in individual states and the congruence of ideologies across governments require this more nuanced understanding of ideology.

Two additional alternative explanations, realism (soft balancing) and rational choice institutionalism (institutional choice and adoption), are drawn from International Relations theory. In security studies, realism remains predominant, while the leading theoretical approach in the study of international institutions is rational choice institutionalism. Relying on different variables to explain why institutions are created and maintained, they advance explanations at odds with my focus on political party ideologies. Realism emphasizes power aggregation and security through strategies of balancing and binding as reasons for security cooperation; cooperation lasts only as long as it serves these particular purposes. Rational choice institutionalism stresses cooperation problems which, in the interest of efficiency

and mutual gains, are resolved through the creation of an institution. Realist explanations emphasize the role the United States has played in the creation of a European security institution autonomous from NATO. Rational choice institutionalist scholarship focuses on actual events that occurred during the time period under investigation and how these events have changed the calculations for a new security institution. Despite their differences, the two approaches both pay little – if any – attention to domestic politics and share a functional understanding of international institutions.

My own explanation takes seriously inter- and intrastate differences in how governments interpret power distributions and institutional cooperation problems across time. This sets it apart from realism and rational choice institutionalism.² I nonetheless draw important insights from these theoretical approaches to explain how political parties operate. Parties' preferences that rest on ideological foundations can resemble the sorts that realism or rational choice institutionalism attribute to states. The behavior of both British Conservatives and French Socialists conform to realist predictions. The policies of the British Labour Party, on the other hand, resemble behavior predicted by rational choice institutionalism. The explanation found in this book diverges from realist and institutionalist explanations in that it shows that efficiency and power concerns exist within a larger universe of values that compose political ideologies based on the three values of multilateralism in the use of force, sovereignty and Europe. Power constellations and cooperation problems are not universally accessible constraints that are interpreted the same way across all governments and political parties. Instead, political parties within and across states have particular understandings of power and cooperation problems.

In order to assess the relative explanatory weight of potential causal factors, I focus on the creation of the weak Common Foreign and Security Policy (1990–1), the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations (1996–7) that failed to create a security institution, and the creation of the robust European Security and Defense Policy (1998–2000). The main actors on which I concentrate are France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. To be more precise, these states are the units-of-analysis for the rational choice institutionalist and realist approaches, while the parties in power are the units-of-analysis for my own approach and the

² As former Foreign Minister Fischer said, "Europe is not just a rational but also an emotional event (*Veranstaltung*).” Interview with the author in Princeton (February 21, 2007).

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partisan values approach. The main reason for my selection of these three states is that they are the three biggest militaries in the EU and an effective autonomous security organization is possible only with their consent.

Claims and contributions

My analytical lens and argument contribute to various debates within political science and policy debates about European security: the role of material power, cost–benefit calculations of multilateral action, as well as institutionalization dynamics and political ideologies in international and European cooperation. First, I demonstrate that major European states created an autonomous European security institution in spite of US concerns. The success of ESDP was dependent on neither the US geopolitical position, nor its policy preferences. Neither was it dependent upon European member states' structural positions. In fact, the US government has voiced concern in all the cases of attempted European security autonomy (Kissinger 1965; Sloan 2000). Instead, I observe an important variance in political parties' attitudes toward the United States and multilateral European security policy. At any given point in time, major European governments understood the relationship toward the United States differently despite their similar structural position as medium-sized powers in the international system. Nonetheless, a few political parties exhibit realist logics of balancing in security policy.

Second, *European Security in NATO's Shadow* shows that the creation of international institutions cannot be studied without their broader institutional context in mind. Observing the proliferation of international organizations is not enough to explain why there are overlapping institutions. One needs to look at the concrete processes through which institutions come to overlap with each other. Until now, regime complexity has been predominantly studied in terms of taxonomy of institutional constellations (Young 2008). This happened at the expense of the analysis of the origins of overlap. In this regard, ESDP – let alone attempts to create an autonomous security institution – has received little attention. ESDP, however, challenges NATO's purpose as Europe's security provider as it overlaps significantly with NATO's membership, mandate and resources. Despite the decision to create an additional institution in an already institutionalized space, the major concern of most governments has not been the creation of an efficient division of labor between the two institutions. Instead, governments have formed this additional institution for their own ideological

purposes, showing remarkable tolerance for the costs and inefficiencies this involves. By studying how the already-existing NATO has affected the likelihood of the creation of another institution, I attempt to fill a serious gap in the IR literature.

Third, the book advances our understanding of national preference formation, with special attention to the dimensionality of political ideologies, by pointing to the neglected role of political party ideologies and party positions in security policy. Its argument is derived from scholarship in IR theory and Comparative Politics that provides insight into why and how the political ideologies of parties matter. I suggest that the left–right dimension does not structure party positions on issues of European security. Instead, after I derive the main value dimensions deductively from the major IR paradigms, I investigate the ideological structures underlying political preferences inductively. Put differently, my argument makes no assumptions about the relationships between the values. I then show the different political positions that exist in the conceptual space spanned by dimensions, and systematically link these domestic variables to international outcomes.

Fourth, *European Security in NATO's Shadow* emphasizes the fits and starts of the institutionalization of European security cooperation. Though governments have repeatedly come back to proposals for security cooperation, I find that such proposals have never been substantiated when parties in power disagreed about the need for an autonomous security institution. The creation of a European security institution has not been an incremental process. Unlike other domains in which the European Union has slowly incorporated responsibilities, such as the EU internal market, security cooperation has been an exceptionally political project.

A final claim contributes to debates about who should provide for European security, and how – a policy debate that is decades old. In the extensive debate on “soft balancing,” for instance, I illustrate that some political parties exhibit realist logics of balancing in security policy, but ideological differences across European states exercise an important influence and constraint on their ability to do so through multilateral cooperation. By extension, I argue that the debate about whether or not ESDP represents a competitor to NATO depends largely on the core values of parties in power in key European states at a particular point in time. Though I examine European attempts to create a security institution in an already institutionalized policy space, the argument has broader relevance for understanding international cooperation in a world with growing instances of institutional density and overlap

(Shanks *et al.* 1996; Pevehouse *et al.* 2003).³ Some scholars term this development “treaty congestion” (Brown Weiss 1993: 679). Assuming that existing institutions do not significantly interfere with efforts to create new ones, scholars ignore, both empirically and analytically, much of international relations around institutionalized cooperation (Raustiala and Victor 2004: 278). I show how a focus on institutional overlap changes our understanding of European security cooperation.⁴

Plan of the book

The plan of the book is as follows. Chapter 2 presents and describes key building blocks for a theory of ideological congruence and incongruence. To explain how configurations of European political party ideologies affect the outcome of European attempts to create security institutions, I discuss the various ways political parties conceive of political ideology and how those ideologies motivate parties.

Chapter 3 connects political party ideologies to the outcomes of attempts to create a European security institution. It presents the central mechanism of my theory: ideological congruence or incongruence among international actors at a particular time. To come to this conclusion, I study national governments’ preference formation and international ideological configurations. This chapter demonstrates ways to systematically combine International Relations and Comparative Politics literatures so as to be able to explain both the *origins* of government preferences and how these preferences *influence* international policy. This chapter also positions my theory against alternative explanations rooted in realism (soft balancing), rational choice institutionalism (institutional choice and adaptation) and Comparative Politics (party politics).

Chapters 4 through 6 consist of the empirical case studies that provide evidence for the claim that political ideologies structure the evaluation of specific policies and influence international outcomes. In Chapter 4, I look at the creation of CFSP in 1990–1 and show that it was institutionalized in only declaratory form as a result of minimal ideological congruence on issues of European security institutions and European

³ The security field has witnessed the proliferation of crisis management actors (Bellamy and Williams 2005). The EU–NATO overlap is the most significant example of overlap in the field of international security – both in functional and geographic terms.

⁴ For example, the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 has not been considered in terms of a failed attempt to create a security institution. Instead, it has been portrayed as a compromise to institutionalize foreign policy in a non-binding way, though NATO’s existence and concerns about overlap explain why EPC looked the way it did (Nuttall 1992).