Introduction

“Who are you?” The social formation of identity

Asked for money by a man in the garb of a mendicant Cynic, the great Herodes Atticus, a man of consular rank and high culture, replies with a simple, devastating question: “Who are you?” The man responds indignantly that he is plainly a philosopher, but Herodes remains unconvinced. “I see a beard and a cloak,” he says, “but I do not yet see a philosopher. But indulge me, please, and say what evidence you think we could use to know that you are a philosopher?” (Gell. 9.2.1–5). There are no more basic questions than these: who are you, where do you fit, and how can we know? In this instance both Herodes and his hapless interlocutor speak as though it were easy to determine who deserved the “most holy name” (nomen sanctissimum) of philosopher and on what grounds (Gell. 9.2.9), but their very disagreement indicates otherwise. The prestigious title “philosopher” was “not an absolute but a differential category,” maintained at the cost of an unending labor of discursive and social distillation from the others who marked its boundaries (the layperson, the charlatan, the sophist, and, eventually, the Christian). The same is true of “sophist,” another notoriously slippery category often maddeningly entwined with “philosopher.” The right to either label could not be established once for all but had to be continually defended through assiduous self-presentation that in turn advanced implicit definitions of one’s own field(s) and its rivals. Contemporary Christians concerned to define the parameters of authentic (“orthodox”) Christian identity confronted

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1 Herodem Atticum, consularem virum ingeniique annoeno et Graeca facundia celebrem, adit nobis praesentibus palliatus quipiam et crinitus barbaque prope ad pubem usque perrecta ac petit aes sibi dari atque sibi. Tum Herodes interrogat quisnam esset. Atque ille, vultu sonituque vocis obiurgatorio, philosophum sese esse dicit et mirari quoque addit cur quaerendum putaret quod videret. “Vide,” inquit Herodes, “barbam et pallium, philosophum nondum video. Quaeso autem te, cum bona venia dicat mihi quibus nos uti possi argumenti existimis, ut esse te philosophum noscimus?” “All translations from Latin and Greek are my own. Unless otherwise noted, translations of Nag Hammadi treatises come from The Coptic Gnostic Library (CGL).”

2 Whitmarsh 2001a: 159.
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similar problems of self-definition by pursuing a remarkably similar set of strategies.

The central premise of this book is that establishing and evaluating identity as a sophist, philosopher, or Christian was a matter not only of being – that is, conformity with certain cognitive, ritual, ethical, and/or professional standards – but also of ties to other members of the group, past and present – that is, of belonging. Demarcating these frequently intersecting categories from each other, as well as sorting out legitimate from illegitimate members within each group, was (and is) notoriously difficult. The dividing lines remained blurry and disputed and were too schematic to map fully the hybrid complexities of one person’s identity. Further, as is often pointed out, the Roman world possessed “few explicitly professional qualifications, institutional structures for controlling and guaranteeing expertise”; lacking these, ancient intellectuals leaned heavily on rhetorical means of legitimation and group definition. This fluidity placed heavier weight on social modes of self-definition as well, so that integration into the social fabric of each community, past and present, served as a vital index of identity and a medium through which contests over status and authority were conducted.

That identity is constituted through social interactions has been widely recognized, especially for the ancient world, where individuals were embedded in networks of family, class, city, ethnicity, patronage, and friendship. The relevance of belonging to Second Sophistic contests over identity and status has been explored only in rather limited ways, however. Except in the symposium, where socialization and the cultivation of social bonds are foregrounded, the “groupness” of early imperial pepaidumenoi as such is not immediately obvious and is sometimes dismissed as unimportant. Yet to the extent that sophists and philosophers thought of themselves as

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2 The entanglement of sophistic rivalries with inter-city competitions has long been recognized; see Bowersock 1969: 89–100. The role of quarrels in the self-fashioning of pepaidumenoi has been illuminated by (among many) Hahn 1989: 109–18; Gleason 1995: 27–8; and Whitmarsh 2002: 32–4. Remus 1996 considers the role of Aelius Aristides’ social networks in facilitating his return to oratory. These analyses typically stop short of seeing such feuds and friendships as bearing on the shape of the sophistic movement or philosophy as a whole, however.
3 Jenkins 1996.
4 Glucker 1978; Sedley 1989. Glucker in particular downplays the role of belonging to philosophical identity: “Here, a group of people is indeed included as an essential ingredient in [the definition of αἵρεσις]. But αἵρεσις is not defined in terms of the group – not to speak of an organized school or institution: it is identified with the opinions of such a group. Indeed, the group itself is defined only in terms of holding such opinions” (181).
belonging to an in-group distinct from various out-groups, they can be said to constitute groups. Philostratus represents his subjects as competing for recognition as “worthy of the circle of sophists” (VS 614, 625). That circle was no more than a dispersed set of men engaged in roughly the same pursuits. It was metonymically embodied, though, in a myriad short-lived assemblages that formed and reformed in classrooms and auditoria, at public performances, and even more informal gatherings. Invisible, fluid, and contested as its dimensions are, this “circle” has a definite reality in the minds of Philostratus and his subjects. As for philosophers, taking belonging into account might seem at odds with the ideal of disinterested inquiry. In Lucian’s Eunuch, candidates for the Peripatetic chair are judged not on their personal connections or academic record, but on the degree to which they look and act the part, exhibiting mastery of Aristotle’s writings and a life consistent with them. Some scholars have justly singled out these criteria as core constituents of philosophical identity. Others, however, have shown that personal relationships too, either with peers or with the “golden chain” of philosophers stretching back to the classical past, played a role in establishing philosophical identity.

The interpenetration of being and belonging is more evident in the early church, despite the institutional fluidity and wide internal diversity that characterizes it in its first centuries. From the start, Christians conceptualized themselves in communitarian terms, as a family or a “third race,” united by shared norms of belief, behavior, and belonging, even

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8 For this cognitive approach to group formation, which has some points of contact with Benedict Anderson’s (1991) notion of imagined communities, see J. C. Turner et al. 1987, esp. 51–67; Jenkins 1996: 80–3.
10 Interactions with peers: Hahn 1989: 109–18; Watts 2006: 7–11. “Golden chain” (of Platonists): Dillon 1979: 77, 1982: 66–9; Swain 1997: 181, 186. Apuleius describes himself as a member of the Platonica familia (Apol. 64.3; cf. 22.7 [Cynica familia]). His relationships with other members of this familia seem to be largely mediated through text, and in this instance are defined by shared cognitive commitments, but the metaphor resonates; see Hijmans 1987: 416 n. 82 for parallels.
11 On “ethnoracial” reasoning in Christian self-definition, see Buell 2005; she explores the implication of Christianity in “cultural struggles over forms of affiliation and identification” (12) complementary to the ones treated here.
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if disagreement persisted as to what those norms were.\(^\text{12}\) Perhaps as a result, the social dimensions of Christian identity have received more attention, in studies of conversion, congregational life, and the role of ritual participation in Christian socialization and self-definition.\(^\text{13}\) Despite a growing integration of Christianity into treatments of Roman religion,\(^\text{14}\) however, early Christian struggles over individual and corporate self-creation have rarely been seen as relevant to the strategies of self-fashioning employed by early imperial *pepaideumenoi*.\(^\text{15}\) Setting early Christian controversialists alongside Second Sophistic intellectuals helps to highlight the less often noticed dynamics of inclusion and exclusion among the latter.

This project sits at the intersection of several lines of recent scholarly interest. In classical studies in the past two decades, interest in the self-fashioning or “symbolic representations” of Greek sophists and philosophers has breathed fresh life into the perennial debate over what exactly it meant to be a philosopher or a sophist in the early Empire, and what distinguished them from each other and from Greek urban elites generally;\(^\text{16}\) this discussion has blended with broader investigations of the (re)construction of Greek identity under Rome.\(^\text{17}\) At the same time the formation of early Christian identity within and against the Jewish and Greco-Roman world

\(^{12}\) Kreider 1999: 4–7 abstracts this formula from Justin Martyr’s statement that the eucharist is restricted “to the one who believes that our teachings are true, has received the washing that is for the forgiveness of sins and for rebirth (i.e. baptism), and lives as Christ handed down” (τῷ πιστεύοντι ὄληθή εἶναι τὰ δεδιδαγμένα ὑμῖν καὶ λαυσαμένῳ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἀφίσας ἑαυτῶν καὶ εἰς ἀναγέννησιν λοιπάν καὶ οὕτως βιοῦντι ὡς ὁ Χριστός παρέδωκεν, *Apol.* 66:1).

\(^{13}\) Understanding conversion as a social process has significantly revised, if not entirely replaced, the Jamesian view of conversion as an individual, psychological event: see e.g. L. M. White 1989–66; Gallagher 1993; Sandnes 1994; Taylor 1995; Finn 1997 and Ch. 1 n. 68 below. Closely related is recognition of the place of ritual in Christian identity formation: e.g. Meeks 1983: 140–63; Theissen 1999: 121–18; Pagels 2002; D. E. Smith 2003: 173–217. Liu 2004: 147–77 offers a nuanced discussion of the interplay of practice and (textual) discourse in the formation of Christian identity. On social models of congregational life, see n. 49 below.

\(^{14}\) Exemplified by the inclusion of Christianity in Beard, North, and Price 1998.


\(^{17}\) Bowie 1974 is seminal. A sampling of more recent work: Alcock 1993; Woolf 1994; Swain 1996; Braund and Wilkins 2000; Goldhill 2001a and 2002; Whitmarsh 2002a; Stader and Van der Stockt 2002; Konstan and Said 2006; Bowie and Ehlser 2009.
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has been incisively studied from a variety of angles in recent years, as has the rise of normative Christianity and the Christian rhetoric of authenticity, a process that intersects at many points with the first. Work in both veins has benefited greatly both from the “linguistic turn” in historical scholarship and from a greater engagement with social-scientific approaches to identity; both have encouraged scholars to eschew essentializing views in favor of understanding identity as socially and discursively constructed, always plural (and hybrid), and continually subject to negotiation. These studies have done much to illuminate the interplay of social and rhetorical strategies in Christian identity formation. On the whole, however, they have focused more on the construction of borders with (and within) the Jewish and Greco-Roman matrices, than on internal boundary construction as such, insofar as those things can be disentangled. While much labor has gone into mapping early Christian diversity at the regional and local levels, only fairly recently has the social articulation of Christian “orthodoxy” begun to receive detailed attention.

The anecdote with which we began hints already at the interpenetration of personal authority, corporate identity, and social ties. The definitions of “philosopher” implicitly advanced by Herodes and the would-be Cynic are ostensive rather than descriptive: the Cynic defines the word by pointing to himself. Herodes by invoking Musonius Rufus; Aulus Gellius, meanwhile, records this story in part as a way of touting his own friendship with Herodes, and hence his own credentials as an evaluator of other intellectuals. The same holds for our other categories as well: what Christianity or sophistry is depends to a large degree on whom one regards as prototypical Christians and sophists, while authority to make those judgments rests in

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19 Two watersheds in twentieth-century scholarship on the construction of “orthodoxy” and “heresy” are Bauer 1971 [1934] and Le Boulueec 1985; M. A. Williams 1996 and King 2003 have spearheaded an ongoing revolution in the study of the phenomena long lumped together under the heading “Gnosticism.” In addition to these, I have profited especially from Wisse 1971; Elze 1974; Koschorke 1978; Vallee 1981; P. Perkins 1993; Buell 1999 and 2003; Inglebert 2001a and 2001b; Iricinisch and Zellentin 2008a; King 2008b.

20 Although many of the specific historical claims of Bauer 1971 [1934] have not held up under scrutiny, his central insight, that early Christianity was characterized by wide diversity and that its history must be written regionally, remains foundational, even for studies (like this one) that seek to trace translocal patterns.

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part on the social and intellectual pedigree of the judge. As a result, the self-presentation of individuals and the (self-)definition of the communities to which they belong are mutually implicated: a notion of philosophy oriented around Musonius Rufus will be different from one centered on a pugnacious mendicant Cynic. As self-professed members of each group jockey for position, therefore, they also seek to shape those groups in ways that provide meaningful and advantageous contexts for their identities and activities. As a result, the present investigation will move back and forth between the level of the individual and that of the community, both small- and large-scale. Pride of place will necessarily be given to those individuals who sought to claim definitive authority for their vision of their community – and hence to secure their own position within it – through writing, but I will also try to compare these textual strategies with the real-world behavior of the authors’ colleagues, to the extent that that can be glimpsed through the textual record.

A second aim of this book is to place the construction of Christian orthodoxy in the second and early third centuries within the broader context of the formation and (self-)regulation of intellectual communities in the early Roman Empire. I hope to contribute to an understanding that the formation of a dominant orthodoxy was not only an intellectual and theological project but also a social one. The role of discourse, both oral and textual, in the crafting of Christian identity has been well recognized: as Averil Cameron puts it, “if ever there was a case of the construction of reality through text, such a case is provided by early Christianity.”

Yet discourse cannot be divorced from social behavior; it arises out of and seeks to intervene in social reality. There is an obvious difficulty in trying to tease out from texts the social realities they address and seek to affect; the glimpses we catch of those realia can never be more than partial. Nonetheless, the historian must undertake that effort, if we are not to confine ourselves solely to textual analysis. The works under consideration here both describe and prescribe ways of interacting with others who call themselves Christians. Their prescriptions were not always heeded, or not as their authors intended, as their frequent complaints make clear. Yet many of those complaints point to a widely shared assumption that social contact could and should be used to regulate the boundaries of

22 Formulation adapted from Markus 1980: 5. G. Anderson 1986: 8 notes that “it is characteristic of [Philostratus’] habit of mind to quote any number of examples of who is a sophist or who is not, without actually stating his terms of reference.” I contend that this inductive procedure is not merely a Philostratean quirk.

the “orthodox” community, however understood. Rhetoric and action are mutually informing: I will argue that early Christian texts operated in a dynamic feedback loop with behavior “on the ground,” conditioned by and seeking variously to enforce or revise the social “rules” by which believers and congregations daily made and remade (their) Christian identity.

Treating second-century Christians within the world of the Second Sophistic offers a fresh angle on the Christian discourse of orthodoxy and heresy, especially as it played out in the life of Christian congregations. At the same time the more richly documented, self-conscious process of Christian identity formation can shed useful light on the strategies employed by pagan intellectuals to define their own communities. Examining early Christian self-definition alongside the authorizing practices of contemporary *pepaideumenoi* broadens our view of the cultural and social world of the Second Sophistic and helps to bring the stakes in play for intellectuals and their historians more sharply into focus. I do not propose that the parallels identified here arose through direct interchange between Christians and *pepaideumenoi*. Rather, the conjunction of their behaviors reveals a set of culturally available technologies of identity formation, authorization, and institutionalization, which early Christian modes of self-definition mirror, map, and transform.

**Two encounters**

The congruence between sophistic and Christian modes of community formation, and the intertwining of personal authority, social connection, and group identity that will be at the heart of this book are illustrated in a pair of anecdotes from the middle of the second century. The first takes place in Athens in the 130s, where the irascible sophist Philagrus of Cilicia had an unfortunate run-in with the student Amphicles of Chalcis. The congruence between sophistic and Christian modes of community formation, and the intertwining of personal authority, social connection, and group identity that will be at the heart of this book are illustrated in a pair of anecdotes from the middle of the second century. The first takes place in Athens in the 130s, where the irascible sophist Philagrus of Cilicia had an unfortunate run-in with the student Amphicles of Chalcis. The first takes place in Athens in the 130s, where the irascible sophist Philagrus of Cilicia had an unfortunate run-in with the student Amphicles of Chalcis. As Philostratus tells it in the *Lives of the Sophists*, Philagrus had recently arrived in Athens for a lecture tour and was wandering around the Kerameikos with a few groupies when he came upon Amphicles, star pupil of Herodes Atticus: "I am Amphicles,” replied the man, “if indeed you have heard of that man of Chalcis.” “Then stay away from my lectures,” said Philagrus.

Seeing that a young man on his right with a fair number of companions kept turning around, and supposing that the man was somehow making fun of him, Philagrus said, “Who are you, then?” “I am Amphicles,” replied the man, “if indeed you have heard of that man of Chalcis.” “Then stay away from my lectures,” said Philagrus.

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24 I follow Puech’s dating (2002: 55–7), which is more plausible than a date c. 150 (Papalas 1979–80) or in the 160s (Bowie 2009: 22). Unless noted, all dates are CE.
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Philagrus, “for you seem unsound to me.” “And who are you to give such orders?” asked the other, whereupon Philagrus said that he took it as an insult if anyone anywhere failed to recognize him.

After this incident it was all downhill for Philagrus in Athens (VS 578–80). First he was caught using an “outlandish” (ἐκφυλοῦν) word. Then he managed to offend Herodes himself, by dragging him into the quarrel and ignoring his advice, and irritated the Athenians with a new-fangled (νεοφοροχῆς) and poorly delivered encomium. Finally, Herodes’ students conspired to sabotage one of Philagrus’ lectures by exposing his penchant for self-plagiarism, which so enraged Philagrus that he literally choked during a subsequent declamation. Thereafter, says Philostratus, although Philagrus went on to win the Roman chair of rhetoric, he never attained the reputation he deserved at Athens.

As this passage illustrates, to be a sophist in the second century was to belong to a worldwide movement whose local “chapters” were only loosely connected to each other: celebrity at Rome was no guarantee of success in the Athenian market. Among those who cared about such things, membership in this fraternity was highly desired and hotly contested. Acceptance as a sophist depended on meeting certain professional and aesthetic criteria – public declaration, lectures for students, fluent (and fresh) extemporization, flawless mastery of classicizing language and style – which formed part of an exacting performance of class, gender, and culture required both on and off stage. At this performance Philagrus, unable to master either his language or his emotions, failed wretchedly on this occasion. And yet, as this story hints, the sophistic paradigm remained open to negotiation. Both Philagrus and Amphicles sought recognition within the circle of sophists, but a secure position within that circle was as elusive as it was desirable. Its circumference was subject to continual redrawing, as each would-be inhabitant of that culturally valorized space sought to define it in a way that put himself at, or near, the center, while excluding as many of his rivals as possible. (Others – including some classified by their peers and modern scholars as sophists – regarded the same terrain as a cultural wasteland, employing the word “sophist”)


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with its negative Platonic valence to label what they considered wrong ways of being an intellectual.)

Once again, the definition of “sophist” proves to be subject not only to theoretical debate, but also to ostensive demonstration: what precisely it means to be a sophist hinges in part on who counts as a sophist. Philagrus pushes this principle to the limit: caught in the use of an alien word and challenged to name a classic author in which it appears (ταρά τίνι τὸν ἐλλογιμὸν,), he fires back, “In Philagrus!” (VS 578). If successful, this assertion would enshrine Philagrus among the standard-setting classics – in social-scientific terms, as an in-group prototype27 – in which case his language and conduct ipso facto meet sophistic standards; if not, he stands accused of deviating from a model embodied by others.

Policing the membership of the sophistic world was therefore of vital importance for the self-definition of the movement as a whole. What this story makes clear is that inclusion among the sophists depended to a large degree on recognition by one’s peers – literally, in this case: Philagrus expects to be known at sight, while Amphicles seems to be banking on his own name recognition. Further, these two men do not want merely to be known, but to be known as sophists. This is especially crucial for Philagrus, an outsider whose professional success at Athens hinges on his reception by sophists there. Amphicles’ apparent mockery and failure to recognize him constitute a serious threat: how can he claim a place in the local sophistic community if the members of that community do not acknowledge him?

Philagrus’ response is a case study in how sophists sought to establish their identity and authority in the eyes of their peers. Faced with a challenge to his insider status, he seeks to present himself as a recognized authority, empowered to dispense or withdraw authorization. To mask his vulnerability and need for approval, he conducts himself with lofty confidence, addressing Herodes as an equal, and suggesting that Amphicles needs his endorsement, rather than the other way around. Further, he tries to neutralize his apparent rejection by a local insider by challenging first Amphicles’ identity as a sophist (“Who are you?”) and then his competence (“You seem unsound”). Implicit is that if Amphicles is not a real sophist, then his ignorance of Philagrus is irrelevant; he is just a witless outsider. (Amphicles attempts the same maneuver in return, arguably with more

27 As J. C. Turner et al. 1987: 57–65, 71–88 explain, “the prototypicality of any ingroup member is the degree to which he or she exemplifies or is representative of some stereotypical attribute of the group as a whole” (79); members perceived as prototypical will generally be more influential within the group, their behavior more normative.
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success.) Last, Philagrus cements his repudiation of Amphicles’ sophistic credentials by barring him from his lectures – that is, by denying him access to the central activity of the profession. These tactics bespeak an insider’s perspective according to which status as a sophist is contingent upon recognition by other acknowledged sophists, who alone are qualified to judge each other. Competence to evaluate other sophists thus becomes one of the defining characteristics of a sophist, so that establishing one’s own status within the sophistic community is necessarily bound up with defining the scope of that community.

Not only bids for recognition and social access but also questions of pedigree and networking thread through this passage; consequences for status within the sophistic movement ripple out from this brief showdown. Young Amphicles derives his clout more from his connection to Herodes Atticus, the doyen of sophistic rhetoric at Athens, than from any accomplishments of his own. A prolific teacher and political heavyweight, Herodes in turn stands at the center of an extensive network of students and colleagues. An insult to Amphicles is interpreted as picking a fight with Herodes and his entire network; arguably, this is what proves most fatal for Philagrus, as Herodes’ students turn out en masse to expose his deviation from sophistic norm. In addition, Philagrus and Amphicles are both attended by entourages. Philagrus’ followers, we learn, make a habit of chasing after sophists. If for the moment they have chosen to ride on Philagrus’ coattails, then presumably, they, too, have a stake in his reputation. Finally, Philostratus himself has close ties to the school of Herodes, but also a distant link to Philagrus; getting the balance right between these two figures has consequences for his own academic pedigree.

This episode finds a striking parallel a generation later in an encounter between two intellectuals of rather different sort: the great Polycarp, former student of the apostles (Ὅπο τῶ ἀποστόλων μαθητεύεις) and apostolic appointee as bishop of Smyrna, and the controversial theologian Marcion. The anecdote comes to us from Polycarp’s student, the heresiologist Irenaeus, who offers it as a model for orthodox Christian behavior (Haer. 3.3.4):

Papalas 1979–80: 95 argues that Amphicles must have recognized Philagrus – that Philagrus had already attracted groupies in Athens suggests that his visit had been well advertised, and Herodes’ students knew his work well enough to catch him recycling it – but pretended not to in order to rattle him.