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978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Introduction: Louis XVI, a constitutional monarch?

‘He that you call a king, we call a tyrant’¹

Some time after the insurrection of 10 August 1792, the abbé Jean-Louis Soulavie travelled to the Comité de Surveillance of the Tuileries district to present an odd request.² He pleaded for permission to consult the papers of the deposed Louis XVI which were still stored in the royal palaces. François Chabot, the head of the committee and formerly a Capuchin monk, could not contain his amazement.³ There was nothing intrinsically wrong with the abbé’s desire to write a history of Louis XVI’s reign. However, the question which deeply troubled Chabot was on which side of the scales of historical bias Soulavie’s writings would lean.

I think that among these scribblings and scraps of paper you will find the writings of Turgot, Necker and Malesherbes, and that you will become biased in favour of Capet, like one member of [our] committee whom we surprised crying like an idiot over a letter sent by [Madame] Elisabeth to her brother Capet ... Is it among these [papers] that you can find the majesty of our revolution, the insurrection of the people, their resounding triumph over the crowned ogres who sought to devour them[?] Do you not have the means at your disposal of making history more inspiring, more imposing, more interesting than the miserable court intrigues that you wish to examine? Beware lest your work makes you forget yourself and, that will inevitably happen, if you feel pity for Capet.⁴

By toppling the House of Bourbon the Revolutionary government had sought to consign it to historical oblivion. Soulavie’s rather disingenuous

¹ Jean-Louis Soulavie, *Mémoires Historiques et Politiques du Règne de Louis XVI, depuis son mariage jusqu’à sa mort. Ouvrages composé sur des pièces authentiques fournies à l’auteur avant la révolution, par plusieurs ministres et hommes d’état et sur les pièces justificatives recueillies après le 10 août dans les cabinets de Louis XVI à Versailles et au château de Tuileries*, 6 vols (Paris, 1801), I, xcii.

² Ibid.

³ August Kuscinski, *Dictionnaire des Conventionnels* (Paris, 1973), 121–4; and Bio Uni, VII, 384–5.

⁴ Soulavie, *Mémoires Historiques*, I, xciii.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

2 Introduction

claim that he wished merely to seek out the truth cannot have been reassuring to the politicians of the future National Convention. In a somewhat Thucydidian dialogue, the abbé proved to the hot-headed Chabot that historical interpretation was relativistic in nature. After all, had not the king's public image varied considerably throughout the entire reign? In a strange turn of events, Soulavie managed to induce the Committee to approve the intellectual validity of his enterprise. He was granted permission to access the documents he required.⁵ It was an adventure which would take him to Versailles, where he was to be among the last to see the palace in a furnished state before its contents were publicly auctioned.⁶ He was also shown around Louis XVI's *petit cabinet* by the locksmith Gamin, the man who revealed the existence of the *armoire de fer* to the National Convention.⁷ The abbé worked in an environment where time had been suspended. These unique circumstances endowed his research with an originality which has been difficult for his successors to equal.⁸

It was an endeavour which was going to take Soulavie the better part of a decade to accomplish. Naturally, other events were to distract him from his academic task. In 1793 he was appointed French Résident at Geneva for two years.⁹ It was only in 1801 that he published the fruit of his labours in six volumes. In spite of asserting a complete impartiality, the finished article was suspiciously laudatory of the Napoleonic Consulate as the successful end-product of the Revolution.¹⁰

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., I, cv–cvj; and *Avis Aux Amateurs de Beaux Meubles à Paris le 25 octobre 1792*. ‘Through a succession of decrees issued by the National Convention one has proceeded to the sale of the goods, castles, townhouses and homes of our émigrés ... But nowhere will you find items more precious than those furnishings which will be auctioned as part of the contents of the palaces of Versailles, Saint-Cloud, Rambouillet, Compiègne, Fontainebleau and Bellevue. These items of furniture were commissioned no later than the time of Louis XV, and everything will be sold immediately to the highest bidder. Now considering that the number of items on sale is too vast to be purchased entirely by the richer inhabitants of Paris, whose homes are already richly furnished, it is safe to assume that valuable objects will be sold for very reasonable prices, as a result we have the honour of inviting Gentlemen from abroad to consider this unique circumstance ... Interested parties who wish to make purchases are asked to address their orders, at the earliest opportunity, to Citizen Eberts in Paris, no 19 rue Saint-Thomas at the Louvre, who after many years of dealing with this sort of commission and whose fine taste for the arts is accompanied by a most exacting sense of probity, assures his customers that their orders will be fulfilled with the utmost care.’ *Revue de l’Histoire de Versailles et de Seine et Oise*, 30 (1928), 83–4.

⁷ Ibid., I, cv.

⁸ John Hardman, *Louis XVI, The Silent King* (London, 2000), 23–7.

⁹ Bio Uni, XXXIX, 675–7.

¹⁰ Soulavie, *Mémoires Historiques*, VI, 527, 549; and see also the large table entitled ‘on the mechanics of the French Revolution, representing its forward march towards the

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

‘He that you call a king, we call a tyrant’

3

Nevertheless, Soulavie produced a history that was both sophisticated and exhaustive in its scope. It divided the reign into nine *époques*, each of which chronicled the miscalculations and policy failures of Louis XVI’s monarchy.¹¹ Particularly innovative was the second half of his third volume, which analysed the impact of international affairs on the course of events in France.¹² Although not a globalist, by current standards, the abbé certainly recognised that Louis XVI’s failure to keep up with the pace of international competition was to have devastating consequences. In particular, Soulavie argued that the inability to thwart the ambitions of Austrian foreign policy and the king’s decision to disband the *secret du roi* did much to undermine the diplomatic efforts of the Bourbon monarchy.¹³ In relation to domestic matters, a narrative was constructed which was to become the traditional view of a monarch unable to control public spending and forced to resort to a myriad of expedients in order to put a stop to the downward spiral.¹⁴ The interpretative balance of this complex, and at times contorted, history is difficult to gauge with precision. At certain moments the author alluded to the structural defects present in the *ancien régime* system of government; at other times he argued for the primacy of human agency in unleashing the Revolution.

It is not until the sixth volume that the abbé unequivocally states that the: ‘fleeting and uncertain character of Louis XVI, is the primary cause of the collapse of the ancient monarchy and also of the fall of the constitutional monarchy’.¹⁵ Although sympathetic to Louis XVI, as a scrupulous and morally unimpeachable individual, Soulavie saw him as unsuited to the role of leader of a country in crisis. The central character flaw of the monarch was an inability to pursue and sustain policy decisions when faced with determined opposition or the threat of popular unrest. This portrait of the last *ancien régime* Bourbon monarch has come to embody the revised and sympathetic interpretation of Louis XVI. The king was deemed unable to choose between the opposing poles of asserting the royal will and following the common good as expressed by public opinion.

The abbé’s successors have also been thorough in their investigations into the pre-Revolutionary reign. Research into Louis XVI, as both an individual and as a label for a specific historical period, has expanded

Consulate as [the culmination in] the restoration of an efficient administration, the reorganisation of good government and the reestablishment of order and security both within and without the borders of France’, in the same volume.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, i–ii. ¹² *Ibid.*, III, 205–338.

¹³ *Ibid.*, III, 268–90 and 324–34; and IV, 335–41.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 15–23, 265–73; and VI, 113–19 and 265–356. ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, VI, 379.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

4 Introduction

steadily over the past two centuries and interpretations have become more elaborate.¹⁶ The most noticeable lacuna in the subject concerns the lack of scholarship surrounding the constitutional monarchy of Louis XVI. For better or worse, this *époque* constituted not only one sixth of the entire reign but also one of the most momentous events in modern European history. John Hardman, the most insightful English biographer of Louis XVI, deliberately avoids discussing this period for some admittedly sound reasons:

I propose to move straight from Louis's forcible installation in the Tuileries on 6 October 1789 to his escape from Paris on the night of 20/21 June 1791 and his recapture at Varennes ... My reason for omitting this period of nearly two years (a long time in a revolution) is that as Louis said in the declaration he left behind in the Tuileries he regarded his actions during this periods as provisional because his 'palace was a prison' and promises made under duress were not binding.¹⁷

The hidden machinations of the court and the conspiracies of émigrés have justly held centre stage in the analysis of the court of the Tuileries.¹⁸ Some historians see the appeal to assistance from outside France as Louis XVI's only credible means of restoring the authority he had lost in 1789.¹⁹ At first sight, the constitutional monarchy of 1789–1792 does present the rather depressing tableau of an institution in a terminal state of decline. It has been assumed that the royal household during the revolutionary crisis, was neither fish nor fowl. It had an ambiguous identity, as it was not quite the organisation reinvigorated by Louis Quatorze, nor was it merely the residence of a head of state. It embodied an unworkable compromise, which satisfied neither radical nor conservative factions.²⁰

¹⁶ Among the better contemporary biographies are: Jean-Christian Petitfils, *Louis XVI* (Paris, 2005); John Hardman, *Louis XVI* (New Haven, CT, 1993); Joël Felix, *Louis XVI et Marie-Antoinette, un couple en politique* (Paris, 2006); and Évelyne Lever, *Louis XVI* (Paris, 1985). Saul K. Padover, *The Life and Death of Louis XVI* (London, 1939), is the first modern English biography of Louis XVI; unfortunately its contents have not aged very well. Padover however does have the merit of having been among first scholars to draw attention to the manuscript collection on Louis XVI's education preserved at the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal (see Padover, *Life and Death*, 13).

¹⁷ Hardman, *Louis XVI, the Silent King*, 115.

¹⁸ For the latest, and a very compelling, contribution to the subject, see Munro Price, *The Fall of the French Monarchy, Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette and the Baron de Breteuil* (London, 2002).

¹⁹ Pierre Gaxotte, *La Révolution Française* (Paris, 1947), 221–2.

²⁰ François Furet and Ran Halévi, *La Monarchie Républicaine, La Constitution de 1791* (Paris, 1996), 227–33; Hardman, *Louis XVI*, 175–84; Norman Hampson, *Prelude to Terror, the Constituent Assembly and the Failure of Consensus, 1789–1791* (Oxford, 1988),

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

‘He that you call a king, we call a tyrant’

5

This monograph does not fundamentally disagree with the central axis of this interpretation. As the Revolution became increasingly radicalised, it was unlikely that the court of the Tuileries could have become a stable political entity. However, it is difficult to concur with any interpretation which dismisses the constitutional monarchy during the 1790s as an inert entity, which had no influence on the issues of the day. The debate, transformation and decline of the court of France reveal much about the nature of both the *ancien régime* and the Revolution which sought to erase it. The Maison du Roi was a microcosm within which all the great controversies over authority, hierarchy and religion were articulated. It is difficult to conceive of any political struggle which did not impinge directly on the royal household.

On 17 June 1789 the Third Estate declared itself to be the National Assembly.²¹ From this moment in France there existed two rival and competing forms of political authority. The Assembly, realising that it had to protect its new powers, immediately cast doubt on the legitimacy of the organs of royal government. The army, navy, civil service and judiciary of the old order were in a state of continual crisis, as their allegiance to both king and Assembly gradually became unsustainable.²² Unsurprisingly, the king’s household, the most important organisation of the crown, was the institution most affected by these developments.

The court, at least symbolically, had been the supreme site of power during the *ancien régime*. Its tentacles extended into the administrative, judicial, diplomatic, military and religious spheres.²³ Versailles was the home of the king of France, but also the headquarters of the royal administration. The Hôtels de la Guerre, de la Marine, des Affaires Étrangères and du Contrôle Général were separate buildings, physically located within the precincts of the court.²⁴ The Ministre de la Maison du Roi was responsible not only for the day-to-day running of the court, but also administered the Capital, with the cooperation

156–70; and most recently, for a positive reassessment in the realm of political theory, see Guillaume Glénard, *L’Exécutif et la Constitution de 1791* (Paris, 2010), *passim*.

²¹ William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 2nd edn (Oxford, 2002), 104–5.

²² Samuel F. Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution, the Role and Development of the Line Army* (Oxford, 1978), 81–123; William S. Cormack, *Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy 1789–1794* (Cambridge, 1995), 78–108; and Henri Carré, *La Fin des Parlements 1788–1790* (Paris, 1912).

²³ Jean-François Solnon, *La Cour de France* (Paris, 1987), 392–414.

²⁴ Arnaud de Maurepas and Antoine Boulant, *Les Ministres et les Ministères du Siècle des Lumières 1715–1789, Étude et Dictionnaire* (Paris, 1996), 54–7; and Basile Baudez, Elisabeth Maisonnier and Emmanuel Pénicaud, eds, *Les Hôtels de la Guerre et des Affaires Étrangères à Versailles* (Paris, 2010), esp. 9–97.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

6 Introduction

of the *Prévôt des Marchands* and military governor of Paris.²⁵ The *feuille des benefices*, the list for all the church livings and dioceses, which the crown held the right to appoint, was also located at Versailles.²⁶ Furthermore, the 10,000 troops of the royal guard made it one of the more important military sites in the kingdom.²⁷

It was only with the move to the palace of the Tuileries that the court lost the lion's share of its administrative functions and became the residence of the monarch and the place where the ministers met in council. From being the summit of government the court was relegated to the role of the most exclusive venue for elite sociability. It required one tumultuous day, 6 October 1789, for the French crown to undergo a transition which would take the other European monarchies the better part of the nineteenth century to accomplish.

While the institutional evolution from early modern princely court to constitutional monarchy was rapid, the symbolic dimension did not adapt at the same pace. It has often been noted that Louis XVI was not particularly keen on entertainments. His serious and introverted character was ill suited to such displays of vanity. However, the same cannot be said for ceremonies, whose prescriptions he observed scrupulously. As Soulavie noted:

He [Louis XVI] showed no inclination towards boisterous pleasures, dancing, gambling, the theatre, [courtly] splendour let alone licentiousness ... He was however very attached to the glory of his house: he feared constantly of engaging in any enterprise which could potentially tarnish its splendour.²⁸

The maintenance of the glory of the dynastic household was one of the primary objectives which united Louis XVI with his Bourbon predecessors. Elsewhere in Europe the character of kingship was evolving rapidly. More reformist sovereigns such as Frederick II and Joseph II were beginning to place national considerations well above dynastic ones when it came to making policy decisions. They actively portrayed themselves as the 'first servants of the state' rather than its physical incarnation.²⁹ This was a central difference with France where the symbolic

²⁵ René-Marie Rampelberg, *Le Ministre de la Maison du roi, 1783–1788, Baron de Breteuil* (Paris, 1975); and Maurepas and Boulant, *Les Ministres*, 37–8.

²⁶ John McManners, *Church and Society in Eighteenth-Century France*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1998), I, 48–56.

²⁷ Samuel Gibiat, *Hiérarchies Sociales et Ennoblement, Les Commissaires des guerres de la Maison du roi au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 2006), 35–40 and 51–54,

²⁸ Soulavie, *Mémoires Historiques*, II, 42.

²⁹ Derek Beales, *Joseph II, In the Shadow of Maria Theresa 1741–1780*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987 and 2009), I, 41, 173, and 392; and Jean Paul Bled, *Frédéric le Grand* (Paris, 2004), 163–164; 175–177 and 310–11.

Cambridge University Press

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Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

‘He that you call a king, we call a tyrant’

7

exercise of sovereignty was inextricably linked to court etiquette and ceremonies.³⁰ The function of these stage-managed rituals was to make the power of the king manifest and indisputable. On the contrary, the other European monarchies, ruled by more progressive men, sought to associate their dynastic glory with the efficiency of the bureaucratic state and in the successful pursuit of the national aggrandisement.³¹

The fate and transformation of these rituals of sovereignty during the Revolution remains unstudied. It is true that the semiotics of great events, such as the opening of the Estates General and the festival of the federation of 1790, have been unpacked in meticulous detail by Edna Hindie Lemay and Mona Ozouf.³² However, not a single monograph has been devoted to examining the persistence of royal pageantry and representation during the constitutional monarchy. Louis XVI’s ceremonial routine survived right up to 10 August 1792. Admittedly, the symbolic gestures and festivities associated with the crown, gradually, became restricted, and the focus of much public controversy. After all, as the work of Lynn Hunt has shown, anything, even on the subconscious level, reminiscent of the *ancien régime* became increasingly suspect as the policies of the Assembly became more radical.³³ However, such an observation needs to be qualified. This book suggests that the symbolic conflict which was to rage over royal ceremonial only became intensely acrimonious once the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was promulgated. This piece of legislation polarised and radicalised politics in a manner which made the monarchy’s attachment to its time-honoured practices and rituals not only unpopular but scandalous.³⁴ The organisation and routine of the Maison du Roi, during the first eighteen months of its stay in Paris, was virtually indistinguishable from that of Versailles. This continuance of the traditional representational culture of the Bourbon dynasty during a time of crisis highlighted both Louis XVI’s commitment to the traditions of his ancestors and his distrust of revolutionary innovations.

³⁰ T C W Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture, Old Regime Europe 1660 – 1789* (Oxford, 2002), 36–52.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 186–194, 354–56; Linda Colley, *Britons, Forging the Nation 1707 – 1837* (London, 2003), 204–36; and even Pius VI toyed with such ideas, Jeffrey Collins, *Papacy and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Rome, Pius VI and the Arts* (Cambridge, 2004), 30–86.

³² Edna Hindie Lemay, *La Vie Quotidienne des Députés aux États Généraux 1789* (Paris, 1987), 17–30, 79–89; and Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution* (London, 1988), 33–60.

³³ Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (London, 1986), 50 and 75.

³⁴ Cf. Barry M. Shapiro, *Revolutionary Justice in Paris 1789–1790* (Cambridge, 1993), 14–34 and 223.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

8 Introduction

This monograph puts forth two fundamental contentions. Its primary concern is to highlight that the assault on the *ancien régime* monarchy and its court had its origins in the earliest days of the Revolution. However, the impossibility of accommodating the crown within the regenerated French state only became evident once the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was passed into law, and was made inevitable by the declaration of war on Austria and Prussia in 1792. Prior to this, during the *liste civile* debates of 1790, some effort had been made by *monarchiens* and other moderates to define the basis under which the constitutional monarchy was to operate. However, a sense of mistrust on both sides, and the growing radicalisation of the French press, made the feeble compromises reached in June 1790 unworkable in practice. The routine, practices and ceremonies of the royal household, which had been allowed to operate undisturbed, became potential flashpoints between the court and public opinion in 1791.

The final part of this book suggests that, regardless of whether or not Louis XVI was engaged in double dealing with émigrés and foreign agents, his persistence in court ceremony was interpreted negatively by both Assembly and public opinion. A monarch with a strong attachment to forms, symbols and procedures of the old order made an unconvincing constitutional head of a regenerated revolutionary state. The pageantry of the royal household contrasted starkly with the emergent political culture of France.³⁵ It allowed the public to suspect Louis XVI of dissimulation and intrigue even before he undertook the ill-fated flight to Varennes. The king and his court were not passive spectators before the unfolding Revolution. Their traditions and behaviour during this time contributed to the radicalisation of politics. They ultimately caused the collapse of the very institution they were trying to preserve.³⁶

This monograph also provides a supportive case study for relatively recent theories on the changing definition of the ‘State’ during the early modern period. Quentin Skinner’s analysis regarding the mutating linguistic connotations of the ‘State’ finds an, admittedly late, example of this semantic shift in the experiences of the French constitutional court.³⁷ According to this theory the ‘State’ adapted from being a term denoting the prince’s charismatic behaviour and physical power in upholding the standing of his realm, to meaning the apparatus of

³⁵ Roger Chartier, *The Origins of the French Revolution* (London, 1991), 136–168.

³⁶ It confirms the hypothesis launched in, T. C. W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (Harlow, 1986), 122–3.

³⁷ Quentin Skinner, ‘The State’, in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr and Russel Hanson (Cambridge, 1989), 90–131; and this

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

‘He that you call a king, we call a tyrant’

9

an abstract and impersonal form of government independent of both rulers and ruled. Skinner’s periodisation of this semantic shift traces its roots to the Italian *Quattrocento* and finds its clearest definition in Hobbes’ *Leviathan* in the seventeenth century.³⁸ Although French political theorists had participated actively in this process, it was to be Bossuet’s argument which was to carry the day at the court of Versailles. The Bishop of Meaux argued that there was no distinction between the passive office of a monarch and the physical body which exercised the active powers of the crown.³⁹

This synecdochical understanding of one man, symbolically representing the totality of the state and vice versa the state being readable as the will of this single individual, was the definition which most conformed to the aspirations and claims to power of the Bourbon kings.⁴⁰ The ceremonies of Versailles clearly express this solar understanding of sovereignty. It was the central body of the king which directed the movement of the other orbiting bodies. This is highlighted by the timetable of the court which followed precisely the biological rhythms of the king, thus reaffirming the centrality of the royal body within court life.

As Skinners’ own periodisation made clear, by the late eighteenth century this way of doing things was anachronistic. Other European states had moved away from this personification of public power within the king’s body.⁴¹ One of the first actions of the National Assembly was to define the constitutional monarch as the agent of the sovereign nation. He was no longer to be a sovereign in his own right. This allowed radical deputies and journalists to define the king either as *premier mandataire* or *fonctionnaire de l’état* (which roughly translates as the first civil servant of the state). Louis XVI found this definition offensive, as it struck at the conviction, inculcated since his youth, that he had been divinely anointed to assume the throne of his forefathers.⁴²

He resisted his demotion to being a mere civil servant by meticulously upholding a ceremonial symbolism which clearly rejected any

article represents an expanded version of the conclusions already exposed within the same author’s classic *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1978), I, ix–x, and II, 349–58.

³⁸ Skinner, ‘The State’, 90.

³⁹ Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, *Politics drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture* (Cambridge, 1990), 160.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*; and Julian Swann, ‘The State and political culture’, in *Old Regime France*, ed. William Doyle (Oxford, 2001), 140, and 168.

⁴¹ ‘One outcome of distinguishing the authority of the state from that of its agents was thus to sever a time honoured connection between the presence of majesty and the exercise of majestic powers.’ Skinner, ‘The State’, 125–6.

⁴² Pierrette Girault de Coursac, *L’éducation d’un Roi*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1995), 193–6.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02633-9 - Louis XVI and the French Revolution, 1789–1792

Ambrogio A. Caiani

Excerpt

[More information](#)

10 Introduction

apparent subordination. This caused resentment in the press and forced the National Assembly gradually to create its own state rituals which emphasised the equality of the executive and legislative branches of government. After the flight to Varennes, any reference to the king as a civil servant was avoided in the renegotiated constitutional settlement. The wording of the 1791 document was adjusted so as not to offend royalist sensibilities. It stated that executive power was delegated to the king to be exercised under his authority.⁴³ This step backwards did not conform to the expectations of public opinion and the newspapers became increasingly unhappy with any form of public spectacle which celebrated the power and independence of the crown. One of the central outcomes of this modern understanding of the ‘State’ as an administrative trust independent of all individuals, whether they were agents or subjects, was the collapse of ceremonial pageantry, which claimed to endow its protagonist with majesty.⁴⁴ The culture of the *ancien régime* court was at an end and the age of the constitutional monarchy was beginning.

The French Revolution and the constitutional court

The study of the Revolution and the court of France have, like Giovanni Giolitti’s definition of the separation of Church and State, travelled along parallel lines which, by definition, never meet.⁴⁵ The nineteenth century’s sustained endeavour to throw light on the Revolution’s course of events drew very near to studying the constitutional court. However the obsession, shared by amateurs and professional academics alike, to untangle the international plots of Marie Antoinette, Louis XVI and the émigrés obscured the far from exhilarating routine of the Tuileries. The second half of the nineteenth century was the great age for the publication of collections of *correspondance inédite* which sought, with each instalment, to shed new light on the 1790s. Feuillet de Conches, Bacourt, Geoffroy and Arneth all scavenged in the archives of the European court chancelleries in order to discover that mythical Eldorado of documents which would either acquit or convict Louis XVI.⁴⁶

⁴³ *Almanach Royal* (Paris, 1792), 88. ⁴⁴ Skinner, ‘The State’, 123.

⁴⁵ Giovanni Giolitti, *Discorsi Parlamentari pubblicati per deliberazione della Camera dei deputati*, 4 vols (Rome, 1953), II, 819–20.

⁴⁶ Auguste Geoffroy, *Gustave III et la cour de France, suivi d’une étude critique sur Marie-Antoinette et Louis XVI apocryphes*, 2 vols (Paris, 1867); Adolphe Fourrier de Bacourt, *Correspondance entre le comte de Mirabeau et le comte de La Marck, pendant les années 1789, 1790 et 1791*, 3 vols (Paris, 1851); Alfred Ritter von Arneth and Auguste Geoffroy, eds, *Correspondance secrète entre Marie-Therèse et le Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, avec les*