

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

- absentee ownership, of merchant ships, 111–112, 112n14, 112n15, 114
- Acts of Union, sovereignty issues under, 36n6
- admiralty law
 - captain predation and, 114–116
 - merchant shipping organization and, 111–114
- adult literacy in Somalia, 179–186
- agricultural production
 - in Nuer society, 164n11
 - reiving practices and, 36–38
 - in Somalia, 176
 - Somali advances in, 186–192
- Ahmed, Abdullahi Yusuf, 194–196
- Aideed, Hussein, 178
- Alesina, Alberto, 165–169
- Ambuscade* (ship), 88–92
- American Arbitration Association, 167–168
- American Revolutionary War, plunder
 - contracts during, 88–92, 97–98
- anarchy
 - argument in less developed countries for, 197–210
 - big G anarchy, 159–161
 - economics of, 155–156n2
 - efficient anarchy, 155–158
 - future perspectives on, 211–225
 - Hobbes on, 1
 - ideal government and, 156n3
 - impact in Somalia of, 178–186
 - low-quality vs. high-quality anarchy, 204–210
 - mechanisms of, 2–11
 - private solutions to social cooperation and, 225
 - as second-best governance, 202–204
 - small H-L anarchy, 159–161
 - Somalia's economic development and, 171–173, 178–186, 204–210
- anathema, practice of, 216
- Anglo-Scottish conflict
 - border law enforcement and, 46–53
 - clan intermarriage, 51–53
 - corruption during, 50–52
 - days of truce and, 43–46
 - inter-group anarchy and, 33–36
 - Leges Marchiarum* law and, 38–42
 - reiving system and, 36–38
 - restitution under border justice during, 42–43
- Anna* (ship), 84
- Arbitration Association of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 167–168
- Archer, John, 115
- “articles of agreement” on pirate ships, 124n34, 122–124, 131
- Ashion, William, 88–92
- asymmetric information, plunder contracts and, 99n23, 100–101
- authority
 - decentralization of, on pirate ships, 117–121, 121n30
 - in *La Nuestra Familia*, 138–143
 - piracy and hierarchy of, 116–117
 - piratical checks and balances and, 117–121
 - social distance and relationship to, 25–27
- autocracy
 - on merchant shipping organization, 111–114
 - piracy and absence of, 116–117

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

244

Index

- banditry
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict and normalcy of, 36–38
 - credit policies as response to, 66–70
 - self-governance in face of, 57–60
 - threat of violent theft and, 62–63
 - tribute as risk premium and, 70–74
- bargaining problems, breakdown of plunder
 - contracts and, 93–102
- Barre, Mohamed Siad, 174–177
- bawling
 - border law enforcement in Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 48–50
 - duel contracts and, 49n33
- BBC, in Somalia, 189–192
- Beekman, Gerard, 97–98
- Benson, Bruce L., 30–31
- Betagh, William, 114
- Bible, self-governance mechanisms and
 - influence of, 218–219
- big G anarchy
 - benefits of government and, 159–161
 - characteristics of, 165–169
- bilateral monopoly, breakdown of plunder
 - contracts and, 93–102
- bilateral-punishment strategies,
 - self-governance mechanisms and, 15–18
- Bilbao* (ship), 84
- bills of complaint, Anglo-Scottish days of truce
 - and, 44n22, 43–44, 46
- binding constraints, first-best governance and, 200–201
- Bird, Bilege, 24
- black meale, Anglo-Scottish conflict and
 - custom of, 36, 36–37n8
- “blood in, blood out” policy, in La Nuestra Familia constitution, 137
- Bolton* (ship), 97–98
- bonds, border law enforcement in
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 46–53
- Bonnet, Stede, 116n25
- bonuses, pirate constitutions and creation of, 127
- booty, articles of agreement regarding division of, 126
- border law enforcement
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 39n12, 46–53
 - landlord liability for tenants and, 47n29
 - outlawry and, 46n28
 - perjury and, 50n35
- The Border Papers*, 33
- Bowen, John, 130–131
- Bowes, Sir Robert, 48–50
- “breaking bulk” practices, prohibitions
 - against, 82–83n11
- Britain, plunder contracts in, 93–102
- broadcast efficiency, social distance reduction
 - and, 24
- buccaneering, piracy and, 109n8
- Calender of Colonial Office Papers, 105–108
- captains
 - constitutional powers of pirate captains, 122–131
 - democratic election of, on pirate ships, 119
 - in La Nuestra Familia, control over, 139n6, 138–139, 143
 - merchant ship alignment of, 111–114
 - on pirate ships, 116–117
 - piratical checks and balances and authority of, 117–121
 - predation by, 114–116, 119n26
 - principal-agent problem, 112n17
- captives, laws regarding care of, 87–88
- caravan traders
 - credit policies and, 66–70
 - monopolies among, 70
 - in precolonial Africa, relations with, 60–61
 - threat of violent theft and, 62n14, 62, 63–66
 - tribute as risk premium and, 70–74
- Carey, Robert, 38
- Carolingian dynasty, property rights under, 212–219
- cattle trading, between Kenya and Somalia, 186–192
- central government
 - in less-developed countries, 202–204
 - Somalia’s embrace of, 174–177
- chasse-partie* (pirate articles), 122–131
- Chasseur* (ship), 99–100
- cheating behavior
 - relationship to authority and, 25–27
 - signaling with social distance and, 18–25
- China, piracy in, 111n11
- chiseling, in organized crime families, 133–137
- choice variables, signaling with social distance
 - and, 18–25
- clamor rituals, property protection through, 215, 215n8, 215–216n9
- clan conflict, in Somalia, 176–177
- clan intermarriage, Anglo-Scottish conflict
 - and, 51–53

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

245

- clan militias, public goods provision in
 - Somalia and, 192–196
- Clay, Karen, 19n3
- Coase theorem
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
 - efficient plunder and, 77–79
 - plunder contracts and, 88–92
 - privateer-merchantman bargaining and, 84–92
 - social inefficiencies of plunder and, 75–77
- Coillard, Francois, 73
- collective action, maritime rebellions, 76n2
- colonialism
 - government authority and, 61n12
 - negotiation of violence and, 57–60
 - in Somalia, influence on governance in, 174–177
 - tribal societies and, 162n8
- commercial arbitration associations
 - big G anarchy and, 167–168
 - international treaties and, 168n14
- commercial vessels, privateering as threat to, 82–84
- communication cheating, in organized crime families, 133–137
- Compagni, Dino, 30
- compensation
 - for Anglo-Scottish cross-border violence, 50–52
 - thievable goods as, 73n26
 - tribute payments as, 71n21, 73n25
- Comte de Guichen* (ship), 88–92
- Condent, Christopher, 130–131
- consensus
 - criminal constitutions and creation of, 133–137
 - in La Nuestra Familia constitution, 137
- constitutions
 - criminal constitutions, 132–151
 - framework for criminal constitutions, 133–137
 - for La Nuestra Familia, 137–143, 145–151
 - on pirate ships, 122–131, 144–145
 - for prison gangs, 137–143
 - repeal in Somalia of, 175
 - Somalia and failure of, 174n3
- consumable goods, as tribute payments, 73–74
- consumption levels, in Somalia, 179–186
- contract cursing, medieval practice of, 216–217
- contract enforceability
 - big G anarchy and, 167–168
 - in criminal constitutions, 133–137
 - efficient plunder and, 77–79
- convoy shipping, defenses against privateering and, 86–87
- cooperative behavior
 - anarchy and, 157–158
 - constitutional rights of pirates and, 122–131
 - in criminal organizations, 133–134n3, 137, 141n8, 138–141, 143
 - negotiation of violence and, 57–60
 - piracy and, 105–108
 - precolonial Africa property practices, social distance reduction through, 27
 - private solutions for, 225
 - signaling with social distance and, 18–25
- corporal punishment, on merchant ships, 111–114
- corruption
 - law enforcement in Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 45n25, 50–52
 - in Somalia, 174–177
- costless transfer, efficient plunder and, 77–79
- court systems
 - in Middle Ages, 213n5
 - in Somali stateless economy, 192–196
- cowfur (oath taking), 223n26
- credit
 - caravan trade increases and, 72n23
 - middleman-producer relations and, 66–70
- crews on pirate ships
 - constitutional rights of, 122–131
 - deposition of captains by, 119, 120n27
 - judiciary powers of, 128–129
 - quartermaster elected by, 120
- criminal activity and organizations
 - constitutions and, 132–151
 - framework for constitutions for, 133–137
 - judicial ordeal of sassywood and, 219–224
 - Leges Marchiarum* law and, 38–42
 - piracy and, 108n3
 - prison gang constitutions and, 137–143
 - self-governance and, 105–108, 132–133
- cross-border cooperation
 - border law enforcement and, 46–53
 - days of truce and, 43–46
 - Leges Marchiarum* law and, 38–42
 - restitution under, 42–43
- cults, precolonial Africa, social reduction through, 27–28

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

246

Index

- currency exchange, Somalia's stateless economy and, 189–192
- cursing, as self-governing mechanism, 212–219
- customary law
 - big G anarchy and, 167–168
 - public goods provision in Somalia and, 192–196
- “Custom of the Coast,” 123–126
- Dampier, William, 105–108, 110–111
- Davis, Howell, 124
- days of truce
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict, 43–46
 - vowers and, 45–46n26
- deadweight loss of destruction, social costs of
 - plunder and, 77–79
- debt repayment process, precolonial
 - African trading policies and protraction of, 68
- defensive investments, social costs of plunder and, 86n14
- degree of homogeneity, signaling with social distance and, 18–25
- democracy
 - piracy and, 116–117
 - piratical checks and balances and, 119n26, 117–119, 121
- Demsetz, Harold, 208–209
- developing world, governance in, 170–173
- development indicators
 - human development in Somalia and, 179–186
 - Sierra Leone vs. Somalia, 204–210
 - in Somalia stateless economy, 194–196
- Dias de Carvalho, Augusto, 68–70
- dilaal* (cattle brokers), 188
- direct voyages, as defense against privateering, 86–87
- discount rate, credit policies and
 - producer-middleman relations and, 66–70
- diya* (rules of misconduct), 192–196
- diyke abd sawefey* rule, *Leges Marchiarum* law and, 41–42
- Djibouti, Somalia compared with, 182–183
- Dole Fruit, 189–192
- Dolphin* (ship), 97–98, 99–100
- double seizure, breakdown of plunder
 - contracts and, 95
- duel contracts, Anglo-Scottish border conflicts and, 49n33
- dueling, border law enforcement in
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 48–50
- duration of negotiations, breakdown of
 - plunder contracts and, 93–102
- economics
 - of anarchy, 155–156n2
 - human development in Somalia and, 179–186
 - medieval international trade and, 30–31
 - organized criminal cooperation and, 133–134n3
 - of piracy, 116–117, 129–131
 - in Somalia, 171–173, 176–177
 - Somali advances in, 186–192
 - threat of violent theft and, 63–66
- educational levels, in Somalia, 171–173, 179–186, 193
- Edward I (King of England), 35n4
- efficient anarchy
 - characteristics of, 155–158
 - ideal government and, 156–157n4
- efficient plunder, theory of, 77–79
- endowments of individuals
 - benefits of government and, 159–161
 - in primitive societies, 161–165
- enemy blockades, privateering and risks of, 87–88
- enforceable contracts
 - efficient plunder and, 77–79
 - plunder contracts' lack of enforceability and, 100–101
- enforceable rules
 - cost of government and enforcement of, 158–159
 - criminal constitutions and, 133–137
 - in organized crime families, 133–137
- enforcement costs of government, 158–159
- England, separation of powers in, 118–119
- English assizes, days of truce in Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 43–46
- English common law, Anglo-Scottish border conflict and jurisdiction of, 35n4, 35n5
- entrance requirements, in criminal constitutions, 133–137
- Ethiopia
 - assistance to Somalia from, 194–196
 - Somalia compared with, 182–183
 - Somalia's stateless economy and, 189–192
- ethnic conflict, predatory government and, 202–204

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

247

- ethnic diversity, in piracy, 108–111
- ethnic favoritism, Somali clan tensions and, 176–177
- Evans-Pritchard, Hugh, 161–165
- Every, Henry, 130–131
- ex ante mechanisms
 - in La Nuestra Familia constitution, 137
 - pirate articles of agreement and, 124–129
 - ransom and parole system of privateering and, 84–92
 - social distance reduction and, 15–18, 21–22, 24
- exchange methods
 - benefits of government and mechanisms of, 159–161
 - medieval international trade social distance reduction through, 30–31
- excommunication, practice of, 216
- exit costs
 - government and concept of, 7–9
 - in La Nuestra Familia, 138–143
- exports, threat of violent theft and, 63–66
- ex post mechanisms, social distance reduction and, 21–22, 24
- Exquemelin, Alexander (pirate captain), 105–108, 110–111, 122–124, 127, 128–129
- Failed States Index, stateless societies statistics and, 170–173
- Fanning, Nathaniel, 88–92
- Fearon, James, 17
- Ferreira da Silva Porto, Antonio Francisco, 71–72
- feudal anarchy, historical evolution of, 212–219
- financial sector, Somalia's stateless economy and, 189–192
- first-best governance, conditions for, 200–201
- fishing, by merchant ships, 113n18
- folk theorem, government failure and, 2
- foreign aid in Somalia, 176–177
- France, plunder contracts in, 93–102
- franco valuta* system (Somalia), 184
- fraternal societies, precolonial Africa, social reduction through, 27–28
- free riding problem, pirate constitutional incentives and, 127
- gains from trade, efficient plunder and, 77–79
- game theory, credit policies and producer-middleman relations and, 66–70
- Garitee, Jerome, 94
- General History of the Pyrates* (Johnson), 107n1, 105–107, 108
- General Motors, 189–192
- generals, in La Nuestra Familia, 138–143
- “General Theory of Second Best,” 203–204, 209
- George II (King of England), 81–82
- gift-giving practices, relationship to authority and, 25–27
- Glorious Revolution of 1688, 118–119
- “Golden Age” of piracy, 109n6, 108–109, 111
- governance
 - anarchy as second-best governance, 202–204
 - anarchy in midst of, 225
 - benefits of, 159–161, 169n15
 - constitutions on pirate ships and, 122–131
 - costs of, 158–159, 165–169
 - in developing world, 170–173
 - efficient anarchy as alternative to, 155–158
 - failure in less-developed countries of, 197–210
 - first-best governance, conditions for, 200–201
 - predatory government, 202–204
 - profit and welfare maximization and, 155–161
 - social rules and institutions and, 1
 - Somali improvements in human development and role of, 179–186
 - statelessness in Somalia and future of, 194–196
- government
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict and interaction with, 51–53
 - failure of, 2
 - relevant and irrelevant alternatives to, 2–11
 - Weberian characterization of, 5–7, 7–8n1
- grievances and complaints, in La Nuestra Familia constitution, 140n7, 138–141, 143
- hawilaad* system (Somalia), 184, 189–192
- heterogeneity
 - big *G* anarchy and, 165–169
 - medieval international trade and social distance reduction, 29–31
 - signaling theory in social distance, 18–25
- historical constraints, governance in less-developed countries and, 197–210
- Hobbes, Thomas, on anarchy, 1, 101–102

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

248

Index

- homogeneity
 - medieval international trade and, 29–31
 - medieval international trade and social distance reduction, 29–31
 - in precolonial communities, 25–27
 - in primitive societies, 161–165
 - signaling with social distance and, 18–25
- Hooff, Peter, 127–128
- Hornigold, Benjamin, 122–124
- hospitality industry, growth in Somalia of, 189
- hostage negotiations
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 95–96
 - plunder contracts and, 96–97n22
- hostile groups, social distance reduction between, 32–53
- hot trod institution, Anglo-Scottish border justice and, 42–43
- “hue and cry” custom, Anglo-Scottish border justice and, 42–43
- human development, Somali improvements in, 179–186
- Human Development Report-Somalia 2001*, 179–186
- ideal government
 - anarchy and, 156n3
 - ideal anarchy vs., 197–210
 - “nirvana fallacy” concerning, 208–209
 - self-governance as alternative to, 157–158
- import duties, on plunder, 82n10, 82, 84
- incentives
 - absence in Somalia of, 176
 - in La Nuestra Familia constitution, 138–143
 - in pirate constitutions, 127
- income levels, in Somalia, 171–173, 179–186
- industrial nationalization in Somalia, 176
- inflation policies
 - in Somalia, 176–177
 - Somalia’s stateless economy and, 189–192
- information
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
 - communication restrictions in organized crime families and, 133–137
 - control in Somalia of, 174
 - perfect information, threat of violent theft and, 63–66
 - piracy and sharing of, 123–124n33
 - symmetric information, efficient plunder and, 77–79
- insurance
 - as defense against privateering, 86–87
 - risks of privateer attacks increased with, 87n15
- inter-criminal communication, criminal constitutions and, 133–137
- inter-group anarchy
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 33–36
 - laws of lawlessness and, 32–53
 - pirate articles of agreement and, 123–126
- inter-group interactions
 - medieval international trade social distance reduction through, 30–31
 - in precolonial Africa, 25–29
 - precolonial African religious practices and associations, 27–28
 - religious sacrifice and, 19n4
 - social distance reduction and, 23–24n5
- internal conflict, pirate constitutions and prevention of, 128–129
- internal contract enforcement institutions, trade relations and, 19n3
- international anarchy
 - as big *G* anarchy, 165–169
 - existence of, 155–156
 - small *H-L* anarchy as, 161–165
- International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), 167–168
- International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 167–168
- international institutions
 - aid to Somalia from, 176–177
 - big *G* anarchy and, 165–169
 - medieval international trade and, 29–31
 - multiple governments and, 9
 - Somalia’s stateless economy and, 189–192
- international laws of war, privateering and, 81, 81n9
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), aid to Somalia from, 176
- international trade, big *G* anarchy and, 167–168
- international treaties, arbitration and, 168n14
- investments
 - failure in Somalia of, 175
 - medieval international trade social distance reduction and, 30
 - privateering and, 79–84
 - ransom and parole system of privateering and, 84–92

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

249

- relationship to authority and, 25–27
- social distance reduction through, 18–25
- Somalia's stateless economy and, 189–192
- “Jamaica Discipline,” 123–126
- James II (King of England), 81
- Japan, organized crime in, 133–134n3
- Johnson, Charles, 105–108, 119, 125–126, 127–128
- judicial ordeals, sassywood practitioners in
 - Liberia and, 220n20, 219–220, 220n21, 221n25, 223n26, 223–224n27
- judicial review process, in pirate constitutions, 128–129
- jury selection, Anglo-Scottish days of truce and, 43–46
- justice system
 - in Carolingian dynasty, 212–219
 - in Somali stateless economy, 192–196
- Kennedy, Walter, 117–121
- Kenya
 - Somalia compared with, 182–183
 - Somali cattle trading with, 186–192
- Kidd, William, 121n31
- kinship ties, in primitive societies, 161–165
- Koranic schools, in Somalia, 193
- La Bouche, Oliver, 120n27, 130–131
- Laitin, David, 17
- Lancaster, Kevin, 203–204
- land customs
 - in monastic communities, 212–219
 - precolonial Africa property practices, social distance reduction through, 27
 - Somalia land nationalization, 175
- language difficulties, breakdown of plunder
 - contracts and, 93–102
- La Nuestra Familia
 - constitution for, 137–143, 145–151
 - membership statistics, 137
- lawlessness
 - laws of, 32–53
 - Leges Marchiarum* law and, 38–42
- law of nations
 - care of captives under, 87–88
 - privateering and, 79–84
- laws, lawlessness and, 32–53
- legal system, first-best governance and, 200–201
- Leges Marchiarum*, 32
 - bonds and enforcement of, 46–53
 - border law enforcement and, 46–53
 - days of truce and, 45n25, 43–45, 46
 - English common law and, 35n5
 - lawlessness and, 38–42
 - limits of violence reduction and, 50–52
 - restitution under border justice and, 42–43
 - self-governance and, 33
- legitimacy, government and role of, 7–8n1
- Le Saint Nicolas* (ship), 88–92
- less-developed countries (LDCs)
 - anarchy as second-best governance in, 202–204
 - anarchy in, 171
 - argument for anarchy in, 197–210
 - first-best governance in, 200–201
- letters of marque
 - “breaking bulk” prohibitions and, 82–83n11
 - plunder contracts and, 91–92
 - privateering and, 79–84
- lex mercatoria*, medieval international trade and, 29–31
- Liberia, sassywood practitioners in, 220n21, 219–220, 224
- Lipse, R. G., 203–204
- liturgical *maledictio*, 214–215
- Livingstone, David, 60–61
- London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), 167–168
- Lopez, Robert, 29–31
- Low, Edward, 122–124
- Lowther, George, 122–124
- Lugbara society, 155–156
- Mahdi, Ali Mohamed, 178
- maledictions
 - definitions of, 212n2
 - historical practice of, 217n13, 212–217, 218n14, 219, 219n16
- manbote*, *Leges Marchiarum* law and, 38–42
- mandatory lifetime membership, in La Nuestra Familia, 138–143
- March governments
 - Anglo-Scottish inter-group anarchy and role of, 33–36
 - Leges Marchiarum* law and, 38–42
 - Union of the Crowns and demise of, 51–53
- marginal benefit, of banditry, 62–63
- marginal cost, of banditry, 62–63

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

250

Index

- maritime plunder
 - Caribbean piracy and, 105–108
 - piracy and, 116–117
 - privateering and, 79–84
- market thickness, benefits of government and, 159–161
- marooning, pirate practice of, 128, 128n35
- medieval international trade, social distance
 - reduction and, 29n7, 29, 31, 167
- Melanic Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun
 - prison gang, 140–141n7
- merchant guilds, medieval international trade
 - and, 29n7
- merchant ships
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
 - Coasean privateer-merchantman bargaining
 - and, 84–92
 - corporal punishment on, 111–114
 - defenses against privateering by, 84–92
 - fishing activities and, 113n18
 - hierarchical organization of, 111–114
 - modification for privateering of, 88–92, 92n19
 - ownership groups and, 111n13
 - piracy and organization of, 111–114
 - privateering and, 79–84
 - private men-of-war conversions and, 91–92
- Mexican California, trade institutions in, 19n3
- middlemen
 - credit strategies of producers with, 66–70
 - mobility of, 62–63, 63n15
 - monopoly practices among, 70
 - in precolonial Africa, producer relations
 - with, 60–61
 - punishment of corruption among, 70
 - threat of violent theft and role of, 62–66
 - tribute payments and, 71–72
- Mill, John Stuart, 32, 171
- Minerva* (ship), 84
- minority populations, cooperative interaction
 - with majority and, 19n3
- mobility, threat of violent theft and role of, 62–63
- monastic communities
 - governments and, 214n6
 - maledictions from, 213n4, 212–213, 219
- monetary policies, Somalia's stateless economy
 - and, 189–192
- monopoly authority, government as, 7n1, 7–8, 9
- monopoly control, precolonial trade relations
 - and, 70
- Moody, Christopher, 119
- Moore, John R., 107n1
- “Moses's Law,” pirate practice of, 128
- multilateral-punishment strategies
 - medieval international trade and, 29–31
 - self-governance mechanisms and, 15–18
 - signaling with social distance and, 18–25
 - threat of violent theft and, 63–66
- multinational corporations, Somalia's stateless
 - economy and, 189–192
- mutiny, on merchant ships, 76n2
- Nash equilibrium
 - government failure and, 2
 - threat of violent theft and, 63–66
- National Gang Crime Research Center, 132–133
- National Security Law No. 54 (Somalia), 174–175
- natural resource abundance, predatory
 - government and, 202–204
- navy warships
 - organization of, 111n12
 - plunder by, 92n20
- ‘Ndrangheta crime family, 133–134n3
- negative externalities, pirate constitutions and
 - avoidance of, 126–127
- neutral nations, privateering and, 82–84
- Neville, Cynthia, 35
- Nicolson, William (Lord Bishop of Carlisle), 33
- “nirvana fallacy,” ideal state and, 208–209
- Nonsuch* (ship), 81
- North, Douglass, 155, 156
- novelties, as tribute payments, 73–74
- Nuer society, 155–156, 164n10, 161–164, 164n11, 165
- oath taking
 - “cowfur” practice of, 223n26
 - on pirate ships, 128n36
- opportunity costs, of plunder, 77–79
- oppression
 - by government, 171
 - in Somalia, 174–177, 179–186
- organizational cost of government, 158–159
 - big G anarchy and, 165–169
- organized crime family
 - constitutional framework for, 133–137

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

251

- government characteristics of, 7–9
- La Nuestra Familia as example of, 137–143
- outlaw societies
 - border law enforcement and, 46n28
 - criminal constitutions and, 132–151
 - self-governance and, 105–108
- owner-sailor-principal-agent problem
 - merchant ship organization and, 113n19, 111–113, 114
 - pirate ship organization and, 116–117
- ownership groups, merchant ships and, 111n13
- path dependence, social order and, 156
- payoff-maximization
 - of banditry, 62–63
 - credit policies and producer-middleman relations and, 66–70
 - ideal government and, 157–158
 - threat of violent theft and, 63–66
 - tribute as risk premium and, 70–74
- peaceful theft, negotiation of violence and, 57–60
- per capita Gross Domestic Product, human development in Somalia and, 179–186
- perfect information, threat of violent theft and, 63–66
- performance bonds, privateering and, 79–84
- perjury, Anglo-Scottish border law enforcement and, 50n35
- Phillips, John, 126–127
- Pinkerton Doctrine, 133–137
- Pinto, Serpa, 63n15
- piracy
 - buccaneering and, 109n8
 - captain predation and, 114–116
 - ethnic diversity in, 108–111
 - history in Caribbean of, 108–111
 - merchant ship organization and, 111–114
 - organized crime families compared with, 136–137, 143
 - population demographics, 110n9, 108–110, 111
 - power checks and balances in, 117–121
 - private orders system under, 105–131
 - production activities in, 143n9
 - profitability of, 130–131
 - ship organization and, 116–117
 - voluntary participation in, 121–122n32
- Pirate Round, statistics on, 108–111
- pirate ships, constitutions on, 122–131, 144–145
- plunder. *See also* booty
 - efficient theory of, 77–79
 - maritime plunder, privateering and, 79–84
 - by piracy, 108–111
 - plunder contracts *vs.* traditional plunder, 98–100
 - ransom and parole system and production of, 84–92
 - social inefficiency of, 75–77
- plunder contracts
 - ban on, 100–101
 - conditions and breakdown of, 93–102
 - double seizure practices and, 95
 - efficient plunder and forging of, 77–79
 - enforceability of, 100–101
 - multiple templates for, 93–102
 - ransom and parole and, 88–92
 - ransom payments and breakdown of, 93–102
 - repossession and payment of, 97–98
 - state courts and, 96–97
- Pogge, Paul, 68
- police system
 - first-best governance and, 200–201
 - private sector provision of, 158–159
- political actors
 - first-best governance and constraints on, 200–201
 - predatory government by, 202–204
- power
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and inequalities in, 93–102
 - captain predation and, 114–116
 - informal mechanisms and, 59–60n5
 - merchant shipping organization and alignment of, 111–114
 - negotiation of violence and, 57–60
 - piracy and checks and balances in, 117–121
 - threat of violent theft and, 62–63
 - tribute payments and role of, 71n21
- precolonial Africa
 - authority relationships in, 25–27
 - Christian conversion in, 28n6
 - credit policies in, 66–70
 - producer-middleman relations in, 60–61
 - property practices in, 27
 - religious practices and associations, 27–28
 - social distance-reducing signaling in, 25–29
 - threat of violent theft in, 62–63
 - trade practices in, 59n3
 - tribute as risk premium in trade relations in, 70–74

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

252

Index

- predation
 - ethnic conflict and, 202–204
 - by pirate captains, 119, 119n26, 120–121
 - resources for prevention of, 77–79
 - statelessness in Somalia and threat of, 194–196
- preferences, benefits of government and, 159–161
- price negotiations, breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
- principal-agent problem, pirate captains and, 112n17
- prisoners
 - exchange of, self-governance through, 33
 - plunder contracts with, 88–92
 - privateering and burden of, 83n12, 82–84, 84n12, 87–88
 - privateers' treatment of, 84n13
 - revolt by, 88
- prisoner's dilemma, government failure and, 2
- prison gangs, constitutions for, 141n8, 137–141, 143
- private courts
 - big G anarchy and, 167–168
 - in Somali stateless economy, 192–196
- privateering
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
 - Coasean privateer-merchantman bargaining and, 84–92
 - maritime plunder and, 79–84
 - plunder contracts with, 75–77
 - ransom and parole under, 84–92
 - self-governance and, 33
- privateers, convertibility to merchant ships, 92n18
- private institutional arrangements, big G anarchy and, 167–168
- private men-of-war
 - plunder contracts and, 91–92
 - privateering and, 79–84
- private sector
 - public goods provision by, 158–159n5
 - Somali public goods provision and, 192–196
- prize courts
 - “breaking bulk” prohibitions in, 82–83n11
 - costs of adjudication in, 87–88
 - plunder contracts and, 98
 - privateering and establishment of, 82–84
- prize crews
 - creation of, 87–88
 - plunder contracts and, 100–101
- producers
 - benefits of government and abilities of, 159–161
 - credit policies and middleman relations with, 66–70
 - monopoly practices and, 70
 - in precolonial Africa, trader relations with, 60–61
 - in primitive societies, 161–165
 - threat of violent theft and role of, 62–66
 - tribute as risk premium for, 70–74
- professional bondsmen, border law enforcement in Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 46–53
- profit-sharing, pirate ships and, 113n19
- property rights
 - maledictions for protection of, 217n13, 212–217, 218n14, 219
 - natural resource abundance and threats to, 202–204
 - precolonial Africa, social distance reduction through, 27
- property theft, resource investment in, 77–79
- provision costs, of plunder, 88, 88n16
- public goods provision
 - big G anarchy and, 165–169
 - costs of government and, 158–159
 - first-best governance and, 200–201
 - mismanagement in Somalia of, 176–177
 - private provision of, 158–159n5
 - Somalia's stateless economy and, 192–196
- public investment, tribute payments for, 71n21
- punishment mechanisms
 - bilateral- and multilateral-punishment strategies, self-governance mechanisms and, 15–18
 - in pirate constitutions, 127–128
 - relationship to authority and, 25–27
- Puntland region
 - establishment of, 178n5
 - human development in, 184–186
- quartermaster
 - constitutional powers of, 122–131
 - division of booty and, 126
 - piratical checks and balances and role of, 117–121
 - punishment administered by, 127–128

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

253

- Queen Anne's Revenge* (ship), 108–111
- racial diversity, in piracy, 108–111
- Rackam, “Calico” Jack, 108–111
- Rajan, Raghuram G., 91
- ransom and parole system
- breakdown of plunder contracts and, 95–96, 100–101
 - plunder contracts and, 88–92
 - privateer's establishment of, 75–77, 84–92
- ransom bill, plunder contracts and, 88–92
- rational choice theory, anarchy and, 10
- Raymond, Irving, 29–31
- reciprocity, gift-giving and, 25–27, 73–74
- reiving system
- Anglo-Scottish conflict and, 36–38
 - laws of lawlessness and, 32
- religious practices and associations
- precolonial Africa, social distance reduction through, 27–28
 - sacrifice as cooperation mechanism, 19n4
- remittance systems in Somalia, 184
- Somalia's stateless economy and, 189–192
- repossession, plunder contracts and, 97–98
- Republic of Somalia, formation of, 174
- Revenge* (ship), 126–127
- Reynell, John, 97–98
- Rift Valley fever, cattle trading between Kenya and Somalia and, 187
- risk premium, tribute payments as, 70–74
- Roberts, Bartholomew (pirate captain), 108–111, 120–121, 125–126, 127, 144–145
- Roman Catholic Church, maledictions from, 213n4, 212–213, 219
- rules of behavior
- cost of government and enforcement of, 158–159
 - criminal constitutions and, 133–137
 - in organized crime families, 133–137
- Russia, human development indicators in, 172–173n2
- sailors on merchant ships
- captain predation and, 114–116
 - opportunism and, 111–114
- sassywood practitioners, superstition-based mechanisms of self-governance and, 220n20, 219–220, 220n21, 221n25, 223n26, 223–224n27
- school enrollment in Somalia, 179–186
- Scott, Sir Walter, 36
- self-dealing behavior, La Nuestra Familia
- prevention of, 138–143
- self-enforcing exchange, social distance and, 15–31
- self-governance
- Anglo-Scottish inter-group anarchy and, 33–36
 - big G anarchy and, 165–169
 - bilateral- and multilateral punishment strategies, 15–18
 - in criminal societies, 132–151
 - future thoughts on, 211–225
 - ideal government as alternative to, 155–156
 - laws of lawlessness and, 32–53
 - legitimacy of, 7–8n1
 - medieval international trade and, 30–31
 - piracy and, 105–131
 - in primitive societies, 161–165
 - solutions and mechanisms in, 2–11
- self-help empowerment
- Anglo-Scottish border justice and, 42–43
 - privateering as example of, 79–84
- separation of powers, piracy and, 117–121
- service industry, growth in Somalia of, 189
- “shadow of the state” concept, international arbitration and, 168n14
- shared manners, medieval international trade
- social distance reduction and, 30
- Sheerness* (ship), 87–88
- ship organization, pirate ships, 116–117
- Sicilian Mafiosi, constitutional code of, 132–133
- Sierra Leone, anarchy and development in, 204–210
- signaling
- medieval international trade and social distance reduction, 29–31
 - precolonial Africa example of social distance reduction, 25–29
 - social distance and theory of, 18–25
 - social distance-reducing practices, 25–31
 - tribute payments as, 73–74
- slavery
- compensation using, 73n26
 - credit policies precolonial Africa and, 68–70
 - in precolonial Africa, trade relations and, 60–61
- small *H-L* anarchy
- benefits of government and, 159–161
 - characteristics of, 161–165
 - efficiency in, 161n6

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

254

Index

- Smith, Adam, 57
- Snelgrave, William, 105–108, 117–121
- social costs of plunder, 75–77
 - defensive investments and, 86n14
 - efficient plunder and reduction of, 77–79
 - maximization of, 98–100
 - plunder contracts and, 101–102
 - ransom and parole system in privateering and, 84–92
- social distance
 - bilateral and multilateral punishment mechanisms and, 15–18
 - medieval international trade and reduction of, 29–31
 - precolonial Africa example of reduction in, 25–29
 - relationship to authority and, 25–27
 - self-enforcing exchange and, 15–31
 - signaling and reduction of, 25–31
 - signaling in theory with, 18–25
 - tribute payments and reduction of, 73–74
- social diversity
 - big *G* anarchy and, 165–169
 - self-governance mechanisms and, 15–18
- social insurance, pirate constitutions and creation of, 127
- social interaction, absence of government and, 2
- socialism, in less-developed countries, 202–204
- social order
 - criminal societies' production of, 132–133
 - La Nuestra Familia constitution and imposition of, 138–143
 - path dependence and, 156
 - reiving system as threat to, 38
 - in Somali stateless economy, 192–196
- social wealth
 - benefits of government and, 159–161
 - big *G* anarchy and, 165–169
 - costs of governance and, 158–159
- social welfare, anarchy's implications for, 171
- Socio-Economic Survey in Somalia*, 179–186
- Somalia
 - anarchy in, 171–173, 178–186, 204–210
 - civil war in, 178–186
 - comparisons with sub-Saharan countries, 204–210
 - economic advances in, 186–192
 - human development improvements in, 179–186
 - postcolonial governance in, 174–177
 - predatory government in, 202–204
 - public goods and statelessness in, 192–196
 - sources of progress in, 186–196
- Somaliland region
 - establishment of, 178n5
 - human development in, 184–186
- Somali National Movement, 176–177
- Somali Patriotic Movement, 176–177
- Soviet Union, influence in Somalia of, 174
- Spain, separation of powers in, 118–119
- specialization, precolonial African trade relations and, 60–61
- Spolaore, Enrico, 223–224n27
- Spotswood, Alexander, 123–124n33
- Spotswood, William, 108n5
- state courts, plunder contracts and, 96–97
- statelessness
 - in developing world, 170–173
 - economic advances in Somalia under, 186–192
 - governance as alternative to, 168–169
 - history of, 155–156
 - small *H-L* anarchy and, 161–165
 - in Somalia, 171–173
 - Somalia as example of, 171–173
 - Somali improvements in human development and, 179–186
- state-owned enterprises, corruption in Somalia of, 176
- stationarity of producers, threat of violent theft and role of, 62–63
- Stiles, George, 81
- St. Lawrence* (ship), 99–100
- Stocc, Sir W. (Justice), 84
- stock inventory
 - credit policies and producer-middleman relations and, 68–70
 - tribute as risk premium and, 70–74
- Sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia's stateless economy compared with, 204–210
- supercargo, merchant shipping and, 113n20
- superstition-based mechanisms of self-governance
 - fallacies concerning, 211–212
 - history of, 212–219
 - sassywood practitioners and, 219–224
- supranational organizations, 9
 - big *G* anarchy and, 165–169
 - privateering and absence of, 79–84

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-02580-6 - Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think

Peter T. Leeson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

255

- Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC),
 - 179, 194–196
 - ouster of, 171–173
- “Supreme Power Structure of La Nuestra Familia,” 137–143
- Swanson, Carl, 97
- symmetric information
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
 - efficient plunder and, 77–79
- taboos, precolonial Africa property practices,
 - social distance reduction through, 27
- taxation
 - in Somalia, 184–186
 - Somalia’s stateless economy and, 192–196
 - tribute payments as, 71–72
- Taylor, John, 130–131
- Teach, Edward (Blackbeard), 108–111
- telecommunications industry, growth in
 - Somalia of, 189
- “ten commandments” (Mafia’s core laws), 132–133
- territory, Weberian concept of government
 - and, 5–7
- thick markets, benefits of government and, 159–161
- thin markets
 - benefits of government and, 159–161
 - in primitive societies, 161–165
- third party government, characteristics of, 5–7
- Tiv society, 155–156
- total anarchy, ideal government and, 156–157n4
- Total Oil Company, 189–192
- trade relations
 - benefits of government and size of trading
 - population, 159–161
 - big *G* anarchy and, 165–169
 - credit policies and, 66–70
 - nationalization in Somalia of, 176
 - in precolonial Africa, producer-middlemen
 - partnerships, 60–61
 - in primitive societies, 161–165
 - threat of violent theft in precolonial Africa
 - and, 62–66
 - tribute as risk premium in, 70–74
- transaction costs
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
 - efficient plunder and reduction of, 77–79
 - plunder contracts, 88–92
 - ransom and parole system of privateering
 - and, 84–92
- transaction costs, of plunder, 75–77
- Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
 - (Somalia), 179
 - establishment of, 194–196
 - international backing of, 171–173
 - Somalia’s stateless economy and, 189–192
- Transitional National Government (TNG),
 - establishment of, 194–196
- transportation services
 - growth in Somalia of, 189
 - private provision in Somalia of, 193–194
- Treaty of Norham, 33–36
- trench warfare, self-governance in, 33
- tribal organization
 - colonialism and, 162n8
 - small *H-L* anarchy and, 161–165
- tribute payments
 - as compensation, 71n21, 73n25
 - as risk premiums, 70–74
 - thievable goods as, 73n26
- Ulor* (ship), 101
- unanimous consent, government and role of, 5–7
- Union of the Crowns
 - Anglo-Scottish conflict, 51–53
 - sovereignty issues under, 36n6
- United Nations, 165–169
- United Nations Development Program
 - (UNDP), Somali improvements in
 - human development statistics, 179–186
- United Somali Congress, 176–177
- United States
 - organized crime families in, 133–137
 - separation of powers in, 118–119
- UNOSOM, intervention in Somalia by, 184–186
- Vane, Charles, 119
- vessel design, defenses against privateering
 - and, 86–87
- “Victory Pioneers” in Somalia, 174–175
- violence
 - piracy and use of, 116–117
 - self-governance and negotiations regarding, 57–60
 - in Somalia, 178–179

- violent theft
 - precolonial African trade relations and threat of, 62–63
 - self-governance and, 57–60
 - threat analysis of, 63–66
- vowers, Anglo-Scottish border trials and, 45–46n26
- wardens
 - Anglo-Scottish inter-group anarchy and role of, 33–36
 - corruption of, 50–52
 - days of truce imposed by, 43–46
- warlords, in Somalia, 178–186
- War of 1812
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 100–101
 - plunder contracts during, 92, 98
- War of Scottish Independence, 33–36
- War of Spanish Succession, breakdown of plunder contracts during, 93–102
- War of the Grand Alliance, plunder contracts and, 98
- wartime, privateering and maritime plunder during, 79–84
- water services, private provision in Somalia of, 193–194
- weapons
 - breakdown of plunder contracts and, 93–102
 - defenses against privateering using, 86–87
 - pirate constitutions regarding management of, 126–127
 - threat of violent theft and role of, 60n8, 62–63
- Weber, Max, characterization of government by, 5–7, 7–8n1
- welfare-maximization
 - anarchy in less-developed countries and, 204–210
 - ideal government and, 156n3, 157–158
 - Somalia’s stateless economy and, 192–196
- wergild*, *Leges Marchiarum* law and, 38–42
- White, Thomas, 130–131
- WHO Somalia Annual Report*, 179–186
- Wife of Sable d’Ollone* (ship), 88–92
- witchcraft, sassywood practices and verification of, 221n25
- World Bank, human development in Somalia statistics from, 179–186
- World Court, 165–169
- World Health Organization (WHO), human development in Somalia statistics and, 179–186
- World Security Network, 171–173
- World War I, self-governance in trench warfare during, 33
- worst-case anarchy, plunder contracts and, 101–102
- xeer* (Somali customary law), 192–196
- Yakuza (Japanese organized crime), 133–134n3
- Yankee* (ship), 88
- Zingales, Luigi, 91